De Revelatione. Vol. II. Garrigou-Lagrenge (english)

 

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 

On the Value of the Motives of Credibility 

That Are Internal to Us {{2}} SINGLE ARTICLE 

§1. The internal motives of credibility are not utilized correctly by the partisans of the method of immanence. 

§2. Individual internal motives per se can ordinarily convey probability, though not certitude, concerning the credibility of the mysteries of faith. 

§3. Universal internal motives, when taken together, can supply a kind of moral certitude concerning the fact of revelation, and taken together, along with the correlative external motives that are intrinsic to religion, they constitute an irrefutable argument on behalf of the credibility of revelation. 

§1. The Internal Motives of Credibility Are Not Utilized Correctly by the Partisans of the Method of Immanence 

As is discussed in the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis, 2 these new apologetes have too much affinity with the semisupernaturalism of liberal Protestants and of modernists, both of whom ultimately tend toward naturalism itself. 

A. CERTAIN RATIONALISTS also make use of internal motives in order to show that Christian ethics corresponds to our aspirations. However, they do not admit the supernatural origin of Christianity. Nay, like Kant and Hegel, they reject all supernatural dogmas or interpret them as being symbols of natural truths. B. LIBERAL PROTESTANTS AND MODERNISTS, in almost the same way, make use of internal motives drawn from our aspirations to religion. Thus, they show that the perfect fulfilment of these aspirations is found only in Christianity. However, this does not provide a foundation for proving that Christianity is revealed by God and, hence, is infallibly true and immutable in all of its dogmas and precepts. Nay, the modernists believe that Christianity is only a superior form of religious evolution and, hence, essentially changeable. And thus, they say that Catholicism, a religion founded upon authority, must give way to liberal Christianity (that is, religion of the spirit), wherein dogmas are only symbols that express the evolution of man’s religious sentiment.3 Modernists do indeed make use of historical methodology, but they only thereby look to show that there is “something unknown hidden” in the history of the Church’s miraculous life, akin to the natural mystery of evolution (for, already, this mystery is found in the appearance of plant life, sense life, and intellectual life, so a fortiori, it is found in the evolution of the religious sentiment). However, they do not thereby look to prove the supernatural origin of Catholicism.4 {{3}} C. THE PARTISANS OF THE METHOD OF IMMANENCE WHO ARE NUMBERED AMONG CATHOLICS (e.g., Blondel and Laberthonnière) do indeed hold, by faith, that Catholicism is a religion supernaturally revealed by God; however, in their apologetics, they make particular use of the method of immanence and assert that it holds primacy. 5 Indeed, they argue, in particular, from the desire (or need) for religion, intending to show that this desire is fulfilled only in Christianity—nay, only in Catholicism. This gives rise to the practical necessity to embrace Catholicism in order to live uprightly. Blondel argues as follows. Man wishes to be fully alive. Now, in the Catholic religion, and indeed in it alone, man finds the full development [evolutionem] of his life. Therefore, man needs the Catholic religion, which hence, is true, indeed, the only true religion. These new apologetes intend to lead men to the true religion through an analysis of what is naturally postulated by human action, and they strive to show that in the very nature of such action there is something that calls for the supernatural order. 6 They do not completely reject the value of miracles. However, on account of their agnostic prejudices, they do not hold that miracles have an ontological value but, rather, solely have a symbolic value. That is, they hold that miracles are not some kind of abrogation of the intrinsic laws of nature but, rather, are conceived by us as being such an abrogation (for[, according to them,] the laws of nature are not intrinsically fixed, as they are, however, in our static conception of them). Therefore, miracles cannot be known as something brought about through God’s special intervention as an utterly certain sign of the divine origin of our religion. Rather, they are only extraordinary sensible symbols compelling the attention of a nonbeliever so that he might consider the Catholic religion itself and, especially, its conformity with our nature’s aspirations and exigencies. In this way, they still do preserve the primacy of the methodology of immanence, for, according to them, this method enjoys not only temporal priority, inasmuch as it disposes the person who does not yet believe to an examination of religion, but even hold that this methodology has a priority of value inasmuch as, without it, other motives [of credibility] (e.g., miracles) do not have probative force. 

CRITIQUE. In the first volume of this work (Prolegomena: On the Methodology of Apologetics), we set forth what contemporary theologians teach against this methodology. Now, however, three things need to be said in particular. 

(1) This new methodology of immanence gravely diminishes or destroys the probative force of miracles on account of its agnostic prejudices.7 This is so because it proceeds from (at least partial) agnosticism in relation to speculative reason, and it is not philosophically clear how it can arrive at true certitude concerning extramental reality. 8 

{{4}} (2) It exaggerates our natural desire for supernatural life, and this contains the danger of falling into Baianism and Immanentism. Hence, the encyclical Pascendi says: And here We cannot but deplore once more, and grievously, that there are Catholics who, while rejecting immanence as a doctrine, employ it as a method of apologetics, and who do this so imprudently that they seem to admit that there is in human nature a true and rigorous necessity with regard to the supernatural order—and not merely a capacity and a suitability for the supernatural order, such as has at all times been emphasized by Catholic apologists.9 

(3) This methodology does not prove the credibility or [seu] divine origin of Christianity and, hence, slides toward fideism. Indeed, in a way, it does manifest the fact that Christianity is a beautiful and enticing religion, one that is worthy of religious experience—nay, something morally necessary today in order to live aright. However, this does not prove that the Catholic religion is to be irrevocably embraced with utter firm certitude through divine faith as regards all of its dogmas and precepts, nor does it rule out the possibility that perhaps someday in the future a religion that is more perfect than Christianity might emerge. This proof remains inefficacious for two reasons: on account of its agnostic prejudices and because it nearly exclusively makes use of internal motives. 

Nor does it sufficiently preserve the Catholic notion of credibility because, according to this form of apologetics, divine faith is more or less the same as religious experience, which is found in all forms of religion. Nonetheless, in various places, Blondel proposes various good ad hominem arguments 10—that is, those that can dispose an agnostic person to look into the true religion and its notes.11 Hence, when proposing the faith to agnostics, this methodology can be proposed as having temporal priority, though this does not mean that it has, without any qualification, priority of value for proving credibility. 

§2. Individual Internal Motives Per Se can Ordinarily Convey Probability, Though Not Certitude, concerning the Credibility of the Mysteries of Faith 

Individual internal motives are drawn from the marvelous way that our loftiest aspirations are fulfilled, something that someone can experience in himself while reading the Gospel or while listening to the preaching {{5}} of the faith. Thus, the disciples on the road to Emmaus said: “Was not our heart burning within us, whilst he spoke in this way and opened to us the scriptures?” (Luke 24:32, DR). These motives do provide probability, though per se and ordinarily they do not provide certitude. Indeed, the credibility of the mysteries of faith is made manifest inasmuch as these mysteries appear to our reason as having been revealed by God. Now, individual internal motives can manifest in a probable manner (though not certainly, at least ordinarily) that a given religion has been revealed by God. Therefore [, these motives cannot manifest the certain credibility of the mysteries of faith.] The major premise holds on the basis of what we said in our preceding thesis concerning the notion and necessity of credibility. The minor, however, must be proven part by part. 

(a) These motives convey probability. Indeed, while reading the Gospel or hearing preaching of the faith, the man who does not yet believe sometimes experiences within himself so great a feeling of peace that, to his eyes, this state of soul seems to arise from God himself, under the influence of actual grace: “Peace I leave with you: my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, do I give unto you” (John 14:27, DR). Thus, he enjoys within himself this interior peace that the world cannot give, a peace surpassing the powers of our nature. Hence, in some way, it is made manifest that the Gospel’s teaching is something that has been revealed by God, not precisely because it is conformed to our natural aspirations (for then it would only be naturally excellent) but, rather, because it is so profoundly conformed to our loftier aspirations, and, likewise, so freely given, that it seems to come from God alone, inasmuch as only God can profoundly know and stir the human heart, inasmuch as he alone can intimately join together these extremes— namely, the loftiest conformity with our nature and the greatest gratuity.

Many have been able to experience this upon hearing what Jesus said in the Sermon on the Mount, before any miracles happen to be performed. Hence, it is said in Matthew 7:28 (DR): “And it came to pass when Jesus had fully ended these words, the people were in admiration at his doctrine.” Hence, St. Thomas says in Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 1: “If Christ had not performed visible miracles, there still would have been other methods for drawing men to faith, by which men would have been bound to submit thereto. Indeed, men were bound to believe upon the authority of the Law and the Prophets and, likewise, were required not to resist God’s interior call within them.” 

In righteous believers, this experiential knowledge confirms faith and proceeds from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which presuppose faith and charity. This is expressed in the words of Psalm 33:9 (DR), “O taste, and see that the Lord is sweet,” and in those of St. Paul in Romans 8:16 (DR): “For the Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God.”12 Something similar takes place (even if it is less certain) through “an interior instinct come from God drawing one”13 in those who approach faith under the influence of actual grace. 

{{6}} Thus, these internal motives in some way manifest the credibility of the mysteries of the faith. Indeed, they frequently provide great aid to the consideration of external motives when they are at work together. 

(b) However, per se and ordinarily, they do not suffice for proving credibility, for by them one only knows in a conjectural manner through internal experience that this internal effect of peace and joy is supernatural and not natural, for a kind of interior peace and fulfillment of our natural aspirations could be found in Christianity if it happened to be only an excellent form of religious evolution (that is, a form of merely natural religion). Indeed, peace is found in non-divine forms of religion, as in Protestantism14 and Buddhism. 

Hence, in the annotations to the pre-conciliar schema for the [First] Vatican Council, we read, against liberal Protestants, who make use of internal motives in a nearly exclusive manner: That sentiment according to ordinary providence is not subject to experience having a supernatural formal character, and if it is separated from extrinsic criteria, it is open to the gravest of illusions. 

Whence, we even see that, on behalf of false religion and manifest errors, men call upon “an experience and internal sentiment,” which they attribute to the Holy Spirit. Equally consistent with this confidence in “internal sentiment” and with a rejection of the motives of credibility is another error spread among many today, by which they dare to affirm that it is sometimes divinely ordained that one defect from the Catholic religion to another religion, if it is discovered that it does not satisfy internal experience and religious sentiment.15 

Likewise, in ST I-II, q. 112, a. 5, St. Thomas shows that without special revelation man cannot determine with certitude whether he is in a state of grace, in accord with the word in 1 Corinthians 4:3–4 (DR): “Neither do I judge my own self . . . but he that judgeth me is the Lord.” “But,” adds St. Thomas, “in a conjectural manner, through signs, someone can judge that he is in the state of grace, namely, inasmuch as he perceives that he delights in God and scorns things of the world, and inasmuch as a man is not aware of being guilty of any mortal sin.”16 

{{7}} Thus, per se, this individual fulfillment of our heart’s aspirations is not a sufficient motive of credibility, for three things are required in order for a given fact to be a sufficient motive of credibility: (1) that it be intrinsically certain; (2) that it certainly be brought about through a special intervention by God; and (3) that its meaning be certain for confirming revelation.17 

Individual internal motives, without others, per accidens and extraordinarily suffice. In such a case, an extraordinary grace supplies for external motives, as in the case of a prophet accepting revelation immediately from God under the light of prophecy and, likewise, in the case of private revelations or in certain miraculous conversions, like that of St. Paul.18 

Hence, in Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1, St. Thomas says: “Among those works which Christ performed while among men, we must also include His inner calling, by which He attracted certain men. Thus, Gregory says, in a given homily, that Christ interiorly drew Mary Magdalene through mercy, having also externally received her through His mercy.” Likewise, in Matthew 9:9 (DR), we read: “And when Jesus passed on from thence, he saw a man sitting in the custom house, named Matthew; and he saith to him: Follow me. And he arose up and followed him.” And in Acts 16:14: “The Lord opened Lydia’s heart to attend to those things which were said by Paul.” 

These individual internal motives have such a value only for particular men who have such experiences within themselves. 

§3. Universal Internal Motives, When Taken Together, Can Supply a Kind of Moral Certitude concerning the Fact of Revelation 

Nay, taken together, along with the correlative external motives that are intrinsic to religion, they constitute an irrefutable argument on behalf of the credibility of revelation. 

These universal internal motives are taken from the marvelous fulfillment of all of the moral and religious aspirations of humanity. They are called universal inasmuch as these aspirations are found in all men, at least in a vague manner and inasmuch as this miraculous [mirabilis] fulfillment agrees not only with one’s individual experience but with the general experience of society renewed through Christianity. Moreover, the fulfillment in question is not any sort of fulfillment whatsoever but, rather, one that is extraordinary and miraculous [mirabili]. 

External motives drawn from the sublimity of the Church’s teaching and from her marvelous religious life correspond to these internal, universal motives. 

A. Taken together, these universal internal motives offer, per se, moral certitude concerning the fact of revelation. 

{{8}} Indeed, if all of our nature’s legitimate aspirations, even its loftier ones, are marvelously satisfied—nay, surpassed—in some given religion, this is a sign of this religion’s divine origin, for solely by their natural powers, men would not be able to discover so great a conformity and interior peace, as is especially clear from what we said above concerning the moral necessity of the revelation of the sum of the natural truths of religion. Indeed, as we there said, men morally cannot readily arrive at firm, error-free knowledge concerning all the truths of natural religion. Therefore, if in some religion all the essential questions concerning God and the soul are harmoniously resolved, and all the aspirations of our nature marvelously satisfied and surpassed, it is morally certain that this religion is from God, especially if some legitimate aspiration is offended in other religions and philosophical systems, or at least if not all of them are satisfied in them. 

In this way, one can have a kind of moral certitude concerning credibility, indeed, one that excludes, for the wise, every prudent doubt. Note, though, that I say, “for the wise,” for not all can judge in a distinct manner concerning the value of this kind of motive. (Regarding the notion of moral certitude, see what we will say below in ch. 19, a. 3 concerning the discernibility of miracles). Moreover, in order for this argument to offer this kind of moral certitude regarding the fact of revelation, three things are required: 

(1) Against the agnostics, it is necessary that one presuppose the ontological value of the first principles of reason, especially the principles of causality and of finality. Nay, one must even presuppose natural certitude concerning the existence of God, a certitude that belongs to common sense and is defended by philosophical reasoning. 

(2) One must argue not only from how the proposed religion is conformed to our aspirations and needs but also from how great and marvelous a conformity it has, so that it would seem to come solely from God—namely, inasmuch as this marvelous conformity and fulfilment exceeds our natural powers and exigencies, constituting a kind of moral quasi-miracle, as we said above. Hence, “marvelous” or “miraculous” [mirabile] is here not said merely oratorically but, rather, with a theological meaning, for it contains a probative middle term. 

(3) Finally, one must argue from all these aspirations taken together, negatively and positively considered. In this way, it will be clear that only God can so profoundly know and satisfy men’s hearts. 

However, these aspirations are “the seeds of the natural virtues” in us concerning the ultimate end and the means [leading thereto]. That is, concerning the end, they are our aspirations to know God, to hope in him, to love him above all things, and to offer him internal and external worship. Likewise, concerning the means, they are inclinations to prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. However, we must insist in particular upon both the desire for eternal beatitude and the conditional and inefficacious desire to see God through his essence, which we spoke about in the previous volume, where we treated the topic of man’s obediential potency (see vol. 1, ch. 12, §4). 

Therefore, if all of these aspirations, without suffering any injury, are miraculously fulfilled—nay, surpassed—in some religion (as we will show below to be the case for Christianity when we consider the Christian virtues and the beatitudes set forth in the Gospel), this will be a sign of the divine origin of this religion. 

{{9}} Preachers of the faith develop this argument in depth, inasmuch as in Christianity knowledge of God through faith arrives at the intimate secrets of the Heavenly Father and promises an eternal beatitude that consists in the immediate vision of God. Hope is given the greatest of reinforcements through the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption. Charity for God arrives at a holy and familiar friendship, especially in Eucharistic Communion. (What could be more conformed to our human aspirations than Holy Communion and, nonetheless, what is more freely given and not owed to us? Only God can thus join together this intimate conformity with the greatest of gratuity.) Likewise, in Christianity, charity for one’s neighbors is extended even to the point that one sacrifices one’s own life for the sake of others’ souls, in the apostolate of missionaries and in other works of mercy. Internal and external worship are marvelously united in the sacrifice of the Mass. Christian prudence is neither carnal nor worldly but, rather, heavenly. Justice toward one’s neighbors comes to be elevated through its connection to charity; courage pushes on to the heroism of martyrdom; temperance arrives at virginity; and humility is commended as a fundamental virtue, though it was overlooked by the pagans. Hence, Fr. Lacordaire argued from the three privileges of Christianity— namely, from charity, humility, and virginity. By contrast, allow faith and the Christian life to die away in a given region and nearly all at once vices, discord, and pride will appear once again.19 

These supernatural effects are indeed not subject to common experience as having the formal character of being supernaturally produced by God. However, their supernaturality indirectly shines forth from man’s inability (at least morally speaking) to arrive at such a teaching and form of life. 

Likewise, solely by the powers of nature, men cannot arrive at the peace experienced by the saints—namely, that which is found in their lives. Indeed, this peace differs essentially from the world’s peace in at least two ways, as St. Thomas says: “First, as regards the end, for the world’s peace is ordered to undisturbed enjoyment of temporal things, whereas the peace had by the saints is ordered to eternal goods (and is not diminished in an essential way through privation of temporal things). {{10}} However, secondly, they differ as imitation-likeness and truth, for the world’s peace is a mere imitation of peace because it is only external in nature, whereas Christ’s peace is true because it is both internal and external.”20 Now, this true internal peace proceeds from the fact that we efficaciously love God above all things with all our heart and love our neighbor as ourselves.21 However, efficacious love cannot exist in us without God’s aid, inasmuch as the order of agents must correspond to the order of ends.22 As St. Thomas says, “Only God can remove all disturbance from our hearts.” Whence, it is said, “May the peace of God, which surpasseth all understanding, keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.”23 As St. Paul says in this same text, “Rejoice in the Lord always: again, I say, rejoice. . . . The Lord is nigh. Be nothing solicitous: but in everything, by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your petitions be made known to God.” Likewise, one should consult biblical concordances at the entries for “desire,” “blessed,” “joy,” “happiness,” and “alleluia.” Indeed, in these words within Sacred Scripture and in the writings of the classical doctors, we find what is expressed in modern apologetics by the words “aspiration” and “fulfillment.” On all of this, see bk. 2, ch. 7 below. B. Taken together, all of these internal motives offer moral certitude [of credibility], but they cannot be separated from the correlative external motives that are intrinsic to religion.24 As we will show in the next chapter, together with them, they constitute an irrefutable argument.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 

On the Value of External Motives That Are Intrinsic to Religion 

SINGLE ARTICLE 

§1. The Church’s teaching concerning the value of these motives 

§2. A defense by reason that these motives, when taken all together, constitute an irresistible argument 

§3. Concerning how these motives are related to the other motives, as well as concerning the unity of the whole of apologetics 

§1. The Church’s Teaching concerning the Value of These Motives 

{{11}} As we said above, these motives are called “external” inasmuch as they exist outside of man’s awareness, thus being opposed to our nature’s internal aspirations to something divine. However, they are said to be “intrinsic” to religion inasmuch as they are drawn from the latter’s excellence, purity, sanctity, and fruitfulness in everything that is good. For this reason, they are contrasted with extrinsic-external motives (e.g., miracles and prophecies), which are extrinsic signs in confirmation of the divine origin of religion. 

And the [First] Vatican Council defines: “In fact, it is to the Catholic Church alone that belong all those signs that are so numerous and wonderfully arranged by God to make evident the credibility of the Christian faith.” And immediately thereafter, it adds, with regard to external motives that are intrinsic to religion: In fact, the Church by herself, with her marvelous propagation, eminent, holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything that is good, with her catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony of her divine mission. Thus, like a standard lifted up among the nations (Isa 11:12), she invites to herself those who do not yet believe and at the same time gives greater assurance to her children that the faith that they profess rests on solid ground.1 

In this declaration, the miraculous life of the Church is presented as being an irrefutable sign of her divine mission—that is, as a moral miracle, which clearly can be produced only by God. Nor is it proposed merely as being an extrinsic seal from God but, rather, as a manifestation of the divine life itself through certain visible notes. 

Some say this represents a form of immoderate optimism in apologetics. {{12}} Response: It is the optimism of the Holy Church founded on countless signs of the divine goodness and persevering in the midst of the miseries, failures, doubts, and errors of this life. However, the apologete is the minister of the Ecclesia docens of God, and she teaches not only the mysteries of faith but also the rational pathway to faith. Now, in order for the excellence of this marvelous life to be made clear, the Council considered the issue in relation to its four causes and its effects: (1) in relation to its efficient cause (“with her marvelous propagation” —the note of apostolicity [sic]); (2) in relation to its final cause (“eminent holiness”), as well as in relation to the effects that manifest the end (“and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything that is good”); (3) in relation to the material and formal cause together (“with her catholic unity”); (4) adding also “invincible stability” as a sign of the perfection of the whole work, which has such a miraculous and eminent appearance, exceeding natural powers, hence being “a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony of her divine mission.” The value of this motive is explained at greater length in the Annotations to the PreConciliar Schema: Although less-educated believers do not know all of the motives of credibility distinctly nor are able to explain them to themselves, they nonetheless know, in a way that is accommodated to their own abilities, that the Church is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic, and in this they forever have before their eyes an unchanging, fully sufficient, and certain motive of credibility, or, rather, complex of motives, so that they would not now, as it were, “hastily believe with fickle hearts,” but rather would rely upon the firmest of foundations for full certitude of credibility, always prepared, in a way appropriate to each of their conditions, to give an answer, truly through the Church and in the Church, whenever anyone asks about the reasons in support of what they hold in hope. For indeed, just as in the case of given natural truths, prior to having a scientific demonstration, all of mankind has full certitude concerning the providential dispositions of God in the natural order, even though this can indeed be more fully and distinctly explained in its foundations by philosophical inquiry, without this [certitude] being shaken by reasons that are brought forth [against it], so too the divine goodness and wisdom in the order of supernatural providence disposes the Catholic Church to be eminent in those given characteristics, so that in them, prior to scientific inquiries—which are quite inappropriate for the great host of men—uneducated persons already have an easily knowable compendium of the motives of credibility needed for full certitude, even though these motives can indeed be confirmed by apologetic disciplines by means of a more distinct and fuller explanation, though the prudent man cannot be led into doubt by reasons opposed to them, thereby being led to waver in his certitude concerning this matter. 2 

Also see what we will say below in ch. 19, a. 3 concerning the moral certitude involved in the discernibility of miracles. 

§2. A Defense by Reason That These Motives, When Taken All Together, Constitute an Irresistible Argument 

These motives can be considered in two ways: (A) negatively and (B) positively. 

A. NEGATIVELY CONSIDERED, they are immunity from manifest error, contradiction, deceit, and immorality. Taken together in this way, they demonstrate that nothing could stand in the way of the proposed religion being revealed, though they do not thereby prove its divine origin but, rather, encourage the presumption that such an origin indeed exists. Immunity from manifest error involves the lack of evident opposition to natural truths that are already known with certitude. Revealed truths can indeed be above reason, but they cannot be contrary to it, even though they frequently stand in opposition to philosophical systems that have not, in fact, demonstrated their conclusions, such as pantheistic evolutionism. Immunity from all contradiction is had from the coherence of the truths that are proposed as being revealed. {{13}} Immunity from deceit pertains above all to the mode of proposing religion, and immunity from immorality to the effects of this religion. If all such negative notes are present, one will already be stirred to some presumption concerning the divine origin of the religion thus proposed, for as we proved earlier (in our thesis concerning the moral necessity of the revelation of the natural truths of religion3 ), it hardly could be possible that man, without some special divine aid, would teach speculative and practical religious truths without any admixture with error. This argument is confirmed through a consideration of other religions, wherein we can find obvious errors, deceit, and immorality. (In St. Thomas’s works, see SCG I, ch. 6, where he compares Islam with the excellence and purity of Christianity.) 

B. POSITIVELY CONSIDERED, the external motives intrinsic to religion are taken (1) from the sublimity of the doctrine proposed; (2) from the holiness of the religion’s founder, its apostles, and its martyrs; (3) from its astonishing propagation; (4) from its fruitfulness in all that is good; (5) from its catholic unity; and (6) from its unconquered stability. Taken all together, these notes constitute an irresistible argument for the divine origin of this religion. Why? Because, as we must show, they cannot exist without a special intervention by God. 4 Therefore, we need to argue from what is marvelous in God’s principal work and from its harmony, in accord with what is said in Psalm 67:36: “Marvelous is God in his saints.” Let us begin by defining what harmony and sublimity are. 

Harmony is the perfection of order. However, as Aristotle shows,5 order is a disposition by way of priority and posteriority in relation to some principle. This is found analogically in magnitude, numbers, motions, knowledge, love, action, and in the hierarchy of beings. Hence, according to this definition, an order is more perfect to the degree that more things are disposed in a more united fashion in relation to some principle. Therefore, this perfection of order (or harmony) is all the greater to the degree that a more profound unity is found in a greater diversity, as in the universe, all of whose parts are ordered to each other and to God.6 Now, harmony is required for beauty, which, according to St. Thomas,7 includes three things: integrity (as regards the multitude involved, at least, of power [saltem virtutis]), due proportion (as regards the unity of order), and clarity or splendor (as regards the manifestation of order in a number of parts or attributes). As regards human life, already in the natural life, beauty is an order of reason that per se and essentially is found in contemplation of the truth, though participatively in the moral virtues.8 

On the nature of what is truly sublime. It seems that this term comes from the expression sub limine caeli [up unto the threshold of heaven], in order to designate that which is most loftily situated in the air. {{14}} And even if men abuse this word quite often, they say that, properly speaking, “sublime” signifies something that belongs to the loftiest and most extraordinary place in the order of beauty, especially that of intellectual and moral beauty. Now, from the aforementioned definitions of order, beauty, and harmony, we can say that sublimity appears most especially in the loftiest and most intimate union of various things that are most distant from each other (e.g., of the loftiest and the lowliest). On account of this distance, such a union, which at first glance seems to be impossible, is utterly marvelous and arouses tears of admiration. Such is the case for the way that the supreme mercy is inclined toward [lifting us out of ] our misery, or the union of infinite justice with immense mercy. This is also true for the intimate reconciliation of the greatest strength and perfect sweetness found in martyrdom. By contrast, the discord found in the delusions of false mysticism rouse one to laughter. Thus defined, the sublime, in the order of intellectual and moral beauty, is in a way akin to what a miracle is in the sensible order— namely, something extraordinary. Thus, as we will discuss below, just as a miracle is above (and not opposed to) nature, so too the sublime is above the customary order of things intellectual and moral and not opposed thereto.9 

Modernists wish to see in this marvelous life of the Church only “something unknown”10 that has not yet been historically and psychologically explained (namely, the natural mystery of religious evolution). By contrast, what we must show here is that something supernatural is indeed found in this marvelous life. This sublimity at the basis of our argument is indicated by St. Paul in Ephesians 3:18–19 (DR) when he says: “You may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, to know also the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge: that you may be filled unto all the fulness of God.” As is commonly held,11 breadth is extension to all the parts of the universe, length to all times past and future, height to the loftiest mysteries of God, and depth to the worst evil or to obstinacy to be punished, so that “all things cooperate in the good,” to the salvation of souls and the glory of God. 

The value of these various motives must be considered part by part, not merely in a rhetorical manner but indeed philosophically and theologically. 

(1) Purity and sublimity of doctrine. The divine origin of a given teaching can be at least morally certain, on the basis of a threefold consideration of this doctrine: (a) considered in itself, (b) with regard to the way that it is proposed, and (c) with regard to the way it has been constituted. 

(a) THE DOCTRINE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF. One sign of the divine origin of a religion is found in the doctrine that it proposes in the name of God, marvelously uniting what is greatest and what is least, supernatural things and natural things, the riches of the divine mercy and the misery of mankind, preserving the rights of justice, which are proposed to all men of all nations and times, gathering together what is oldest and most new so that even though the mysteries thus handed on may be obscure, they appear as being most excellently connected together with each other as well as with man’s ultimate end. Thus, the Catholic liturgy [of the Roman rite] says, “God gives peace, reconciling in Himself the lowliest with the loftiest.” 

{{15}} However, this is made manifest specifically [in particulari]: 

(1) As regards natural truths, inasmuch as this doctrine exceeds, by far, all the systems of philosophers and other religions, proposing nothing that reason would show to be false, and perfectly teaches all things that pertain to natural religion concerning God’s existence, nature, attributes, providence, and creation, as well as concerning man’s origin, nature, and end, along with those truths concerning moral precepts and counsels, so that it fully suffices for rightly establishing a way of life for man and indeed perfectly responds to all of man’s legitimate aspirations.12 

(2) As regards mysteries as supernatural things proposed. The divine origin of a religion is thus manifested inasmuch as these mysteries, as well as the duties correlative to them, notwithstanding their obscurity and inaccessible loftiness, seem to be most greatly conformed to the naturally knowable attributes of God and to our nature’s aspirations, likewise calling for the mortification of the wicked inclinations of our sensuality and pride.13 

This argument is reinforced if, as Pascal said, by these mysteries it should also explain both man’s misery as well as the nobility of his desires for supreme things, likewise offering a remedy for this misery.

By contrast, false mysticism proposes the absurd delusions of exultation, or falls into sub-rational sensualism. The aforementioned doctrine is divine on account of these marvelous notes. For what human reason was not able to accomplish in so many philosophers, following upon the exertion of such great labors, manifestly surpasses, at least morally, the natural powers of man teaching this body of doctrine, or the powers of many men teaching this same doctrine firmly and without any division among themselves. At the very least, it is evident that, without supernatural assistance, it would be morally impossible to constitute this teaching as regards the sum of the natural truths of religion and to order so befittingly [such] mysteries, which are proposed as being supernatural.14 

{{16}} As Cardinal Zigliara wrote: Indeed, it is morally impossible that the man who says this on his own, that is, from the light of reason, would always and in all things pursue the truth, for sometimes he falls into error, often fluctuates between opposed opinions, and gets caught up in contradictions. However, where truth always exists, where no opposition exists in those things which are said by one person or (something even more marvelous, really) by many, who say that they speak through divine inspiration, this is a sign that the doctrine in question does not come from man but, rather, from God, especially if the preaching of it is concerned with the loftiest mysteries of God.15 Also based on the goodness of this doctrine, it is manifest that it does not come from an evil spirit, something confirmed by comparing it with superstitions that suggest the basest of things concerning God. 

Similarly, this argument is confirmed if the apostles enjoy such an abundance of wisdom that all of their adversaries are not able to resist them or contradict them. Hence, in 1 Corinthians 12:8–10 (DR), St. Paul places words of wisdom first among the various freely given graces when he says: “To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom: and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same spirit; to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another, diverse kinds of tongues; to another, interpretation of speeches.”16 

(b) DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO THE WAY IT IS PREACHED. This pertains to the “grace of words” [sermonis], which is given so that the divine truth may be readily accessible, delightful, and moving—in other words, so that it may illuminate the intellect, piously delight the affect, and efficaciously move the will to fulfill God’s commands.17 

(1) In relation to its illumination, a given harmony is marvelous if the loftiest mysteries are taught with the greatest of authority, together with simplicity and humility, in a way that is accommodated to the understanding of all men coming from various times and peoples. By contrast, philosophers often speak about the loftiest of things only in a probable manner, doing so with such abstractness that these truths can only be understood by the wise. Moreover, they often lack simplicity and humility. Similarly, neither could true illumination proceed from a false religion, which either tends toward the delusions of false mysticism or is inclined to naturalism, being unable to reconcile grace with nature. 

(2) It is also miraculous that the preaching of the faith brings holy delight by its own unction, even though it austerely proposes arduous precepts. It duly offends the evil inclinations of the sinner and nonetheless profoundly draws his heart, bringing it peace. This intimate reconciliation of the greatest unction and austerity indicates that it involves God’s special assistance. {{17}} By contrast, false religions are pleasing through a kind of false piety, do not impose difficult obligations, do not “raise the sword” against the spirit of error and evil, and do not bring true inner peace. They please men in order to achieve human acclaim and do not labor for the glory of God. If it sometimes is the case, as in that of Montanism or Jansenism, that they commend immoderate austerity, they lack unction and destroy harmony.

 (3) Finally, the extraordinary efficacy of words is clear if countless hosts of people—not only men who are simple but also the wise—in contempt of visible things, are moved efficaciously to invisible and utterly lofty things, notwithstanding the countless hindrances involved therein, indeed sometimes in the midst of the tyranny of persecutors. This sign will be even greater if this doctrine perpetually preserves its influence, while other doctrines die off. 

(c) DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO ITS ORIGIN. This argument can be perfected, and the impossibility (not only moral but also psychological) that this doctrine would be natural in origin can be made manifest, if it is historically clear that it appeared without human preparation—that is, neither being elaborated by the human genius of the person teaching it nor having been eclectically concocted from other sources. Therefore, St. Thomas says that it is loftier than a physical miracle, something “marvelous, [namely,] that simple men (like the Apostles), filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, achieved the heights of wisdom and eloquence in a mere instant.”18 Above all, this newness must be reconciled with the utterly great antiquity of the religion in question, for there can only be one divine religion for all men. 

However, this is historically verified in Christ, who said: “I have come not to do away with the law and the prophets but, rather, to fulfill them.” (See bk. 2, ch. 7 below, where we will historically set forth this motive, along with other similar ones.) This excellent manner of teaching indicates the existence of a special intervention by God, “Who makes use of human language like a kind of instrument, although He Himself is the one who perfects the activity interiorly.”19 A new sign is added if the preachers of the faith immediately “begin to speak in various tongues,” which heretofore were wholly unknown to them, as is seen in Acts 2.20 

Objection: The aforementioned argument is not scientific in character. 

Response: It does not pertain to some particular science, like physics or psychology, but, rather, to wisdom (that is, the supreme science), which is concerned with the highest causes, as Aristotle says (Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 1). In other words, in accord with St. Augustine’s terminology, it pertains to superior reason, not inferior reason. 

It will be insisted, however: If a given doctrine proposes supernatural mysteries, this itself is obscure and requires miracles in confirmation of it. Therefore, it is not a motive of credibility by itself. 

Response: A motive of credibility is present here (1) in the purity and excellence of this doctrine, inasmuch as it most perfectly hands on all the truths of natural religion, surpassing all philosophical systems and all other religions; also (2) in relation to obscure supernatural mysteries, inasmuch as this obscurity essentially differs from the obscurity found in teachings that wander about incoherently, illuminating in its own way all souls of good will and continually moving them to do good.21 

{{18}} A miraculous sign is found in the intimate union of this obscurity with the mysteries’ mutual harmony with each other, and in the reconciliation of the loftiest heights of reflection with the greatest simplicity, so that the deep things of God are thus handed on to little ones.22 And therefore, this doctrine appears obscure to us not on account of something it lacks as regards its truth and coherence but, rather, on account of its utterly great sublimity and brightness. Inasmuch as it is essentially supernatural, it is a loftier miracle than those things that are only supernatural from the perspective of the efficient causality involved in their production. Hence, it is too lofty to be intrinsically evident for us, something like a light that is far too bright surpassing the powers of our intellect, just as the light of the sun surpasses the visual power of the night owl’s eye. 

Indeed, this sublimity of doctrine is above all apparent when one is subject to the Holy Spirit’s internal illumination, though it can also be known in its effects by reason alone. By itself and without the internal light of faith, reason does not formally attain supernatural revealed truths. It knows the letter of the Gospel, not its spirit. And yet it nonetheless can know certain miraculous effects of supernatural truth, just as all people contemplating Christ’s gentleness, humility, charity, and fortitude see there, as it were, rays of his supernatural life.

Hence, many rationalists, like Renan, admit nobody has proposed (nor could anyone ever propose) a loftier doctrine than Christ’s doctrine. And the scribes of the Pharisees said, concerning Christ: “Never did man speak like this man” (John 7:46, DR). Hence, even if it is most highly fitting that a supernatural doctrine be confirmed through sensible miracles, already in its purity and sublimity we find a kind of sign of its divine origin. Nay, among the circumstances used in distinguishing a true miracle from a false one, it is quite common for one to include the goodness of the doctrine in question, in confirmation of which this given miracle was performed. Thus, without committing any vicious circle, what remains obscure in a given doctrine is confirmed by the miracle, and the evident goodness of the doctrine confirms the truth of the miracle. In this way, the spiritual and the sensible mutually aid each other, like intellection and sensation, in accord with the common axiom, “Causes are mutually related as causes to each other, though in different genera of causality.” 

(2) The utterly great and obvious holiness of a religion’s founder, apostles, and martyrs. If this holiness is utterly great and obvious, it provides yet another sign, for such holiness cannot exist without some special intervention by God. Indeed, holiness is a virtue involving perfect purity from earthly things, as well as utterly firm union with God—indeed, ordering all of the acts of the virtues to God.23 Now, the order of agents must correspond to the order of ends. Therefore, holiness cannot exist without God’s aid,24 and extraordinary holiness comes from God intervening in the world in an extraordinary manner. However, this holiness appears most clearly in the heroic25 exercise of all the virtues. “Common virtue perfects man in a human manner, whereas heroic virtue does so in a way that is super-human. Indeed, when the brave man fears something when it should be feared, this is a virtue; however, if he does not fear it, it will be a vice. Now, if he fears nothing, trusting in God’s aid, this virtue will be above the human mode of virtue, and such virtues are called divine.”26 

According to Benedict XIV (De canonizatione sanctorum, bk. 3, ch. 21), four things are required so that heroic virtue can be said to have been proven: (1) that the matter was difficult, above the common powers of men, (2) that the acts were performed promptly and readily, (3) indeed, being done with delight, (4) and not only once or rarely but, rather, frequently, on a given occasion. (Regarding Christ’s holiness, see bk. 2, ch. 6 below.) 

{{19}} St. Thomas says, “There are certain virtues had by those who have already achieved likeness to God. These are called ‘perfect virtues.’ Thus, prudence sees only the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; courage knows no passions; and, by imitating the Divine Mind, justice is united to it by an everlasting bond. We say that these virtues are had by the Blessed, or, in this life, by those who are utterly perfect.”27 

For example, St. Louis Bertrand remained at peace in the midst of the greatest dangers, and when he knew he had taken poison, which had secretly been given to him, he remained tranquil and trusted in God alone. In the midst of the most bitter of sufferings, he did not lament but, rather, said, “Lord, burn here and cut things off there, so that you may refrain from doing so eternally.” Another holy priest, after being falsely accused of an atrocious crime, was suspended by his bishop, and immediately he gave thanks before the cross, as being unworthy of such grace. The holy deacon [levita] Vincent, having been taken from his horse and carried off to the gibbet, eagerly offered his executioners arguments so that they might hasten his demise, which they were delaying to bring about. And undaunted, he climbed up onto the grill of shining iron on his own, and unmoved there, standing erect in the light, looking to heaven, he prayed to God.28 (Likewise see the other examples of heroic virtue given in the same text by Benedict XIV.) 

As St. Thomas says in ST II-II, q. 124, a. 3: 

Now, of all virtuous acts, martyrdom most greatly demonstrates the perfection of charity, for a man’s love for a thing is manifested all the greater to the degree that what he despises for its sake is dearer to him and that he chooses to suffer for its sake something more offensive to him. However, it is quite clear that of all the goods that man has in this present life, he loves life itself most of all and, on the other hand, hates death equally as much, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment —and as Augustine observes (in his work, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 36), “even brute animals draw back from the greatest pleasures so as to avoid such pains.” And for this reason, martyrdom clearly is the most perfect of human acts in respect to its genus, being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John 15:13 (DR): “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” 

Hence, “a martyr is said to be a kind of witness to the Christian faith, displaying before our sight the idea that visible things should be scorned for the sake of invisible things, as is said in Hebrews 11:39.”29 “Indeed, nobody can scorn present things except out of hope for future goods. Indeed, such scorn is the principal means for overcoming the world. And therefore, because faith holds out invisible things to us, on account of which the world is to be held in scorn, therefore, our faith conquers the world.”30 

However, in order for true heroic virtue to be discerned as being something coming from God (in distinction from the false appearance of such virtue), beyond the four aforementioned conditions, {{20}} we must consider the connection of the virtues in prudence and in charity. Indeed, we see that some people are prompt to perform courageous deeds on account of their natural makeup or on account of some habits they have formed from custom, without however being ready to perform deeds of meekness, for nature is determined to one thing. However, if someone has all of the virtues at once and in a truly excellent manner, even those that are most distant from each other (like the greatest courage along with the heights of mercy, perfect love of the truth and justice simultaneously alongside the greatest mercy toward those who go astray), this is possible only through extraordinary assistance coming from God, who alone in his simplicity eminently contains utterly diverse perfections and can unite them together intimately within the human soul. This interconnection is the expression of a marvelous kind of harmony: “Charity is patient, is kind: charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up; it is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinketh no evil. It rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth. It beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things” (1 Cor 13:4–7, DR). 

Hence, in bk. 3, ch. 21 of the aforementioned work, Benedict XIV says: If true moral virtues can be found among nonbelievers [gentilibus], this does not seem to cause any issue; moreover, they can attain to a heroic degree of virtue, considering the nature of the thing. However, in order to be established as being truly heroic, the full collection of all of the moral virtues is required. Now, no matter how many nonbelievers [gentiles] have been said to have heroic [virtue] on account of the excellence of a given moral virtue, they were lacking a number of other virtues and served the interests of [certain] vices, and therefore none of them was able to have been established as being strictly heroic, as is proven at length by Cardinals de Laurea and de Aguirre, and at great length by Théophile Raynaud.31 Therefore, a marvelous harmony is found in the preacher of the faith when he speaks in God’s name with the greatest of authority, “as one having power,”32 “not through persuasive words of human wisdom,”33 with the greatest humility, without boasting, sincerely expressing oneself, out of zeal for God, with the greatest charity for one’s neighbor, without fear but with unconquerable courage in the face of persecutions, yet combined with meekness so that such a person would come to pray for those who persecute him. This provides a sign of God’s presence in him, for this marvelous harmony of heroic virtues, so very diverse among themselves, could not exist without some special aid given by God.34 Such a sign can only be denied if one is clearly filled with malice and perversity, as was the case for the Pharisees. {{21}} However, then, they who denied brought forth a new sign, for through their obvious malice, they prove the sufficiency of the aforementioned signs (see Acts 4:16). 

By contrast, in the founders and preachers of false religions and sects, uncharitable fanaticism is substituted for the firmness of faith, or liberalism without true faith for charity. In false prophets, we find ostentation without humility, obsequiousness without dignity, being angry in difficult situations or rash without meekness and pusillanimous without courage. 

Objection: Holiness needs to be confirmed through miracles. Therefore, by itself, it is not a motive of credibility. 

Response: Eminent holiness, especially as we see in the constancy of the martyrs, already in itself is a sign, inasmuch as it quite clearly comes from God himself. Nonetheless, holiness is given certain attestation when it is confirmed by miracles. Nay, they confirm each other, though without involving any vicious circle, inasmuch as causes are causes of each other, though in different genera of causality. What remains obscure in holiness is confirmed by miracles, and what is already evident in holiness confirms the truth of miracles and excludes the possibility of [mere] marvels. 

Second objection: However, it seems that without perfect charity—nay, even merely without charity—someone can offer his life as a martyr. Indeed, St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:3 (DR): “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” And many have died out of their fanaticism, undergoing torments for the sake of various religions and sects. Nay, without any special aid from God, soldiers undergo the brutalities of war. 

Response: St. Thomas himself says: In the acts of the virtues, two things must be heeded, namely, that which is done and the manner in which it is done. Therefore, we must say that the act of offering oneself as a martyr or even the suffering of martyrdom can be performed not only by one having perfect charity but also by someone who lacks charity. However, he who has perfect charity does this promptly and with delight, as is clear in Laurence and Vincent, who even had humorous dispositions in the midst of their torments. However, this could not be done merely out of imperfect charity or, likewise, by him who lacks charity. 35 Likewise, supernatural courage is something to be distinguished from natural courage, as well as from fanaticism, through the connection of virtues, inasmuch as it is joined with charity, humility, and prayer for one’s persecutors.36 For our discussion of arguments [on behalf of credibility] on the basis of the constancy of the martyrs, see bk. 2, ch. 9 below. 

(3) The wondrous propagation of religion. The strength of this argument is set forth by St. Thomas in SCG I, ch. 6: 

Not the violence of arms, nor by the promise of pleasures, and— what is most miraculous of all—in the midst of the tyranny of persecutors, an innumerable host, not only of the simple but also of the wisest of men, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith, things exceeding every human intellect are preached, the pleasures of the flesh are restrained, and it is taught that all things that are in the world are to be held in contempt. For the minds of mortals to assent to such things is the greatest of miracles, one that likewise is a manifest work of divine inspiration, so that men would come to seek only that which is invisible, doing so in contempt of that which is visible. However, this marvelous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the most certain evidence of the signs from the past (i.e., of miracles), such that it is no longer necessary that they be further repeated, since they are evidently apparent in their effect. Indeed, it would be more marvelous than all signs if the world were led by simple and humble men without miraculous signs to believe such difficult things, to perform such difficult actions, and to have so lofty a hope. . . . 

{{22}} But those who founded those erring sects followed the opposite path, as is clear in the case of Mohammed, who enticed people through promises of carnal pleasures, to which the concupiscence of the flesh rouses men. Likewise, he preached precepts that were conformed to these promises, giving free rein to carnal pleasures, and carnal men were quite ready to obey him in these matters. . . . He said that he was sent through strength of arms, signs which, however, are not lacking even in thieves and tyrants. Moreover, no wise men, trained in things divine and human, believed him from the start, but rather, he was believed by brutal men wandering in the desert, wholly ignorant of divine teaching, and through their number, Mohammed forced others to follow his law by violence of arms. 

So that the value of this argument may be clear, we must manifest the absolute disproportion between this marvelous conversion of the world and natural causes, insisting on the loftiness of the end to be obtained, the hindrances to its propagation, and the natural weakness of the apostles, as St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 1:25–29 (DR): 

The weakness of God is stronger than men. . . . But the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise: and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and the things that are contemptible, hath God chosen: and things that are not, that he might bring to naught things that are: that no flesh should glory in his sight. 

Likewise, in 2 Corinthians 4:7 (DR): “But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God and not of us.” We must note this quite carefully: This weakness remains in God’s instrument so that the supernaturality of the divine intervention may be made manifest more clearly. Above all, one must argue from the fact that the vitality of the Church is not diminished but, rather, is increased through persecutions, as the Lord himself said: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake. . . . Blessed are ye when they shall revile you, and persecute you . . . for my sake. Be glad and rejoice for your reward is very great in heaven” (Matt 5:10–12, DR). 

For a historical exposition of this argument, see bk. 2, ch. 9 below. 

(4) The fruitfulness of religion in everything that is good. This fruitfulness must be considered in relation to the individual, family life, and society. 

(a) In relation to the individual, inasmuch as his intellect is freed from errors concerning God, the world, and the soul, while the will is freed from the worst corruption of paganism. 

(b) In relation to family life, inasmuch as the dignity of wives is here restored, the protection and education of children [fostered], and the harshness of slavery was tempered and, gradually, extinguished. 

(c) In relation to society, inasmuch as legitimate authority, finding its foundation in God, is promoted, as well as due liberty, charity, and the [natural] laws common to all nations [ius gentium]. Thus, tyranny and license are shunned, as well as the interpersonal confusion arising from communism and the personal separation involved in individualism, with the harmony of individuals and society thus being established. 

(d) From all the works of mercy and beneficence an argument is at hand too, here verifying the words of Christ: “Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Luke 6:36, DR), as well as those of Paul: “Who is weak, and I am not weak?” (2 Cor 11:29, DR); “put ye on therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, the bowels of mercy” (Col 3:12, DR). 

{{23}} In order to make this sign clearly manifest, we must distinguish the virtue of mercy from inefficacious, sense-derived commiseration. This sense passion is often found in fearful things [in formidolosis], whereas by contrast mercy presupposes goodness and courage and is a manifestation of the good through its own self-outpouring. Hence, St. Thomas says that it is the greatest of virtues inasmuch as “it falls to it to pour oneself forth for another and, what is more, to come to the needs of others. And this bespeaks the greatest of superiority. Whence, mercy is even said to be proper to God, and in it His omnipotence finds its greatest manifestation.”37 Indeed, in mercy the inclination of the loftiest toward that which is least is made manifest, as well as God’s greatest goodness and omnipotence, inasmuch as “God is so omnipotent and good that He draws good even out of evil.”38 Hence, when a given religion manifests the greatest of mercy, this is a sign of its divine origin. The strength of this argument will be even clearer if this fruitfulness in all that is good is found only in one religion, as is clear through an examination of history. See bk. 2, ch. 9 below. Hence, in the annotations to the pre-conciliar schema to the [First] Vatican Council, we read: “Solely to the Catholic Church pertains the everlasting continuation of the motives of credibility found in the marvelous propagation and preservation of the Christian religion, in the same effects which are both certain and worthy of admiration, indeed exceeding all natural causes, found in the behavior and multitude of her martyrs, as well as (the moral continuation of) the perpetual manifestation of spiritual charisms.”39 Christ himself indicated this sign, saying: “Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and the evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit” (Matt 7:17, DR). And St. Paul wrote to the Corinthians: “But as from God, before God, in Christ we speak. . . . Or do we need (as some do) epistles of commendation to you, or from you? You are our epistle, written in our hearts, which is known and read by all men: Being manifested, that you are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written: not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God: not in tables of stone but in the fleshly tables of the heart” (2 Cor 2:17–3:3, DR). Indeed, the conversion of the Corinthians to Christ was known to all and served as an example for the conversion of others. 

In these holy effects, the end of a religion is made manifest (inasmuch as the end, which is prior in the order of intention, is last in execution). Likewise, we here find a manifestation of the divine cause of religion, in accord with the axiom: The order of agents must correspond to the order of ends. 

(5) Catholic unity. A new argument is furnished by the catholicity (or universality) of a religion (on the side of its material cause, or members), as well as by its unity (on the side of its formal cause). It is suitable in apologetics to draw these two marks [of the Church] into one, inasmuch as unity is all the more miraculous to the degree that the Church is more universal. Indeed, if men from all times and from among all peoples, be they uncivilized or civilized, notwithstanding the profound diversity and opposition of their languages, inclinations, conceptions, political rules, and so forth, come to be gathered together in the unity of faith, hope, and charity, as well as that of ecclesiastical rule and worship, so that dogmas never come to be defiled for the sake of the utility that a particular nation might draw therefrom, nor the essential principles of ecclesiastical rule revoked in order to meet the demands of secular power, this is a sign of God’s intervention, {{24}} for he alone can produce and preserve such intimate unity in the midst of such diversity. 40 This is made even clearer by considering the variation existing among the diverse sects that are not able to grow in extent without their dogmas coming to be defiled and also without allowing themselves to be unduly subordinated to secular powers. By contrast, the divine truth is made manifest in the fact that it is not unduly subordinated to any other power, not even the strongest (see bk. 2, ch. 9 below). 

Hence, enumerating the signs of the true faith, Pius IX said: This faith . . . revealing the salutary laws of Christ and acquiring greater strength every day from these most cruel persecutions, has pervaded the whole earth, land, and sea, from the rising to the setting of the sun, under the one standard of the Cross, and also, having overcome the deceits of idols and torn away the mist of errors and triumphed over enemies of every kin, it has illuminated with the light of divine knowledge all peoples, races, nations, however savagely barbarous and diverse in disposition, customs, laws, and institutions; and has subjected them to the most sweet yoke of Christ himself, “Announcing peace” to all, “announcing good.”41 

(6) The unconquered stability of a religion. Finally, the aforementioned arguments are confirmed by the unconquered stability of a religion that proposes itself as being revealed, for all things in the world are subject to change, with the generation of one thing involving the corruption of the other whence it comes, not only in the physical order but even in the social and political order. Nations rise and fall, as do political forms, and indeed so do religions, along with philosophical systems. All things gradually spring forth, flower, and then come to their end, “for the fashion of this world passeth away.”42 Hence, many today are concerned with writing about the history of religions, presenting the tale of their formation, development, and downfall. 

By contrast, if only one religion remains the same, indefectible and unconquered in its stability, notwithstanding the countless hindrances and causes of ruin it may have suffered, if it is preserved without changing its dogmas, precepts, or authority structure [in suo regimine], above all if it remains living in the midst of this immutability so that it forever renews itself—if, for example, “there is growth and abundant progress in understanding, though in the same dogma, meaning, and judgment”43—then all of this stands as a sign of its divine origin, here bearing witness to an extraordinary participation in the divine immutability, which is not a deathlike immutability but, rather, a living one. In such a case, we have a verification of Christ’s words: “Heaven and earth shall pass: but my words shall not pass,”44 and “I say to thee: That thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”45 And in the words of the Psalms: “(God is the one) who satisfieth thy desire with good things: thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle’s.”46 {{25}} By contrast, false religions and sects remain either lifelessly in a deathlike immobility, as is found in Islam, or in a state of perpetual variation through continuous accommodation to the undue demands of the age, tending likewise to naturalism or the denial of religion, as is clear in the case of Protestantism.47 (Here too, see bk. 2, ch. 9 below.) 

Conclusion. All of these motives intrinsic to religion, taken together, provide us with an irresistible argument. For if a religion in which all of these signs are found (the sublimity of doctrine, holiness, wondrous propagation, fruitfulness in all good things, catholic unity, and unconquered stability) were not from God, there would be an effect without a cause, without a raison d’être, for all of these goods can only arise from the fount of all goods. Nor can it be said that this religion would be from God mediately through the natural evolution of religious sentiment, as the human sciences are mediately from God inasmuch as he is the author of our intelligence. Indeed, the aforementioned notes are extraordinary and manifest an extraordinary intervention by God. Moreover, this religion proposes itself as being supernaturally revealed and always affirms that this supernatural revelation is the fount of the whole of its truth, strength, and fruitfulness. Therefore, if this supernatural revelation were merely fabricated, all of the goods enumerated above would be founded on lies or delusions, and this is impossible, for real effects presuppose a real cause, not a fabricated one, good effects presuppose a good cause, and supernatural effects a supernatural one. 

Finally, nor must one say that all of these goods come from natural religious sentiment, together with error or delusion, for by reason alone, it is clear that the omnipotent God, who is infinitely good, truthful, just, and provident, cannot permit all of these signs and goods to be found in some religion proposed as being revealed by God without, however, in fact having been revealed by him. God cannot permit mankind to be invincibly deceived in those things that are necessary for salvation, and he would permit this if all the aforementioned signs were joined together in conjunction with a fabricated revelation. Hence, even if no sensible miracles existed,48 leaving only the moral miracle of the Church’s miraculous life, the words of Richard of St. Victor would already hold true: “Surely, will we not be able to say to God with full confidence, ‘Lord, if this is in error, we have been deceived by you, for these things were confirmed for us with such great signs and marvels, and by such things as can only be brought about by you’?”49

The objection of the modernists: The vitality of a religion that overcomes all hindrances, adversaries, hostilities, and battles, drawing to itself whatever teachings, cultural achievements, and ecclesiastical forms that are useful to itself, cannot indeed be fully explained through the laws of evolution, however much these laws appear unscathed throughout the history of this religion. Therefore, there is something unknown hidden in this history, something that is a worthy object of religious experience. However, this unknown element does not prove that God has supernaturally intervened, for perhaps what is here present is only a natural production of the loftiest form of religious evolution.50 {{26}} Response: Given their agnostic prejudices, modernists find themselves forced to reach this conclusion. Indeed, they doubt the ontological and transcendent value of the first principles of reason and, hence, the value of the demonstrations of the existence of God as he who is essentially distinct from the world, as well as the demonstration of the possibility of supernatural revelation and of miracles. Nay, for them, miracles cannot involve the abrogation of laws of nature but, rather, are only the abrogation of the customary, subjective experiences that we fashion through our knowledge of natural phenomena. Therefore, even concerning the most openly miraculous of physical events, they say: This fact cannot be fully explained in accord with the laws that are now known; it contains something unknown. They must say the same thing concerning the Church’s own marvelous life. However, against their assertions, we defend the ontological and transcendent value of the first principles of reason, the value of the demonstrations of the existence of God as he who is essentially distinct from the world, the possibility of supernatural revelation, and in the next chapter we will metaphysically defend the possibility and discernibility of miracles. Now, presupposing all of these things, the argument drawn from the marvelous life of the Church is irresistible, as the Church herself says, provided that this marvelous life appears as being a moral miracle surpassing all created powers. 

Therefore, against the immanentists, we must say: A given religion is made credible by divine faith, not inasmuch as it seems to be conformed to the exigencies of our nature but, rather, inasmuch as it exceeds these exigencies and can be constituted only by God, freely. Hence, if one is to argue from the conformity of this religion with the aspirations of our nature, one must make manifest how this great conformity exists alongside such gratuity, such that God alone could produce it. 

§3. Concerning How These Motives Are Related to the Other Motives, as Well as concerning the Unity of [the Whole of ] Apologetics 

[Now, let us discuss the interrelation of these motives] (A) according to the partisans of the methodology of immanence and then (B) according to traditional apologetics. 

A. According to the partisans of the methodology of immanence, internal motives have primacy—that is, not only priority of time (inasmuch as they dispose a subject to consider the other signs) but also a priority of value, for [according to them] without these motives, the others would remain too partial and, hence, inefficacious. [As they say,] the unity and power of the apologetic demonstration belongs to the practical order (that is, the order of life), in accord with the aspirations and exigencies of human action.51 This conception proceeds from a form of semi-agnosticism, which rejects the ontological value of miracles, in order to only admit their symbolic value, as well as from a form of semi-immanentism, which holds that our nature contains some kind of efficacious desire for supernatural religion—nay, specifically for the Catholic religion—in other words, a desire that also posits the requirement that it be fulfilled [desiderium cum exigentia].52 

B. According to traditional apologetics, the subordination of the motives of credibility can be expressed as follows. (1) Internal motives are per se subordinated to external motives, though the former dispose one to consider the latter and, afterwards, also confirm them. (2) Among external motives, signs that are extrinsic to religion, like miracles and prophecies, are more knowable from our perspective, though motives intrinsic to religion are loftier in themselves. Finally, the strongest of these are those miracles that are most intrinsically concerned with religion, in which the prophecies are fulfilled and future beatitude announced. 

{{27}} This calls for explanation. 

(1) Internal motives are per se subordinated to external motives. This is so because our aspirations are subordinated to the religion in which they are fulfilled, as intelligence is subordinated to objective truth (or to being), just as love is subordinated to the good, for potency is designated in relation to act and acts in relation to their objects. Hence, in philosophy, the supreme criterion of truth must be objective and not subjective.53 And the same holds true in apologetics: When judging concerning the rational credibility of religion proposing itself as supernatural, we must do so through a resolution to objective, external motives and not to the subjective exigencies of our nature. Moreover, if this religion is truly supernatural, it exceeds these exigencies and arouses loftier aspirations in us. Hence, as we said earlier, when they are separated from external motives, internal motives are exposed to the gravest of illusions, and they cannot duly prove the divine origin of a given religion. 

Against the tendency to subjectivism and humanism in matters of religion, we must recall the words heard by St. Augustine: “I am the food of those who are fully grown; grow and you will eat me. But you will not change me into yourself, as you change food into your own flesh, but rather, you will change into me.” We must not judge divine things by resolving things to our level but instead must judge ourselves by resolving our notions to God. This is, properly speaking, wisdom—that is, science through the loftiest causes. Likewise, experiential wisdom, which is the gift of the Holy Spirit, judges all things in relation to God, supernaturally delighted in. 

Nonetheless, internal motives drawn from our aspirations dispose the subject who does not yet believe so that he may consider the other motives. Thus, they have a priority of time, not of value, a priority standing on the side of the subject. 

Indeed, as St. Thomas says: Just as the end is prior in intention and posterior in existence, so too, to the degree that something is closer to the end is it prior in proposition. . . . For this reason, hope is said to open the way to faith, not that it would already exist, but that it is proposed as something future. For example, when someone proposes eternal goods, he first wills those things, then willing to adhere to them through love, next willing to hope in them, and fourthly willing to believe in them, so that by believing thus he may hope in them, love them, and have them. . . . Thus, hope precedes faith by way of proposal but not in existence.54 Hence, on account of the fact that a religion draws to itself men who do not yet believe, they are roused by this to inquire into whether this religion is truly divine. 

However, afterwards, internal motives drawn from the fulfillment of our aspirations confirm the other motives. 

For, after the infusion of faith and charity, under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the believer can experience more fully the profound peace that proceeds from the Gospel, which is known and loved55 as is befitting to it, {{28}} in accord with the words of our Lord: “But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you. Peace I leave with you: my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, do I give unto you” (John 14:26–27, DR). And thus, the evident credibility of the mysteries of the faith is confirmed by experiential knowledge, coming forth from the gifts of the Holy Spirit. These gifts perfect faith in a qualified manner (secundum quid), though, speaking without qualification (simpliciter), they are ruled by it, meaning that faith is therefore loftier than they are.56 No wonder, either, that internal motives first play the role of being a disposition and then, afterwards, that of being a confirmation, for generally, “just as on the way to generation a disposition precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in those things that are brought to their perfection in a successive manner, so too this same disposition naturally follows upon the perfection once it has been obtained. Thus, heat, which disposed to fire, is an effect flowing from the form of fire when the latter already exists.”57 Likewise, phantasms dispose to ideas, and afterwards they come to express them in a sensible way, for there is no knowledge without a conversion to the phantasms. Similarly, an antecedent emotion or passion precedes volition, and afterwards volition makes use of it as a consequent passion. 

(2) The marvelous life of the Church is loftier than a physical miracle, though it is not understood as easily. Indeed, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics bk. 1, ch. 2: “The supreme causes of things are those that are the most intelligible . . . and they are known by men with the greatest of difficulty, for they are utterly remote from the senses.” In other words, those things that are most intelligible in themselves are, from our perspective, more difficult to know, because our intellectual knowledge takes its origin in the senses. St. Thomas applies this principle in order to show the fittingness of miracles as signs of invisible revelation, saying: “It is natural to man to discover intelligible truth through sensible effects. Hence, just as man, led along by natural reason, can arrive at some knowledge of God through natural effects, so too is man led through other supernatural effects to some supernatural knowledge of things to be believed in.”58 “Because those things that are of faith exceed human reason, they cannot be proven through human reasons but, rather, must be proven through arguments drawn from the divine power so that when someone performs works that only God can do, we may believe that the things that he says are themselves from God. This is akin to when someone brings letters, stamped by the king’s ring, thus leading one to believe that what is contained in those letters does indeed proceed from the king’s will.”59 

Hence, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, in apologetics, an extrinsic-external methodology is easier, briefer, and safer. For it is easier, when speaking to the simple, to set forth obvious, splendid miracles (like Christ’s Resurrection), supported by the testimony of many people, than it is to set forth the characteristics by which the excellence and sublimity of religion is recognized. This methodology is also briefer, for having already demonstrated that the truth of revealed religion is sufficiently evident on the basis of some miracle (e.g., Christ’s Resurrection), the obligation to embrace it is thereby already clear enough, without needing to set forth the miraculous life of the Church through the whole of history, as well as the sublimity of her doctrine by diligently examining each of her dogmas and precepts. Finally, it is safer, for there is less danger of error involved in investigating into sensible facts like miracles than there is in carefully considering the exceeding excellence, purity, and immunity from error belonging to some doctrine, or in considering the moral effects of this doctrine. {{29}} This is especially the case because many dogmas remain very obscure, like that of the Holy Trinity, original sin, predestination, and eternal punishment. Hence, the [First] Vatican Council places among “external arguments for revelation, namely divine facts . . . miracles and prophecies in particular, which since they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God are the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men.”60 Indeed, they are the most befitting of signs, considering matters from our own perspective. 

However, IN ITSELF, the miraculous life of the Church is a loftier motive, just as an intellectual and moral miracle is loftier than a physical one. Hence, St. Thomas, in SCG I, ch. 6, after enumerating sensible miracles—namely, “the miraculous curing of the weak, the raising of the dead, and alteration of heavenly bodies”—adds: “And what is more miraculous, there is the inspiration of human minds, leading simple and unlearned men, filled with the Holy Spirit, to possess at a single stroke the heights of wisdom and eloquence.” And immediately afterwards he says concerning the miraculous conversion of the world to the Christian faith: “By which, the minds of mortals were led to assent to these things, and here we have the greatest of miracles, one that likewise is a manifest work of the divine inspiration, so that men would come to seek that which is invisible, doing so in contempt of that which is visible.” Likewise, the [First] Vatican Council says that the Church’s miraculous life is not only a motive of credibility but, indeed, “a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable testimony of her divine mission.” In this perpetuity, she surpasses all properly sensible miracles. 

And therefore, souls going forward in the spiritual life increasingly come to see this miraculous life of the Church, no longer needing to take miracles into consideration. Similarly, the whole Church, now founded, no longer stands in need of miracles in the same way as she did at the time of her founding, for, as St. Thomas says in SCG I, ch. 6: “This great and marvelous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the most certain witness from the signs from the past, so that it is no longer necessary that such signs be repeated, since they appear with the greatest of clarity in their effect, . . . although God does not cease, even in our own days, to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.” St. Louis, the king, was invited to see a miracle, but he preferred to remain in adoration before the Most Blessed Sacrament in the obscurity of the faith that he already had. Therefore, the splendor of the Church, in itself, exceeds the splendor of miracles of the sensible order, even if the former is less obvious to our own eyes. 

(3) What are the stronger motives of credibility? They are those miracles that are most intrinsically concerned with religion, in which the prophecies are fulfilled and future [things] announced. Such is the case for Christ’s Resurrection, which is at once a mystery of faith (the Resurrection of the Word) and a sensible miracle of the first rank (the glorious resurrection of a man), fulfilling a number of prophecies, providing a sign of Christ’s victory over sin (which has death as one of its consequences), an exemplar of the Church in her ability to acquire power through persecutions, and a pledge of our future beatitude (which fulfills and indeed exceeds all of our aspirations). Hence, concerning this excellent motive, St. Paul says, “If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain: and your faith is also vain” (1 Cor 15:14, DR). If Christ had not been victorious over death, he therefore would not have been victorious over sin, the wages of which are death. However, on account of its perpetuity, and from our perspective as we now live on earth, the marvelous life of the Church exceeds Christ’s Resurrection [as a motive of credibility]; indeed, in her, an effect of the Resurrection is made manifest: “Christ conquers; Christ reigns; Christ commands.” 

Corollary concerning the unity of apologetics. Here we are not speaking of apologetics as though it were a science that would be distinct from sacred theology, for, as we already said in our prologue, apologetics is a {{30}} defensive office of sacred theology, which defends and explains revelation, likewise deducing conclusions from revealed truths.61 

However, the unity of the defense of the faith (i.e., apologetics) is a unity in the order of arguments—that is, in the motives of credibility —for we must not merely mechanically juxtapose these proofs but instead must organically order them. Now, per se, this order must not be taken relative to our subjective aspirations or exigencies, as is wished by the partisans of the methodology of immanence but, rather, must be taken relative to the end toward which apologetics tends—namely, the evident credibility of the mysteries of faith, inasmuch as they are manifestly revealed by God. The various methodologies employed in apologetics are ways to the same end and, therefore, are ordered in relation to it. 

Objection: However, the partisans of the methodology of immanence, following ways that are too subjective, say that the unity of apologetics must be taken through a resolution to the internal aspirations and exigencies that direct the inquiry undertaken by apologetics. Nay, were one not to consider these exigencies, other apologetic arguments would remain only inefficacious parts of the whole demonstration thus established. Response: The order of agents corresponds to the order of ends,62 and therefore, in order to arrive at the true end of apologetics (namely, evident credibility of the mysteries of faith),63 the agent directing the apologetic demonstration must not be a natural aspiration or exigency of our will (or action) but instead is human reason, placed under the direction of faith. This is so because a natural exigency does not transcend the natural order, whereas reason, by contrast, can examine the value of the signs that are put forward by God himself in confirmation of revelation, just as it manifests the possibility and fittingness of this supernatural revelation, the true notion of which is given by God himself through revelation. 

Hence, primacy, or priority of value, belongs to the methodology that draws closest to this end, in short, the external method. Nonetheless, by way of temporal priority, we can first make use of an internal methodology so as to remove agnostic and naturalistic prejudices that would render any historical inquiry into miracles and prophecies useless. Indeed, they who believe that the dogmas of Christianity are absurd often do not wish to consider miracles, denying their power, lest they be compelled to admit something that is absurd to their eyes or something that would be too difficult to accept. By contrast, if they first understand, through a cleareyed exposition, the conformity of the dogmas and precepts of Christianity (at least its principal ones) with our legitimate and supreme aspirations, then they may already begin to desire that they be able to acknowledge the truth of this religion. 

Hence, (1) we must first set forth internal motives, drawn from the aspirations of our nature, just as Christ began his own preaching with the beatitudes, which fulfill and exceed our aspirations. (2) Then we must set forth the excellence and sublimity of the Christian doctrine with regard to the truths of the faith and precepts, just as Christ did in particular in the Sermon on the Mount; and we must simultaneously argue from the holiness of Christ and the apostles, as well as from the marvelous life and fruitfulness of the Church. (3) We must bring forward the prophecies and miracles that were performed in confirmation of revelation, {{31}} for a miracle is not performed prior to the proposal of the divine doctrine but, instead, afterward, as a sign in confirmation thereof, like the seal placed at the end of a letter. Thus, the evangelists, especially St. Matthew, first refer to Christ’s words and then, afterwards, to his miracles. Likewise, the apostles preached, “the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed” (Mark 16:20, DR). Thus, the defense follows the proposal of faith, as it should. (4) Finally, all the motives of credibility come to be confirmed through the experience of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the circle is perfected, and the unity of apologetics (that is, the defense of faith) preserved, just as the end is first in intention and last in execution.

CHAPTER NINETEEN 

On Miracles as Motives of Credibility 

Art. 1: On the notion of miracles 

Art. 2: On the possibility of miracles 

Art. 3: On the discernibility of miracles 

Art. 4: On the probative force of miracles 

ART. 1: ON THE NOTION OF MIRACLES 

§1. Nominal definition 

§2. The Catholic notion of miracles 

§3. Heterodox notions of miracles 

§4. Theological explanation of the Catholic notion of miracles 

§5. Division of miracles 

§1. Nominal Definition 

{{32}} This nominal definition is clear from its etymology, as St. Thomas shows in ST I, q. 105, a. 7: 

The word “miracle” is derived from admiratione, astonishment or wonder. Now this arises when an effect is made manifest, while its cause remains hidden—as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 2. Now, the cause of an effect may be known by one person, while remaining unknown to others. Whence, something is wonderful to one man, but not to others (e.g., as an eclipse is to a country farmer but not to an astronomer). Now the term miracle is used because something is, as it were, full of wonder, namely as having a cause completely hidden from all. However, this cause is God. Therefore, we use the term “miracles” for whatever God does outside the order of causes which we know. As Cajetan notes here, there is, therefore, “a difference between a marvel [mirum] and a miracle [miraculum], for the former is said of a part (that is, in relation to this [or that] thing), whereas the latter is only said of the whole (that is, in relation to all things). This conclusion finds its proof in the fact that God is a cause that is entirely [simpliciter] hidden. Whence, in using the words ‘causes which we know,’ St. Thomas means the same thing in the conclusion as what he says in the title of the article in speaking of second (or natural) causes.” 

This is explained at greater length in De potentia, q. 6, a. 2, and in SCG III, ch. 101, where St. Thomas draws a similar conclusion: “Therefore, properly speaking, the term ‘miracle’ is to be applied to those things which are done in a divine manner outside of the commonly observed order of things.” This notion can be had after the manner of a nominal definition, for it does stand in need of an explanation, added in ST I, q. 110, a. 4, so that one may philosophically determine {{33}} what is meant by saying that something is “outside” the commonly preserved order of things, and so that one may form a clearer idea about how miracles differ from extraordinary natural facts as well as from wonders and from divine, providential facts that are not, however, miraculous. All of these are already distinguished by common sense, but philosophical reason must set forth the root of this distinction. 

§2. The Catholic Notion of Miracles 

The [First] Vatican Council set forth the nature of miracles when it said: However, in order that the obedience of our faith be nevertheless in harmony with reason [cf. Rom 12:1], God willed that exterior proofs of His revelation, viz., divine facts, especially miracles and prophesies, should be joined to the interior helps of the Holy Spirit; as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, they are the most certain signs of the divine revelation adapted to the intelligence of all men.1 Thus, according to the Council, miracles are divine facts manifestly displaying God’s omnipotence. Therefore, according to the Church, miracles, properly so-called, must be above the powers of the whole of created and creatable nature, even above those of angels.2 Thus, they essentially differ from extraordinary natural facts, as well as from demonic wonders, which are mere simulacra of miracles. They also are distinct from ordinary divine facts, like God’s daily creation of [spiritual] souls, which is done in accord with a given, regular order of things and cannot function as a sign of revelation. In this declaration by the Council, miracles are distinguished from prophecies because what is being discussed here are miracles inasmuch as they pertain, properly speaking, to the physical order and not to the intellectual order. Nonetheless, externally manifested prophecy can be reduced to [the category of ] miracles—that is, to God’s miraculous intervention in the world, either in the physical order or in the intellectual / moral order. 

§3. Heterodox Notions of Miracles 

As we said earlier in this work,3 there are two principal heterodox notions of miracles. (A) According to the first, which proceeds from determinism, a miracle is an extraordinary natural fact that has not yet been explained scientifically, something that religious sentiment attributes to God, like the hearing of a prayer. This is what many liberal Protestants think about these matters. (B) According to the other heterodox notion, which by contrast proceeds from agnosticism and contingentism, a miracle is not an abrogation of the laws of nature but, rather, of our manner of conceiving of the laws of nature. Such is the position held by a number of modernists.4 {{34}} In both conceptions, miracles do not have an ontological value as divine seals but instead only have a symbolic value for provoking the soul to examine a religion as well as its conformity with our aspirations. These two notions, which seem opposed to each other, are ultimately reduced to naturalism, as we will explain in what follows. 

A. The heterodox notion of miracles founded on determinism 

Determinism holds that all things take place in a necessary manner, in accord with the determinate laws of nature, so that God himself could not act contrary to such physical laws, just as he cannot act in a way that would be contrary to mathematical or metaphysical laws. Hence, BARUCH SPINOZA, who after Descartes wished to reduce physical laws to mathematical laws,5 absolutely denied the possibility of miracles: Just as God cannot make a square circle, so too it is impossible for him to raise someone from the dead.6 Hence, Spinoza does not directly deny God’s omnipotence but instead his freedom. According to Spinoza, God acts ad extra from a necessity of nature and therefore always acts in the same way, like the vital principle in plants. This error was already set forth and refuted by St. Thomas in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1. THE DEISTS did indeed admit the essential distinction between God and the world, but they said God only has his general acts of will [voluntates generals], by which the laws of the world were constituted, but not particular acts of will concerning singular things, for this would be unworthy of divine providence. Hence, miracles are not possible. Such was also the position of the Averroists in the Middle Ages. Here too, see the same text from St. Thomas’s De potentia. NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE, however, in order to resolve the objections raised by determinism, said in certain works of his: “A miracle is an effect depending upon general laws which are not known by us, especially upon the general laws of the spiritual world, by which the angels act in the sensible world.” And Malebranche seemed to hold that most miracles could be explained in this way. 7 However, according to him, there are other miracles, like the Incarnation, which exceed the powers of angels, and he seems to be speaking of these when he says, in another place, miracles do not depend on general laws but, rather, on God’s particular will, and in this way they are distinguished from natural facts.8 {{35}} However, Malebranche’s teaching diminishes the supernaturality even of these chief miracles, on account of his absolute optimism, according to which God was obliged to create the best world. Thus, all things that have been made, even the Incarnation and all supernatural deeds, would be morally necessary. LEIBNIZ too, on account of [his] absolute optimism and the determinism of moral necessity, diminished the supernaturality of miracles. He says: “If the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of the first rank (exceeding all of the powers of creatures), God would have thereby changed the entire course of the universe, on account of the interconnection of bodies, or otherwise, he would have needed, even more miraculously, to prevent this interconnection. Thus, this miracle required more than appears at first glance.”9 For according to Leibniz, all things are connected in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason. Nonetheless, he says, in the same text, some great miracles exceed all created powers; such are the Incarnation and certain other actions of God that constitute miracles properly so-called—nay, mysteries. Nonetheless, these miracles, according to Leibniz, are morally necessary. Thus, in the end, he comes to diminish their supernaturality and gratuity. At the same time, [ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS ALEXANDRE] HOUTTEVILLE, in his French work on the truth of the Christian religion, proposed a new definition for miracles, which he thought to be necessary in order to resolve the objections raised by determinists. This definition caused no small tumult among philosophers and theologians. {{36}} He said that miracles are rare, stupendous, sensible effects exceeding human powers, following in so hidden a manner from the laws of the communication of motions that we can in no way naturally know, whether through experience or through reason, that they are consequences of the same sorts of laws. Thus, this author made a distinction, saying that miracles are rightly said to be natural inasmuch as they follow the order of nature (or the laws of motion), though they are called supernatural inasmuch as they cannot be foreseen by man solely through his natural powers. Houtteville strove to prove this opinion by appealing both to the fact that God acts through utterly simple and general laws and to the fact that nobody knows all of the possible effects of the general laws of the communication of motions. The majority of theologians rose up against this opinion, believing that it destroyed the probative force of miracles.10 However, some people, especially nonbelievers, embraced his position. This definition of miracles, as we said above (with Vacant11 ) cannot be reconciled with the definition that is found in the texts of the [First] Vatican Council. Indeed, if a miracle is produced in a hidden manner in accord with the laws of motion and by the power properly belonging to the angels, they would not manifestly display the divine omnipotence [as the Council says that they do]. Finally, many LIBERAL PROTESTANTS reject the traditional notion of miracles on account of the determinism that they hold exists in the laws of nature.12 For them, a miracle is an extraordinary natural event that has not yet been explained by science, an event that can be attributed to God by religious sentiment, like the hearing of a prayer. Hence, one and the same fact is natural for science (that is, in accord with the unknown laws of nature) and miraculous for religious sentiment (as an effect of the divine benevolence). Such was the position held by thinkers like Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Sabatier. 13 {{37}} Sabatier adds that Jesus and the apostles had such piety for and trust in God—indeed, to the highest degree—that they thereby looked upon both extraordinary and ordinary facts as being manifestations of providence. At the same time, they were able to have imperfect or erroneous scientific notions concerning the way that God acts in nature. However, Christ’s religious outlook is not necessarily connected with these imperfect ideas and can be accommodated to contemporary science in our own day. This definition of miracles represents an open denial of their supernaturality, retaining only the name, a vain exhalation of sound (flatus vocis), not the meaning, of what is meant by “miracles.” So defined, miracles no longer have an ontological value as seals of God in order to confirm revelation with utter certitude but instead retain nothing more than a symbolic value in order to provoke the soul to an examination of religion and of its conformity with our nature’s aspirations and exigencies. Nay, [according to these thinkers,] this symbolic value of miracles cannot be perceived unless one already has religious faith.14 

B. The heterodox notion of miracles founded upon agnosticism and contingentism 

At the end of the nineteenth century, many philosophers15 and physicists,16 following along the ways of Kantian agnosticism, exhibited the exaggerations of determinism and fell into the opposite excess, which is called “contingentism.” {{38}} According to them, the laws of nature are not evidently necessary but instead are contingent. Nay, they held that we indeed cannot prove that they are, in fact, fixed and stable. Rather, according to them, this stability only pertains to our subjective manner of conceiving things, as Kant showed, and thus is something relative, for science can forever be perfected and these laws forever modified. 

Therefore, a miracle is not evidently impossible (for physical science speaks about what is, not about what is possible or impossible). However, exceptions to the laws of nature frequently happen naturally without thereby constituting a miracle. Nay, as an intervention of the divine freedom over all the laws of nature, a miracle is something unknowable for us, for we do not know all the laws of nature, nor the extramental objectivity of laws that have already been determined. A fortiori, our knowledge cannot discern an immediate intervention in the world by some cause that would completely transcend the phenomenal order, for our reason is numbered among phenomena. Hence, from our perspective, miracles cannot be the abrogation of the laws of nature as they are in things themselves but, rather, only an abrogation of apparent laws, inasmuch as they are subjectively conceived of by us17 (in the words of Blondel, abrogations “of anthropomorphic appearances,” and in those of Fr. Laberthonnière, abrogations “of an order which is illusory”).18 

Hence, the ontological value of miracles cannot be scientifically and philosophically defended so that a special intervention by God would appear in order to confirm and prove the fact of revelation. [According to such thinkers] miracles have only a symbolic value. That is, they manifest to us God’s presence in the world and in our life, and hence provoke the soul to an examination of religion and, especially, to consider the conformity of religion with the exigencies of our action. Nay, this symbolic value of miracles can only be perceived by minds that are already morally conscious of these exigencies, being disposed to acknowledge God’s action in the midst of ordinary facts. Some modernists went further still in diminishing the power of miracles. Indeed, they said, according to our manner of conceiving things, every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent phenomenon. Miracles, however, as conceived of by scholastic theologians, would be a phenomenon without a phenomenal antecedent. In other words, they would be contrary to the law / principle of causality and, hence, would be unthinkable. For at the very least, our subjective knowledge is ruled by the principle of determinism, and phenomena are conceived of as being successive moments in universal evolution. Therefore, a separated-off phenomenon, lacking any connection with preceding ones, is unintelligible. Therefore, miracles cannot be admitted, unless there happens to be some law of miracles— that is, unless there be an antecedent phenomenon from which a given miracle would as a rule follow. However, this phenomenon exists and is found in vigorous religious faith, which produces a miracle (e.g., extraordinary healing), just as our spiritual freedom ordinarily moves our bodily appendages. {{39}} Therefore, miracles are extraordinary effects of vigorous faith and a unique example of the superiority of spirit over matter. Nonetheless, at the same time, it is an effect of God inasmuch as faith comes from God.19 Hence, it is said in the Gospel: “If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove: and nothing shall be impossible to you” (Matt 17:19, DR). And in Mark 6:5–6 (DR), it is said of Christ: “He could not do any miracles there (in his own homeland), only that he cured a few that were sick, laying his hands upon them. And he wondered because of their unbelief.”

 Modernists add that physically speaking, a miracle is not something above nature but, rather, is only above our scientific knowledge concerning nature. Science can neither affirm nor deny it. It is an extraordinary fact that has not yet been explained. False miracles in the physical order are not inferior to true miracles, but they do not have a religious value. True miracles can only be distinguished from false miracles through moral and religious criteria, which are known solely by faith (or religious experience). Hence, miracles proceed from faith, are known by faith, and confirm faith, inasmuch as they manifest its vitality, in accord with what was said: “The tree shall be judged by its fruits.”20 

This conception of miracles is manifestly opposed to what is said in the Gospel21 and does not differ in any significant way from the notion proposed by liberal Protestants like, for example, Sabatier. Hence, like determinism, this contingentism reduces miracles to extraordinary natural effects, which religious sentiment attributes to God inasmuch as they are a manifestation of the divine benevolence. Therefore, these two opposed conceptions are ultimately reduced to naturalism. However, already, in a way, they refute each other. 

§4. Theological Explanation of the Catholic Notion of Miracles 

As has been said already, according to the [First] Vatican Council, a miracle is a divine fact manifestly displaying the omnipotence of God. This traditional notion of the miraculous is explained as follows by St. Thomas in ST I, q. 110, a. 4: 

{{40}} Properly speaking, a miracle takes place when something is done outside the order of nature. However, it does not suffice for there to be a miracle if something is done outside the order of any given particular nature. Otherwise, anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such an action is outside the order of the stone’s nature. Therefore, in order for something to be called a miracle, it must be outside the order of the whole created nature. And this is something that God alone can do, for whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power is in accord with the order of created nature, thus meaning that such an action is not miraculous. Whence, God alone can work miracles. (Ad 1) To the first objection, we must say that some angels are said to perform miracles either because God works miracles at their request, as when holy men are said to work miracles, or because such angels exercise some form of ministry in the miracles which take place, as in collecting the dust [of the deceased] in the general resurrection or by performing other such actions. 

Therefore, going beyond the nominal definition to the real definition of miracles, strictly speaking, Catholic theologians say that a miracle is a fact produced by God in the world, outside the order of action that belongs to the whole of created nature. 

(1) It is called a fact and not, however, a doctrine. Nay, in order that it be a sign, it must be a sensible fact.22 

(2) It is said to be produced by God, at least as by its principal cause, for it does not exclude the activity of a wonderworker, who acts by God’s power as an instrument. 

(3) It is said to be in the world, not outside of the world. 

(4) It is outside the order of nature, but not outside the order of divine providence, for miracles depend upon God’s ordinate power, guided by his wisdom, even though it is here exercised in an extraordinary way. 23 

(5) Finally, it is said to be outside the order of action that belongs to the whole of created nature and not only outside the order of acting belonging to some particular created nature, for otherwise the throwing of a stone into the air would be a miracle. And it is said to be outside of the order of action, not of being, for the miraculous effect effectively exceeds all created powers but does not entitatively exceed all created natures. Only intrinsically supernatural grace, which is a kind of formal participation in the divine nature, exceeds the order of being of the whole of created nature. However, by contrast, bodily resurrection supernaturally bestows natural life upon a corpse, not supernatural life. 

Thus defined, miracles are distinguished (1) from natural facts (even extraordinary ones), like fortuitous events, which are called fortuitous in relation to second causes and not in relation to providence, to which all things are subject; (2) from diabolic marvels, which are mere simulacra of miracles; {{41}} (3) from divine facts, or effects that are ordinary, as are the conservation of things in being, [God’s] premotion [in created beings’ activity], the daily creation of [spiritual] souls, and the justification of the wicked, which is not a miracle but instead the end aimed at by miracles.24 Likewise, miracles are distinguished from ordinary facts that are called providential inasmuch as providence is more clearly made manifest in them (e.g., in accord with a favorable answer to a prayer). 

Corollaries. First, “nothing can be called a miracle in comparison to the divine power, for all actions are of little account in comparison to the divine power. . . . However, something is said to be a miracle in comparison to the power of nature that it exceeds.”25 Second, even if a miracle ought to be sensible as a sign, it need not be limited to being performed outside the laws of the physical order but can also be outside the laws of the intellectual or moral order (as in the cases of prophecy, the gift of tongues, and St. Paul’s miraculous conversion). However, in order for it to be called a miracle and a sign, it must at least be manifested externally in some way, for otherwise it would not cause wonder. 26 Third, although properly speaking a miracle exceeds all the powers of created nature, the term miracle is used improperly (or in a broad sense) for certain deeds that do not exceed the powers of angels and that, in consideration of the circumstances surrounding them, are attributed to good angels or to God. (For example, the fact that someone holy would walk upon the waters does not exceed all created powers. Hence, someone like Simon the Magician was able to be lifted into the air by some demonic power.)27 

The properties of miracles28 

(1) A miracle is said to be arduous inasmuch as it exceeds the powers of nature. 

(2) It is said to be outside of the hopes or exigencies of nature, for nature is only obedientially, not naturally, ordered to it—namely, inasmuch as it obeys God in order to receive whatever he may will. However, it is not above the hope of grace, which comes from faith, through which we believe in the future resurrection. 

(3) It is said to be not customary, “for it does not frequently take place, but rather, stands outside of the ordinary course of natural activity.”29 

(4) A miracle is not contrary to nature (i.e., it does not violate nature), whatever those who hold to naturalism might say. Rather, it accords with the obediential potency of nature—namely, with its primary aptitude by which any given creature naturally obeys God in order to accept whatever he may will, as our arm obeys our will.30 {{42}} Thus, a miracle is not contrary to the laws of nature, is not a violation of the laws of nature, and indeed does not destroy them. Rather, it presupposes and confirms them, as an exception confirms the rule. For example, the dead do not naturally rise again. This law is so true that God alone can supernaturally raise the dead. Indeed, as we will discuss below, the laws of nature are hypothetically necessary—namely, on the supposition that all the various natural causes act in the appropriate conditions. 

(5) Miracles are called signs because they manifest something supernatural—namely, either the divine origin of a given doctrine or the holiness of some servant of God.31 

(6) They are called portents or marvels on account of their excellence.32 

§5. Division of Miracles 

A. This division is explained by St. Thomas in ST I, q. 105, a. 8, and is drawn in accord with the formal character of what a miracle is— namely, in comparison with the power of the whole of created nature, which is exceeded by miracles: Something is called a miracle in comparison with the power of nature, which it exceeds. Thus, the more the power of nature is exceeded, the greater is the miracle in question. Now, the power of nature is exceeded in three ways. First of all, it can be exceeded in the very substance of the deed in question (quantum ad substantiam facti)—as happens, for example, in the case of two bodies occupying the same place, that of the sun reversing its course, or that of the glorification of a human body. These kinds of things are absolutely beyond the power of nature and, thus, hold the highest rank among miracles. Second, something exceeds the power of nature, not in what is done but, rather, in the subject of its activity (quantum ad subiectum in quo fit)—as, for example, in the case of the raising of the dead and returning of sight to the blind, and other such things, for nature can give life, though not to the dead. Thus, such miracles are second in rank. Third, something exceeds nature’s power in the manner (quantum ad modum) and order in which it is done—as when a man is immediately cured of a fever, without undergoing treatment or the usual course of nature’s healing processes, or when the air is suddenly condensed into rain by divine power without some natural cause, as took place at the prayers of Samuel and Elijah (1 Kgs 12; 2 Chr 3:18). And these are the lowest kind of miracles. However, each of these kinds has various degrees, depending on the different ways in which the power of nature is exceeded.33 {{43}} Nevertheless, we must carefully note the difference between that which is substantially (quoad substantiam) miraculous and that which is essentially (quoad substantiam) supernatural. A miracle quoad substantiam (e.g., the glorification of the human body) is only modally supernatural in relation to the way in which it is produced, not, however, essentially supernatural (that is, entitatively supernatural), as is sanctifying grace. The bodily brightness of glory is indeed supernaturally produced, but it is natural “as regards its formal character [speciem] and can be seen naturally by a non-glorified eye.”34 By contrast, sanctifying grace is supernatural quoad substantiam (that is, essentially supernatural) as a formal participation in the divine nature. Hence, “quoad substantiam” is taken in the division of miracles as being a subdivision within modal supernaturality (that is, effective supernaturality [i.e., solely in relation to efficient causality, not formal causality]). By contrast, in the division of supernaturality, it is taken formally and intrinsically in opposition to that which is modally (that is, effectively) supernatural. B. The division of miracles is expressed in a different way in De potentia, q. 6, a. 2, ad 3. There, St. Thomas says that miracles are commonly divided inasmuch as they are either above, contrary to, or outside of nature. However, this division generally [quasi] coincides with the preceding one. That which is above nature is, in particular, what exceeds nature as regards the substance of what is done. That which is contrary to nature is that which is contrary to the natural disposition of the subject in which the miracle is performed. Finally, that which is outside of nature is that which is done outside of its customary mode of activity. In this second division, “contrary to nature” is used in an improper sense, for, as St. Thomas proves in SCG III, ch. 100, no miracle is, properly speaking, contrary to nature but, rather, is done in accord with nature’s obediential potency in relation to God. Nonetheless, improperly speaking, “it is said to be contrary to nature when nature retains a disposition contrary to the effect which God performs, as when He preserved the young men in the furnace uninjured, though the fire therein retained its burning power.”35 The words “outside of nature” [praeter naturam] are properly said of miracles of the third order, though they are commonly used for any miracle when one says a miracle is that which is done outside the order commonly preserved in things. Thus, the common acceptation for the word “praeter” / “outside” contains the meanings of “supra / above,” “contra / contrary to,” and “praeter / outside” the order of nature, just as the modally supernatural contains the three orders of miracles. 

ART. 2: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES 

§1. The state of the question and its difficulty 

§2. Demonstration of this possibility 

§3. Resolution of objections 

§1. The State of the Question and Its Difficulty 

Having explained the orthodox notion of miracles, we now must discuss how it is that they are possible. As we have said, this possibility is something held de fide, but it can also be philosophically proven against those who deny such possibility. (1) Now, those who deny the possibility of miracles are above all drawn from the ranks of determinists, who at least reject certain foundations of this thesis. These foundations are God’s existence, his omnipotence, his providence, his freedom, and the non-absolute necessity of the laws of nature. {{44}} Indeed, in arguing against determinists, it does not suffice that we solely bring forth the divine omnipotence, for as was said above, miracles do not merely depend on God’s merely absolute power but, rather, depend on his power inasmuch as it is ordered, though extraordinarily, by his providence. Therefore, we must take up our argument precisely upon the basis of God’s omnipotence inasmuch as it lies under the divine freedom, on which such a miraculous exception depends, for a miracle is the effect of an exceptional intervention by God in the world. Spinoza did not directly deny God’s omnipotence but instead his freedom. Hence, the former rejected the possibility of miracles. The same holds for deists, who held that God does not have particular volitions but, rather, only general volitions. Leibniz, however, held that the divine choices are always morally necessary; in this way, he diminished the gratuity and supernaturality of miracles, as we discussed above. If, as Spinoza wished, God were a non-free first cause, like the vital principle in plants, he could indeed produce effects exceeding the powers of finite nature, as the vital principle produces effects exceeding the order of physiochemical phenomena. However, these divine effects never would be miracles, for if God were not to act freely but, rather, from the necessity of his nature, he would always act in the same way, in accord with the customary order of things (e.g., he would conserve all things, move all things, and illuminate all intellects, but always in accord with the laws of nature, without any exception). These various errors were already set forth and refuted by St. Thomas himself, for example, in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1.36 (2) However, other adversaries—namely, agnostics and contingentists— deny our ability to discern miracles, rather than their intrinsic possibility. Nonetheless, many of them hold that miracles are not intelligible if they are phenomena that lack some prior phenomenon (that is, in opposition to the principle of causality). {{45}} Moreover, contingentists say the following: As they are defined by theologians, miracles presuppose the hypothetical necessity of the laws of nature so that they are marvelous and divine exceptions to them; now, the laws of nature are not fixed in this way but instead are contingent; hence, a divine exception is not distinguished in an absolute manner from natural exceptions to these laws. Therefore, we must argue at once from the divine freedom and from the laws of nature. Many consider these two reasons separately. However, when this course is taken, the unity of this demonstration is not sufficiently clear. By contrast, St. Thomas considers, in one single argument, the customary course of nature inasmuch as it stands under the divine freedom. 

§2. Demonstration of This Possibility 

This question is treated at length by St. Thomas in opposition to medieval pantheists and Averroists37 in SCG II: ch. 22 (“That God can do all things”); ch. 23 (“That God does not act out of natural necessity”); ch. 24 (“That God acts in accord with His wisdom”); ch. 25 (“How the omnipotent one is said to be unable to do certain things”); ch. 26–29 (“That neither divine intellect, nor the divine will, is confined to determinate effects”); and ch. 30 (“How there can be absolute necessity in created things”) Also see, in bk. 3, ch. 98 and 99 (“That God can act outside the order of nature”). Likewise, see De potentia, q. 6. In ST I, q. 105, a. 6, he proposes the fundamental argument, reducing to one single demonstration all the various proofs that are drawn either from the divine attributes or from the laws of nature that are not absolutely necessary. There he says: If we consider the order of things which depend on any given secondary cause, God can indeed do something outside the order of things, for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes. On the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not through natural necessity but, instead, by His own free choice. Indeed, He could have created another order of things. Whence, when He so chooses, God can do something outside this order created by Him—for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. This demonstration can be reduced to the following syllogism: A superior, free cause, on which depends the application of hypothetically necessary laws without itself being confined to them, can act outside of the order of such laws. Now, God is the omnipotent, free cause on whom depends the application of all hypothetically necessary laws that constitute the order of acting belonging to the whole of created nature, and the divine freedom is not confined to this order. Therefore, God can do something outside of the order of action belonging to the whole of created nature (in other words, can perform miracles). Now, there are three propositions to be proven in this demonstration— namely, the major premise and the two premises contained in the minor premise. (1) A superior, free cause, upon which depends the application of hypothetically necessary laws without itself being confined to them, can act outside of their order. This proposition is made manifest (A) a posteriori by way of examples and (B) a priori through an analysis of the notions involved therein. {{46}} A. A posteriori. By his own freedom, man can throw a stone in the air, thus acting against this hypothetically necessary law: A stone, left to itself, would naturally fall downward.38 Likewise, a person who has a given artistic ability [artifex] acts outside of and above the particular laws of whatever he instrumentally utilizes. Thus, in plucking the strings of a harp, the musician produces an artificial effect through it, one that exceeds the natural power of the string left to itself, such that the non-musician does not know how to produce this effect through this string. Hence, St. Thomas says that the artisan draws out the artificial effect from the obediential potency of the thing that he uses and that obeys him. For example, “the fact that he would make a stool out of wood does not lay in the natural potency” of the wood but, rather, in its obediential potency. 39 Nay, a person who has a given artistic ability [artifex] (for example, a musician of exceptional talent) can act outside and above the ordinary laws of his art, thus producing a work that is not only beautiful but, indeed, sublime (or extraordinary). Nonetheless, this happy exception neither destroys nor negates the ordinary law. Rather, it only suspends its application on account of the extraordinary motive involved therein. Thus, this exception confirms the law, for it is above, not contrary to, it. B. A priori, through analysis of the notions involved therein, this major premise is evident. Indeed, if the application of hypothetically necessary laws depends on some free cause, this cause enjoys freedom of exercise as regards this application or non-application. Moreover, if40 this free and superior cause is not confined to these laws, it also enjoys freedom of specification in relation to them, inasmuch as it can positively act outside or above them, as is clear in the examples cited above. For otherwise, this cause would be determined and necessitated to the application of these laws, thus being subject to them, meaning that it would be neither superior nor free in relation to them. However, now we must prove our demonstration’s minor premise, which contains two propositions. (2) The order of action belonging to the whole of created nature is constituted by laws that are hypothetically, not absolutely, necessary. This is proven as follows. Hypothetical necessity is that which is drawn not from intrinsic causes but, rather, from extrinsic causes (namely, the efficient and final causes). Now, the order of action belonging to the whole of created nature is constituted by laws drawn from the order of efficient causality. Therefore, the order of action belonging to the whole of created nature is constituted by laws that are hypothetically, not absolutely, necessary. {{47}} The definition of hypothetical necessity is found in Aristotle’s writings41 and is explained by St. Thomas in ST I, q. 82, a. 1: The term “necessity” is used in a number of ways, for something is necessary if it cannot not be. Now this may belong to something on account of an intrinsic principle: either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible, or on account of a formal principle, as when we say that it is necessary that the three angles of a triangle be equal to two right angles. In these cases, we have natural and absolute necessity. Necessity belongs to something in another way, on account of something extrinsic, namely either the end or the agent. Such necessity holds in relation to the end inasmuch as the end cannot be attained, or cannot be well attained. For example, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse necessary for traveling. This is called “necessity of end,” and sometimes also is called “usefulness / utility.” On the part of the agent, something is necessary when someone is forced to do something by some [other] agent, so that he cannot act to the contrary. This kind of necessity is called “necessity of coercion.” Likewise, the possible or impossible is divided inasmuch as it is absolute or solely relative to a finite power. 42 This division of necessity can be so written: Hence, absolute necessity is that which, independent from whatsoever condition, cannot not be, nor be otherwise. It is founded immediately on the essence of the thing or on its intrinsic causes. For example, it is absolutely necessary that a triangle have three angles equaling two right angles, for this depends immediately on the essence (or formal cause) of the triangularity. Mathematical laws enunciating the properties of figures or of numbers are absolutely necessary, for mathematics abstracts from efficient and final causality, as Aristotle says on a number of occasions.43 Likewise, metaphysical principles, which have the greatest of universality, are absolutely necessary (e.g., the principle of contradiction or the principle of causality holding that every contingent being has a cause). Hypothetical necessity is that which cannot not be, presupposing some condition or extrinsic (efficient or final) cause. For example, presupposing that a given natural agent happens to act in natural conditions, a given effect is thus necessary. To take an example, if fire acts by its natural power, then it necessarily burns and does not freeze. However, this law does not rule out the possibility that the action of fire would be able to be impeded or modified by some preternatural cause. Similarly, on the part of the end, man must have two eyes in order to see well, but strictly speaking, one eye suffices in order that he be able to see, and man preserves his essence even if he happens to lack sight, just as a demented person, having lost the use of reason, nonetheless remains a man. However, the order of action that belongs to the whole of created nature is constituted by the laws that express the mode of acting belonging to created agents. Therefore, the laws of nature are drawn in accord with efficient causality and hence are hypothetically, not absolutely, necessary. In other words, positing that all [the necessary] created causes (and only them) act in natural conditions, a given effect (e.g., the resurrection of a corpse) is impossible. {{48}} However, in the case of a miracle, a supernatural cause is added— namely, God. These causal laws of nature are either positive or negative, but they are never absolutely necessary. Positive laws express that which created nature can do: presupposing that natural agents act in accord with natural conditions, then they necessarily produce this natural effect. However, these laws do not exclude the possibility that God would supernaturally intervene in order to impede or modify their natural effect. Negative laws express that which created nature cannot do (for example, nature cannot produce life in a corpse, presupposing that nature alone acts). However, these laws do not exclude the possibility that God would supernaturally intervene, if God exists above nature. Likewise, no created cause can make an accident remain in existence without a subject, nor make one substance transubstantiate into another. However, this does not mean that this would be impossible for God.44 Finally, it is clear that these hypothetically necessary laws remain in force even in the case wherein their application is suspended by a superior cause (e.g., fire preserves its power to burn, even if it does not exercise this combustive power, just as a stone preserves its gravitational inclination, even if it is thrown upward). Hence, a miracle is not a violation of the laws of nature. In other words, miracles are not contrary to nature. Therefore, the hypothetical necessity of the causal laws of nature is essentially distinguished from the absolute necessity of mathematical laws or of metaphysical principles. Only such absolute necessity excludes the possibility of miracles. Thus, it is not surprising that Spinoza denied that miracles are possible, for according to his Cartesian tendencies, he wished to reduce physical laws to mathematical laws, which abstract from final and efficient causality, thus rendering them absolutely necessary. Nay, certain laws of nature are, properly speaking, contingent (e.g., that the earth is moved in one given direction rather than the opposite, for this is not determined by the nature of the earth, as is the case for the power of burning that proceeds from the nature of fire). {{49}} (3) God is the omnipotent, free cause upon whom depends the application of all hypothetically necessary laws, and he is not confined to them. And there are two parts in this proposition. A. God is a free, omnipotent cause. (a) Indeed, the First Cause must necessarily be immaterial and intelligent, for otherwise he could not produce our intellects nor order the world, for the greater is not produced from the lesser. Now, the will follows the intellect (ST I, q. 19, a. 1), and the divine will is free concerning particular things, which it does not need in order to have its infinite goodness in itself. “Whence, since God’s goodness is perfect and can exist without other goods, gaining no perfection from others,” it follows that God is free to act ad extra—namely, to create or not create.45 Not only does God act freely ad extra but, moreover, he acts there through will, thus differing, for example, from man in human generation, in which case man freely generates, though not through will but instead because he is a given nature. And St. Thomas proves this against pantheists and Averroists in ST I, q. 19, a. 4:46 First, indeed, this is seen in the very order of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as is proven in Physics, bk. 2, ch. 5, it is necessary that the natural agent have its end and the necessary means for attaining that end predetermined for it by some higher intellect, as the arrow’s end and definite movement is predetermined for it by the archer. Whence, an intellectual and voluntary agent must precede agents that act by nature. Therefore, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will. Moreover, this is clear from the character of a natural agent, which has the property of producing one and the same effect, for nature acts in one and the same way unless it comes to be prevented from so acting. This is because the nature of an agent’s activity accords with that agent’s nature. Hence, for however long it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature, for every natural agent has a determinate being. Therefore, since the Divine Being is not determined and contains in Himself the fullness of the perfection of being, He would act by a necessity of His nature only if He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being. However, as we have already shown (ST I, q. 7, a. 2), this is clearly impossible. He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of nature. Rather, determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection in accord with the determination of His will and intellect. Finally, this is seen in how effects are related to their cause, for given that every agent produces its like, effects proceed from the agent that causes them in so far as those effects preexist in the agent causing them. Now, effects preexist in their cause according to the mode of the cause. Whence, since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects preexist in Him in an intellectual manner. Therefore, they proceed from Him in an intelligible manner and, consequently, in a volitional manner. . . . Therefore, God’s will is the cause of things. (b) Moreover, God is omnipotent. In other words, his power is infinite, for operative power follows upon existence, and “the divine existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited through receptive [potency].”47 Indeed, if the divine existence were received into a finite essence, then it would be caused and not uncaused, self-subsistent existence.48 Hence, God can do whatever is absolutely possible— namely, whatever is not contradictory in relation to existence.49 “And whatever is attributed to God’s power considered in itself, He is said to be able to do in accord with His absolute power. Such things include everything in which the character of being is preserved [thus solely excluding that which implies contradiction]. However, whatever is attributed to the divine power inasmuch as it executes the command of His just will, {{50}} God is said to be able to do by His ordered power,”50 which is, as is immediately proven thereafter, either ordinary or extraordinary. B. The application of all hypothetically necessary laws depends upon the divine freedom, which is not confined to them. (a) Indeed, the application of the hypothetically necessary laws of nature depends upon the exercise of the action of the natural agent [in question] and upon its end. Now, the action of any given created agent depends upon the first agent—namely, upon God, who acts ad extra in a free manner—for every created agent needs to be “premoved” by God in order that it may act.51 And every natural end is subordinated to the ultimate, spiritual end intended by God, for the order of agents corresponds to the order of ends. Hence, God can sometimes deny his natural concurrence, which is necessary for the activity of a created agent, just as he is not bound to create things or to conserve them in existence. Therefore, a contradiction is not involved in a natural action [operatio] falling short (e.g., as in the case of fire that does not burn), if God draws back his concurrence from it. In this, we can see God’s freedom in relation to the exercise of acts (quoad exercitium). (b) Likewise, as regards specification, God is free in relation to the order of nature, inasmuch as he is not confined to it. This is said against the medieval Averroists, as well as against the absolute optimism and determinism of moral necessity found in Leibniz and Malebranche. As St. Thomas says in SCG II, ch. 26, “Lest someone should think that God’s intellect or knowledge [scientia] can only reach certain effects, thus meaning that He acts by a kind of intellectual necessity, though not out of natural necessity, we still must show that His knowledge [scientia] or intellect is confined within no limits in its effects.” God can do other things than what he does, for the order placed in things by divine wisdom does not equal the divine wisdom. . . . Thus, it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into the things which he makes is taken from their end. Thus, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to a given, definite order. However, the divine goodness is an end which exceeds all proportion with created things. Whence, the divine wisdom is not restricted to any particular order such that no other course of things could have come forth from it.52 Indeed, it is true to say that God could not have done better, “if the word ‘better’ is an adverb and implies the mode of activity of the one acting, for God cannot act with greater wisdom and goodness. However, if the word ‘better’ is a noun or implies something regarding the manner of existence of what has thus been created, in that case, then, He is able to do something better”53 or, in other words, can create better things because “God can do something better than any given thing that he has done,” given that there is forever an infinite abyss that separates the finite goodness of created things and his infinite. And he even can make accidentally better the very things that he has made, for example, by increasing their power (for example, human wisdom). Therefore, God is not confined to a given order of nature. Conclusion. Therefore, God can act outside and above the order of acting belonging to the whole of created nature (or, in other words, can perform miracles). And when he performs one, he does not act contrary to nature but, rather, acts in accord with its obediential potency, by which all creatures are naturally suited to obey God, so as to accept whatever he may wish, as the instrument obeys the artisan or as the arm obeys the human will.54 {{51}} There is only one efficient cause and one end outside of which God cannot act— namely, himself, the very first cause and final end of all things. Nor can it be said, with the deists, that only general volitions pertain to God’s dignity but not particular volitions, governing through the mediacy of laws and not providing for particular things immediately. And St. Thomas responds in ST I, q. 22, a. 3, ad 1: “It belongs to a king’s dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. However, the fact that he does not have a plan for those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency that exists in him, for every knowledge ordered to activity is perfect to the degree that it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.” “God, who has in His intellect the notion of all things, even the smallest, provides for all things, and He has given to whatever causes He has placed in charge of certain effects the power to produce those effects.”55 Therefore, God can act outside of the order of nature, negatively or positively. He does so negatively by impeding the action of natural things (for example, the action of fire). He does so positively in three ways, as is set forth in the division of miracles, inasmuch as they exceed the power of nature: as regards the substance of what is done (e.g., bodily glorification), in relation to the subject in which it takes place (e.g., resurrection), or as regards the way it is done (e.g., a sudden conversion of water into wine). These effects are possible for God’s absolute power (inasmuch as they do not imply a contradiction) and for God’s ordered, though extraordinary, power. On the end of miracles. However, a proportionate end is required for this extraordinary intervention by God. Now, the manifestation of the saving truth is a sufficient end for God to act outside the order of nature. Indeed, St. Thomas says in SCG III, ch. 99 (in fine): Nor should we take this argument lightly, namely, that God does something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men, for as we showed earlier (ch. 17), all bodily creatures are, in a sense, ordered to intellectual nature as an end and, moreover, this intellectual nature’s end is divine knowledge, as we also showed above. Therefore, it is not surprising that some change is made in bodily substance in order that provision might be made for the intellectual nature to be able to know God. Indeed, the whole of the bodily world is, as it were, nothing in comparison with the supernatural grace conferred upon this soul, “for the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole of the universe.”56 Likewise, miracles can be performed “in order to demonstrate the holiness of someone, which God would like to propose to men as an example of virtue.”57 And sometimes, he miraculously “bestows upon man some particular benefit, namely, bodily health, beyond the common benefit set forth in miracles, namely so that they may lead men to knowledge of God.”58 Corollary: No creature can perform miracles through its own proper power; however, in order to perform a miracle, God can make use of men and good angels as instruments. {{52}} The first part of this follows from the definition of miracles, for they exceed all created powers (cf. ST I, q. 110, a. 4), and we will discuss below how we can discern effects that exceed all created powers and likewise can distinguish true miracles from false miracles (e.g., from wonders performed by demons). The second part of the corollary is proven as follows. In order for rational creatures to be physical instruments of God, it is required and suffices that they receive from God some transient supernatural power, and by their own proper powers act dispositively in relation to the miraculous effect thus performed. Now, it is not difficult for God to confer this kind of power upon the rational nature, just as our soul instrumentally moves our members or external things. And thus holy men perform miracles not only by praying and asking for things but also by cooperating with God. “For God instrumentally uses either the internal powers of man, his speech, or also, some kind of external act.”59 By contrast, no instrument is possible in the case of creation, for “the instrumental cause participates in the action of the superior cause only inasmuch as it acts dispositively through something that is proper to itself in bringing about the principal agent’s effect. . . . And it cannot do something dispositively and instrumentally in relation to the effect of creation since creation is not brought about from anything presupposed which could be disposed through the action of an instrumental agent.”60 Objection: A miracle can only be produced by a divine and infinite power. Now, creatures cannot participate in infinite power. Therefore, creatures cannot instrumentally cause miracles. Response: I concede the major premise but make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I concede that creatures cannot participate in infinite power as its own proper power. However, I deny that they cannot participate in an instrumental and transient motion coming from the omnipotent God. Indeed, this instrumental motion does not need to be proportioned to the subject in which it is received, except in a transient manner. Moreover, it is received in it on account of its passive obediential potency, which belongs to all things inasmuch as they are created beings. Therefore, a spiritual instrumental power can exist in a transient manner in a bodily instrument because it does not need to be proportioned to it, and it is received in it not inasmuch as it is bodily but, rather, inasmuch as it is a being.61 Thus, our intellective soul instrumentally makes use of its body in order to manifest its thoughts. Even if one’s face is bodily, it is in some way intelligent—namely, instrumentally— inasmuch as it exists under the motion of the intellect and the will. Likewise does it express the virtues or the vices. Whether an evil person can instrumentally perform miracles. As St. Thomas says, “Since the performing of miracles is a kind of divine testimony indicating the divine power and truth, if the power of performing miracles is given to demons, whose will is wholly turned to evil, God would stand in witness to their falsity, which is not suited to the divine goodness.”62 Hence, the demons can only simulate miracles through the alteration of bodies or through some sensual illusion brought about through the alteration of one’s imagination. “Miracles can be performed in order to confirm the truth of preaching by anyone who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, {{53}} which even the wicked do from time to time.”63 “However, miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are performed. Hence, wicked men who teach false doctrine never perform true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although they may sometimes do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer.”64 We have thus provided sufficient proof for the possibility of miracles, which God alone can perform as their principal cause. 

§3. Resolution of Objections 

There are two, mutually opposed series of objections concerning this matter. The first proceeds from determinism, whereas the second proceeds from contingentism. I . Ob j e c t i o n s p r o c e e d i n g fr o m d e t e r m i n i s m These objections proceed from determinism inasmuch as it is applied to God or to the laws of nature. They can be proposed (A) in their ordinary form and (B) in their more recent form. A. Objections in their ordinary form First objection: A miracle is something outside of the orderly course of things [est praeter ordinem]. Now, the divine wisdom cannot act outside of the orderly course of things. Therefore[, miracles cannot be wrought by God.] Response: A miracle is outside of the order of things inasmuch as things are subordinate to [a given] order, though not as regards the very notion of order, for it is ordered by God. Second objection: A miracle would require alterations in divine will and providence themselves. Now the divine will and providence are immutable. Therefore, miracles are impossible. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede the point if God had not decreed from eternity that there would be exceptions to these very laws. Otherwise, I deny the claim. 1. It will be insisted, however, that there can be no such exception. Indeed, to act in an exceptional manner outside the order of nature would be to act violently (i.e., contrary to nature). Now, it is not fitting to God that he act in a violent manner. Therefore[, there can be no such exception to the laws of the natural order]. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede the point if this action were not performed in accord with the obediential potency by which the creature is naturally suited to obey God. Otherwise, I deny it. 2. Urging the point further, one could say that this would be opposed to its obediential potency. For, indeed, God cannot do something outside the order of metaphysical principles, especially outside the order of the principle of contradiction. Now, this fundamental principle is included in every necessary proposition, even in the laws of nature. Therefore, God cannot act outside the laws of nature. Response: I concede the major premise, though I distinguish the minor. I concede that the principle of contradiction is included in every necessary proposition, in accord with the way that it is necessary. However, I deny that it is so included in such a way that every necessary proposition is absolutely necessary. Moreover, I distinguish the conclusion along the same lines: I concede that God could not act outside the laws of nature if they were absolutely necessary, but I deny that he could not do so if they are only hypothetically necessary. For example, it is necessary that a dead person not rise so long as nature alone acts; however, this does not exclude the possibility that the dead could rise through God’s supernatural intervention. 3. Pushing back more, however, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary. The principle of causality, even though it holds from the perspective of the efficient cause, is nonetheless likewise absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of the order that it establishes. Now the laws of nature are laws of causality. Therefore, God cannot act outside of them. {{54}} Response: No parity exists between the utterly universal principle of causality, on the one hand, and the laws of nature, on the other. Indeed, the former principle extends even to the divine causality, outside of which God obviously cannot act, for he cannot bring into existence an uncaused creature. By contrast, the laws of nature express a manner of acting belonging to created nature, and God can modify this manner of acting. The principle of efficient causality is hypothetical only in the sense that it is possible that a contingent beings not exist, though it is absolutely necessary that contingency depends upon the most universal first cause. 4. Further insistence: Even if the laws of nature are particular, nonetheless, they are absolutely necessary. Indeed, even though mathematical laws are particular, they are absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of them. Now, the laws of nature are expressed mathematically and, hence, are likened unto mathematical laws. Therefore, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary, and God cannot act outside of them. Response: I concede the major premise. God cannot, even extraordinarily, make a triangle whose three angles would not be equal to two right angles. However, I make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I concede that the laws of nature are likened unto mathematical laws as regards their quantitative (or numeric) expression. However, I deny that they are such as regards their very nature. For mathematical laws are drawn from the formal principles of figures or numbers and hence are absolutely necessary. By contrast, the causal laws of nature are drawn from extrinsic causes—namely, from efficient or final causality—and hence are hypothetically necessary. In other words, something that is mathematically impossible is absolutely impossible, whereas what is physically impossible is impossible for sensible nature, though not absolutely for every possible cause. Spinoza erred when he reduced physics to mathematics, for only mathematics abstracts from efficient and final causality. 65 5. Further insistence: Even if they are distinguished from mathematical laws, the laws of nature are absolutely necessary. Indeed, natural things have a determinate essence, whence flow determinate properties and a determinate manner of acting. Now, God cannot change what is essential to some given thing and simultaneously have that thing remain what it is. Therefore, God cannot change the natural manner of action in natural things. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede that natural things have a determinate manner of acting as regards the power of acting. However, I deny that this is so as regards the exercise of their activity. I concede the minor premise. I distinguish the conclusion along the same lines as the major. As St. Thomas says in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 20: “In the furnace’s fire, an order to burning remains, even though it did not burn the three young men therein.” 6. Further insistence: Not even in relation to the exercise of a thing’s activity can God act outside the laws of nature. Indeed, God cannot do something outside the order of justice. Now, the order of justice is the rule of the very exercise of moral action, for the omission of due action is a sin. Therefore, similarly, God cannot act outside of the order of nature, by which the exercise of natural agents’ action is ruled. Response: As St. Thomas explains (in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3), there is no parity here, for the order of justice directly designates an order to the ultimate end, outside of which God cannot act, whereas, by contrast, the laws of nature do not directly designate an order to the ultimate end but, rather, an order of one creature to another. Thus, God cannot, in an extraordinary manner, order us to despair or to hate God, for this would represent the denial of his infinite goodness. 7. Further insistence: Moreover, God cannot act outside of the particular moral precepts that rule the interrelationships between men. For example, God cannot, in an extraordinary manner, command murder. Therefore, similarly, God cannot act outside of natural laws. Response: I deny the major premise. See what St. Thomas says in ST III, suppl., q. 67, a. 2: “There can be a divine dispensation even to the first principles of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing forth some divine mystery. {{55}} For example, we see the dispensation to the precept given to Abraham in relation to the slaying of his innocent son. However, such dispensations are not granted to all generally, but only to certain individual persons, as also is the case for miracles.” Likewise, see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2 and q. 100, a. 8, ad 3: “When Abraham consented to kill his son, he did not consent to murder, for his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death, for He Himself inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent. If a man executes that sentence upon the Divine authority, he will no more be a murderer than God would be.” Likewise, see Cajetan’s comments on this article: Just as this statement, “the dead cannot rise,” is necessary (according to natural power) . . . and when God raises someone, He does not falsify that proposition or do away with it but, instead, acts above (not contrary to) nature, so too in the present case, this conclusion, “One must not murder,” in the sense in which it is expressed, namely, by a private authority with certain other conditions, is a necessary conclusion; . . . however, since God orders the performance of an act which would be murder were he not to command it, he orders an action that is not outside or contrary to the precept but, rather, as it were, one that is above it, provided that he orders that the commanded act be performed by a superior authority. B. Objections raised by more recent forms of determinism Objection: Science presupposes the immutability of the laws of nature, for this provides the foundation for us to have infallible foresight concerning natural effects. Now, a miracle would disturb this immutable order and would impede our foresight. Therefore, miracles are impossible. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I deny that science presupposes the metaphysical immutability that founds metaphysically infallible foresight [concerning natural effects]. I concede that it presupposes physical immutability as the foundation for physically certain foresight [concerning natural effects]. I contradistinguish the minor in the same manner. Indeed, the natural law holding that the dead cannot rise naturally remains in force even if they do sometimes supernaturally rise. Nay, the law is thereby confirmed, for no natural agent but, rather, God alone can cause someone to rise from the dead. This does not disturb the law in question, for it takes place in few cases, just as natural exceptions also occur in a few cases. (For example, a man is sometimes born with six fingers on his hand.) Moreover, superior agents often alter the activity of inferior agents without the laws [of nature] being violated, as, for example, when the law of gravity is not destroyed by someone throwing a stone in the air, even though gravity is overcome by another through a superior force. Similarly, the vital powers of plants and animals make use of physical powers and surpass them. 1. It will be insisted, however, that at the very least there cannot be an exception to the fundamental principle of the conservation of energy. Now, a miracle would represent an exception to this principle, for through an extraordinary intervention, God would change the quantity of energy that exists in the world. Therefore[, miracles remain impossible]. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede it if that principle were utterly universal, like the principle of causality. However, I deny it if it is only particular and true for the physical agents with which the physicist is concerned. I distinguish the minor along the same lines. This principle is a hypothesis that is held commonly enough today for energy arising from physical actions, which are the object of external experience. (For example, an equal amount of energy exists between motion and heat when heat is generated by motion.) However, this law cannot be extended, without a vicious circle [petitione principii], to the energy that arises from God’s invisible influence. In order to affirm this extension, one would need to prove that the world is a closed system, receiving nothing from God’s invisible influence, and this cannot be proven by science. Rather, it is only a gratuitous postulate presented by materialism, which a priori denies the existence of God. 2. Continued insistence: At least we must say that there cannot be an exception to the principle of causality: “Every phenomenon presupposes an antecedent phenomenon.” Now, a miracle would be a phenomenon without a phenomenal antecedent. Therefore, miracles are impossible. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede that there cannot be an exception to the principle of contradiction, rightly understood: Everything that is done has a cause. However, there can be an exception to the principle of causality wrongly understood, along phenomenalist lines. {{56}} It suffices that there be a first, free cause existing above the phenomenal order. 3. Continued insistence: Nonetheless, a miracle can only be intelligible for us as being an effect of some phenomenal antecedent—namely, as an effect of living faith, which exceeds physical powers, just as our freedom moves our body. 66 Response: I make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I concede the point along phenomenalist or evolutionist lines, and then a miracle would not be, properly speaking, a divine effect and would only have a symbolic value. However, according to the principles of sound philosophy, a miracle is intelligible as a fact that manifestly displays the divine omnipotence, as is said by the [First] Vatican Council. 4. Continued insistence: It is unfitting that a greater good would be forsaken for the sake of a lesser one. Now, in a miracle, a greater good is forsaken in this way for a lesser one— namely, the good of the universe for a given particular good. Therefore, it is unfitting that a miracle be performed. Response: I deny the minor premise, for the order of the universe, in which its own good consists, is not destroyed through the performance of a miracle. Rather, the only thing that is removed is the order of a given particular cause to its effect (e.g., fire to burning). Hence, when a miracle is performed, a particular good is forsaken for the sake of a greater good and a loftier end. 5. Continued insistence: However, as Leibniz says (in Theodicy, 3.249), the order of a given particular cause to its effect cannot be done away with without the entire course of the universe’s activity thereby being altered, on account of the interconnection of all bodies with each other. Indeed, all things disposed by God are connected together in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, this world is the best of all possible worlds. Response: Leibniz’s conception here, which is called psychological determinism or the determinism of moral necessity, is false. Yes, it retains the terms involved in discussing human and divine freedom, but it in fact does away with their very reality. Indeed, freedom does not require only deliberating intelligence, spontaneity, and the contingency that is found in the physical world. Beyond this, the dominating indifference of the practical judgment and the will are required, things that Leibniz denies (cf. Theodicy, 3.302).67 Thus, not all things that are willed by God are necessarily connected in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason, and this world is not the best of all possible worlds. God can forever make better things. Nor does man, by throwing a stone in the air, thereby change the entire course of the universe. Moreover, the principle of raison d’être68 must be understood analogically, not univocally. That is, it must be understood proportionally, or in various ways in things that are themselves necessary in various manners (namely, metaphysically or physically, and when physically either always or only in most cases, for matter is the principle of non-determination in physical things).69 St. Thomas resolves this objection in De potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ad 21: “We must say that when God does something contrary to the course of nature, He does not destroy the whole order of the universe but, rather, only the course which is from the order of one particular thing to another.” I I . Ob j e c t i o n s p r o c e e d i n g fr o m c o n t i n g e n t i s m Objection: Miracles presuppose the hypothetical necessity of the laws of nature. Now, the laws of nature certainly {{57}} are not hypothetically necessary but instead are contingent, for it is not rare that exceptions take place. Therefore, miracles are impossible or, at least, are not specifically distinct from natural exceptions. Response: I concede the major, while distinguishing the minor premise. I will let the claim pass if one means that all natures are contradictorily identified with each other in universal becoming, as absolute evolutionism wishes things to be. However, I deny it if, in virtue of the principle of contradiction and identity, the natures of things are distinguished from each other. I distinguish the conclusion along the same lines. Allow me to explain. According to absolute evolutionism, contradictory things are identified in becoming itself, as Heraclitus held among the ancients and Hegel in modern times. Hence, according to natural evolution, the more proceeds from what is less and the more perfect from the less perfect, and this is something more than a miracle—indeed, the production of the impossible itself. Nay, absolute evolutionism identifies necessity and contingency and hence denies the possibility of miracles, sometimes on account of the necessity of laws (as in idealistic evolutionism) and sometimes on account of their absolute contingency (as in certain forms of empirical evolutionism). By contrast, in virtue of the principle of contradiction, being and nonbeing are radically opposed, and becoming is not self-explanatory, for it is not self-subsistent being. Consequently, there is a real and essential distinction between, on the one hand, God, who is immobile and completely simple, and, on the other, the changing and composite world. Hence, the law of created agents is not the same as the law of God’s creative action. A creature cannot do whatever is possible for God, just as flesh cannot do what spirit can do. In the world, there are at least determinate laws that are hypothetically necessary: for created agents in general, for inanimate bodies, for living beings like plants, for animals, and for men. For example, there most certainly are laws like the following: Living things do not naturally return to life after their death; brute animals neither speak nor reason. The denial of these laws represents the contradictory confusion of all natures with each other. Nevertheless, natures are diverse, as well as whatever takes place on account of their activity (inasmuch as activity follows upon being and the mode of acting upon the mode of being). 1. However, it is insisted that in order to know hypothetically necessary laws, we must know the essences of things. Now, we do not know the essences of things. Therefore[, we do not know hypothetically necessary laws]. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I deny that we must know them intuitively and in a comprehensive manner. However, I concede that we must know them abstractively and imperfectly. I contradistinguish the minor premise along the same lines. It suffices that we generically know what bodily living things are, even if we are not aware of what their specific differences are, in order that we might know, for example, the law stating that following upon death living things do not naturally return to life. Otherwise, induction of the laws [of nature] would be entirely impossible, bringing all physical science to ruin. 2. Continued insistence: Scientific classifications and laws are only representations that are useful for subjectively ordering phenomena. Hence, a miracle is only an abrogation of our subjective classifications, though not an abrogation of the laws of nature. Hence, it does not have an ontological value but instead only a symbolic one. Such was the position of Édouard Le Roy and Fr. Laberthonnière. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede the point if it is considered in line with nominalism or conceptualism, denying it, however, if considered in terms of moderate realism. I distinguish the consequent in a similar manner. Contrary to what is held by the nominalism of empiricists and the conceptualism of subjectivists, moderate realism efficaciously defends the ontological value of the first notions and principles of reason, hence also defending the ontological value of miracles. On this, see what we said earlier, in vol. 1, ch. 9 (Examination of Agnosticism). Indeed, positive science must not metaphysically determine what the nature of things is; however, it also must not admit the principles of a false philosophy (namely, nominalism or phenomenalism). Otherwise, it would not be positive science but instead a form of positivistic science. In reality, positive science must speak in accord with common sense— that is, in accord with natural reason concerning the substance of things, their powers, the soul’s faculties, and so forth. {{58}} Our commonsense notions contain, vaguely, in the form of nominal definitions, the real definitions that are arrived at by philosophical reason. However, what common sense and sound philosophy understand by the term “humanity” is not an empirical collection of men but, rather, human nature, for otherwise, to say, “Peter is a man” or “Peter has humanity” would mean the same thing as saying, “Peter has a collection of men.” Likewise, what common sense and sound philosophy mean by the term “human will” is not the collection of volitions but, rather, a given faculty. Thus, in virtue of the realism of our natural reason, classifications and laws, at least those fundamental laws that are established by science with certitude, designate extramental things and the real notions of things. 

ART. 3: ON THE DISCERNIBILITY OF MIRACLES 

§1. State of the question: The principal objection raised by adversaries 

§2. The Church’s teaching 

§3. On certitude and its degrees in relation to the discernibility of miracles 

§4. On the discernibility of miracles as regards the nature of the fact (or as regards their supernaturality) 

§5. On the discernibility of miracles as regards the existence of the fact 

§6. On false miracles and on magic, Spiritism, and hypnotism 

§7. Resolution of objections 

§1. State of the Question: The Principal Objection Raised by Adversaries 

No few rationalists concede that miracles are possible. However, they hold either that they do not exist or that they cannot be distinguished from more or less extraordinary natural facts or from wonders. In the introduction to his work, Vie de Jésus, Ernst Renan wrote, “We do not say that miracles are impossible but, rather, that hitherto no miracle has been truly demonstrated.” Kant held the same thing, as do agnostics in general. According to the modernists, like Édouard Le Roy, only religious faith can discern what is a miracle, for physically considered, a miracle does not differ from a natural fact, though, for religious faith, it is a symbolic sign of the value of faith itself. The principal objection against the discernibility of miracles is: It is impossible to know with firm certitude that something that has been done exceeds all of nature’s powers, for we do not know all the powers and laws of nature. Hence, that which is inexplicable through laws that are already known can come into existence through natural laws and powers that are unknown. Nay, agnostics add, as we said above: We do not know the laws of nature as they are outside of the soul in things themselves. Hence, that which seems to us to be an abrogation of these laws as they are in reality is, perhaps, only an abrogation of these laws as they are conceived by us. However, we already saw the resolution to this last difficulty at the end of the preceding article. 

§2. The Church’s Teaching 

Against this error held by agnostics, the [First] Vatican Council defined: “If anyone says that no miracles are possible . . . or that miracles can never be recognized with certainty and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be legitimately proved by them, let him be anathema.”70 And the corresponding chapter in Dei filius states: “which as they (miracles) manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, they are {{59}} the most certain signs of divine revelation adapted to the intelligence of all men.”71 And in Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris, miracles are called “established proofs, as it were, of unshaken truth.”72 Indeed, miracles would not manifestly display the omnipotence of God if they were not discernible from natural facts. Likewise, in order that they might be utterly certain signs of divine revelation, they themselves must be known with certitude by reason alone, prior to the reception of faith, which is founded upon revelation. Indeed, as is defined in logic, a sign is that which, beyond the appearance it brings forward to the senses, makes something other than itself come into one’s knowledge.73 Thus, upon seeing smoke, we come to know the fire that exists under it. However, a sign is certain when it determinately signifies something and uncertain when it can signify many things (e.g., a red face). Likewise, in the Anti-Modernist Oath we read: “I accept and acknowledge external arguments of revelation, that is, divine deeds, in particular miracles and prophecies as utterly certain signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion, and I hold that they are most excellently adapted to the understanding of all eras and men, even of our own days.” Above all, we must note that, as regards the discernibility of miracles, a natural certitude exists that is loftier than the practical moral certitude admitted by Georg Hermes. Indeed, along with Kant, Hermes held that speculative reason can only arrive at a merely subjective persuasion concerning objective reality, which itself can only be phenomenal and apparent in character. As regards practical reason, Hermes held, following Kant’s thought on the matter, that it is autonomous. And whenever practical reason imposes some duty upon us, it obligates to all those things required for the fulfillment of that duty. Hence, according to Hermes, sometimes we find ourselves faced with the obligation to admit as being practically certain something that is theoretically uncertain (e.g., the obligation of admitting the testimony of the external senses, or the experience and honesty of men, or experience of current or past things—and, hence, the truth of history and of miracles). Hermes said we cannot have physical certitude concerning the reality of a given man’s death based upon the viewing of a corpse; however, we have the moral duty to bury the dead. Therefore, this duty requires us to admit, as something morally certain, the death of a man who must be buried. From this theory, it follows that our reason cannot prove the fact of revelation with utter certitude. Already before the [First] Vatican Council, this Hermesian teaching was condemned by Pius IX in his encyclical Qui pluribus: Indeed, human reason, lest it be deceived and err in a matter of so great importance, ought to investigate diligently the fact of divine revelation so that it can know with certainty that God has spoken. . . . But how many, how wonderful, how splendid are the proofs at hand by which human reason ought to be entirely and most clearly convinced that the religion of Christ is divine . . . and that, therefore, nothing is more certain than our faith.74 Objection: The Church does not seem to admit that individual [human] reason can discern a miracle with certitude, for the Church reserves to herself judgment concerning the truth of miracles, for example, in the canonization of saints. (Such was the argument made by Maurice Blondel.75 ) Response: {{60}} The Church sometimes solemnly and officially judges concerning the truth of certain miracles and concerning the sufficiency of given signs for the manifestation of the holiness of the servants of God. Indeed, it is true that this official judgment does not fall to individual persons’ reason. Likewise, the Church solemnly defined (e.g., at the [First] Vatican Council) as a dogma of faith: “The narrations concerning miracles contained in Sacred Scripture are not to be dismissed as being fables and myths.” However, this does not mean that individual reason is incapable of knowing miracles. Nay, the Church herself presents miracles as being “the most certain signs (of her divine mission), adapted to the intelligence of all men.”76 Therefore, miracles are naturally knowable with certitude before one comes to admit the divine mission and infallibility of the Church. 

§3. On Certitude and Its Degrees in Relation to the Discernibility of Miracles 

On certitude in general. Certitude is the firmness of the mind’s adherence to some given knowable thing, without any fear of error. It does not suffice that the intellect be without fear; rather, the exclusion of fear must arise from a due motive (or foundation). On account of one’s prejudices, ignorance, or passions, someone can be firmly persuaded that something is the case, even when it is in fact false. However, this accidental firmness does not suffice for the formal character of certitude. Moreover, we must not confuse persuasion, even when firm, which sometimes is concerned with false things, with certitude. The formal motive of certitude is always and essentially (per se) that which is true and causes a true judgment. Persuasion, even when firm, if it is considered later with diligence, can be set aside as being false. However, this is not so for certitude. Certitude admits of degrees, not as regards the exclusion of the fear of erring but, rather, as regards the firmness of one’s adherence, inasmuch as this firmness is founded essentially (per se) in metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity. (Similarly, spirituality admits of degrees, not as regards the exclusion of matter but, rather, as regards the perfection of spirit.) These various degrees must be explained in relation to the present question: Metaphysical certitude, which is founded on metaphysical necessity, is had when the connection between the predicate and subject of a statement is absolutely necessary— that is, when it depends on the nature of its subject and predicate being made manifest through an analysis of those notions. Therefore, the denial of a metaphysically certain assertion implies a contradiction in an absolute manner. In this certitude, there is an absolutely necessary resolution to intelligible being, the formal object of the intellect, and to the first principles of reason. Hence, this certitude completely exceeds experience, even if the notions involved in the principles arise materially from experience through abstraction. Thus, it is metaphysically certain that every contingent being is caused and, hence, that there is a first, Uncaused Cause. Indeed, the denial of God’s existence is radical absurdity, for were God no longer to exist, all things would become absurd, as we see, for example, in Hegel’s absolute evolutionism. Likewise, as we will come to say, it is metaphysically certain that God alone can cause transubstantiation or raise the dead. {{61}} Like those forms of certitude to be discussed below, metaphysical certitude can be spontaneous (as it is for common sense) or critical / reflexive (as it is in metaphysics). Moreover, there is certitude that is intrinsically metaphysical, which is directly founded on metaphysical necessity, and certitude that is extrinsically or metaphysical by [intellectual] resolution inasmuch as something physically or morally certain cannot be denied without some metaphysical impossibility indirectly following from such a denial (e.g., that something comes into being without a cause). Mathematical certitude is reduced to metaphysical certitude inasmuch as it is concerned with absolutely necessary propositions. Nay, from our perspective, mathematical evidence is clearer than is metaphysical inasmuch as it is less remote from the senses. Physical certitude is founded on the physical necessity of the laws of nature, which are hypothetically necessary and do potentially undergo exceptions. This certitude is had, formally, by the mediation of experience (that is, formally by the mediation of the senses), and its resolution to being and to the first principles of being is only hypothetically necessary. This is particularly clear in foresight that is physically (not metaphysically) certain, for physical certitude concerning a future fact is less than physical certitude concerning a present fact in which it is empirically clear that there is no exception involved therein. Even if physical certitude (whether spontaneous or scientific) is inferior to metaphysical certitude, it is a true form of certitude, fully excluding fear of error. Thus, I am physically certain concerning the existence of the table on which I am writing, and through reflection, we can firmly know that this is not a hallucination. For there are the laws and conditions for hallucination, and it is easy enough for me to verify whether these conditions in fact do exist. Hence, sometimes, intrinsically physical certitude can, through reflection, become extrinsically metaphysical if its falsity were to lead to a kind of metaphysical impossibility. This is so if it were a question of all sensations taken together—that is, of the existence of the external world. Otherwise, a sensation would exist without that which is sensed, which is a contradictory claim; it would exist without an end, without an efficient cause, and [thus] without any raison d’être. However, nothing exists without a raison d’être. 77 This likewise holds true if we are speaking of general facts (e.g., heat generally expands iron; the falsity of countless experiences concerning this fact would lack a raison d’être). Likewise, this holds for the case of some particular fact upon which the religious life of humanity depends. (e.g., Based on the experience of seeing Christ’s scars, the Resurrection of Christ was quasi-physically certain for the apostles and for a number of disciples. If in these circumstances this knowledge concerning Christ’s Resurrection were false, God would have permitted the whole of the Christian religion, which is fruitful in all good things, to be founded on an invincible error, which is contrary to the rational notion of providence.) Moral certitude is founded on moral necessity and on the moral impossibility of the opposite being true.78 For example, it is morally impossible that men would naturally arrive at perfect knowledge {{62}} of all the truths of natural religion. Hence, if this knowledge exists, it is morally certain that it comes from God who reveals. Likewise, it is morally impossible that a given intelligent and honest witness would lie in these particular circumstances. This certitude is had through the mediation of suitable human testimony. Yes, indeed, it is metaphysically and physically possible that a witness can be deceived and can deceive. Nonetheless, all things considered, his testimony seems evidently credible, and it produces true moral certitude and not merely great probability. For example, it is certain that my father, whose truthfulness I know well, is not lying when he tells me about the death of my brother. By contrast, testimony offered by some foreigner frequently furnishes only probability. Moreover, against Georg Hermes, we must distinguish speculative moral certitude from prudential certitude. The first is concerned with a given fact, whether existing or past, and can be either spontaneous or critical (and then it is called historical certitude). The other— namely, prudential certitude—also called practico-practical moral certitude, is concerned with the moral fittingness of an action, especially concerning the golden mean to be observed in a given, utterly particularized act (e.g., in order to preserve, here and now, the virtue of humility). For, as St. Thomas says, following Aristotle: “The truth of the speculative intellect is taken through the intellect’s conformity to reality [ad rem]. . . . Whereas the truth of the practical intellect (in prudence) is taken through conformity to right appetite” 79—that is, to right intention—and this takes place when we must prudentially judge concerning contingent things to be done. Thus, someone who is invincibly unaware of the fact that a given wine contains poison can judge with practical certitude concerning the moral fittingness that this wine is to be drunk, while nonetheless erring speculatively. His judgment is conformed to right intention, not to reality. Hence, sometimes intrinsically moral certitude can, through reflection, become extrinsically metaphysical, if its falsity would mean that a kind of metaphysical impossibility would follow. This is so in the case of the universal testimony of men, the falsity of which would be lacking in a raison d’être. The same holds true in the case of the testimony of many who, without any usefulness for themselves, would converge in order to tell a lie; nay, in such a case, they would speak falsely against what would be useful for them. So too is this true in the case of some morally certain miracle, paying heed to all the physical and moral circumstances, for God does not permit us to be deceived in a matter of such great importance, as will be made clearer in the next thesis concerning the probative force of miracles. This consideration, is, of course, extrinsic, but through it, intrinsically moral certitude does find itself to be reinforced. 

§4. On the Discernibility of Miracles as Regards the Nature of the Fact (or as Regards Their Supernaturality) 

Here we must respond to this objection: We cannot know with certainty whether some given extraordinary fact surpasses all the powers of nature, for we do not know all such powers; perhaps what seems to be a miracle can, in fact, be produced by unknown powers. Moreover, many things are held to be miracles when they can, in fact, be attributed to our imagination or to hypnotism.80 Let us see (1) the response offered by certain recent thinkers and (2) the more profound solution. I. The response offered by a number of recent thinkers. A number of authors who do not give sufficient metaphysical consideration to this question say the following: In order for us to be certain concerning the supernaturality of a given concrete fact, it is not necessary that we know all the powers of nature and be able to say how far their efficacy is able to extend; {{63}} rather, it suffices that we be able to practically decide what cannot be done in given, determinate circumstances. Now, the laws of nature, in the same circumstances, are determined to the production of one effect, whereas, in the case of a miracle, the effect is produced by an agent that, in the same circumstances, brings about entirely different effects, as though it were endowed with freedom. If explained rightly, this response can indeed make manifest that such effects exceed the powers of sensible nature;81 however, it does not follow from this that they exceed the power of imagination or of hypnotism (and, a fortiori, the powers of the demons). Now, they respond to this difficulty concerning the power of imagination or hypnotism with the following: According to science, sicknesses that come from a given lesion of an organ cannot be healed in these ways. Moreover, not all miraculous facts are cases of healing of disease; indeed, many others are spoken of, such as the resurrection of the dead. And they add that in order for the works of God to be distinguished from diabolical wonders, many signs must be considered: (a) as regards the nature of the work, which sometimes manifestly exceeds created powers (e.g., the raising of the dead); (b) as regards the moral characteristics of the work, namely: (1) as regards the person of the wonderworker; (2) as regards the manner in which the miracle is performed; (3) in particular, as regards its effects; and (4) as regards the teaching with which it is connected. In this way, the majority of divine miracles are distinguished from diabolical marvels. CRITIQUE: This response is true, but it does not argue with sufficient profundity from the nature of a miraculous work, which must be considered first and principally, for a miracle is the seal of God inasmuch as it is a work “which God alone can do,” as St. Thomas says in ST III, q. 48, a. 1. Indeed, moreover, some of the aforementioned authors, not giving sufficient consideration to the nature of a work of God, affirm too much when they wish to discern a miracle on the basis of the prior preaching by which it is obtained. They say that miracles are extraordinary facts that seem to exceed already-known sensible powers of nature—indeed, even those powers that are imaginable— for these extraordinary facts are not produced when these causes are posited, but, by contrast, the prayer of the wonderworker always precedes them, and without this prayer, the miracle is not produced. Thus, it inductively seems that the prayer is the moral cause of the miracle, while its physical cause is God, who, as he wishes, freely hears the prayer. However, this explanation involves an exaggeration, and it does not even fully resolve the difficulty, for even a false wonderworker sometimes imitates a prayer prior to performing his wonder. Indeed, those who, with sincere heart, pray for a miracle without, however, always obtaining it sometimes obtain some providential assistance, though such assistance can fail to be, strictly speaking and certainly, miraculous. Hence, theologians generally hold that this prior prayer is one of the circumstances by which a miracle is discerned, though it does not constitute the first criterion for discerning a fact that exceeds natural powers, even those that are unknown.82 II. The more profound solution. {{64}} In response to the aforementioned objection, traditional theologians answer in a more profound manner, saying the following: Indeed, we do not positively know all natural powers; however, we negatively know what nature cannot do.83 Indeed, we know certain proper effects of God that can only be produced by God and, hence, surpass all created powers, even powers that are unknown. However, such knowledge is already had by common sense, or natural reason, and afterwards is perfected by philosophical reasoning. (1) ACCORDING TO COMMON SENSE, in proposing the first rule for the discernibility of miracles, theologians generally say: There are certain effects which, by the common and constant sense of all men of whatsoever time and nature, are held to exceed all the powers of nature as something truly miraculous. Such things include, for example, the raising of the dead. In whatever place and at whatever time a truly dead man, as Lazarus was, rises, there is nobody who does not hold that such an occurrence is not truly and properly speaking a miracle. Whence, as is said of the man born blind in John 9:32 (DR): “From the beginning of the world it hath not been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind.” Whence, when there is such an effect, which the common and constant sense of all men, of whatever time and place, thinks to be miraculous, it must certainly be held to be a true miracle, for this sense, both constant and universal, possessed by all men of whatever time or nature, attentive to the infinite goodness, wisdom, and truthfulness of God, cannot be false. Otherwise, God who is the Author of common sense and of reason would either deceive us or permit us to be deceived, without any means of being able to discern error and to be freed from it, which stands in infinite contradiction to His goodness, wisdom, and truthfulness. And this would be quite especially the case if the error were concerned with something asserted as being a dogma.84 Therefore, common sense (or natural reason) knows that certain effects are proper effects of God and, hence, exceed all the powers of nature, even those that are unknown. For example, only the Author of life can return a corpse to life, illuminate someone born blind, and heal those who are sick with incurable diseases. {{65}} Only the Author of matter can suddenly multiply a material substance or instantaneously convert it into another. Only the Author of the soul can slip into the soul and know the secrets of hearts, reveal with certainty future free actions, and suddenly convert the will to heroic acts. In all such cases, common sense declares: The finger of God is at work here. This spontaneous knowledge of natural reason is, indeed, quite vague, though certain. In what objective medium does common sense perceive these truths? In the first principles of being, inasmuch as being is the formal and adequate object of our intellect. Indeed, natural intelligence perceives being in sensible things, just as sight perceives color; thus, common sense knows that contingent being depends upon the Necessary Being and vaguely discerns the proper effects of the First Being. 85 Therefore, in order to discern miracles, supernatural faith is not needed; rather, natural intelligence, which by its very nature exceeds the senses, suffices. However, this vague knowledge needs to be explained and defended by philosophical reason. (2) ACCORDING TO PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING, the aforementioned knowledge had through common sense is explained and defended through a resolution to being and to the first principles of being. In this way, the following two conclusions come to be established: (A) the supernaturality of many miracles of the first, second, and third order is metaphysically certain; (B) the supernaturality of others is generally morally certain on the basis of physical and moral circumstances. A. The supernaturality of many miracles of the first, second, and third order is metaphysically certain. Indeed, it is metaphysically certain that God alone can produce (and, hence, immediately change) being inasmuch as it is being, prime matter, material substances without the mediation of accidents, the intellective soul, and the intellect and will. Now, many miracles of the first, second, and third order necessarily and evidently involve such immediate alterations. Therefore, it is metaphysically certain that these miracles can be produced by God alone. THE MAJOR PREMISE. Here we must prove that such effects are proper effects of God. In this way, it will be made manifest that no cause inferior to God can produce them, for otherwise the power of this inferior cause would have the same specification as the divine power. Moreover, we must note that only a universal cause that can immediately produce some universal effect (whether in the depths of material things or in that which is separated from matter) can immediately change that effect, for this immediate change presupposes the same universality in the cause that immediately produces it. For example, the imagination, which cannot produce an intellectual judgment, cannot immediately change such a judgment but, rather, can only do so mediately—that is, through its own proper effect (namely, the phantasm). This principle will become clearer as we set forth the following examples.86 (a) However, God alone can produce being inasmuch as it is being (or existence, absolutely speaking) and not only inasmuch as it is this (e.g., Peter) or such (e.g., white). For to produce existence absolutely involves bringing about that effect from no presupposed subject (i.e., ex nihilo). {{66}} In other words, only God can create. Now, this is metaphysically demonstrated by St. Thomas (α) based on the universality of such an effect and (β) based on the manner of its production.87 (α) “It is necessary that we reduce more universal effects to more universal and prior causes. Now, among all effects, the most universal of all is existence [esse] itself. Whence, it is necessary that (existence inasmuch as it is existence) is the proper effect of the first and most universal Cause, which is God.” Just as fire can ignite and light illuminate, SelfSubsistent Existence can produce existence absolutely. (β) Similarly, this is made manifest from the way it is brought about: “Indeed, if a greater power is required in the agent to the degree that the (passive) potency is more remote from act, it is necessary that the power of the agent acting upon no presupposed potency, as is the case for the creative agent, be infinite, for there is no proportion between no potency and some potency, the latter of which the power of a natural agent presupposes, just as there is no proportion between nonbeing and being. And because no creature has, without qualification, infinite power, just as no creature has infinite existence, as we proved earlier in ST I, q. 7, a. 2, it follows that no creature can create” (ST I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 3). Consequently, only God can change being [ens], inasmuch as it is being, in its most profound depths. By contrast, every created agent acts to bring about a determinate effect and does not extend itself to the whole nature of being.88 (b) Only God can produce matter89 because matter can only be produced through creation—that is, from no presupposed subject—for it itself is the first subject of all natural changes. Consequently, only God can immediately (or from within) change prime matter. On this, see what is said in ST I, q. 105, a. 1: “God can immediately move matter to form (for example, suddenly bringing forth the form of wine from the matter of water) because being in passive potency can be reduced to act by an active potency which contains it within its power. Therefore, since matter is contained under the divine power, as something produced by God, it can be reduced to act through the divine power. And this is to move matter to form, for form is nothing other than the act of matter.” And, as is said in ST I, q. 110, a. 2, this is proper to God, for he alone can produce matter and, hence, immediately change it. This immediate change is specified in the same manner as is immediate production. A cause that is inferior to God cannot change matter from within but only from without, by means of accidental alterations and local motions, as is clear in the case of substantial generation. This will become clearer from what we will say in what follows. (c) Only God can immediately change material substances—that is, change them from within and not through the mediation of accidents. Indeed, as we have said, only God has immediate power over matter so as to be able to draw forth from it a new substantial form without the mediation of accidental dispositions. Therefore, God alone has immediate power to produce material substances without the mediation of accidents and, consequently, has the power to change them immediately (e.g., to immediately change the substance of water into the substance of wine). {{67}} (d) Only God has immediate power within the substance of the intellective soul, the intellect, and the will. (α) Only God can act immediately within the substance of the soul precisely as a substance. In other words, only he can act there without the mediation of accidents, as inferior substances must do. Moreover, the substance of the soul, precisely as spiritual and not able to be educed from matter, can only be produced by God through creation. Hence, it can be changed immediately by God alone (e.g., by being substantially joined anew to a body through resurrection, as we will discuss immediately below). (β) Similarly, only God can subjectively move the intellect and the will in an immediate fashion, as is shown in ST I, q. 105, a. 3 and 4, because the order of agents must correspond to the order of ends. Now, the intellect and the will are essentially ordered to something absolutely universal—namely, to universal truth [verum] and to universal goodness [bonum]. Therefore, they can be subjectively moved only by a universal agent, which is at once the first intelligence and the first willing (that is, by God). And if such motions are extraordinary, as we will come to say, they pertain to prophecy or to graces of this kind or to miraculous conversions. In this way, philosophical reasoning provides us with an explanation for the major premise of the demonstration. However, it is already vaguely known by common sense (or natural reason), whose formal object is being, and this is the source of the certitude had by common sense concerning the absolute supernaturality of the main kinds of miracles. THE MINOR PREMISE is proven as follows. Now, many miracles of the first, second, and third order necessarily and obviously involve immediate changes of this kind, whether of being, of matter, of substances, of the soul, and so forth. This is proven (1) among miracles of the first order for transubstantiation, even if this is an invisible miracle, as well as for the coexistence of two bodies in the same place; (2) among miracles of the second order for resurrection and the healing of one born blind; (3) among miracles of the third order for the sudden conversion of water into wine and for the multiplication of loaves. (1) MIRACLES OF THE FIRST ORDER. (a) Transubstantiation is indeed an invisible miracle in the Eucharist and is held by faith alone. Hence, it does not have a value as a sign confirming revelation. However, it is metaphysically quite clear that transubstantiation can be produced only by God. Thus, it provides an illustration for our principle, enabling us then to understand how it is applied to other miracles. Indeed, of its very essence, transubstantiation involves the changing of being inasmuch as it is being. Hence, it can only be produced by God. This is proven in ST III, q. 75, a. 4, for transubstantiation is not only a formal conversion with the same matter remaining, as happens in natural generation, but rather is the conversion of the whole substance of bread into the whole substance of Christ’s body. “The nature of being is common to both forms (i.e., of bread and of the body of Christ) and to both matters. And that which is of being in the one can be converted by the Author of being into that which is of being in the other, withdrawing that by which it was distinguished from the other.”90 No created agent can perform transubstantiation because every agent acts inasmuch it is in act. (Activity follows upon being, and the mode of activity upon the mode of being.) Now, any given created agent is determined in its act since it belongs to a determinate genus and species. Therefore, the action of any given created action bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of any given thing in actual existence comes from its form. Therefore, no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form of that upon which it acts, {{68}} and for this reason, every change brought about in accord with nature’s laws is a formal change. However, God is infinite act. Whence, His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore, He can bring about not only formal conversion, thus making diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject, but also the change of the whole of being, namely, so that the whole substance of one thing would thereby be changed into the whole substance of another. 91 (b) According to St. Thomas, the coexistence of two bodies in the same place belongs to miracles of the first order—for example, as when following upon his Resurrection, Jesus entered the upper room “through closed doors” (John 20:26). The demonstration of the divine origin of this miracle is hinted at by the Angelic Doctor in ST I, q. 67, a. 1, and is more explicitly presented in ST III, suppl., q. 83, a. 3. It can be reduced to the following argument: Two bodies cannot exist in the same place unless in this same place they remain distinct as regards their existence and as regards their matter. Now, two bodies in the same place cannot remain distinct as regards their existence and as regards their matter except by virtue of him who has immediate power over existence and matter, so as to preserve in being and in matter the substantial distinction that naturally requires the distinction of positioning and place. Just as an accident can remain without a substance only by the divine power, so too only by the divine power can one material substance remain distinct from another without having its own proper location.92 (c) Among miracles of the first order there is also placed the glorification of the body (or glorious transfiguration) inasmuch as it is derived from the glory of the soul, which can only be produced by God since it is supernatural quoad substantiam. 93 However, by reason alone, it is difficult to prove that this illumination of the body can only arise from the glory of the soul. Similarly, St. Thomas places among miracles of the first order “that the sun would reverse its course,” at least in appearance,94 or “the alteration of the course of heavenly bodies, which receive their unchangeable order from God alone.”95 (2) MIRACLES OF THE SECOND ORDER. Among these miracles, we find RESURRECTION. We must prove that here we find a change that God alone can produce. This is indeed admitted by common sense, inasmuch as it is commonly said that only the Author of life can return the dead to life. Nay, even nonbelievers do not say that resurrection can be brought about in accord with natural laws that are not yet known. Rather, they deny either the fact of such a person’s death or the fact of resurrection in such cases. We must here pass from the vague knowledge had by common sense (or natural reason) to more explicit knowledge through a reduction to principles that are per se nota. This demonstration can be proposed as follows. {{69}} The soul is united to the body through its substantial existence as a form. Now, resurrection is the substantial joining of a separated soul with the matter of a corpse, with no prior accidental dispositions mediating this rejoining. Therefore, resurrection can only be produced by him who has immediate power over matter and the substantial existence of the soul—namely, by God.96 This is explained somewhat in ST III, suppl., q. 75, a. 3, though more profoundly in De potentia, q. 6, a. 7, ad 4, where it is said: Nothing has power over its existence, for the power of any given thing flows from its essence or presupposes its essence. And because the soul is united through its existence to its body as a form, it does not lay in its power that it release itself from union with the body; and similarly, it does not lay within an angel’s power that he unite himself to a body in his existence as a form. However, an angel can take on a body in the aforementioned manner, being united to it as a mover and as a figure to its shape. And, in ad 14: “To exist in a given body can be understood in two ways. In one way, something can be there by being contained within quantitative boundaries, and this kind of presence is possible for demons. However, in another manner, something can be within the essence of the thing as giving it existence and activity, and this kind of presence is proper to God alone, even though God is not a part of any given thing’s essence,” though he is the cause of its existence.97 From these points, we have our demonstration. The major premise is as follows: The soul is united to the body through its substantial existence as a form. This is proven in philosophical psychology. In the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas there are three proofs for this: (A) inasmuch as the soul is the radical principle of man’s vegetative, sensitive, and rational actions; (B) inasmuch as man’s substantial difference is drawn from them; (C) because otherwise man’s natural unity would be destroyed, for he would not be something that is essentially (per se) one but, rather, would be one in a nonessential (i.e., per accidens) manner, as for example, that which moves and that which is moved are accidentally united.98 {{70}} However, this doctrine is nothing other than an explanation for the vague apprehension had by common sense (or natural reason), and it has been defined by the Church.99 Now, the minor premise of our demonstration is the very definition of resurrection—namely, the substantial joining of a separated soul with the matter of a corpse, with no prior accidental mediating dispositions, so that a dead corpse immediately returns to life, manifesting within itself, in a permanent manner, the various activities of vegetative, sensitive, and intellective life. Indeed, this is the meaning of the term “resurrection,” excluding all previous accidental dispositions that are necessary for the generation of a living being. Hence, resurrection can only be produced by him who has immediate power within matter and the substantial existence of the soul. Now, as we said above, this agent is God alone, who can change matter and the soul interiorly within their profoundest depths. Also refer, at the end of this thesis’s exposition, to the response to the objections raised against the value of this demonstration. Also included among miracles of the second order is the illumination of those who are blind, especially those who are born blind.100 And, as is recounted in the Gospel according to John 9:32 (DR), the man who was born blind said himself: “From the beginning of the world it hath not been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind.” Blindness, especially when congenital, is incurable, like a kind of partial death, the death of a given organ. {{71}} Hence, the argument brought forward for the case of resurrection proportionally holds good for the case of the illumination of a person born blind. (3) MIRACLES OF THE THIRD ORDER. Among these miracles is included the sudden conversion of water into wine. St. Thomas states in In II Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4: “Although the conversion of water into wine was not something above the powers of nature as regards the substance of the thing done, nonetheless, it was above its powers as regards the mode of it being brought about, for nature cannot suddenly change water in a given vessel into wine. This is only possible through the digestion and maturation of grapes over time.” Likewise, in In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, q. 1c, the conversion of water into wine is placed among miracles of the third order. Now, because this alteration is brought about instantaneously, without the mediation of accidental alterations, it is the immediate educing of the form of wine from the potency of matter. Hence, it can only be produced by him who has immediate power within matter— namely God, who is not limited to moving matter externally but is he who alone can move it interiorly within its profoundest depths. In other words, in the matter of water, the form of wine is not in proximate potency but, rather, only in remote potency, so long as the preceding dispositions are lacking. Hence, the sudden, formal conversion of water into wine is not in the natural potency of the subject on account of the manner in which it is brought about but, rather, is only in the subject’s obediential potency, which is subject to the divine power. The same must be said concerning the multiplication of loaves. St. Thomas says in ST III, q. 44, a. 4, ad 4: “The multiplication of the loaves was not brought about by way of creation but, rather, through an addition of extraneous matter which was transformed into loaves. Thus, Augustine says, in commenting upon John 6:1–14, ‘Whence, He multiplies a few grains into harvests; thence in His hands He multiplied the five loaves.’” And St. Thomas adds, “It is manifest that grains are multiplied into harvests through a process of conversion.” Likewise, in his comments on ch. 14 of the Gospel of Matthew, St. Thomas explains this multiplication as follows: “Some say that this can be brought about naturally, for just as matter is related to any possible form, so too is it related to any possible quantity. Now, it is foolish to say that matter would be related to any possible quantity, for the only way that this can be brought about is through the process of expansion [rarefactionem]. However, this process is determinate in natural things.” Moreover, bread so condensed could not nourish five thousand men, as we read in Matthew, ch. 14. Hence, St. Thomas concludes in ST I, q. 92, a. 3, ad 1: “Whence, given that no condensation is apparent in such multiplications, we must hold that there was an addition of matter involved, whether through creation or, more probably, through conversion,” and he cites the same words from St. Augustine (In Joan., tr. 24). He says that it is more probably through conversion, because there is no need here to have recourse to creation since this multiplication can be brought about through conversion. If the multiplication of loaves was brought about through creation, it obviously could only have been brought about by God. It is more probably the case, however, that it was brought about through conversion, though certainly not transubstantiative conversion but, rather, through a sudden formal conversion, just as at the wedding feast of Cana water was turned into wine, with the same matter remaining. Hence, it can only be produced by him who has immediate power within matter—namely, by God. Thus, the supernaturality of many miracles of the first, second, and third order is metaphysically certain and is confirmed through a consideration of the circumstances involved, as we will immediately discuss. {{72}} However, the existence of these miracles can be physically certain for those who witness them (e.g., for the witnesses of Lazarus’s resurrection), as we will discuss below. The same must be said concerning many cases of healing, as will be discussed below in bk. 2, ch. 10, a. 3. B. The supernaturality of other miracles of the third order is in general known with moral certitude on the basis of physical and moral circumstances (e.g., the sudden healing of a disease that would be difficult to cure). Frequently, it is physically determinable that these facts exceed the powers of bodily agents, given the manifest disproportion involved and because the laws of nature are determined to one thing, whereas, in these extraordinary cases, the effect is produced by an agent that in the same circumstances would have brought about entirely different effects, as though that agent were endowed with freedom. However, this does not mean that these effects exceed the powers of all created agents, even spiritual agents. Hence, we must consider, beyond the nature of the work done, its circumstances, not only those that are physical but also those that are moral and religious as well. Thus, we can discern whether a given fact arises from a good or evil spiritual agent, for if no evil is clear in these circumstances, then this extraordinary fact may legitimately be judged to come from God, at least mediately (namely, by the mediation of angels / good spirits). However, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether it exceeds the proper powers of the angels such that it could be produced by God alone as by its principal cause. Concerning this matter, let us consider (1) what St. Thomas says; (2) what circumstances are, physically speaking; and (3) what moral circumstances are. (1) What does St. Thomas say? He responds: Signs performed by those who are good can be distinguished from those which are done by the wicked in at least three ways. First, they can be so distinguished through the efficacy of the power of the person performing them, because the good perform signs through the divine power, even to the point of bringing about things to which the active power of nature in no way extends, such as the raising of the dead and other things of this sort, which demons cannot truly do but, instead, can only bring about marvels that do not last for a long period of time. Second, such a distinction can be drawn from the usefulness of signs, because signs performed by those who are good are concerned with useful things, such as the curing of sicknesses, and other such things. However, signs that are performed by the wicked bring about harmful or vain effects, such as flying in the air, the stunning of the bodily members of persons, and other such things. . . . The third difference is found in relation to the end of the sign thus performed, for those signs which are performed by good men are ordered to the building up of faith and good morals, whereas the signs performed by the wicked are detrimental to faith and morals. Moreover, they differ in relation to the way in which they are performed, for the good bring about miracles by invoking the divine name in a pious and reverent manner, but the evil do so by certain absurd ravings, such as by cutting themselves with knives and other such disgraceful actions. Thus, signs that are performed by those who are good can manifestly be discerned from those which are brought about through the power of demons.101 Likewise, Benedict XIV said: “False miracles can be distinguished from true miracles through their efficacy, usefulness, manner of being performed, end, person, and occasion.”102 However, in order for our knowledge to be more methodical and certain, {{73}} we must distinguish physical and moral circumstances from each other. Moreover, in the latter kind of circumstances, we must determine which are principle and which are secondary. (2) The physical circumstances by which one can distinguish whether or not extraordinary healings and other such effects are natural are enumerated by Benedict XIV in Doctrina de servorum Dei beatificatione et beatorum canonizatione, bk. 4, pt. 1, ch. 8: “In order for a healing to be counted as being miraculous, the following conditions are needed: (1) the sickness must be grave and either impossible or difficult to cure; (2) [the sickness] should not be in its final stage so as shortly afterwards it should decline [in vigor]; (3) medicines must either not be employed or, if employed, they should be useless; (4) the healing must be sudden; (5) the healing must be perfect; (6) no purging or crisis must precede it, (7) and the sickness that was taken away must not return.” These seven signs are explained one by one in this work by Benedict XIV, who makes use of a number of examples. Likewise, the work treats separately the illumination of the blind brought miraculously, the marvelous healing of the deaf, dumb, paralyzed, and epileptic, as well as the miraculous healing of persons from leprosy, tumors, gangrene, and fever. Similarly, it treats of negative miracles such as sweating drops of blood, going for great lengths without food, certain spiritual miracles (such as miraculous conversions), the driving out of demons, the nondecaying of corpses, apparitions by the saints, as well as the imagination and its powers. There are many scientific works recently edited by theologians and doctors concerned with the miraculous healings performed in the shrine of Lourdes.103 Likewise, see shortly below concerning the effects of magnetism and hypnotism, as well as what is said in bk. 2, ch. 10, a. 3. (3) The moral circumstances by means of which we can distinguish the aforementioned extraordinary facts from diabolical illusions are as follows. In ST I-II, q. 7, a. 3, St. Thomas explains the seven circumstances of human actions, which are commonly enumerated in the following verse: quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando; who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when. In this text, he states: Whence, considering given acts, we must pay heed to “who” did it, “by what aids” or “instruments” he did it, “what” he did, “where” he did it, “why” he did it, and “how” and “when” he did it. . . . The reason for this enumeration can be presented as follows. A circumstance is said to be something outside the substance of the act, yet in a way touching it. Now this takes place in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; second, inasmuch as it touches the act’s cause; and third, inasmuch as it touches its effect. Now, it touches the act itself, either by way of measure (as in time and place) or by qualifying the act as how (quomodo). It touches the effect when we consider what is done. It touches the cause of the act, depending upon the cause in question. In the case of the final cause, we have the circumstance why. In that of the material cause, or object, we have the circumstance about what. In the case of the principal efficient cause, we have the circumstance who. Finally, in the case of the instrumental efficient cause, we have the circumstance by what aids. {{74}} NB: In ad 3, he says, what, why, and who are called circumstances not inasmuch as they are the object or specifying end or the agent himself but, rather, inasmuch as they are conditions on the side of the object, the end, or the agent. However, what are the principal circumstances of human acts? St. Thomas responds in a. 4: “Properly speaking, acts are called human inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. And therefore, the most principal circumstance of all is that which touches upon the act from the perspective of the end, namely, ‘that for the sake of which’ [something is done]. Now, accidents of the second rank are those which touch upon the substance of the act, namely what is done. But the other circumstances are more or less principal to the degree that they more or less draw close to the aforesaid accidents.” Hence, in order to know whether some extraordinary fact is a true miracle, after considering its nature and physical circumstances, we must consider why it is performed, what is performed, the person by whom it is performed, how it is performed, by what means it is performed, and where and when it is performed. A. Why (or propter quid). The end of a miracle must always be the glory of God, for a miracle is a work of God, and the order of ends must correspond to the order of agents. A miracle coincides with the glory of God inasmuch as it confirms either a doctrine that is revealed by God or the holiness of some servant of his. This end can be considered in two different ways: (a) inasmuch as it is first in intention, if104 it is declared by the wonderworker prior to the production of the miracle; and (b) inasmuch as it is last in execution, for thus is it manifested in the moral effects of the miracle. (a) From the first perspective, we have this rule: A miracle performed in the name of God the Creator in confirmation of some revelation to be accepted by all cannot be false, especially if the wonderworker first announces it. This is so because it stands in contradiction with the infinite goodness, wisdom, and truthfulness of God that he would permit his name to be alleged in order to substitute a false miracle for a true one and that he would suffer his name to be brought forth as a witness to a lie through which men would necessarily and invincibly be led into error against what they owe God and what is necessary to their salvation.105 (b) The end is also manifested in execution, and true miracles are discerned by their effects or fruits, for if they give rise, in a permanent manner, to worship of the Supreme Divinity [cultus supremi Numinis], the overturning of the worship of demons, reformation of morals in conformity with right reason, and concord of citizens and in social life, it is impossible that miracles of this kind would be performed by a demon to his own self-destruction. This rule is drawn from Origen (bk. 2, Contra Celsum). By contrast, if certain wonderful things only serve to feed curiosity, if they provoke shameful or scurrilous actions, if they lend support to pride and disobedience and perturb the harmony and peace of society, they cannot come from God. In this way, many illusionary wonders from paganism, Islam, and Buddhism are excluded from being miracles. B. What is done. If an extraordinary fact is in any way contrary either to the truth or to morals, or if it is ridiculous, it is the work of a demon, not of God. In this way, many illusory wonders attributed to the gods by paganism are ruled out [as not being true miracles]. So too, the illusory wonders spoken of in the books of Buddhism. For example, there is [the tale of ] how the Buddha, about to do battle with the king of serpents, turned his whole body into fire; {{75}} and another time, he ran through the entire firmament of the heavens from east to west, simultaneously pouring water from one eye and fire from the other. Similarly, Mohammed’s disciples relate the tale of him dividing the moon into two parts, gathering it with his sleeve, and then joining the two parts back into one. Likewise, the illusory wonders of the fakirs today are many, ridiculous, and useless (e.g., sitting on small pins). C. The person by whom it is performed. True miracles are discerned on the basis of the morals and teaching of those who perform them. In other words, if they hand on a doctrine that honors God and is conformed to right reason, leading to good morals and favoring social life, and if the same people also bring together life and morals carefully in accordance with such a teaching, if they excel in zeal for God’s glory, modesty, humility, and charity, then these sorts of miracles are true. Thus, without any vicious circle [petitione principii], the miracle confirms the teaching and is confirmed by it, for it confirms what is obscure in the given doctrine and in its origin, and is confirmed by the doctrine, inasmuch as the latter stands forth as an excellent means for manifesting and honoring God, as well as for bringing about the reformation of morals. If, by contrast, the person acting is vicious, proud, wicked, fickle, inconstant, troublesome, impatient, and taking glory in his own defects of character, and if he proposes a teaching that is manifestly irrational, irreligious, and immoral, the illusory wonders that he performs are obviously not divine. Indeed, as St. Thomas explains,106 miracles can sometimes be performed by wicked men who preach the true faith and call upon the name of Christ. However, then, it is clear from the circumstances that a miracle can only be performed in confirmation of the divine truth and not in commendation of the life of the man used by God. “Whence,” St. Thomas says, “wicked men who express some false teaching never perform true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although they sometimes may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke and by the power of the sacraments which they administer.”107 D. How. If something immoral, violent, cruel, or incongruous is discerned in the manner or acting, it is not a miracle. In this way, many of the illusory wonders of magicians are ruled out. Those who perform true miracles act in a pious, reverent, and utterly humble manner. E. By what aids. True miracles are performed through invocation of the divine name—nay, in the name of God the Creator. If, by contrast, the means brought forth seem blasphemous, disgraceful, and absolutely ridiculous, it is not a miracle. When considering this circumstance, one must take into account the persons, times, and places to which the divine action can accommodate itself. F. Where. If it is among vain, unworthy men, so that in many ways it turns out as things do in cases of Spiritism or hypnotism, it is not a miracle. G. When. When there is no necessity or fittingness in the miracle, it is not a true miracle, as takes place in the miracles of the fakirs or those of spiritualists. Thus, Christ did not wish to perform miracles before Herod merely in order to feed his curiosity. {{76}} If all these circumstances taken together are in favor of the action being a miracle, it is morally certain that the extraordinary fact comes from God, at least mediately—namely, by the mediation of good angels.108 This intrinsically moral certitude is reinforced through a consideration of God’s infinite goodness, wisdom, and truthfulness, for God cannot in such a case permit falsehood, which would give rise to invincible error in a matter of such great importance. 

§5. On the Discernibility of Miracles as Regards the Existence of the Fact 

Supposing that the aforementioned miracles are discernible as regards the nature of the fact (e.g., that resurrection, the multiplication of loaves, or the sudden conversion of water into wine exceed all created and creatable powers and can be produced by God alone), we still must discern whether a given case of resurrection is truly such or is instead only apparent (and the same holds for the case of the multiplication of loaves and so forth). Four things must be said concerning this matter. (1) In general. To the extent that they are facts that are obvious to the senses, miracles are as easily observed as any other sensible facts. For example, the voice of the man who once was mute can be surely heard, as well as the command of the wonderworker healing him, just as much as one was able to hear the voice of someone who never was mute. And let it not be said that a miracle is a supernatural fact and therefore exceeds our knowledge. This is not true because such a miracle is only modally supernatural, in relation to how it is produced, not, however, entitatively, as is grace, for a miracle is intrinsically something natural, falling under the senses: When a resurrection is wrought, natural life is rendered unto someone in a supernatural manner. Nay, because miracles are marvelous and disturb the ordinary course of events and excite more attention, they must be tested more diligently, and through such testing they are known with greater certitude. Some people are overly prone to recognize supernatural events, but in general we must face those who unbelievingly object, to whom a response must be given. (2) The existence of many miracles is physically certain for its witnesses (e.g., resurrection, the illumination of someone born blind, the multiplication of the loaves, and the sudden conversion of water into wine). The existence of any case of resurrection can be physically certain for those who witness it, for they can have (a) physical certitude in accord with the senses and with psychological laws concerning the reality of the death of some given man when his body already has a stench or when his heart stops. Granted, in certain cases, death is uncertain because of the lethargy involved, but this does not mean that all such cases are doubtful in nature, for the existence of death is physically certain when organs that are completely necessary for life (like the heart) not only do not exercise their essential functionality but, indeed, do not even have the possibility of exercising such functionality. (b) The witnesses of someone’s resurrection can have physical certitude concerning the life restored to a corpse when the dead person rises, speaks about himself, senses, eats, and responds to questions, for then the functions of vegetative, sense, and intellective life appear in him, manifesting in him life inasmuch as it is something that is sensible per accidens. 109 {{77}} Objection: According to theologians, a demon can simulate resurrection for some time by impeding the corruption of the body and by locally moving the members and tongue of the corpse so that it seems to speak. Response: After examining the corpse, along with all the physical circumstances involved, it is manifest in such cases that this is not a true case of life, especially if one considers the eyes of the corpse, for a living gaze is not found therein but, rather, only a likeness of life and, gradually, signs of corruption. See ST I, q. 51, a. 2 (Whether angels can assume bodies and, in bodies that they assume, whether they can exercise vital actions). Likewise, see ST I, q. 114, a. 4, ad 5 and De potentia, q. 6, a. 7. This false appearance of resurrection, which can indeed sometimes take place, does not destroy physical certitude concerning a true resurrection (e.g., that of Lazarus), for in this latter case, the signs of life and physical circumstances are not the same as in the former. Likewise, the possibility of hallucination does not destroy the physical certitude of sensation, for we can see that in such a case the causes and circumstances of hallucination are not present. See our discussion below in bk. 2, ch. 10, a. 2 (on the resurrection of Christ). This physical certitude is indeed inferior to metaphysical certitude, but it does exclude all fear of error and can be either spontaneous or reflexive (that is, confirmed through reflection). Similar certitude can be had concerning the healing of someone born blind, the multiplication of loaves, and the sudden conversion of water into wine, for these things and similar things are obvious to the senses. Moreover, this certitude is reinforced by a consideration of the moral and religious circumstances of the miraculous deed. For example, see the Gospel account of the resurrection of Lazarus in John 11 and the illumination of the man born blind in John 9, in which we can see how the unbelieving Pharisees had physical certitude concerning the existence of these miracles, for they wished to have Lazarus killed “because many came to believe in Jesus on account of him” (John 12:11). Likewise, they cast out from the synagogue as a madman [prae rabie] the man who was blind from birth, who had been miraculously healed and was defending Christ (John 9:34). (3) Certain miracles of the third order seem to be only morally certain, both as regards the existence of the fact, as well as with regard to its supernaturality (e.g., the sudden healing of fever). Indeed, as we have said, it is difficult to prove with either metaphysical or physical certitude that these facts, by their very nature, exceed all sensible powers and all created powers. Likewise, as regards the existence of the fact, a deceitful simulation is not always discerned with physical certitude, but moral certitude can be had through a consideration of moral circumstances. This intrinsically moral certitude can be metaphysically strengthened through a consideration of God’s attributes—namely, by being attentive to the infinite goodness, wisdom, truthfulness, and providence of God beneath all circumstances. Indeed, when all circumstances, whether physical or moral, are in favor of the miracle, if this in fact only was a merely apparent miracle brought about through a demonic deception, then this would imply that God would permit us to be invincibly led into error against something we owe to God himself and that is necessary to our salvation. [And this stands in opposition to his wisdom and providential care.] {{78}} (4) From historical human testimony, we can have moral certitude concerning the existence of miracles. Once a miracle is recognized by witnesses as a sensible fact, it can be known with no less certitude by other men than are other historical facts. And in order to discern a miraculous fact that is narrated from a supposed or fabulous fact, it suffices (a) that it be a sensible fact that can be seen or heard (e.g., the resurrection of a dead person or the multiplication of loaves). Moreover, (b) it merely needs to be performed in the presence of many who can attentively see or hear it, who carefully assess it and are known for their honesty. Thus, in 1 Corinthians 15:5–6 (DR), St. Paul says, concerning Christ after his Resurrection: “He was seen by Cephas, and after that by the eleven. Then he was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present, and some are fallen asleep.” And, finally, its certitude is guaranteed (c) if, in memory of this fact, public monuments are then erected, narratives written, or enduring burdens imposed. Such conditions, taken all together, establish the historical truth of the fact. Hence, if such a testimony is rejected, the whole of historical certitude will come into ruin, and no past or present facts will be able to be certain unless we see them ourselves, but nobody of sound mind holds such a position. Now, just because a fact is extraordinary does not mean that its historical certitude is thereby diminished, for a historian precisely as a historian must not choose a particular philosophical system that is opposed to common sense (i.e., natural reason)—for example, determinism—for a historian must not explain a fact philosophically but, rather, must refer to it precisely as it was.110 Nonetheless, this historical certitude requires all the greater certitude to the degree that the fact in question is more extraordinary. 111 Moreover, this historical certitude, which is, properly speaking, a form of moral certitude, can be strengthened through philosophical reflection: (1) when there are countless suitable witnesses whose false testimony would lack a raison d’être, for how would these many, various witnesses agree in one and the same deception or error without some use for themselves? {{79}} Moreover, (2) in a matter of great importance for salvation, God cannot permit invincible error, which would follow of necessity from this kind of false testimony. And finally, (3) a miracle can, as St. Thomas says in SCG I, ch. 6, “appear evidently in its effect”—namely, in the miraculous conversion of the world, which would have been “more miraculous than all other signs,” [even] if it took place without [other] miracles. Therefore, we must conclude that miracles can be known with certitude. Many, such as the resurrection, multiplication of loaves, and so forth, can be known by witnesses with physical certitude regarding the existence of the fact and with metaphysical certitude regarding the nature of the fact. However, other men can have moral certitude (which does exclude all fear of error) concerning them on account of historical testimony. 

§6. On False Miracles and on Magic, Spiritism, and Hypnotism 

As regards the question of miracles, we have sufficiently determined what cannot be brought about by the hidden powers of nature and of created spirits. Indeed, what they cannot produce are effects that are proper to God. Now, however, to the degree that it is possible, we must say what they can bring about. Regarding this matter, three things must be considered: (I) what is signified by the terms magic, Spiritism, and hypnotism, as well as what their correlative phenomena are; (II) an explanatory theory for these phenomena; and (III) the power of spirits to perform illusory wonders. I. The notions and phenomena of magic, Spiritism, and hypnotism (1) In general, magic is the power to bring about marvelous, unheard-of things. Two kinds of magic must be distinguished: natural magic, by which marvels are performed by making use of the hidden powers of nature or works of dexterity; diabolical (or black) magic, by which wonders are produced by the work of demons. Although some wonders of this kind are mythical in character, nonetheless, a good number of them deserved to be believed in on account of the probity, piety, and teaching of their witnesses. This is also mentioned in Sacred Scripture. Thus, in Exodus 7:11 (DR): “And Pharaoh called the wise men and the magicians; and they also by Egyptian enchantments and certain secrets did in like manner.” Likewise, in the New Testament there were the cases of the magical deeds performed by Simon the Magician, Elymas, and the Pythian girl (Acts 8:9–11; 13:8; 16:16). Likewise, Christ and Paul foretold that great signs and wonders would be performed at the time of the Antichrist: “insomuch as to deceive, if possible, even the elect” (Matt. 24:24, DR; cf. 2 Thess 2:9). (2) In our own era, under the names of magnetism, Spiritism, and hypnotism, many phenomena are openly presented to the public. Indeed, many fraudulent cases crop up among these so that it is often difficult to distinguish true cases from false ones. Nonetheless, the phenomena that we will cite here are thought to be free from such fraudulence. The term “magnetism” is used for signifying the art of obtaining marvelous phenomena, especially in man, by either physical or psychological means, and because Franz Mesmer ([1734]112–1815) used magnetism in producing these phenomena, the term “magnetism” came to be attached to it. Now, magnetism is divided, in accord with the variety of means used, into vulgar, hypnotic, and transcendental magnetism (which is called Spiritism nowadays, though it was called magic in earlier times). {{80}} Vulgar magnetism makes use of sensible means such as gestures, the fixing of the eyes, the touching of bodily members, and other such things. Hypnotism is vulgar magnetism itself, though with this distinction—namely, that in order to hypnotize (or to obtain magnetic sleep), it makes use of more or less scientific means, generally all those that tire out the senses and weaken the attention of the subject to be hypnotized (e.g., examination of the eyes, fixed gazing into a clear mirror, the influence of oxhydric light, and various excitations in the senses of sound and touch). However, certain parts in the body have a power by which hypnotism may be induced by means of pressure and, hence, are called hypnogenic zones. However, the principal means used here is verbal suggestion (which the other means supply for as needed). Hypnotists express in an imperative, verbal way the command to sleep, and immediately the subject falls asleep, thus coming to be extrinsically impelled and directed by the hypnotist. Finally, Spiritism calls forth interaction between mortals and spirits or the souls of the dead, which are evoked by means of given signs. The phenomena of magnetism, hypnotism, and Spiritism can be reduced to three genera. (a) First, there are the mechanical phenomena, under which are contained the turning of tables and of other bodies, the motion of the human body or of some member thereof, and the attraction, elevation, movement, and suspension of certain bodies. (b) Second, there are physiological and sensitive phenomena, such as convulsions, the trembling of bodily members, dilation and contraction of pupils and of nerves, magnetic sleep, major or minor insensibility, clearheaded sleepwalking, and the transposition (or translation) of senses as when one sees out of the back of one’s head. The school of Salpétrière admits three states in these hypnotic phenomena: lethargy, catalepsy or rigidity, and finally sleepwalking. In a hypnotic sleep, the hypnotized person communes exclusively with the hypnotist. In clearheaded sleepwalking, the hypnotized person seems to be equipped with wondrous abilities (e.g., the ability to see with one’s eyes closed). They bring about hallucinations that are aural, visual, and even gustatory and olfactory in nature; the sweating of blood is produced. The hypnotist suggests a symphony, and immediately the patient hears music and is gladdened. Likewise, there can be suggestions that are to be completed after a lengthy passage of time. Thus, a hypnotist may suggest, “After a year, on a given day, you will do this, you will see this, you will hear this,” and each of these are confirmed. Suggestion may also give rise to an apparent multiplication of personality, as when a woman believes that she is a soldier. These phenomena of suggestion seem to pertain, properly speaking, to the imagination; however, by means of it, they influence the intellect and the will.113 (c) Finally, there are intellectual phenomena, such as the knowledge of the internal affections of the soul, the predicting of future contingents (even free ones), as well as the ability to know the depths of the human body’s organic composition, to scorn means for curing sicknesses, to discourse at length concerning scientific matters, to speak various unknown languages, and to work other such marvels. These phenomena sometimes take place without the evocation of spirits, though {{81}} sometimes they are obtained after such evocations and thus, properly speaking, pertain to Spiritism. However, spirits of these kind do not immediately communicate with all people but, rather, do so through the mediation of some living person who, hence, is called a medium—that is, the passive medium utilized like a mere instrument by the spirit. In Spiritism, there are apparitions, songs, writings, and scientific discussions that the spirits seem to send to us mortals from the other side. They give responses about things that have been suffered, about medical treatments to be performed, and so forth.114 Many facts of Spiritism are mere myths and frauds, though they cannot all be denied inasmuch as they are testified to by men of greatly proven character. Sometimes the presence of an evil spirit and of horror at sacred things is revealed in these matters, as can be seen in the violent shaking of a given table when a blessed rosary is placed upon it; likewise, these cases sometimes involve responses that are impious, heretical, and obscene for the mind, natural capacities, and dispositions of bystanders. II. Explanatory theories for the phenomena of hypnotism and Spiritism There are five explanatory theories for these phenomena. (1) THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY Strives to explain these phenomena by the aid of a given fluid, which they say is magnetic, and they maintain that it is so subject to the will—to say nothing about the fact that it is of service to the movement of one’s limbs—that it can be sent forth outside of one and enter into other bodies. In this way, the magnetizing person would subject the magnetized person to himself. According to many, this magnetic fluid is the nervous fluid that would be a kind of animal heat; however, others hold that it is an ethereal and luminous fluid, while still others say that it is a universal substance, endowed with light, heat, and intelligence, and they call it God. Critique. This last explanation is already rejected on the basis of our earlier refutation of pantheism. However, the preceding explanations are insufficient because a material fluid cannot produce all of the aforementioned phenomena, for spiritual phenomena, such as knowledge of things and of languages, exceed the power of matter. (2) THE IMAGINATION THEORY has recourse to our imagination, which is vigorously excited by the aid of the apparatus of magnetism. Hence, hysterical women in particular are more apt to undergo the action of hypnotism.115 Critique. This theory seems to provide a sufficient explanation for many hypnotic phenomena, though not for all spiritualistic phenomena. Indeed, St. Thomas already himself noted in SCG III, ch. 99: “Because the soul imagines something and is vehemently affected in relation to it, a change sometimes follows in the body, leading to healing or sickness, without the action of bodily principles, which by their own nature are ordered to causing sickness or health in the body.” {{82}} Indeed, when the imagination acts with an intensity beyond measure, the strength of the other powers is thereby diminished. Hence, the power of the soul passes over through the imagination. Thus, hallucination becomes possible inasmuch as the images that once upon a time had come into the imagination [ad phantasiam] from the senses can again, in a reverse order, with the aid of the intermediary nerves, go back out to the senses. Thus, by making use of bodily dispositions, the hypnotist will be able to produce new images in the imagination [in phantasia] by means of which he will then be able to excite passions, actions, hallucinations, and locutions in the subject. The hypnotist even can stir up or bind the imagination [phantasiam] so that this faculty116 would no longer be able to pay attention to its own species. In this way, the subject becomes incapable of perceiving those things that are present to him.117 According to a number of authors, this perhaps does not imply that the influence of the hypnotist remains virtually in the imagination [phantasia] so that after a certain time it springs forth in act and overpowers [the subject’s] memory. 118 Nonetheless, the imagination theory cannot explain the ability to foretell future contingents, to know the depths of the human body’s organic composition, to discuss at length concerning scientific things, and to speak various unknown languages. (3) THE ANIMIST THEORY Strives to explain these facts through powers innate within the human soul, which indeed are hidden from us and impervious to our powers of observation. This theory attributes to our soul certain vibrations, which it then can communicate to objects, by means of which similar vibrations are sent back into the soul itself. Thus, this is said to explain the occurrence of speaking tables [locutiones tabularum], words of gossip [rumores], songs, and119 other such phenomena. Critique. Like the theories already discussed, this one can explain certain facts of magnetism without falling into contradiction, though not all of them. Indeed, it is possible that there are vibrations that come forth from the human composite, by mediation of the air or the ether, thus influencing bodies at a distance. In this way, explanations have been provided for certain [mutual] attractions, the elevation of bodies, and a kind of telepathy, 120 but not for the ability to suddenly speak unknown languages or to hold lengthy discussions concerning the most difficult questions of philosophy or theology, as sometimes happens. (4) THE SPIRITIST THEORY. Spiritists admit metempsychosis—that is, the passing of human souls from one body to another upon death. However, as they say, some souls remain in the air surrounding us, joined with a very delicate and fine form of body. Thus, spiritualists attribute the more noble phenomena of Spiritism to these souls. Critique. The theory of metempsychosis is unfounded, being nether proven nor even persuasively argued on behalf of either a posteriori or a priori. Nay, it stands in opposition to the facts, for it seems impossible that our soul would have no memory at all121 concerning its prior state, retaining absolutely no awareness thereof. {{83}} Moreover, as St. Thomas says in SCG II, ch. 73, no. 3: “The proportion between man’s soul and man’s body is the same as that between this man’s soul and this man’s body. Therefore, it is impossible that the soul of this man would be able to enter into any other body than his own.” In other words, human souls are individuated through their ordering to this or that given body; however, the life that the soul is naturally inclined to preserve is the life of the individual himself.122 Nor can one admit that the human soul has two bodies, one that has a material weight [ponderabile], from which it can be separated, and another that is delicate and fine, to which it is always united, by means of which it would be united to the aforementioned material body. This is not possible, for the soul is the immediate substantial form of the material body, which is truly animated; indeed, there is only one single radical principle of intellective life along with sensitive and vegetative life. As St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 76, a. 1 and 7: “One and the same man perceives that he senses and understands that he understands.” Otherwise, man would not be something essentially (per se) united but, rather, would only be per accidens unified. Moreover, this theory offered by spiritualists makes recourse to the souls of the dead only in an arbitrary manner—namely, as it were, only inasmuch as these souls are at hand to serve the desires of mortals. Hence, it is surprising that those souls would be used only by determinate persons who are called mediums. Moreover, these persons and spiritualists act in secret and, what is more, they refuse to acknowledge not only Catholic dogmas but also the natural truths of religion concerning God and the next life, as is clear in the books of the theosophists. Finally, the separated soul cannot, by means of its natural cognition, know those things that are done here below, nor can it naturally move a given body since the only way that it can do this is by means of its own body. 123 (5) THE THEORY OF SPIRITUALISM explains the superior phenomena of spiritism through the intervention of spirits, which we call demons. The truth of this theory is established through the exclusion of the preceding [so-called] phenomena. Indeed, the superior phenomena of Spiritism must have a cause. Now, this cause can be neither a material fluid, nor the imagination, nor some power of the soul or something emitted from the soul, nor the souls of the dead. Therefore, we must have recourse to a superior cause, and this cause can be neither God nor a good spirit, for in the use of magnetism, hypnotism, or Spiritism, inasmuch as they are brought forth in order to detect hidden things [occultorum], there are so many things that are trifling, disgraceful, morally wrong, and irreligious that would be wholly unbefitting to God and his good angels. Therefore, it must be the case that the cause in question is an evil spirit, that which we call a demon. The response given in these kinds of wonders is that, even if it is most often the case that they vehemently kindle wicked passions,124 likewise fostering vices and errors, sometimes they can be true and not counterfeit, because as St. John Chrysostom says, “The devil is sometimes permitted to speak true things so that his infrequent truthfulness may gain trust for his lie.”125 Thus, they can gain trust from the powers of reason, though they are contrary to faith, philanthropy, charity, and rational temperance so that Christian mortification would seem exaggerated, etc. Hence, these wonders often enough clearly reveal the presence of an evil spirit, as well as dread at the presence of sacred things. {{84}} Nay, sometimes a demon enters the body of a man. Dwelling therein, it will act, making use of the senses and the person’s bodily members, producing unusual actions. Often, the Gospel mentions people who undergo demonic obsession, referring to them as distinct people from those who are merely ill: “They presented to him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and such as were possessed by devils.”126 And, according to the Roman Ritual, the signs of diabolic possession are “the speaking of unknown languages in many words or understanding the speaking thereof, the disclosure of things that are far away and hidden, the exhibition of powers above the natural capacities of one’s age or condition, and other things of this kind which are significant signs when a great number of them occur.” However, the Ritual adds, “(the exorcist) should not give easy credence to the claim that someone is undergoing demonic obsession; however, let him take note of the signs by which the obsessed person is distinguished from those who suffer from melancholy (literally, ‘black bile’) or some sickness.” Demons do not reveal themselves clearly to materialists. It suffices for them that creatures made in the image of God believe they draw their origin from ridiculous, weak, and lustful monkeys. If the demons were to manifest themselves to materialists, the latter would have a proof for the existence of spirits and a way toward faith in the existence of God. However, the demons do reveal themselves more clearly to the hidden depths of the Masonic sect. III. The power of spirits to perform illusory wonders (1) The existence of spirits (i.e., of angels) was denied in the past by the Epicureans and the Sadducees. Today, it is denied by atheists, rationalists, and indeed by liberal Protestants, who assert that the angels spoken of in Scripture are either good inspirations sent by God or men sent by God in order to instruct others. By contrast, according to the Catholic Church, it is to be held on divine faith that the angels (that is, intellectual creatures that are distinct from God and more excellent than men) exist. Moreover, it is certain that the angels are purely spiritual.127 The existence of the angels is frequently and openly asserted in Sacred Scripture. Nay, reason itself persuasively argues on behalf of the existence of spirits, an existence that was admitted by many pagan philosophers such as Aristotle (who called them “separated substances”). Indeed, as St. Thomas says in ST I, q. 50, a. 1: What is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. Now, the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is brought about when the effect imitates the cause according to that by which the cause produces that effect, as heat produces heat. However, God produces creatures by His intellect and will. Hence, the perfection of the universe requires the existence of intellectual creatures. Now, intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any bodily power, for every body is limited to the here-and-now. Whence, the perfection of the universe requires the existence of some incorporeal creature . . . which is knowable by the intellect alone. Without the angels, the ascending series of creatures would seem to be cut off abruptly and, as it were, undeserving of the wisdom and omnipotence of the Creator, for human reason is a very weak participation in the intellectual light, given that it attains very few truths through simple intuition,128 coming to know many only through the truly laborious work of reasoning. Therefore, in order for God’s work to be fully wrought, it is suitable that there be purely spiritual creatures that would perceive the truth universally through simple contemplation, {{85}} creatures who would be ministers of the Supreme Governor of things.129 (2) The goodness and wickedness of spirits. According to the Catholic Church, it is to be held on divine faith that certain angels, through their own fault, sinned and consigned themselves to eternal punishment. As was said at Lateran IV: “For the devil and the other demons were indeed created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing.”130 However, others were confirmed in the good. This knowledge had through faith perfects the apologetic thesis concerning the discernibility of miracles. Hence, it is useful for the apologete who, from on high, under the direction of faith, defends the probative force of miracles, inasmuch as miracles differ from deceptive diabolic wonders. Indeed, such was the way that they were defended by the prophets and apostles who were the first apologetes. Nonetheless, for those who hear apologetic preaching, it is not necessary to have foreknowledge concerning the obstinacy of the demons in evil. It suffices that by reason alone they see that extraordinary works that are not wholly good cannot be performed by God. Indeed, in reality, certain deceptive wonders of magic and Spiritism clearly manifest the intervention of a wicked spirit inciting one to vice and sacrilege. (3) What spirits can do in order to simulate miracles. We do not know how far their power positively extends, but since they are creatures, they cannot do anything contrary to God’s absolute will. St. Thomas shows,131 at least in general, how wicked spirits can simulate miracles in two ways: (A) by using powers of nature that are unknown to us; and (B) by altering man’s imaginative powers [phantasiam], as well as his external senses, so that something would thus seem to be different from what it is. A. Indeed, spirits can move bodies through local motion, just as man moves them,132 “and, through local motion, they can cause other motions, namely by employing bodily agents in order to produce such effects, as a craftsman employs fire in order to soften iron.”133 And not only can they make use of powers of nature that are unknown to us, but they can even instrumentally move bodies to accidental effects that exceed the instrument’s own proper form in order to, for example, imitate a human voice: In the production of effects of this kind, in comparison with man’s own art, the angel’s art is more efficacious and leads to better results . . . for they have great knowledge of the powers of natural things. . . . Hence, they can better choose the hour at which the power of a heavenly body is more likely to cooperate in producing the desired result. This seems to be the reason why necromancers observe the position of the stars when they invoke demons.134 Thus, spirits can simulate miracles, for example, by forming bodies from preexisting matter, assuming them, and visibly appearing in them. B. Likewise, they can alter man’s imagination [imaginationem], as St. Thomas explains in ST I, q. 111, a. 3: It is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of our bodily spirits and humors, especially in sleep. . . . Indeed, the excitement of our spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur in those who are awake, as happens in those who are insane, and other such people. Thus, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors and sometimes also by man willing it by voluntarily imagining something that he experienced in the past, so too the same may be done by the power of a good or an evil angel, sometimes with stupor of one’s bodily senses, and at other times without such stupor. {{86}} And in ibid., ad 2: An angel alters the imagination, not indeed by impressing an imaginative form which was never previously received from the senses—for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color—but, rather, through the local motion of our bodily spirits and humors, as was said above. Angels can also alter the human senses in two ways. They can do so externally, by externally setting something sensible before the sense power, whether it be something formed by nature or by forming something new, as he does when he assumes a body. Similarly, they can also move the spirits and humors internally, as was said earlier, whereby the senses would be altered in various ways, like how everything tastes bitter to a sick person because of the abundance of choleric humor in his system.135 By their own capacities and experience of the ages, the angels know physical secrets, as well as man’s own innate characteristics, inclinations, and passions, and thus they can have better conjectural knowledge concerning future free actions than we do.136 Moreover, through certain bodily signs, angels can to some degree know man’s thoughts.137 However, as was said earlier, God alone can alter man’s will from within, for only God gives the intellectual nature its inclination to the universal good (for, indeed, the order of agents corresponds to the order of ends). Likewise, God alone can physically influence our intellect. An angel does not illuminate man by giving him the light of nature or that of grace, but only by objectively strengthening its natural light and by manifesting the truth to it. As John of St. Thomas explains in his remarks on ST I, q. 106, a. 1, this strengthening is brought about not through a physical and subjective influence upon our intellect but, rather, through the objective medium by which the proposed truths are manifested in a loftier and more universal manner, as the teacher does for his students. This provides a sufficient discussion concerning what spirits can do. With God’s permission, wicked spirits can simulate miracles, but the good God does not permit men to be invincibly deceived in things that are necessary for salvation.138 However, acting as God’s instruments, good spirits can perform true miracles or, by their own powers, care for men, as the Church believes, namely, by preventing external damage from happening to us, aiding us in our difficulties, warding off demons, suggesting holy thoughts, and {{87}} sometimes inflicting punishments meant to heal us, as is explained in the treatise on the angels.139 

§7. Resolution of Objections 

There are two series of objections: (1) as regards the miraculous nature of the work, as well as regarding its supernaturality; and (2) as regards the existence of the work. A. As regards the nature of the work. It seems absolutely certain that, even if it happens to be extraordinary to the greatest degree, nothing that is done can exceed all created powers. 1. Objection: In order to affirm that some work by its very nature exceeds all of the powers of nature, we would need to know all of these powers. Now, we do not know all the powers of nature. Therefore[, we cannot affirm that some work by its very nature exceeds all the powers of nature]. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I deny it if it means that we would need to know all the powers of nature as regards that which is positively possible. However, I concede it if it means that we would need to know that which they cannot do. I contradistinguish the minor premise in the same way. 2. Continued urging: We do not absolutely know what the powers of nature cannot do. In order to know absolutely (or metaphysically) what nature cannot do, we would need to determine that a priori. Now, we cannot determine a priori what pertains to nature. Therefore, this cannot be metaphysically certain. Response: I concede the major premise but make a distinction regarding the minor premise. I concede that we cannot determine a priori what pertains in a particular manner to this or that given sensible nature. However, I deny that we cannot determine what pertains in general to created nature inasmuch as it is distinct from God. I distinguish the conclusion in the same way. Allow me to explain. Indeed, it is clear a priori that a finite cause cannot produce the effects that properly can be performed only by the First Uncreated Cause, who alone can produce (and, hence, immediately alter) being inasmuch as it is being, matter, or spirit. 3. Continued urging: However, the proper effects of God cannot be determined. For example, it is not evident that the production of life from a nonliving being would be an effect proper to God. Indeed, in Exodus 7, we read that the Pharaoh’s magicians changed a staff into a snake through the power of demons. Now, this change presupposes the production of a living being from a nonliving being, just as happens in a case of resurrection. Therefore, the demons can also raise the dead. Response: Many hold that these kinds of wonders were only hoaxes at the level of the senses. However, according to the literal meaning of the account, it seems more probable that his magicians produced true frogs and true serpents, carried in from elsewhere by the hidden power of demons. Moreover, these marvels performed by the magicians in Egypt must not be set in opposition to the true miracles performed by Moses, since the same biblical account makes clear that Moses conquered the magicians so that his serpent devoured theirs. Moreover, coming to the fourth wonder, the magicians’ art stood inert, leading them to say to Pharaoh, “This is the finger of God” (Exod. 8:19). Hence, these wonders performed by the magicians could be distinguished from true miracles, at least on the basis of their physical and moral circumstances.140 4. Continued insistence: However, St. Thomas proposes141 another interpretation for this fact, saying: “The demons did this through some collected seeds, which had the power to cause the sticks to rot and change into serpents.” And St. Thomas said this because he held that inferior animals are generated from the rotting of plants, without any animal seed.142 Therefore, the difficulty can be proposed, as follows: According to St. Thomas, it is not contradictory to say that a created cause can produce the sense life of inferior animals, using nonliving beings as the basis for this causation. Now, a greater power is not required per se in order to produce life from a corpse, for the effect specifying the action is always the sense life to be produced. Therefore, it is not contradictory to say that a created cause can produce the resurrection of a dead person. {{88}} First response: St. Thomas admits this only for inferior animals because, in his day, physical scientists did not know about the unperceivable seeds from which inferior animals are generated. Now, however, it has been experimentally shown that every living being comes from a living being. Second response: The hypothesis admitted by St. Thomas is not intrinsically contradictory. Indeed, it is not a question of spontaneous generation in the materialists’ sense, for more would be produced from the less and the more perfect from the imperfect. Rather, when St. Thomas says that a created cause can produce inferior animals from nonliving animals, he presupposes the ordinary concurrence of the First Living Being.143 And in this way, the rejection finds its resolution, for resurrection of a dead person likewise requires the concurrence of the First Living Being. However, in this case, such concurrence is extraordinary (i.e., miraculous). Only the Author of life can restore a corpse to life. 5. Continued insistence: Nonetheless, a superior power can do whatever an inferior power can do. Now, man can, even ordinarily, cause life—namely, through generation. Therefore, a created spirit can produce life, at least from a corpse in an extraordinary manner. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede it if they are of the same order. I sub-distinguish it if they are of different orders. Here, I concede it if the superior cause were the cause of the whole being of the inferior cause. Otherwise, I deny it. I concede the minor premise, while distinguishing the conclusion along the same lines as the major premise.144 Allow me to explain. Even if our intellectual light is more perfect than physical light, it cannot physically illuminate but, rather, can only illuminate intellectually (in short, in a loftier manner). However, God, who is the creative cause of physical light can, without this light, produce its effect. Similarly, the angels cannot do what man does inasmuch as the latter is material, just as our intellect cannot sense, even though it is superior to the senses. By contrast, the divine power, which is the cause of the whole being of inferior causes, can produce, without them, their effects in a more perfect mode. See ST I, q. 110, a. 2, where St. Thomas proves that “every informing of matter is either immediately from God or from some bodily agent, though not immediately from an angel.” Likewise, see the response to the first objection to that article. 6. Continued insistence: However, perhaps many things that are called miracles do not exceed the powers of the imagination when intensified beyond measure [supra modum intensae], for through the human soul’s apprehension, the human body is altered, as is clear in those who become angry or fearful, and sometimes, also, this alteration goes so far as to cause sickness or health. Response: In ST III, q. 13, a. 3, ad 3, St. Thomas says: If someone’s imagination is strong, his body will naturally obey it in some things, for example, as when someone falls from a beam set high up, since the imagination of its nature is a principle of local motion. The same holds true as regards change regarding heat and cold, along with their consequences, for by their very nature, the passions of the soul, by which the heart is moved, follow the imagination. {{89}} Thus, by the excitement of the spirits (or humors), the whole body is altered. However, the other bodily dispositions, for example, the shape of the hand, or foot, and so forth, all of which have no natural relation to the imagination, are not altered by the imagination, no matter how strongly it acts. Likewise, according to doctors, a death that is caused by some organic injury cannot be healed by the mediation of the imagination, even if excited beyond measure through hypnotism.145 7. Continued insistence: Nonetheless, facts that are called miraculous do not seem to exceed the powers of religious faith itself, for just as human freedom exceeds material powers and has sovereignty over them, so too, a fortiori, does a vehement religious sentiment that elevates freedom to the point of heroism. This is how modernists strive to explain many miracles.146 Indeed, they cite Mark 6:5–6 (DR): “And he could not do any miracles there (in his homeland), only that he cured a few that were sick, laying his hands upon them. And he wondered because of their unbelief.” Likewise, in Matthew 17:18, the disciples asked the Lord, “Why were we unable to cast out demons?” His response was: “On account of your lack of faith.” Hence, as the modernists say, miracles are effects of faith. In this way, we have a phenomenon that is prior to the miracle, as is needed on account of the principle of causality: Every phenomenon presupposes a prior phenomenon. Nay, there is a law of miracles; namely, great faith extraordinarily exceeds the powers of matter. Response: A response can be drawn from what St. Thomas says in De potentia, q. 6, a. 9 (Whether the working of miracles should be attributed to faith): “Holy men perform miracles in two ways, namely, by way of impetration by prayer that miracles may be divinely brought about and by power (as instruments of God). Now, in both ways faith renders a man capable of performing miracles.” However, as is said in ad 19: “Faith is not the sufficient cause for the performing of miracles but, rather, only a kind of disposition thereunto.” Hence, not all those who have faith perform miracles.

B. Objections against the certitude concerning the existence of miracles (for witnesses—for others) 

1. Objection: There cannot be either physical or moral certitude concerning a fact that is contrary to the necessary laws of nature. Now, a miraculous fact is something of this kind. Therefore, no witnesses can have such certitude concerning them.

Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede that there can be neither physical nor moral certitude concerning a fact performed outside of the bounds of absolutely necessary laws. However, I deny that this holds for hypothetically necessary laws. Thus, there cannot be certitude concerning the existence of a square circle or concerning the existence of a living corpse. However, it is not contradictory to certitude that there be a resurrection of someone who was dead. Nay, witnesses can have physical certitude concerning it. {{90}} 

2. Objection: Some contend, with Renan, that miracles cannot be known with certitude unless they are performed before the scientific academy, indeed, many times. 

Response: (1) If this were the case, God would need to await the establishment of academies. (2) Common sense (i.e., natural reason) suffices for knowing a sensible fact that is public and accommodated to being known by all. (3) At Lourdes, there now is a scientific commission of doctors tasked with examining miraculous healings, and likewise, doctors are gathered to render judgment concerning miracles involved in the beatification of saints.147 (4) Finally, not infrequently, on account of their prejudices, arrogance, and passions, scientists are not equal to the task of judging concerning divine facts.148 

3. Objection: Witnesses too can experience hallucination, whether it be natural or caused by a diabolical deception. Hence, they cannot have physical certitude concerning the existence of miracles. 

Response: A hallucination or illusion can be diagnosed, first of all, on the basis of physical circumstances, for otherwise we could never have physical certitude on the basis of sensation. It is easy to verify whether a given case involves the conditions of hallucination or those of true perception. Moreover, the moral circumstances must be considered. In this way, a true fact is discerned from a demonic illusion. Likewise, Christ’s miracles cannot be attributed to demons, for he himself cast out demons and said: “And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how then shall his kingdom stand? . . . But if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you” (Matt 12:26–28, DR). 4. Continued insistence: This kind of demonic trickery cannot be discerned with firm certitude without supernatural aid, for as is said in Matthew 24:24 (DR): “For there shall arise false Christs . . . and shall shew great signs and wonders, insomuch as to deceive, if possible, even the elect.” Therefore, human reason cannot, by itself, know miracles with certitude. Response: In some cases, per accidens, supernatural aid is required in order to discern such trickery, on account of the multitude of wonders [performed]. However, per se, this aid is not required, for a miracle is, of its very nature [ex se], an obvious fact. 5. Continued insistence: Nonetheless, the Church reserves to herself judgment concerning miracles. Response: As was said above, the Church reserves to herself solemn judgment, ex officio, concerning the truth of certain miracles in order to manifest the holiness of the servants of God. However, this does not mean that individual human reason cannot know miracles with certitude. By contrast, the Church herself holds that miracles are “irresistible signs of her divine mission, accommodated to the intelligence of all,” as was said at the [First] Vatican Council. 6. Objection: However, frequently, in order to have certitude concerning miracles, it is necessary that we consider the doctrine that is to be confirmed by it. Now, this involves a vicious circle inasmuch as the miracle is confirmed by the doctrine that it ought to confirm. Response: Without any vicious circle being involved, causes are causes of each other, though in different genera of causality. 149 In other words, if the doctrine is obviously immoral and impious, the miracle performed in confirmation of it is false; {{91}} if, in contrast, the doctrine obviously does honor to God and fosters peace, this is a new sign in favor of its miraculous character. Indeed, what remains obscure in the teaching is confirmed by the miracle. Thus, the clarity of the miracle and that of the doctrine mutually reinforce each other. 7. Objection: At least, as Hume says, there is not historical certitude concerning the existence of miracles, by means of testimony. Indeed, that which is morally impossible happens more readily than that which is physically impossible. Now, it is only morally impossible that a thousand witnesses would err, whereas it is physically impossible that a fact would exist outside the laws of nature. Therefore, it is easier for a thousand witnesses to err than for a fact to exist outside of the laws of nature. Response: Indeed, it is easier for a thousand witnesses to err than for metaphysical laws to be altered, for they are absolutely necessary and suffer no exception. It is even easier for a thousand witnesses to err than for something to be produced outside of physical laws by a merely natural cause, for this is physically impossible (that is, for nature itself). However, it is, as it were, infinitely easier for something to be produced by the First Cause outside of physical laws than it is for a thousand witnesses to err. Indeed, for God, to act outside the order of nature is neither physically nor morally impossible—nay, it is quite fitting in confirmation of the saving truth or the holiness of his servants. By contrast, it is both physically and morally impossible for a thousand witnesses to err—nay, even to a degree metaphysically impossible—for thence we would have a cause without an effect in such a case. If a thousand witnesses agree concerning something, it is metaphysically certain that the cause of this agreement exists, which cannot be assigned to anything other than the very evidence of the fact. Hence, Hume’s objection is null and void. 8. Continued urging: Nonetheless, the testimony of a few cannot prevail against the universal testimony of mankind. Now, while two or ten witnesses profess that a dead person has resurrected, countless people from all regions of the world hold that the dead do not rise. Response: The testimony spoken of here is not concerned with the same object. For universally, men hold that the dead do not naturally rise, nor generally. By contrast, two or ten witnesses profess that someone who was dead was supernaturally raised from the dead in a particular case. These two testimonies do not contradict one another. Nay, the second presupposes the first, just as the exception presupposes the law outside of which it takes place, for otherwise there would be no marvelous or extraordinary exception. 9. Continued urging: Nonetheless, this certitude concerning the existence of miracles cannot be historical. Indeed, on the basis of human testimony, we can accept natural facts as something historically certain; however, we cannot thus accept facts that are so extraordinary that they have no plausibility. 150 Response: A miracle is a sensible fact that is obvious and, hence, naturally knowable by witnesses. Therefore, it is historical if it takes place before many attentive onlookers who carefully weigh out all of the circumstances of the fact, if public monuments are erected in memory of it, if stories are written about it, and so forth. Historical certitude is not diminished because a fact is extraordinary, for the historian precisely as a historian must not choose a particular philosophical system that is more or less opposed to natural reason and to deny facts that contradict this system. Rather, he must refer to facts as they were, in accord with the certain documentary evidence of them. Nonetheless, historical certitude requires greater testimony to the degree that the fact in question is more extraordinary. 151 This holds true, in particular, if the witnesses needed for asserting the truth of the things spoken of have themselves suffered death. Thus, without exercising sufficient criticism, the foes of Christianity enumerated certain miracles performed by nonbelievers [gentibus]. According to them, Vespasian supposedly healed the blind and lame and Apollonius of Tyana supposedly raised a dead girl, likewise performing many other miracles. {{92}} In reality, however, what is referred to concerning Vespasian has no witness but, rather, relies on his uncertain fame. Moreover, the lame and blind whom he is said to have healed were not, in the judgment of doctors, naturally unable to be healed, as is reported in Tacitus, [Historiae,] bk. 4, no. 81. As regards Apollonius, it was more than a hundred years after Apollonius’s death that one Philostratus wrote his history, which was loaded with fables, and he refers to this raising up of a certain girl on the basis of uncertain rumors, without any testimony, and on the basis of his narrative it is not clear that the girl really was dead.152 Finally, the fact that Apollonius was held to be an imposter thus ensured that he would have no sect. By contrast, as we will show in the second book, Christ’s miracles are historically certain. Nay, the evangelists themselves faced death for asserting the truth of the things that they narrated. 

ART. 4: ON THE PROBATIVE FORCE OF MIRACLES 

§1. The Church’s teaching 

§2. On the nature of this probative force, according to St. Thomas 

§3. Demonstration of the value of miracles inasmuch as they are utterly certain motives of credibility 

§4. Resolution of objections 

§1. The Church’s Teaching 

The [First] Vatican Council defines, in Dei filius: “Miracles, . . . since they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men.”153 And likewise, in canon 3.4: “If anyone says that no miracles are possible and that, therefore, all accounts of them are to be dismissed as fable and myths; or that miracles can never be recognized with certainty and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be legitimately proved by them, let him be anathema.”154 Likewise, in the formula of the Anti-Modernist Oath prescribed by Pius X against modernism, we find it said: “Second, I accept and acknowledge external arguments of revelation, that is, divine deeds, in particular miracles and prophecies as utterly certain signs of the divine origin of the Christian religion, and I hold that they are most excellently adapted to the understanding of all eras and men, even of our own days.”155 Hence, according to the Church, if certain men of our own era do not understand the probative force of miracles or hold that they only have a symbolic value, useful for drawing our attention, such assertions arise from their own agnostic prejudices. Christ himself said: “The works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me. . . . But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works: that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father” (John 10:25, 38, DR). Likewise, “If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin: but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father” (John 15:24, DR). And “there is no man that doth a miracle in my name and can soon speak ill of me” (Mark 9:38, DR). 

§2. On the Nature of This Probative Force, according to St. Thomas 

According to the Holy Doctor, an argument based upon miracles, in order to prove the divine origins of some doctrine, is not a direct a priori demonstration (that is, from a proper cause, as is the demonstration of the soul’s immortality on the basis of its spirituality), nor a direct a posteriori demonstration (namely, from a proper effect, as God’s existence is proven by way of causality), {{93}} but rather, is an indirect demonstration on the basis of an utterly certain sign, which concludes that the thing in question is such, for otherwise absurdity or something impossible would follow. This indirect demonstration does not offer (as is the case in a direct / ostensive demonstration) vision of the truth of the reality in itself; however, it does exclude the fear of error, given the absurdity that would follow upon the denial of it.156 What is directly manifested through a miracle is the intervention of the divine omnipotence, which “manifestly displays” this power, as the [First] Vatican Council says, and on this basis, the divine origin of the revealed doctrine is proven indirectly, though duly, presupposing the declaration of the prophet concerning the miracle’s connection with the doctrine to be confirmed. Now, the fact that this is St. Thomas’s thought on this matter is clear in a number of his texts. (1) In ST III, q. 55, a. 3, he expressly determines that an argument from miracles is a proof through a sign: There are two sorts of arguments. Sometimes, the term “argument” is used to indicate any kind of account [ratio] giving faith (i.e., certitude) concerning a matter that is in doubt, whereas at other times it refers to a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth, just as Aristotle himself also sometimes uses the term in his works (Cf. Prior Analytics, bk. 2; Rhetoric, bk. 1). Therefore, taking the term “argument” in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by way of argument (because what exceeds human reason cannot be proven through human accounts). . . . However, if the term is taken in the second sense, Christ is thus said to have declared His Resurrection by means of arguments, inasmuch as He showed, through certain evident signs, that He resurrected (or that He was sent by God). (2) Nonetheless, according to St. Thomas, this argument from miracles is utterly certain. Indeed, he says in ST III, q. 43, a. 1: Because those things that are of faith exceed human reason, they cannot be proven through human reasons but, rather, must be proven through arguments drawn from the divine power, so that when someone performs works that only God can do, we may believe that the things that he says are themselves from God. This is akin to when someone brings letters, signed by the king’s ring, thus leading one to believe that what is contained in those letters does indeed proceed from the king’s will. Likewise see ST II-II, q. 178, a. 1. Also see ST II-II, q. 5, a. 2: “If, while announcing God’s word, a prophet were to foretell something and give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of the person who sees that sign would be convinced by such a deed that he would clearly know that this is said by God, who does not lie, although that future thing would not be evident in itself. Whence, the formal character of faith would not be destroyed by this certitude.” Likewise, in SCG III, ch. 135: “Since those things that are known by faith surpass reason, the spoken words of the preachers needed to be confirmed by certain signs, which would make it wholly clear that these words came from God, provided that these preachers did things like healing the sick and the performance of other difficult deeds, which could be done only by God.” And in Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4: “It cannot happen that someone who announces a false teaching would perform true miracles, which can only be brought about by the divine power, for were matters otherwise, God would be the witness to falsehood, which is impossible.” This final text makes clear why arguments from miracles provide a proof on the basis of an utterly certain sign, reducing the argument to impossibility or absurdity. Also see In Ioan., ch. 9, lect. 3, no. 8; and see In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2; d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 4; d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, q. 4, ad 4. 

§3. Demonstration of the Value of Miracles Inasmuch as They Are Utterly Certain Motives of Credibility 

A. Foundation for this probative force. 157 {{94}} If a prophet proposing a doctrine as something revealed by God, while performing a miracle in confirmation of this revelation, did not truly receive this doctrine as something revealed by God, it would follow that God would be the witness to falsehood. Now, this inference is absurd. Therefore, the antecedent is also absurd. Hence, when miracles are performed in confirmation of some revealed doctrine, they are utterly certain signs of revelation. Proof of the inference. Indeed, a miracle can be produced only by the divine omnipotence, under the direction of divine providence. Now, providence extends not only to the substance of the miracle to be performed but also to all the circumstances in which it is produced, the most important of which is the declaration made by the prophet concerning the connection of this miracle with this revelation to be confirmed. Thus, divine providence differs from our prudence, which cannot foresee all the external circumstances of our acts. Therefore, if a true miracle is indeed performed, along with all the circumstances that bear witness to the fact that it is done in confirmation of revelation, all the while without revelation actually being made, then God who alone can bring about a true miracle would be a witness to falsehood, either intentionally or at least permissively, inasmuch as he would thus have permitted a false prophet to misuse a true miracle. Proof of the impossibility of drawing the inference. (1) God cannot intentionally bear witness to falsity, for through his very essence he is the First Truth. Were he to intentionally bear witness to falsity, the Unfailing First Truth would indeed fall short of what he is, something absurd. (2) Nor can he do so permissively. That is, God cannot permit a false prophet to misuse a true miracle in circumstances in which men would be invincibly led into deception. Indeed, were he to do so, God would simultaneously will and not will men to be able to arrive at their ultimate end, for he would perform a miracle by virtue of which error would in fact be accepted in place of truth in a matter that is necessary to salvation.158 Hence, miracles directly manifest a free intervention by the divine omnipotence and indirectly manifest the divine origin of doctrine in confirmation of which they are performed. As we read in the constitution Dei filius from the [First] Vatican Council: “miracles, . . . since they manifestly display the omnipotence . . . of God, are the most certain signs of the divine revelation.” The transition from the divine attribute of omnipotence to that of the First Truth revealing is brought about on account of the impossibility of there being any contrariety among the divine attributes. Omnipotence and providence cannot act against the First Truth. {{95}} This argument is confirmed by way of comparison to a king’s seal placed as a stamp only upon truly authentic writings. Hence, the foundation for the value of miracles is the nature of this sign, which can be produced only by God, who is utterly truthful.159 B. The condition for the probative force of miracles. In order for a miracle to be an utterly certain sign of revelation, some necessary condition is required—namely, the explicit or implicit declaration of the connection of this miracle with this revelation to be confirmed—for otherwise, the miracle would indeed be an extraordinary intervention by God, but it would not be a fitting sign of God’s doctrine. This declaration can be implicit, though nonetheless manifest based on its circumstances, by means of which it would be clear that the miracle is performed in confirmation of the doctrine previously proposed as being revealed by God. However, it can be an explicit declaration, either directly (if someone asserts that a given miracle is to follow in manifestation of the divine origin of a given doctrine) or indirectly (if someone announces himself to be sent by God and calls attention to a miracle that he performed earlier). This declaration by the prophet, especially if it is explicit and direct, is confirmed by the miracle as a unified whole along with the revealed doctrine. In fact, the very connection of this miracle with this doctrine to be confirmed is revealed to the prophet by God, for otherwise the prophet himself could not announce the miracle to follow (for it is an extraordinary effect depending upon the wholly free will of God). Hence, we read in Exodus 4:1–19 that God manifested to Moses the miracles that he was to perform in confirmation of his divine mission so that the Israelites might believe. Likewise, Christ, sending forth his disciples to preach, said: “Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils” (Matt 10:8, DR). Thus, the prophets and apostles—that is, the first apologetes—knew from on high (namely, as revealed by God) the probative force of miracles before they performed them. Likewise, the teaching Church (ecclesia docens), in defining this probative force of miracles as a dogma,160 infallibly judges it under the light of revelation, without a vicious circle, although the value of this motive of credibility can be known by the light of reason alone for those who come to faith. Hence, it is not surprising that, like the apostles, the apologete would speak from on high under the direction of faith to men who do not yet believe so that he may present them with rationally efficacious motives of credibility that are chosen and given by God himself. (See what we said earlier in the introduction to this work concerning the nature of apologetics.) Moreover, miracles are motives of credibility accommodated to the intelligence of all, for they are sensible signs whose value is known on the basis of the principles of natural reason (i.e., common sense) concerning the truthfulness and omnipotence of God. However, in opposition to the objections against them drawn from the scientific order, they can be efficaciously defended both metaphysically and historically. 

§4. Resolution of Objections 

{{96}} First, we will present the a priori objections, followed by those that are a posteriori. 

1. Objection: Miracles only prove the fact of revelation through the mediacy of the declaration made by the prophet concerning its connection with this revelation to be confirmed. Now, this declaration is fallible and also perhaps feigned. Therefore, miracles cannot prove, at least apodictically (that is, with utter certainty) the fact of revelation. 

Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede it if this declaration is confirmed by the miracle in a unified manner together with the revealed doctrine; otherwise, I deny it. I distinguish the minor premise along the same lines. 2. Continued insistence: This declaration is not sufficiently confirmed, especially if it is indirect and made by calling attention to miracles that were performed in the past. Indeed, according to many theologians, it is not contradictory to say that a false prophet could misuse a true miracle performed for the sake of another end. Now, in such a case, the prophet’s declaration would be false. Therefore, the prophet’s declaration is insufficiently confirmed by the miracle. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede it if it is clear, along with all the circumstances, that this miracle is performed for the sake of another end; otherwise, I deny it. We explained this earlier in the body of our thesis in the context of the Salmanticenses’ argument concerning this point. 3. Continued urging: Nor in these circumstances does a miracle apodictically prove the fact of revelation. According to Juan de Ripalda, God can perform a miracle in confirmation of some saving error. Now, a false form of revelation can be saving (e.g., false preaching concerning the end of the world can be saving as an exhortation to vigilance). Therefore, God can perform a miracle in confirmation of false revelation. Response: With the Salmanticenses,161 and nearly all theologians, I deny the major premise, for evil things must not be done so that good things may be brought about. Now, error, precisely as error, is not saving, and lies are, of themselves, evil. Therefore, God cannot per se influence one to err, nor to lie, even if, per accidens, salvation were to follow from it. Indeed, God would no longer be the First Truth through his very essence if this weren’t so, and moreover, we would never be able to discern saving error from the truth162 necessary for salvation. This would be to overturn the entire order of truth and morality. 4. Continued urging: Nonetheless, miracles cannot be the basis for scientific demonstration of the divine origin of some doctrine or of the fact of revelation. Indeed, scientific demonstration is either a priori (i.e., from a proper cause) or a posteriori (i.e., from a proper effect). Now, miracles are neither a proper cause nor a proper effect of revelation. Therefore, miracles cannot be the basis for scientific demonstration concerning the fact of revelation. Response: I make a distinction regarding the major premise. I concede it as regards scientific demonstration, strictly speaking. However, I deny it for scientific demonstration in the broad sense. Indeed, the latter can be a demonstration through a sign. Now, if the sign is utterly certain, it provides the foundation for an apodictic demonstration through a reductio ad absurdum argument. As we said earlier, this holds for the case of miracles, through a reduction to this impossibility: God would be a witness to falsehood.163 {{97}} 5. Continued urging: The fact of revelation cannot be demonstrated from a sign either. Indeed, the fact of revelation, by means of which supernatural mysteries are manifested, is specified by these same mysteries and hence is supernatural quoad substantiam. Now, that which is supernatural quoad substantiam is also supernatural as regards how it is known, inasmuch as truth and being are convertible. Therefore, the fact of revelation cannot be naturally known with certainty on the basis of a sensible miracle but, rather, is only held by faith. Response: I make a distinction concerning the major premise. I concede that in itself and intimately considered, the revealing action is supernatural quoad substantiam. However, as it is manifested externally, through the human testimony of the prophet and 2 1 through miracles, it is known as something modally supernatural—namely, as a miraculous intervention by God in the intellectual order. Now, from this external perspective, the fact of revelation is known in the same manner as it would be known even if it were solely modally supernatural—namely, as something ordered only to the manifestation of the natural truths of religion. However, in itself and intimately, it is supernatural quoad substantiam and from this loftier perspective is formally known only through faith, as we discussed earlier in the previous volume of this work.164 6. Continued urging: Finally, an objection is drawn from the facts: Miracles are found in all religions and, hence, they prove nothing. Response: This is not the place to examine in detail the various wonders that are attributed to the various pagan partisans of Buddhism or Islam, as well as those belonging to the various sects of Christianity. For now, it suffices to say this does not prove that these wonders are true miracles and not the deceptive illusions performed by magicians. Nay, on the basis of both physical and moral circumstances, many things appear as being deceptive illusions.165 Finally, St. Thomas does not deny that miracles may be produced by God in false religions, but if they are true, which would need to be proven, they are never performed in confirmation of a false doctrine. In ST II-II, q. 178, a. 2, ad 3, the Holy Doctor says: “Miracles are always true testimonies concerning those things to which they lead men. Whence, wicked men who express some false teaching never perform true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although they sometimes may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke and by the power of the sacraments which they administer.” Likewise, in De potentia, q. 6, a. 5, ad 5, St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, refers to something read in historical texts concerning a certain vestal virgin who, as a sign of her preservation of chastity, carried water from the Tiber in a leaky vase without any water escaping from the vessel. Concerning this, the Holy Doctor says: “It is not unlikely, that as a commendation of chastity that the True God, through His good angels, would perform a miracle of this kind, retaining the water in the vessel, for if something good existed in the gentiles, it came from God. However, if this were done by demons, this does not stand against what we have said[, for . . . just as demons can move a body locally, so too can they hold back such movement].” Hence, true miracles are always true testimonies concerning those things to which they lead men—namely, either in confirmation of revealed doctrine or as witnessing to someone’s holiness. And these remarks suffice as regards miracles inasmuch as they provide an utterly certain motive of credibility.

CHAPTER TEN On Christ’s Miracles ART. 1: ON THE MIRACLES PERFORMED BY CHRIST BEFORE HIS DEATH 

§1. The state of the question. {{305}} 

§2. The classification of the miracles narrated in the Gospels. 

§3. These miracles are historically certain. 

§4. They are truly supernatural. 

§5. They confirm Christ’s divine mission with utter certainty. 

§1. State of the Question 

Although many rationalists admit the majority of the facts recounted in the Gospels, they nonetheless reject the miracles spoken of therein because, according to them, miracles are a priori impossible. Therefore, they deny either the historicity or the supernaturality of these facts. 

As we discussed earlier, the rationalist Paulus (†1851) said that Jesus cured the man who was blind from birth but did so by means of an eye salve that he mixed with mud. Likewise, the five loaves of bread filled the five thousand inasmuch as their example led other men who had bread to give some to those who did not have any. He walked upon the sea—that is, upon the shore, above the sea. Strauss ( † 1874) rejected these ridiculous inventions, which are opposed to the honesty of the Evangelists, contending instead that all the accounts of the miracles must be classified as myths, as facts that have been augmented and adorned by the imagination. Now, since myths could only be formed after the passage of some time, Strauss said that the Gospels were not contemporaneously written accounts but, rather, must have been written a hundred or a hundred and fifty years after Christ’s death. 

However, critics had to acknowledge that the Synoptic Gospels were written after the first letters of St. Paul but before the end of the first century. As we discussed earlier, Harnack today holds that the Gospel according to Mark was composed between AD 65 and 70, the Gospel according to Matthew between AD 70 and 75, and the Gospel according to Luke between AD 78 and 93 or perhaps between AD 60 and 70. {{306}} Therefore, many contemporary rationalists and liberal Protestants admit the historicity of certain miracles recounted in the Gospels, which they contend can be explained by mental suggestion and hypnotism, holding that the accounts concerning the other miracles were gradually constituted through a kind of process of idealization inasmuch as a natural fact that was more or less extraordinary was elevated by faith by being transfigured beyond its historical conditions.1 Such was the position held by the modernists. 2 However, conservative Protestants defend the traditional position concerning the miracles of Christ.3 

The [First] Vatican Council defined, “If anyone says that no miracles are possible and that, therefore, all accounts of them, even those contained in Sacred Scripture, are to be dismissed as fable and myths; let him be anathema.”4 

Already, at the beginning of this second book, we defended the historical authority of the Gospels in general. Now, we must consider the historicity of the miracles recounted therein, along with their supernaturality and probative force. 

§2. The Classification of the Miracles Narrated in the Gospels 

Beyond the extraordinary signs that were accomplished in Christ’s birth, baptism, and death, the Gospel refers to many miracles performed by Christ in confirmation of his divine mission. More than forty are specifically recounted in the Gospels, and many more are mentioned in passing in a general manner, for example, as is said in Luke 6:19, “power went out from him and healed all.” In ST III, q. 44, St. Thomas divided Christ’s miracles from the perspective of how they show his power over all kinds of creatures. 

(1) Over spiritual substances. He freed many who were possessed by demons. In Acts 10:38 (DR), St. Peter said that he “went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed by the devil.” Eight miracles of this kind are referred to in the Gospels: The demoniac was healed in the synagogue of Capernaum (Mark 1:23– 28; Luke 4:33–37); in the region of the Gerasenes two were freed, and the demons were cast out into pigs nearby (Matt 8:28–34; Mark 5:1–20; Luke 8:26–39); the man who suffered seizures [lunaticus] was cured (Matt 17:14–20; Mark 13–28; Luke 9:37–44); likewise, he healed the man who was born deaf and mute (Matt 9:32–34; Luke 11:14–15), the man who was born blind and mute (Matt 12:22–23), the daughter of the Canaanite woman (Matt 15:21–28; Mark 8:24– 30), and the woman who had a spirit of weakness (Luke 13:1–16). Of Mary Magdalene, it is said that “he cast seven demons out of her” (Mark 16:9; Luke 8:2). Finally, we read in the Gospel that “they brought to him many that were possessed with devils, and he cast out the spirits with his word” (Matt 8:16, DR; Luke 6:17–18). {{307}} By contrast, the angels in the desert ministered to Christ, and one of them appeared to him in the Garden of Gethsemane in order to give him comfort (Matt 4:11; Luke 22:43). 

(2) Over heavenly bodies. He performed two miracles of this kind: The star appeared at Christ’s birth (Matt 2:2), and at his death, darkness covered the whole of the land from the sixth to the ninth hour (Luke 23:44). 

(3) Over men. Three resurrections are recounted: the widow of Nain’s son, the daughter of Jairus, and Lazarus, who had been in the tomb for four days (Matt 9:18–26; Luke 7:11–17; John 11:1–45). There are many accounts of him curing people, for example: the ten lepers (Matt 8:1–4; Mark 1:40–45; Luke 5:12–14; 17:12–19); the three paralytics (Matt 9:1–7; Mark 2:1–12; Luke 5:18–26; Matt 8:5– 13; Luke 7:2–19; John 5:1–9); at least seven blind people, one of whom was blind from birth (Matt 9:27–31; 20:29–34; Mark 8:22–26; 10:46–52; Luke 18:35–43); the woman who suffered from a flow of blood (Matt 9:20–22; Mark 5:25–34; Luke 8:43–48); St. Peter’s mother-in-law (Matt 8:14–15; Mark 1:29–31; Luke 4:38–39); the son of a certain princeling (John 4:46); the man with the withered hand (Matt 12:9, 13); the man with dropsy (Luke 14:1–6). And in a general manner, it is said more than once, “a very great multitude of people from all Judea and Jerusalem and the sea coast, both of Tyre and Sidon, who were come to hear him and to be healed of their diseases” (Luke 6:17–18, DR). 

(4) Over irrational creatures. The Gospels refer to the sudden conversion of water into wine at Cana in Galilee (John 2:1–11), the miraculous catches of fish (Luke 5:1–11; John 21:1–13), the discovery of the silver coin in the mouth of the fish (Matt 17:23–26), the two multiplications of the loaves (Matt 14:15–21; Mark 6:39–44; Luke 9:12–17; John 6:5–15; Matt 15:32–38; Mark 8:1–9), the calming of the storm (Matt 8:18–27; Mark 4:35–40), the walking on the water (Matt 16:23–33; Mark 6:47–52; John 6:16–21), and the sudden drying up of the fig tree (Matt 21:18–21; Mark 11:12–14, 20– 22). 

(5) Christ gave his apostles the power to perform miracles (Luke 10:9; Matt 10:8; Mark 16:17; John 14:12), and after the first sending , the seventy-two disciples returned, joyfully saying: “Lord, even the demons are subject to us in your name” (Luke 10:17). Similarly, after the day of Pentecost, many of the apostles performed miracles, which are recounted in Acts (Acts 2:43; 5:12; 9:34–40; 19:11–12; 20:9–12). 

§3. Christ’s Miracles Are Historically Certain 

A defense of the historicity of each of these miracles in particular falls to a course in Sacred Scripture;5 however, for this apologetic thesis, it is briefer and more efficacious that we consider them all together, especially by making clear the way that these miracles are connected with other facts whose historicity (something admitted by most rationalists) we proved earlier. Thus, concerning this matter, we must argue, as do many authors, as follows.6 

(1) The witnesses who refer to these miracles are the same as those who recount the other facts and, hence, are equally deserving of belief. {{308}} Nay, these witnesses suffered death for asserting the truth of the extraordinary facts that they recounted concerning Christ. 

(2) Like other facts, these miracles can be discerned as easily as other events, given that they are sensible. Nor are they unbelievable, like extraordinary things, unless one gratuitously already denies the possibility of miracles, though they do call for greater attention. 

(3) However, due attention to the events in question is not lacking, for Christ’s most well-known miracles were done in public, in cities and in broad daylight, often being performed in Jerusalem itself in the sight of the people. Among their witnesses, many were of influence in matters of science and authority, like Nicodemus, Jairus, the centurion, Zacchaeus, Lazarus, the scribes and Pharisees, the priests, and the Sanhedrin. Not all of them were inclined to admit these miracles, for the scribes and Pharisees made use of all possible means in order to deny their existence. 

(4) Nay, Christ’s own enemies undertook a juridical inquiry into certain miracles (John 5:10–16; 9:1–34). The clearest example of this is found in the account of the curing of the man born blind recounted in John 9. (a) After the miracle was performed, immediately the neighbors who knew that he had been blind diligently asked, “How were your eyes opened?” (b) They led him to the Pharisees, who first asked him how it was that he came to see, but they did not wish to believe that he had been blind. (c) The Pharisees themselves called in his parents, who asserted, “We know this because he is our son, and he was born blind.” (d) Once again, the Pharisees called in the man who was born blind and, again, like judges, interrogated him: 

They said to him: Give glory to God. We know that this man (who is called Jesus) is a sinner. He said therefore to them: If he be a sinner, I know not. One thing I know, that whereas I was blind now I see. They said then to him: What did he to thee? How did he open thy eyes? He answered them: I have told you already, and you have heard. Why would you hear it again? Will you also become his disciples? They reviled him therefore and said: Be thou his disciple; but we are the disciples of Moses. We know that God spoke to Moses; but as to this man, we know not from whence he is. The man answered and said to them: Why, herein is a wonderful thing, that you know not from whence he is, and he hath opened my eyes. Now we know that God doth not hear sinners, but if a man be a server of God and doth his will, him he heareth. From the beginning of the world it hath not been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind. Unless this man were of God, he could not do anything. They answered and said to him: Thou wast wholly born in sins; and dost thou teach us? And they cast him out. (John 9:24–34, DR) 

In this juridical inquiry, the miraculous fact is so clear that the Pharisees could not deny it without utterly obvious malice. Therefore, Jesus, by way of conclusion, said, “For judgment I am come into this world: that they who see not may see; and they who see may become blind. And some of the Pharisees, who were with him, heard, and they said unto him: Are we also blind? Jesus said to them: If you were blind, you should not have sin; but now you say: We see. Your sin remaineth” (John 9:39–41, DR). 

Similarly, we read in John 12:9–11 (DR), following upon the resurrection of Lazarus, many Jews “came, not for Jesus’ sake only, but that they might see Lazarus, whom he had raised from the dead. But the chief priests thought to kill Lazarus also because many of the Jews, by reason of him, went away and believed in Jesus.” {{309}} Similarly, as we see in Acts 4:14–17 (DR), following upon the miracle performed by St. Peter, the leaders and the priests “could say nothing against it . . . and they conferred among themselves, saying: What shall we do to these men? For indeed a miracle hath been done by them, known to all the inhabitants of Jerusalem. It is manifest, and we cannot deny it. But that it may be no farther spread among the people, let us threaten them that they speak no more in this name to any man.” 

(5) We must take note of the simplicity of these narrations in the Gospels, which are completely different from what we read in the apocryphal gospels.7 Hence, all these things considered, these accounts cannot be rejected, unless we were to reject the very honesty of the Gospels as a whole. 

(6) Moreover, these miraculous facts were intimately connected with other facts recounted in the Gospels so that they cannot be denied without leading us to reject the entire historicity of Christ. Indeed, (a) we often read, “Many believed in his name, seeing signs which he performed” (see John 2:23; 11:45; 12:42; 20:29; Acts 5:12). This is how the conversion of many people is explained, like that of Nicodemus (John 3:2), as well as the apostles’ vigorous faith. After the miracle of Cana, “his disciples believed in him” (John 2:11, DR), and after the calming of the storm, they said among themselves, “Who is this, thinkest thou, that both wind and sea obey him?” (Mark 4:40, DR). (b) Likewise, many of Christ’s words were spoken at the time of a given miracle. For example, when he had healed the paralytic, Jesus set forth his divine mission and filiation to the Jews (John 5); likewise, the entire bread of life discourse is connected with the multiplication of the loaves (John 6). (c) Finally, on the occasion of these miracles, especially the raising of Lazarus, the priests and the Pharisees took counsel together, saying, “What do we, for this man doth many miracles? . . . But one of them, named Caiaphas, being the high priest that year, said to them: You know nothing. Neither do you consider that it is expedient for you that one man should die for the people and that the whole nation perish not. From that day therefore they devised to put him to death” (John 11:47–53, DR). Thus, since Christ’s miracles are intimately connected with the details of his life, preaching, Passion, and death, you could not undermine their veracity without simultaneously undermining that of the whole of the Gospel.8 {{310}} Indeed, certain rationalists admit this fact, and because miracles are forever found in Christianity, the only thing that they can do is reject the possibility of miracles a priori. 

(7) The letters of St. Paul can also be argued from. Their authenticity is admitted by nearly all rationalist scriptural critics, especially the letters to the Galatians, to the Romans, and the two letters to the Corinthians, which according to Harnack and Jülicher were written in either AD 53 or 54. Now, these letters formally assert that miracles were performed by the apostles in Christ’s name. However, if the apostles performed miracles in Christ’s name, a fortiori, Christ himself performed miracles. It suffices to cite the words of Romans 15:18–19 (DR): “For I dare not to speak of any of those things which Christ worketh not by me, for the obedience of the Gentiles, by word and deed, by the virtue of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Ghost.” Likewise, see 2 Corinthians 12:12. In 1 Corinthians 12:28, among all the charismata, he speaks of the grace of healing and of powers (that is, the grace of miracles). In Galatians 3:5 (DR), he takes up the argument from miracles: “He therefore who giveth to you the Spirit and worketh miracles among you.” 

(8) The apostles and Fathers would not have been able to call upon Christ’s miracles with such confidence unless they were entirely certain concerning them. How could St. Peter have said to the Jews in Acts 2:22 (DR), “Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him, in the midst of you, as you also know”? 

(9) If Christ’s miracles were only pious inventions made up by his disciples, their contemporaries, especially their adversaries, would have openly declared this fact. However, the contemporary Jews, who wrote the Talmud, or pagan authors like Celsus9 did not deny the miraculous works of Christ but, rather, attempted to explain them as being magical artifices. 

From all of these points, we must conclude that miracles of this kind cannot be historically denied. They are certain, as are the other facts recounted in the Gospels, whose historicity is admitted by rationalists. 

§4. Christ’s Miracles Are Truly Supernatural

 Rationalists do not deny that certain miracles recounted in the Gospels properly speaking exceed natural powers (e.g., the resurrections recounted therein). Hence, as we already have said, they hold that we must reject the historicity of these miracles a priori. As regards other signs, they concede that facts of these kinds truly stirred up amazement in those who saw them at that time, but they contend that they were recognized as being supernatural only because people were unaware of the laws of nature, along with the fact that men in these days had the propensity to admit miracles quite easily. Now, in response to this, we must say the following. 

(1) The Pharisees were not inclined to acknowledge Christ’s miracles, and nonetheless, they were not able to deny them. For example, there was their threefold investigation into the healing of the man who was born blind. {{311}} Likewise, there was their inquiry following Lazarus’s resurrection, which took place before the eyes of many Jews, with many of them believing, though others went away to the Pharisees, and gathering together evidence, they held counsel and said: “What do we, for this man doth many miracles? If we let him alone so, all will believe in him; and the Romans will come, and take away our place and nation” (John 11:47–48, DR). The same thing took place in Acts 4:16, after the miracle performed by St. Peter. 

(2) Earlier, after Christ’s first miracle, which clearly exceeded the powers of sensible nature, the scribes had said, “He hath Beelzebub, and by the prince of devils he casteth out devils.” And Jesus responded to them, “How can Satan cast out Satan? And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. . . . And if Satan be risen up against himself, he is divided, and cannot stand, but hath an end. . . . Amen I say to you that all sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and the blasphemies wherewith they shall blaspheme; but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin” (Mark 3:22–29, DR; see Matt 12:27ff; Luke 11:15). St. Mark explains the nature of the sin against the Holy Spirit by adding, “Because they said: He hath an unclean spirit,” and they said this having seen the miracles that clearly manifested the Holy Spirit’s intervention. 

(3) The extraordinary facts themselves that are presented in the Gospels as miracles, when their nature and physical circumstances are considered attentively, are clearly supernatural. There are many such cases: the instantaneous healing of a person who was born blind solely by means of spit and mud, the full curing of leprosy solely by touch, healings brought about at a distance by a mere word, the sudden conversion of water into wine, the multiplication of loaves, and a fortiori the raising of a dead man who was already beginning to rot. All of these facts, without falling into absurdity, cannot be called natural, as was said in bk. 1, ch. 19, where we showed at length, in our thesis concerning the discernibility of miracles (especially resurrection, the multiplication of loaves, and the healing of the man born blind), that they certainly exceed not only the powers of sensible nature but also those of created spirits. Moreover, among the physical circumstances of miracles, we must consider the fact that Christ performed these miracles instantaneously by his mere word. The winds responded immediately to his utterly certain command, and as Quadratus tells us, these healings were so stable that the sick who were thus cured or called back to life from death led a long life thereafter. 10 

(4) The moral circumstances and fruits of these signs confirm their divine origin. In general, seven moral circumstances are enumerated for human acts: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when. As we said earlier in this volume,11 the principal circumstance is the end, which appears first in the intention and declaration made by the wonderworker, though it comes later in execution—namely, in the moral fruits of the miracles performed. {{312}} (a) Why? Christ always said that he acted for the glory of God and the salvation of souls. And this is utterly clear on the basis of the fruits of the miracles—namely, the emendation of the lives of the disciples, along with the conversion of many Jews and Gentiles, the correction of vices, and the regeneration of humanity. Christ himself said, concerning false prophets: “By their fruits, you shall know them. . . . Every good tree brings forth good fruits, whereas every bad tree brings forth bad fruit” (Matt. 7:16–17). The fruits of Christianity are clearly conformed to right reason and to the nobler aspirations of our nature. (b) What? In the very nature of these miracles, we find nothing that appears ridiculous, indecent, violent, and irrational. On the contrary, all of them are good, morally befitting, beneficent, and worthy of God. (c) Who? Jesus, who performs these miracles, teaches a doctrine that honors God, is conformed to right reason, and leads to good morals. He himself appears to be utterly holy and endowed with a full host of heroic virtues. (d) How? Nothing unbefitting is grasped in his manner of acting, nor any ostentation, but rather, he acts with humility and modesty, indeed, often saying to those whom he healed, “Tell no one” (Matt 8:4; 16:9; Mark 5:43; 7:36; 8:26; etc.). Indeed, not wishing to vainly enkindle souls, he chose not to “show a sign from heaven” to the Pharisees and Sadducees (Matt 16:1–3). (e) By what aids? Christ performed miracles by commanding, after prayer, with majesty joined to humility. (f) Where? He did not perform these miracles among vain and unworthy men. Thus, he did not wish to perform a miracle before Herod in order to fulfill his curiosity. (g) When? He performed miracles at suitable times but not at others, thus showing that miracles must not be multiplied for the sake of the temporal necessities of this life. For example, in John 6:26 (DR), after the multiplication of the loaves, when the crowd from Capernaum gathered and sought after Jesus, he said to them: “Amen, amen, I say to you, you seek me, not because you have seen miracles, but because you did eat of the loaves and were filled.” On the basis of all of these circumstances, we have a clear confirmation that Christ was a minister of God, not of the devil. 

(5) We have an additional confirmation by considering the foolishness or impossibility of the hypotheses to which rationalists make recourse in order to deny these miracles. As we said in our discussion of the state of the question, the explanation proposed by Paulus is held to be ridiculous by rationalists themselves. Likewise, the mythicism invented by Strauss has been rejected by all critics, who are forced by historical evidence to admit that the Gospels were written much earlier than Strauss wished. However, rationalists today contend that Christ’s miracles can be explained by suggestion or hypnosis. 

Earlier, when we discussed hypnosis,12 we showed the limits of the powers of suggestion. Now, however, it suffices to say the following. (1) Only those who are disturbed with a nervous condition can be healed by means of suggestion.13 However, Christ also healed lepers, those who could not hear or speak, and people born blind, and indeed he raised up dead people, calmed storms, multiplied loaves, and so forth. All such phenomena lay beyond the bounds of what can be brought about by means of hypnosis. (2) When it is efficacious, suggestion works only gradually, not immediately, so that the sick may have a kind of persuasion concerning the healing to be obtained.14 {{313}} By contrast, Christ healed suddenly with a mere word or touch and, in many cases, did not gain the trust of these sick people whom he cured (Matt 12:22; Luke 17:12–14; 7:2–10; John 11:6). (3) Moreover, suggestion does not act at a distance.15 However, Jesus sometimes performed miracles at a distance, without any preparation, as he did, for example, when he healed the centurion’s son and the Canaanite woman’s daughter (Matt 8:5–13; 15:22–28). Therefore, the rationalists’ hypotheses cannot explain the historical miracles of Christ, and their supernaturality remains certain.16 

§5. Christ’s Miracles Confirm His Divine Mission with Utter Certainty 

A. In general, this was declared by Jesus in many places. For example, when John the Baptist sent two of his disciples to him to ask whether he was the Messiah, Jesus responded: “Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen. The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, the poor have the gospel preached to them. And blessed is he that shall not be scandalized in me” (Matt 11:4–6, DR; Luke 7:18–23). These signs had been announced by Isaiah as being messianic (Isa 35:5; 61:1). Similarly, when Jesus walked in the temple, in Solomon’s Portico, the Jews surrounded him and said, “How long dost thou hold our souls in suspense? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly,” and Jesus responded to them, “I speak to you, and you believe not: the works that I do in the name of my Father, they give testimony of me. . . . If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though you will not believe me, believe the works: that you may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in the Father” (John 10:24–38, DR). And because this argument was irresistible, the Jews, as the Evangelist adds, “sought therefore to take him, and he escaped out of their hands.” 

B. In particular, on many occasions, Jesus explicitly declared the connection of his miracles with the mission to be confirmed thereby, prior to the performance of that miracle. For example, before the raising of Lazarus, “Jesus lifting up his eyes, said: Father, I give thee thanks that thou hast heard me. And I knew that thou hearest me always: but because of the people who stand about have I said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me” (John 11:41–42, DR). And indeed, as is often said in the Gospel, many believed upon seeing the miracles (John 2:11; 3:2; 9:35–38). 

C. Nay, Jesus declared that this proof of his divine mission is utterly firm and clearly manifest when he said concerning his enemies, in John 15:22–25 (DR): “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin. He that hateth me hateth my Father also. If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father. But that the word may be fulfilled which is written in their law (Ps 24:19): They hated me without cause.” {{314}} Thus, as the [First] Vatican Council says, the divine origin of the Christian religion is legitimately proven on the basis of utterly certain signs that are accommodated to the intelligence of all. Nothing could be clearer, except for the very Resurrection of Christ, which we will discuss in the next article.17 

Objection: Christ himself seemed to have given little weight to the probative force of his miracles. He rebukes the scribes and Pharisees when they ask for a sign from heaven (Matt 12:38), whereas he says to the Apostle Thomas that they are blessed “who have not seen but have believed” (John 20:24). Sometimes he himself forbade that his miracles be announced publicly (Matt 9:30; 12:16; Mark 1:44; etc.). 

Response: Christ rebukes the Pharisees who seek sign after sign, hiding their malice by feigning ignorance, whereas from then on he promises the great sign of his Resurrection. And he rebukes Thomas, who does not wish to believe the apostles’ testimony, even after so many great signs, but moreover demanded to see with his eyes and feel with his hands. Sometimes Christ prudently prevented his miracles from being spoken of publicly, in order to flee from the wrath of the Pharisees, to avoid arousing the commotion of political messianism among his followers, or to offer an example of the virtue of humility. 

ART. 2: ON CHRIST ’ S RESURRECTION 

§1. State of the question. 

§2. The importance of this motive of credibility. 

§3. Christ truly died. 

§4. It is historically certain that Christ was raised from the dead and that his Resurrection was perfectly manifested. 

§1. State of the Question 

Not only is Christ’s Resurrection narrated in the Gospels but also, in the Acts of the Apostles as well as in St. Paul’s letters, it is said that it was preached by the apostles as being the greatest motive of credibility. Rationalists, in order to weaken the strength of this fact, have thought up many different systems, which they themselves have been forced to successively cast aside. There are at least four distinct theories—namely, that holding it was fraudulent, saying that it was a kind of amplification, that asserting it was a hallucination, and that which asserts it was a spiritual vision. 

(1) With the deists in the eighteenth century, Reimarus revived the explanation that was invented by the Jewish priests and then by argued on behalf of by Celsus, holding that the apostles were deceivers in saying that Christ had risen from the dead. However, other rationalists reject this fraud theory because it does not explain how a religion founded upon lies could have renewed the world, nor how the apostles, who had been timid and fickle, fought on behalf of this fraud to the point of martyrdom. 

{{315}} (2) However, certain rationalists, like Weizsäcker and Martineau, 18 preserved part of this first theory, saying that the apostles declared that they saw the Lord only in a general manner, inasmuch as they firmly believed in his immortality. However, afterwards, their disciples amplified these words and gradually believed that Christ truly rose from the dead. However, like the first theory, this amplification theory (or evolution theory) was rejected by many, indeed for nearly the same reasons: For if the apostles declared that they saw Jesus when they did not in fact see him but only believed in his immortality, then they were deceivers. Therefore, their zeal, along with the renewal of the world, remain unexplained, and likewise, this would destroy St. Paul’s argument concerning the future resurrection of bodies, which has the bodily Resurrection of Christ as its pledge (1 Cor 15). 

(3) Admitting the perfect honesty of the apostles, many have said that they were deceived by a kind of hallucination. Such was the position of people like Strauss, Renan, Harnack, Réville, and Meyer. 19 According to them, the apostles could not believe that Jesus had been defeated by his enemies. Therefore, they pored over the Scriptures, finding therein predictions concerning the resurrection of the Messiah, and therefore, ardently desiring his resurrection, they were deceived by hallucinations. 

(4) No few rationalists, like Keim, Ewald, Schenkel, and Stapfer, 20 reject the last explanation as being insufficient, for it is clear that the apostles did not expect the Resurrection and, considering the number and character of its witnesses, as well as the various circumstances of the apparitions, the hallucination hypothesis is unfounded. Therefore, these rationalists thought up a fourth theory, holding that Jesus truly appeared to the apostles, not indeed in a bodily manner but, rather, in a spiritual manner, for although he did not rise from the dead, his soul, which was united to God, was able to comfort the disciples by making them more certain concerning his immortality. 21 Among the modernists, édouard Le Roy proposed a similar theory, for he denied the “reanimation of a corpse” as being something impossible, teaching that Christ was resurrected in some sense, inasmuch as he did not cease to act after his death and inasmuch as his soul retained a kind of virtual matter in the next life. He intended to reconcile this with Catholic dogma, for according to the pragmatism of the modernists, dogmas must be held only in their practical sense—that is, as preceptive norms of acting: One must comport oneself in relation to Jesus as though he rose in a bodily manner. 22 

(5) The partisans of the comparative history of religion say that the idea of the Resurrection, along with the temporal description of this taking place “on the third day” in the Evangelists and St. Paul must have depended upon other religions wherein we find the idea of a god who dies and rises again, namely, divinity of growth [numinis vegetativi]. Thus, Heinrich Zimmern, Peter Jensen, and Charles Virolleaud related this to Marduk in Assyrian myths; Otto Pfleiderer, Thomas K. Cheyne, Hermann Gunkel, Richard Reitzenstein, Wilhelm Bousset, and James G. Frazer had recourse to Eastern, Egyptian, Iranian, and Hellenistic myths (Osiris, Dionysus-Zagreus, Adonis, Attis, and others). Contemporary authors, at least those who hold the doctrine of the Resurrection, deny that the apostles themselves borrowed from pagan ideas, though the early communities, especially those made up of pagan Christians, underwent significant influence from pagan religions. 

{{316}} The Church condemned this last proposition,23 along with the two following modernist theses: “The Resurrection of the Savior is not properly a fact of the historical order. It is a fact of merely the supernatural order, neither demonstrated nor demonstrable, which Christian conscience gradually derived from other facts” and “In the beginning, faith in the Resurrection of Christ was not so much in the fact itself of the Resurrection as in the immortal life of Christ with God.”24 These theses are found in the works of Alfred Loisy. 25 Among the Catholic exegetes who wrote against the aforementioned theories, we should cite Ladeuze, Chauvin, and Mangenot.26 The traditional thesis is also defended by conservative Protestants.27 

Thus, we see the state of the question. Rationalists forever think up new theories to set up against the traditional teaching, doing so in particular (as they themselves admit) on account of their a priori denial of the possibility of miracles.28 However, they object that many contradictions are found in the Gospel accounts of the Resurrection, inasmuch as the sacred authors disagree with each other concerning the appearance of the angels, following the time when the women came to the tomb, and so forth.29 

In order to resolve this question, we will see what Christ’s own declarations as well as those of the apostles tell us about the importance of the Resurrection as a motive of credibility. This is the starting point for debate admitted by many rationalists. Then we will ask about the foundation for this certitude that the apostles had. In other words, we will prove historically that Christ truly died and truly rose on the third day. 

§2. The Importance of This Motive of Credibility 

As we can see from the Gospels, Christ himself had chosen this sign as the seal of his miracles and as an irrefutable argument of his divine mission. 

(a) After performing many miracles, speaking to the Pharisees, who heretofore asked him, “Master, we would like to see a sign from you,” Jesus responded, “An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign: and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet. For as Jonas was in the whale’s belly three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights” (Matt 12:39–40, DR; Luke 11:29). Jesus affirmed this again when the Pharisees asked for a sign from heaven (Matt 16:4). Likewise, he said to them: “Destroy this temple; and in three days I will raise it up,” speaking (as St. John says) of the temple of his body (John 2:19, DR; Mark 14:58). 

(b) Likewise, at least four times Jesus predicted to his disciples his Resurrection. {{317}} Immediately after Peter’s confession, “Jesus began to shew to his disciples, that he must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the ancients and scribes and chief priests, and be put to death, and the third day rise again” (Matt 16:21, DR; Mark 8:31; Luke 9:22). Likewise, he did so immediately after the transfiguration (Matt 17:22; Mark 9:30) and again before his triumphal entry into Jerusalem (Matt 20:19; Mark 10:34; Luke 18:33). In all of these three synoptic accounts of his prediction of his death and Resurrection we read: “He will rise on the third day.” Finally, after the last supper, Jesus announced it again (Matt 26:32; Mark 14:28). 

(c) Nay, while he was on the Cross, the people passing by blasphemed, saying: “Ha! Thou that destroyest the temple of God and in three days buildest it up again. Save thyself, coming down from the cross” (Mark 15:29–30, DR; Matt 26:61). And after his death, the chief priests and Pharisees gathered before Plate, saying, “Sir, we have remembered, that that seducer said, while he was yet alive: After three days I will rise again. Command therefore the sepulcher to be guarded until the third day: lest perhaps his disciples come and steal him away and say to the people: He is risen from the dead. And the last error shall be worse than the first” (Matt 27:63–64, DR). 

The apostles invoked this miracle of Christ’s Resurrection in particular30 in order to confirm the truth of their preaching. 

Matthias was chosen to be an apostle so that he might be a witness to the Resurrection (Acts 1:22). Peter, in his first sermon to the people, argued from the Resurrection of Christ predicted by David in order to prove the truth of the faith: “This Jesus hath God raised again, whereof all we are witnesses, being exalted therefore by the right hand of God and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this which you see and hear. . . . Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly that God hath made both Lord and Christ, this same Jesus, whom you have crucified” (Acts 2:32–36, DR). Similarly, St. Paul, before the Athenians in the Areopagus, after speaking of God the Creator said, “Because he hath appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in equity, by the man whom he hath appointed, giving faith to all, by raising him up from the dead” (Acts 17:31, DR). Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 15:5–8 (DR), St. Paul refers to the Resurrection of Christ, who “was seen by Cephas, and after that by the eleven. Then was he seen by more than five hundred brethren at once: of whom many remain until this present. After that, he was seen by James: then by all the apostles. And last of all, he was seen also by me.” And twice he declares, “If Christ be not raised, then your faith is in vain” (1 Cor 15:13–17). 

St. Paul does not mean that other miracles are insufficient motives of credibility but, rather, only means to say (and expressly affirms): “And if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain. . . . Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God” (1 Cor 15:14–15, DR); that is, our preaching is false, for it is based upon this fact that was alleged by all the apostles. Moreover, “And if Christ be not risen again, your faith is vain: for you are yet in your sins” (1 Cor 15:17–19, DR). That is, if Christ did not rise, then your faith in the resurrected Christ, which is the root of faith (Rom 4:25), is false and does not cleanse you from sin. Nay, according to John Chrysostom,31 Theophylact, and Ecumenius,32 Christ’s death was inefficacious for bringing about the remission of sins, and if Christ remained in death, he would have been conquered by it. {{318}} If he was not able to conquer death through his Resurrection, then neither was he able to conquer sin. Indeed, it is weightier and more difficult to conquer sin than to conquer death. Therefore, sin is fully destroyed only if its effect—namely, death—is destroyed. 33 

In this last declaration by St. Paul, we have an excellent statement of the importance of Christ’s Resurrection and its intimate connection with the principal mysteries of Christianity. This connection can be expressed thus: If Christ did not conquer death by rising again, then we cannot be certain that he conquered death upon the cross and that our redemption has been accepted by God. Why? Because, as is explained at length in the Old Testament, as well as in the letter to the Romans, “as by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned” (Rom 5:12, DR), “for the wages of sin is death,” (Rom 8:10) and “the body indeed is dead because of sin” (Rom 8:10, DR). Therefore, he who invisibly takes away the sins of the world must visibly destroy death—that is, the effect of sin—so that we may have an utterly certain sign of his victory over sin and of our redemption. Christ did not appear sensibly upon the Cross as victor but, rather, as one who has been conquered. By contrast, through the Resurrection, he is manifested as the conqueror of death, and thus, we know how he was able to tell his disciples, “In the world you shall have distress. But have confidence. I have overcome the world” (John 16:33, DR). Hence, Christ’s Resurrection is the greatest motive of credibility inasmuch as it is, according to divine providence, the most resplendent sign of Christ’s victory over sin and the devil.34 

Nay, as St. Paul shows in the same text, in relation to the future, it is the sign and pledge of our future resurrection: “But now Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep, for by a man came death: and by a man the resurrection of the dead. And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive. . . . And the enemy, death, shall be destroyed last: For he hath put all things under his feet” (1 Cor 15:20–26, DR). “And when this mortal hath put on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? Now the sting of death is sin. . . . But thanks be to God, who hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 15:54–57, DR). Thus, Christ appeared as the savior of the whole of humanity, not only as regards the soul but also as regards the body, in which the soul’s glory will be manifested. 

From this utterly lofty aspect, Christ’s Resurrection, thus connected to the redemption of humanity, is a mystery intrinsically pertaining to Christianity and is an object of faith, whereas, from an external perspective, as we will discuss, it is simultaneously a historical fact. {{319}} This gives rise to a number of apologetic points concerning the importance of the Resurrection. 

(1) Rationalists hold that the Resurrection is impossible because it would lack a sufficient reason and would be opposed to the laws of nature. St. Paul, by contrast, assigns the supreme reasons for this miracle, its place in the counsel of providence, showing that this sign is not opposed to the laws of nature but instead is above them, likewise being maximally conformed to the supernatural laws of the salvation of souls. 

(2) Liberal Protestants and modernists teach that miracles are signs that are far too extrinsic to religion that cannot be of use in leading men to interior faith. However, St. Paul makes clear that Christ’s Resurrection is a sign that is not extrinsic to religion but instead is connected with the other mysteries in an utterly profound and marvelous way. 

(3) All adversaries object: There can be no true certitude concerning any fact founded upon apparitions. Therefore, let them deign to explain how the apostles had such great certitude concerning the fact of Christ’s Resurrection. Not only did they preach this to the point of martyrdom as being the greatest motive of credibility, but in confirmation of it, they performed new miracles. 35 Afterwards, for nineteen centuries, Christ’s Resurrection has been preached as being the principal sign of his divine mission. 

Therefore, we must look into the historical origin of this certitude that the apostles had. 

§3. Christ Truly Died 

For the Jews themselves, as well as for the other enemies of Christianity, Christ’s death has been perpetually held to be an utterly incontrovertible fact. Nay, the Jews and the pagans were so certain about this fact that even though they fought against the reality of Christ’s Resurrection, they never claimed that he did not die. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the rationalists Paulus, Schleiermacher, Hase, and Herder did not fear to affirm that Christ did not die on the Cross but only became unconscious, afterwards showing himself to the apostles after he came back to consciousness, then dying later on in some unknown place. Today, this explanation is rejected by rationalists themselves as being materially and morally impossible.36 

(1) All four Evangelists, whom we have proven to be deserving of faith, unanimously state that Jesus Christ suffered and died, was anointed with spices, and was buried. Moreover, other New Testament authors testify to this fact as being utterly certain. All Christians from the beginnings of Christianity held it to be an indubitable fact. Nay, indeed, they held that it was the cause of mankind’s redemption, and many of them rested upon this with the firmest faith, to the point of pouring out their blood. 

{{320}} (2) Many were eyewitnesses of his death, with their witness being preserved in the Gospels: the centurion, along with a number of soldiers; John; the mother of Jesus, as well as godly women. Pilate did not permit Jesus’s body to be buried until after he learned from the centurion that Christ was already dead (Mark 15:39, 44–45). Nay, soldiers were sent so that they might break the legs of those who were crucified: “But after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs. But one of the soldiers with a spear opened his side: and immediately there came out blood and water” (John 19:33–34, DR). Then, Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus “took therefore the body of Jesus and bound it in linen cloths, with the spices, as the manner of the Jews is to bury” (John 19:40, DR). Moreover, as Renan himself admits,37 the only explanation for Christ’s death is the hatred of the Jews, for since they so ardently desired his death, they would not have let their victim remain alive. 

Objection: Christ’s death is rendered doubtful by Pilate’s admiration: “Pilate wondered that he should be already dead” (Mark 15:44, DR). 

Response: That admiration is a sign of its authenticity, for crucified people sometimes lived for a whole day (and sometimes longer). Pilate probably did not pay enough attention to everything that Christ suffered beforehand or, holding that he was a demigod, expected something extraordinary to be done on his behalf. 

(3) It is materially impossible that Jesus remained alive after his Crucifixion. Indeed, he had been hewn with the cruelest scourging, was pierced with the sharp spikes upon the crown of thorns, was put into agony for three hours, and was finished off by the most horrific suffering. However, if he did not die, the soldier’s lance, which opened up his side, would have killed him. Nay, his body was placed in a tomb, was wrapped in linen, and was covered with so great an amount of spices that even by themselves they would have been enough to suffocate Jesus if he were not already dead. Then the tomb was visited by the Jews and had a large stone placed over its opening, lest someone would be able to enter it, and guards were placed at the mouth of the tomb, lest the apostles steal his body. All of this surely makes it quite clear that Jesus truly was dead when he was taken down from the cross. 

(4) Finally, it is morally impossible that Jesus, whose sincerity, utterly great perfection, and zeal remain unquestioned, would have lived in some unknown place after his Crucifixion, deceiving his apostles concerning his Resurrection or allowing them to be deceived and preach this error as being an utterly certain argument for the truth of faith.38 Many rationalists admit that this is impossible. Therefore, there can be no doubt concerning Christ’s death on the Cross. 

§4. It Is Historically Certain That Christ Was Raised from the Dead and That His Resurrection Was Perfectly Manifested 

Let us consider St. Paul’s testimony, which was read in his letters before the Gospels were written. Then we will consider the testimony of the Evangelists, drawing this section to a close with an examination of the objections raised by rationalists. 

(1) St. Paul’s testimony. In 1 Corinthians 15, written around AD 57–58, St. Paul refers to various appearances by the resurrected Christ, which he had already handed on himself to the Corinthians in around 52 or 53: 

{{321}} For I delivered unto you first of all, which I also received: how that Christ died for our sins, according to the scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the scriptures, and that he was seen by Cephas, and after that by the eleven. Then was he seen by more than five hundred brethren at once, of whom many remain until this present, and some are fallen asleep. After that, he was seen by James, then by all the apostles. And last of all, he was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time. (1 Cor 15:3–8, DR) 

St. Paul did not intend to refer to all of Christ’s appearances but, rather, in particular to those that were made to the apostles, without, however, excluding others. The final appearance is that by which he himself was converted near Damascus, four or five years after Christ’s death. This event is referred to in Acts 9:3ff, 17, and 21; 22:14; and 26:14. This vision was not merely spiritual. Indeed, St. Paul says that he saw Jesus last of all, which would have been false if it were a question of a merely spiritual vision, for afterwards, Christ appeared spiritually to Ananias. Nor can it be said that St. Paul is speaking only about the immortality of Christ’s soul, which would not have ceased to act after his death, for in this chapter he expressly affirms, time and again, the Resurrection of Christ’s body, which he proposes as an exemplar of our future bodily resurrection. Likewise, St. Paul frequently mentions the Resurrection in other letters.39 As will be at once clear, there is no disagreement between St. Paul’s texts and the testimony offered by the Evangelists.40 

(2) The testimony of the Evangelists. Most of the appearances are enumerated by authors independently from each other: St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke, and St. John, for St. Matthew and St. John himself were the witnesses of a number of appearances. St. Mark hands on the preaching of St. Peter, and St. Luke probably accepted from Joanna, the wife of Chusa, Herod’s procurator, many points concerning Christ’s Passion, for he names her among the women going to the tomb, and he is particularly aware of things pertaining to Herod’s court (Luke 8:3; 23:7–12; 24:10). 

However, the four Evangelists agree concerning the very fact of the Resurrection, for they all hold that the tomb was found empty and that Christ appeared to the eleven apostles. 

A. They all affirm the tomb was found to be empty. {{322}} According to all of them, Joseph of Arimathea asked Pilate if he might have Jesus’s body, wrapped it in pure linen, and placed it in his new grave, which was dug out of the stone, then placing a large stone at the mouth of the grave (Matt 27:56–66; Mark 15:42; Luke 23:53; John 19:38). Nay, with Pilate’s permission, the Pharisees protected the tomb, sealing the stone and setting guards there (Matt 27:66). Now, according to the four Evangelists, on the first day after the Sabbath, when the women and disciples came to the tomb, the stone had been removed from the mouth of the grave, and they could not find the Lord’s body. An angel appeared to them and announced that Christ had risen (Matt 28:1ff; Mark 16:1ff; Luke 24:1ff; John 20:1ff). St. John relates that the linen and the napkin remained in the tomb, separately folded up. However, if Christ had really been buried in the grave as is narrated in the Gospels but was afterwards not found therein, then a strong confirmation can be had for the Evangelists’ later account concerning his bodily Resurrection.41 

The chief priests themselves, not knowing how to explain the way that the tomb was found to be empty, thought up a false story, which St. Matthew refers to: “They gave a great sum of money to the soldiers, saying, ‘Say that his disciples came by night and stole him away when we were asleep, . . . and this story was spread abroad among the Jews even unto this day.” However, this invention, as even some rationalists admit,42 is obviously a false story. As St. Augustine asked, “If the soldiers were asleep, what could they see? If they saw nothing, how were they witnesses?” Moreover, had the disciples carried away the body, they would have been accused before the judge; however, to the contrary, the apostles, who publicly preached the Lord’s Resurrection, never were condemned as being despoilers of his tomb. Moreover, we would not have an explanation for how the apostles believed in the Resurrection and preached it to the point of suffering martyrdom. {{323}} Nor can it be said that Christ’s body was engulfed by the rending of the earth, for in that case the linens and the napkin would have been absorbed as well. 

No more should we give credence to the hypothesis invented by Loisy holding that Christ’s body would have been thrown into a common grave. This hypothesis enjoys no foundation and stands in open contradiction to the testimony of all the Evangelists. St. Paul and St. Peter also speak about Christ’s burial in a way that expresses honor. 43 

B. All the Evangelists agree with St. Paul that Jesus appeared to the eleven apostles. Twelve appearances are mentioned in total; namely, he appeared to Mary Magdalene when she sat next to the tomb crying (Mark 16:9; John 20:11); to the women returning to the tomb (Matt 28:9–10); to Simon Peter (Luke 24:34; 1 Cor 15:5); to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24:15–35); to all the apostles except Thomas, gathered in the upper room (Mark 16:14; Luke 24:36–43; John 20:19–23); to all of them, with Thomas present, whom he ordered to place his finger in the nail wounds and his hand into Christ’s side (John 20:24ff; 1 Cor 15:5); to five apostles and two disciples at the Sea of Tiberius (John 21:1–24); to the eleven apostles who had gone to Galilee (Matt 28:16ff); to more than five hundred brothers gathered together (1 Cor 15:6); to James (1 Cor 15:6); to the eleven apostles in Jerusalem and in Bethany on the day of the Ascension (Mark 16:19; Luke 24:50–52; Acts 1:1–12); and finally, to St. Paul on the road to Damascus (Acts 9:3ff; 1 Cor 11:8). Nay, in Acts, we read: “To whom (namely, the apostles) also he shewed himself alive after his passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them, and speaking of the kingdom of God” (Acts 1:3, DR). 

Thus, all of the Evangelists and St. Paul hold that Jesus appeared to the eleven apostles after his Resurrection. 

Objection: Many rationalists push back, saying that Matthew and Mark seem to presuppose that Christ only appeared to his disciples in Galilee.44 Luke and John, however, assert that he was seen by his disciples in and around Jerusalem. On the basis of this discrepancy, it is inferred that the apparitions in Jerusalem are not historical.45

 Response: Matthew and Mark have the particular intent to refer to the Galilean appearances, which were both more frequent as well as the place where the institution of the apostles was complete. However, they do not deny the appearances in Jerusalem. Nay, St. Matthew recounts how Christ appeared to the godly women (Matt 28:9–10), and Mark refers to appearances to Mary Magdalene (Mark 16:9), to the two disciples going to the town of Emmaus (Mark 16:12), to the apostles gathered in the upper room (Mark 16:14), and to the apostles on the day of the Ascension (Mark 16:19).46 On this matter, also refer to commentators on the Gospel.47 

{{324}} Rationalist will insist, however: There are many contradictions in the Gospels— for example, as regards the appearances of the angels. Luke and John speak of two angels, whereas Matthew and Mark speak of one. According to Luke, the angels stood alongside the godly women, whereas according to Matthew, the angels sat upon the stone. Likewise, the authors do not always agree regarding the order of the appearances. 

Response: The Evangelists agree concerning the substance of the account, the fact of the Resurrection, and the most important circumstances. However, they are not easily reconciled regarding certain accidental circumstances, for they do not recount all of the interconnections of the facts. We do not concede that there are true contradictions between them, but even if there were such regarding these tiny details, their historicity would not thereby be destroyed, for frequently, when many witnesses recount one and the same complex fact, they agree on what is substantial concerning it and disagree about its minor circumstances. Nonetheless, their testimony is commonly admitted. Nay, these apparent points of disagreement manifest the Evangelists’ honesty, for if they wished to deceive their readers, they would have avoided such points of disagreement. 

Others object: Christ announced, “So shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights” (Matt 12:40, DR). Now, in fact, he remained only two nights and one day in the tomb. 

Response: This prediction, made to the Pharisees, is only found once in this form in the Gospels—namely, in Matthew 12:40—whereas by contrast, as we read in the Synoptics, Jesus announces three times to his disciples: “He will rise on the third day” (Matt 16:21; 17:22; 20:19; 27:63; Mark 8:31; 9:30; 10:34; Luke 9:22; 18:33; 1 Cor 15:4). The expression “three days and three nights” is easily explained through the likeness to the sign of the prophet Jonah that is made by Jesus here. Indeed, as we read in Jonah 2:1 (DR): “And Jonas was in the belly of a fish for three days and three nights.” Hence, Jesus said: “For as Jonas was in the whale’s belly three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.” As St. Thomas explains, following St. Augustine, “Sometimes in Scripture, the part is taken for the whole. Therefore, we must say that Christ, making use of a synecdoche, was in the tomb for three days and three nights, for Friday is counted as being a full day, and even the previous night, with no doubt existing regarding the second day, though the third is counted regarding the night as well as the following day.”48 This was his manner of speaking because of the likeness being drawn between the figure and reality. 

{{325}} (3) The apostles were not hallucinating. Now, we must consider the nature of these appearances.

 As we said earlier, Strauss and Renan, having rejected the theory that the apostles were deceivers, taught that they themselves were deceived by hallucination. Renan says49 that the apostles were not able to believe that Jesus was conquered by his foes. Therefore, they pored over the Scriptures and there found predictions of the Messiah’s Resurrection. Thus, inflamed with a great desire for the Resurrection, they were deceived by a hallucination. Today, the rationalist Meyer speaks along nearly the same lines.50 

This theory, which comes from an a priori denial of the possibility of miracles, completely contradicts the historical testimonies as well as what psychology teaches concerning hallucination. 

A. It is historically certain that the apostles and disciples did not expect the Resurrection. Indeed, Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea placed Jesus’s body in the tomb as though it were going to remain there in perpetuity, and they placed a stone at the mouth of the grave. And when the Sabbath had passed, Mary Magdalene and the godly women brought aromatic spices so that they might anoint Jesus’s body. Therefore, they too did not expect the Resurrection. Nay, Mary Magdalene, seeing the empty tomb, said, “They have taken away my Lord: and I know not where they have laid him” (John 20:13, DR). Then, later on, she did not immediately recognize Jesus when he spoke to her, “for she thought he was the gardener.” When the godly women announced the Resurrection to the apostles, “these words seemed to them as idle tales, and they did not believe them” (Luke 24:11, DR). The disciples on the road to Emmaus had lost all hope. St. Thomas said to the apostles, “Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails and put my finger into the place of the nails and put my hand into his side, I will not believe” (John 20:25, DR). From all of these various testimonies, which are all deserving of belief, it is quite clear that the apostles did not expect the Resurrection. Nay, Christ said to them, “O foolish and slow of heart to believe” (Luke 24:25, DR), and “he upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart” (Mark 16:14, DR). 

B. Taking into account all of the circumstances, it is psychologically clear that the apostles were not hallucinating. (a) Indeed, nobody is deceived by hallucinations unless he is disposed to flights of fancy, by vehement desires or out of fear. However, we find nothing like this in the apostles, for as St. John says, “as yet they knew not the Scripture, that (Jesus) must rise again from the dead” (John 20:9, DR), and therefore they were filled with sorrow and despair. (b) Many people who are awake cannot simultaneously have the same sort of hallucinations involving all of the same sensory experiences so that they would all see, hear, and touch something that never took place. (c) Long-lasting hallucination are a true form of madness, and no traces of such insanity are seen in the apostles. Therefore, how would they be able to imagine that for forty days (but no longer thereafter) they saw someone who had risen from the dead, hearing his instructions, accepting commands from him, eating with him, touching him, and finally seeing him, with their own eyes, ascend into heaven? (d) Once the given excitation of one’s nerves and imagination comes to an end, an experience of hallucination is corrected by reflection. {{326}} By contrast, the apostles remain convicted, even to the point of martyrdom, that they had seen the Lord in a bodily manner. (e) Moreover, how could such preaching, which renewed the face of the earth, be founded upon such a sickly kind of hallucination? (f) Finally, this does not explain how the tomb was found to be empty. 

(4) Christ appeared to the apostles in a bodily manner, not a merely spiritual one. As we discussed earlier, certain rationalists, like Keim and Schenkel, rejected the hallucination theory as being insufficient, holding instead that Jesus appeared to the apostles in a merely spiritual manner. They denied the “reanimation” of a corpse, but according to them, Christ’s soul, united to God after his death, comforted the apostles and manifested itself to them. 

This new theory comes from a gratuitous denial of the possibility of bodily resurrection and cannot be admitted without denying the honesty of the Evangelists and the apostles. As St. Luke recounts, at first sight, the apostles, “being troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit. And he said to them: . . . See my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. And when he had said this, he shewed them his hands and feet. But while they yet believed not and wondered for joy, he said: Have you here any thing to eat? And they offered him a piece of a broiled fish and a honeycomb. And when he had eaten before them, taking the remains, he gave to them” (Luke 24:37–43, DR). 

In fact, the apostles, especially St. Thomas, not only saw but also touched the Lord’s body. Moreover, if the reanimation of a corpse had not taken place, the tomb would not have been empty. Finally, this would bring to ruin St. Paul’s own argument concerning the future resurrection of bodies, which he holds is pledged to us in Christ’s own bodily Resurrection. St. Paul himself, on the road to Damascus, saw Jesus bodily, for he says, “And last of all, he was seen also by me” (1 Cor 15:8, DR). As we already hinted above, this proposition would be false if this were merely a spiritual apparition, for Christ afterwards appeared spiritually to others, like, for example, to Ananias.51 Finally, St. Paul speaks in a different way about his own spiritual visions, indicating that they were spiritual. (Acts 18:9; 22:17; 23:11; 2 Cor 12:1). 

St Thomas says: 52 

Through given evident signs, Christ showed that He had resurrected. . . . Christ manifested His Resurrection in two ways, namely, by means of testimony (by the angels and Sacred Scripture) and by way of argument or sign. And each kind of manifestation sufficient in its own kind. . . . The arguments (or signs) were sufficient for showing that the Resurrection was true and glorious. He first showed that it was a true resurrection on the part of the body, doing so in three ways. (1) He showed that it was a true and solid body, not imaginary or rarefied, like the air, establishing this fact by offering His body to be handled. Whence, at the end of Luke, He states, “Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” (2) He showed that it was a human body by presenting His true features for them to behold. (3) He showed that this body was numerically identical to the body which He had before by showing them the scars of the wounds. Whence, as we read at the end of Luke, he said to them, “See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself.” 

{{327}} In another way, he showed them the truth of His Resurrection on the part of His soul reunited with his body, doing so by means of the activities of the three kinds of life exercised by the soul. (1) He did so in the activities of the nutritive life by eating and drinking with His disciples, as we read at the end of Luke. (2) He did so in the activities of sense life by replying to His disciples’ questions and by greeting them when they were in His presence, thus showing that He both saw and heard. (3) He did so in the activities of intellectual life by conversing with them and discussing the Scriptures. Indeed, in order that nothing might be wanting to make the manifestation complete, he also showed that He had the Divine Nature, by performing the miracle by which they caught the huge load of fish and, moreover, by ascending into heaven while they looked upon Him. . . . 

He also showed his disciples the glory of his Resurrection by entering into the upper room and joining them while the doors were closed. . . . Likewise, it belonged to his property of glory that “he vanished suddenly from their eyes,” as we are told at the end of the Gospel of Luke, for in this way, we are shown that He had the power to be seen or not seen, a power belonging to a glorified body (see 1 Cor 15:42, 44). 

(Likewise, St. Thomas concludes in ad 1): Although each of these arguments (or signs), taken separately, would not suffice on its own to perfectly make manifest Christ’s Resurrection, nonetheless, when they are all taken together, they fully manifest it, above all on account of the Scriptural testimonies, the sayings of the angels, and also Christ’s own assertion supported by miracles. However, regarding the angels who appeared, they did not assert that they were men, as Christ asserted that He was truly a man. 

Objection: There are many accounts in the Gospel that seem to bear witness to merely spiritual apparitions, for Jesus’s body does not have the same nature as his first body. He enters into the upper room through closed doors, suddenly vanishes from before the eyes of the apostles, and indeed, as we read at the end of Mark, “he appeared in another shape” (Mark 16:12, DR) to the disciples on the way to Emmaus. 

Response: These were not merely spiritual apparitions, for the apostles touched the hands and feet of Jesus after the Resurrection (Matt 28:9; Luke 24:39–40; John 20:27). The facts that are alleged in this objection show that after the Resurrection his glorified body enjoyed special endowments, but they did not, however, diminish his body’s reality or identity. As regards the appearance in another shape, St. Thomas notes: “After his Resurrection, Christ appeared in his own shape to some who were well-disposed to belief, while he appeared in another shape to those who seemed to be already growing tepid in their faith. Hence, the latter said, at the end of Luke’s Gospel, ‘We hoped that it was he that should have redeemed Israel.’ Thus, Gregory the Great said that ‘he showed himself to them bodily such as he was in their minds, for because he was still a stranger to faith in their hearts, he put on the pretense that he had to go on further,’ that is, as though he were a foreigner.”53 

Likewise, “In order to manifest the glory of his Resurrection, Christ did not wish to continually converse familiarly with His disciples as He did before, lest it seem that he had risen to the same life as that which he had prior to this.”54 For the same reason, he did not manifest himself immediately to all, for that which pertains to the glorious life is not known in a general manner by the natural law (that is, by common knowledge) but, rather, through a special gift of grace.55 

(5) The reality of his appearances is confirmed by the miraculous way the apostles were changed, as well as by the conversion of St. Paul. Indeed, at first, the apostles were in many ways uncertain, fearful, and as it were, despairing. After the Resurrection and the pouring forth of the Holy Spirit, we see them being wise in divine matters, steady, fearless, and constant in all persecutions. {{328}} Peter, who during the Passion denied the Lord because of his fear, says before the Sanhedrin, “For we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard,” (Acts 4:20, DR) and “We ought to obey God rather than men” (Acts 5:29, DR). The apostles “went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus” (Acts 5:41, DR). Likewise, the sudden and persevering conversion of St. Paul is explained if the Lord truly appeared to him, as he himself recounts. Otherwise, this conversion and the vigorous faith of the apostles remains inexplicable. The tree shall be known from its fruits. 

Objection: According to St. Thomas, the apostles believed in Christ’s Resurrection, and he teaches in another place that one and the same thing cannot be simultaneously seen and believed, nor known and believed. Therefore, the apostles were not able to be visual witnesses of Christ’s Resurrection. 

Response with the Holy Doctor: The apostles did not see Christ resurrect in the same way that they saw Lazarus’s resurrection, for “upon His rising, Christ did not return to the familiar manner of life, but instead, to a kind of immortal and God-conformed condition. . . . Therefore, it was fitting that Christ’s Resurrection was not directly witnessed by men but, instead, was proclaimed to them by angels.”56 Nonetheless, “the apostles were able to witness the Resurrection even by sight, for on the faithful testimony of their own eyes (fides occulata) they saw that Christ, whom they had known to be dead, was now alive. However, just as man arrives from the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so too did men arrive at sight of the risen Christ through the message already heard from angels.”57 

What is meant by these words, fides occulata? 

This is explained by a distinction given by St. Thomas: “Christ manifested his Resurrection in two ways, namely, by means of testimony (by the angels and Sacred Scripture) and by way of argument or sign. And each kind of manifestation was sufficient in its own kind.”58 That is, sensible signs sufficed for producing certitude of the same order, which is called physical certitude: “Touch and see.” The testimony of the angels, of Christ himself, and of the Scriptures sufficed with internal grace for having certitude of a loftier order—namely, for having the supernatural certitude of faith. “Thus, the apostles arrive at sight of the risen Christ through the message already heard from angels.” And faith in the Resurrection remains here, for Christ’s Resurrection is not only a miracle, which is naturally knowable on the basis of signs (e.g., his wounds), but at the same time is a mystery of faith. Indeed, not everything about the Resurrection could be sensed by the apostles and many things remained hidden (e.g., the fact that it was not only the mere reanimation of a corpse but the self-resurrection of the Son of God, connected with the mysteries of the Redemption and future glory). These transcend both the senses and reason and are believed on account of the authority of God who reveals. Hence, in speaking of the Apostle Thomas, St. Thomas says: “He saw one thing and believed another: he saw the wounds and believed in God.”59 Therefore, faith is said to be ocular when a given mystery is made visible regarding some external aspect. Thus, we can say that the apostles had the faithful testimony of their eyes (fidem oculatam) concerning the very fact of divine revelation through Christ, on account of Christ’s miracles, while nonetheless, this very revelation, precisely as God’s uncreated, essentially supernatural action, is a hidden mystery, believed together with the other mysteries, at once that which is believed and that by which we believe, just as light is what we see and that by which we see (see vol. 1, ch. 14, a. 3). 

The idea of the Resurrection did not arise from a kind of syncretism of pagan religions. 60 {{329}} Adversaries call upon the idea of the death and revivification of a solar divinity or divinity of growth found in other religions, derived from the morning rising of the sun and from the death of plants in winter with their subsequent rebirth in the spring. They claim that this is confirmed by the description of time in the Gospel accounts: “in the morning, once the sun had risen” (Mark 16:2) and “on the third day” (1 Cor 15:4), which is a sacred number in various Eastern religions, determining the victory of the good principle of light and of the fruit-bearing power over the evil principle, which also would have entered into the Old Testament through the influence of various mythologies thereupon (Gunkel). 

However, the historical fact of Christ’s Resurrection stands in firm opposition to this theory. His Resurrection was recounted, by witnesses who are deserving of faith, in the New Testament, where we find nothing vague, nor any abstraction, nor any allusion to yearly cycle of rebirth or to the victory over chaos and the dragon. Rather, all of the details recounted here are concrete, being concerned with a historical man, described in accurate terms concerning time and place, and other circumstances as well. Moreover, before the influence of Christianity, the true sense of the resurrection is not indeed found in other religions, which instead only present a continuation of some hero’s life in another world or in another person. Indeed, it was so much the case that the pagans were not familiar with the idea of the true resurrection, that the Athenians, having knowledge of the mysteries, ridiculed St. Paul (or doubted his words) when he preached that Christ’s Resurrection is the pledge of the bodily resurrection of all men (Acts 17:32). Moreover, the various elements in these “resurrections”—such as the intervention of a woman (Mother Earth), who occupies a central location in such narratives, as well as of a generative power and of sexual love along with the impure worship connected with them—make any comparison with the Gospel accounts ridiculous.61 

As regards the confirmation drawn from the temporal descriptions deployed in mythological accounts (e.g., “on the third day,” which adversaries number along with “on the fourth day” and “three and a half times”), it is certain that this description never is concerned with a true bodily resurrection. Finally, it is clear from the Gospels themselves that the apostles in no way expected Christ’s Resurrection on the third day. 62 

{{330}} Therefore, the manifestation of Christ’s Resurrection was utterly perfect in every order. It was the object of natural certitude on account of evidence as a sign and the object of supernatural certitude on account of the testimony of the angels, Christ, and the Scriptures, in which it had been foretold. Afterwards, it was confirmed by new miracles (Acts 3:15; 4:10–33). For us, this is historically certain, with moral certitude, as well as supernaturally certain on account of the Church’s own infallible testimony. See Lamentabili (Against the modernists), no. 36.63 

ART. 3: ON THE CONTINUATION OF MIRACLES IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND IN HER ALONE 

§1. Jesus Christ’s promises. 

§2. Miracles forever continued in the Roman Catholic Church and even today continue. 

§3. This sign of God is lacking in other churches. 

§4. Thus, we have a confirmation for the divine origin of the Roman Catholic Church. 

§1. Jesus Christ Promised That Miracles Would Be Performed in His Church 

This can be shown from many declarations by Christ. (a) He said to his disciples: “But the Father who abideth in me, he doth the works. Believe you not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? Otherwise believe for the very works’ sake. Amen, amen, I say to you, he that believeth in me, the works that I do, he also shall do: and greater than these shall he do. Because I go to the Father” (John 14:10–13, DR). As St. Thomas remarks,64 this is as though he said, “When I will be more greatly glorified, then it will be fitting that I do even greater things and even give you power to greater things.” Thus, before Jesus was glorified, the Spirit was not given in fullness, as he was given later. (b) Jesus, after saying to the apostles, “Go ye into the whole world and preach the gospel to every creature,” immediately continues, “In my name they shall cast out devils. They shall speak with new tongues. They shall take up serpents: and if they shall drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them. They shall lay their hands upon the sick: and they shall recover. . . . {{331}} But they going forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed” (Mark 16:15–20, DR). 

§2. Miracles Forever Continued in the Roman Catholic Church and Even Today Continue 

This is clearly proven from historical records, whose honesty cannot be denied lest the whole of historical certitude were to perish. Thus, in the first century, this was clear, especially in the Acts of the Apostles and likewise in St. Paul’s letters. For example, we read in Acts: “And by the hands of the apostles were many signs and wonders wrought among the people. . . . Insomuch that they brought forth the sick into the streets and laid them on beds and couches, that, when Peter came, his shadow at the least might overshadow any of them and they might be delivered from their infirmities . . . , bringing sick persons and such as were troubled with unclean spirits: who were all healed” (Acts 5:12–16, DR). Likewise, “Stephen did great wonders and signs among the people” (Acts 6:8, DR). St. Paul speaks about miracles that he himself performed (Rom 15:18; 2 Cor 12:12), and he numbered the grace of miracles among the charismatic gifts (1 Cor 12:28; Gal 3:5). In the second century, no few wonders were handed on by the apostolic Fathers, who had orally learned the teaching of the apostles. In the third century, miracles are recounted by writers who are deserving of belief, affirming that they speak about them as eyewitnesses, like St. Irenaeus, St. Justin, St. Cyprian, Origen, Tertullian, and others. In the fourth and fifth centuries, approved historians of the faith testify to them, as well as teachers who were famed for their holiness and teaching, among whom are numbered Eusebius and St. Jerome and then St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and others. And there is no age in which the Catholic Church did not shine forth with men of holiness and the glory of miracles. It suffices that one look through the volumes of Ruinart and the Bollandists, as well as other historical accounts, which have gathered them together from authentic accounts. In our own days,65 the Sacred Congregation for Rites, in the process for the canonization of saints, inquires into the truth of miracles with great subtlety and severity so that when it approves them, they may be held to be utterly certain facts.66 Today, many miracles are performed in the sanctuary of Our Lady of Lourdes, where there is a commission of doctors, whose examination bears witness to the fact that many utterly certain miracles are performed there in any given year. 67 

§3. This Sign of God Is Lacking in Other Churches 

{{332}} No miracles are seen in Protestantism, nor any hope for miracles. Luther said: “Miracles must not be required by us, who deny free choice of the will.”68 And Calvin wrote to the king of France: “Those who demand miracles from us act wickedly.”69 He said that his doctrine does not stand in need of miracles, for he was preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ, not a new gospel for which faith would need to be solidified through signs. Likewise, no true miracles are found in Photianism, and those that are sometimes brought forward as having been performed on behalf of the separated church and against the union of the Ruthenians with the See of Peter are not facts of such a nature as to require a supernatural cause. [Ioannes] Martinov, an expert in Russian matters, affirms with certitude that these miracles are not at all supernatural.70

 §4. Thus, We Have a Confirmation for the Divine Origin of the Roman Catholic Church 

{{333}} Indeed, these same signs, like the raising of the dead and the curing of the sick, which were found in the primitive Church, also have remained into the present in the Roman Catholic Church and in it alone, as may be ascertained from records that are authentic and wholly worthy of belief. For this reason, since, as the Protestants conceded, the primitive Church, at least up to the third or the fourth century, was the true Church, then the present-day Roman Catholic Church must also be true. God never has allowed miracles to be lacking in the true religion. This is clear from history, be it of the patriarchal period, the time of the Jews, or even much more so from Christian history. Already now, to the extent that the miracles that have been performed in the three states of the Church demonstrate her truth and divinity, so too, by contrast, does their absence from Protestantism, Photianism, and Judaism after Christ demonstrate the falsity of the latter. Why were many miracles performed in the earlier centuries of the Church’s existence, while fewer were performed in later times? St. Thomas responds: “This marvelous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the most certain evidence of the signs from the past, such that it is no longer necessary that they be further repeated, since they are evidently apparent in their effect. Nevertheless, God does not cease, even in our days, to work miracles through his saints in confirmation of the faith.”71 Indeed, in the first centuries of the Church’s existence, the Christian religion had to be founded and paganism destroyed. The apostles, men who 1 2 3 5 4 6 were lacking in all human means, stood in need of aid, and Christians needed to be defended against the ferocity of their persecutors, as well as against being seduced by magical deeds of heretics. Therefore, it was necessary that miracles be produced by God in order to show that the Church is divine. Thus, even now, in the evangelization of unbelievers or in certain sanctuaries in Christian regions, they are performed in order to strengthen believers against contemporary naturalism and to manifest the truth of the faith, as well as the supernatural power of God, Jesus Christ, and the Blessed Virgin Mary. Indeed, having seen these miracles, many unbelievers and many Protestants have been converted to the Catholic Church.