Chapter 14: It is sometimes lawful for Christians to wage war
We now turn to the fourth question, which deals with war.122 This discussion has three parts. First, we must demonstrate that sometimes wars are lawful for Christians. Second, we must explain the conditions of a just war. Third, because of Luther, we have to prove that Christians rightly take up arms against the Turks. To start with the first point, it was an ancient heresy of the Manicheans to argue that war was by nature unlawful, and therefore they accused Moses, Joshua, David, and other Fathers of the Old Testament, who waged wars, of impiety, as blessed Augustine reports in Contra Faustum, book 22, chapters 74ff.123 Some people brought up the same heresy in our time, and especially Erasmus who in various places, but especially in Annotationes ad capitulos III et XXII Lucae, argued at length that war was one of the evils that God tolerated and permitted to the ancient Jews, but that war was forbidden to the Christians by Christ and the apostles.124 Also Cornelius Agrippa in De vanitate scientiarum, chapter 79, affirms that the practice of war was prohibited by Christ. So did Johann Wild in book 4 of his commentaries on Matthew, with an explanation of the passage in chapter 26: “All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.” The Anabaptists teach the same, as Melanchthon attests in his Loci, chapter on the magistrate. Alfonso de Castro attributed the same doctrine to Oecolampadius under the entry “war,” which seems surprising to me, since Zwingli, his associate, approved of war so much that he died fighting in battle; and Calvin in book 4 of the Institutiones, chapter 20. Melanchthon, as quoted before, and other heretics of the time likewise teach in word and deed that war should be waged. By contrast, just as the whole Church always taught in words and examples, we say that war by nature is not unlawful, and waging war is allowed not only to the Jews but also to the Christians, provided that the conditions which we will later discuss are fulfilled. This is proved by the evidence of Scripture, in Judges 3: “Now these are the nations which the Lord left, to prove Israel by them, even as many of Israel as had not known all the wars of Canaan; Only that the generations of the children of Israel might know, to teach them war, at the least such as before knew nothing thereof.”125 These words not only show God’s permission but God’s absolute will. Likewise in 1 Kings 15: “Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I remember that which Amalek did to Israel, how he laid wait for him in the way, when he came up from Egypt. Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not, etc.”126 Here also we see not a permission but a command, and the Old Testament is full of similar instances. The same in Luke 3: “And the soldiers likewise demanded of him, saying, And what shall we do? And he said unto them, Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages.”127 The Anabaptists, according to Melanchthon, say that John allowed the Jews war because they were imperfect and that Christ taught something entirely different. On the contrary, since John was preparing the path for the Lord, he cannot have allowed what Christ was soon to remove. Also, the Jews could not make use of that permission, since Christ would come the same year and prohibit war, as they would have it. Moreover, men might have suspected that Christ and John did not agree with each other, which would have been truly absurd. Erasmus replies otherwise, that these commands are given to the soldiers not so that they might live well following them, but so that they might live less badly, which seems also to be Theophylactus’s interpretation. But it is otherwise, for John had said before: “Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of repentance,” and “Every tree therefore which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.”128 As a consequence, the repenting publicans and soldiers asked what was the good fruit they should bring forth. So either John deceived them, or soldiers can attain salvation if they fulfill what John commanded them. Regarding Theophylactus, I say two things. First, he does not say that war is evil, but only that John exhorted the people who were innocent to do good, that is, to share their goods with the others, but he exhorted the publicans and soldiers, who were incapable of such perfection and could not do works of supererogation, to desist from evil. In fact, Theophylactus thought that for somebody who has two coats to give one to him who has none was a work of counsel and supererogation; otherwise he would not call the people innocent to whom he was speaking, and neither would he distinguish this act as good rather than evil, for if it is a command not to keep two coats, keeping them will be an evil act. Second, Theophylactus does not correctly interpret this passage, for he calls the people innocent whom John calls a “generation of vipers” and says to “bring forth therefore fruits worthy of repentance.”129 Moreover, keeping two coats means keeping what is superfluous, as Jerome says in question 1, Ad Hedibiam, and it is a sin to keep what is superfluous. Furthermore, in Matthew 22 our Lord taught that the tribute to Caesar must be paid, and certainly no tribute is owed to kings for any other purpose but to sustain the army in defense of the commonwealth, which the apostle explains in Romans 13: “For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God’s ministers, attending continually upon this very thing,”130 that is, to punish with their sword those who disturb the public peace, for before he had said: “For he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.”131 Second, it is proved by the examples of the saints who waged wars, for if war were evil, certainly it would not be waged by saints. In the Old Testament we read that Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Samson, David, Josiah, and the Maccabees waged war with much praise. In the New Testament, Matthew 8, when the centurion said to Christ, “For I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me: and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh, etc.,”132 the Lord praised him for his faith and did not command him to leave the army. In Acts 10, the same centurion, Cornelius, is called “a just man and one that feareth God”133 so much so that he deserved to see an angel, and afterward, after being taught the path to salvation by St. Peter, he was not told to leave the army. Subsequently, after Christ’s ascension to heaven, there were always Christians in the army, even under pagan princes, some of them truly holy and beloved by God, as Tertullian teaches in Apologeticus, chapter 5, where he reports a great miracle performed by Christian soldiers when they were fighting under Marcus Aurelius in Germany. They would certainly not have been in the army if that was evil, and even if they were, they would not have been so beloved by God that they were even able to perform miracles. See also Eusebius, Historia, book 8, chapter 4, and book 9, chapter 10 [9]. Basil also teaches in Oratio in laudem SS. 40 Martyrum that there were many holy men in the army of pagan emperors, and likewise Gregory of Nazianzus in his first oration In Julianum [4], in the second part. Finally, it is established that Constantine, Theodosius, Valentinian, Charlemagne, St. Louis the king of France, St. Maurice with his legion of Thebans, and many other Christian saints waged wars, and the holy bishops never blamed them; indeed, Theodosius asked the Abbot John for advice on the outcome of the war, as Augustine reports in book 5 of De civitate Dei, chapter 26. Third, it is proved because God always assists just wars, which of course He would not do if war were unlawful, for evil deeds may be allowed, but support to do evil deeds can never be given. In Genesis 14 Melchizedek said to Abram after he defeated four kings with only 318 servants, “Blessed be the most high God, which hath delivered thine enemies into thy hand.”134 In Exodus 17, answering the prayers of Moses, God gave victory to the Hebrews against Amalek; in Joshua 10, when Joshua was fighting, the sun stood still and God made great stones fall from heaven as rain and with the hailstorm of stones He killed more people than the sons of Israel with spears and swords. In 2 Maccabees 10135 angels appearing as knights fought with the Maccabees, and at chapter 15 we read that God gives victory to the worthy ones not because of the strength of the armies but as He wishes. Eusebius in De vita Constantini and in book 9 of Historia, chapter 9, attests that Constantine won battles with the help of God and through clearly proved miracles; Theodoretus in Historia, book 5, chapter 5, attests that the apostles St. John and St. Philip fought openly with Theodosius against his enemies; Socrates in book 7, chapter 18, writes that angels fought for the younger Theodosius against the Saracens; on Clodoveus, see Gregory of Tours, book 2 of the Historia Francorum, chapter 30; blessed Augustine in book 5 of De civitate Dei, chapter 23, writes that Honorius’s army attained an incredible victory against the Goths with a divine miracle; and innumerable similar examples can be reported. Fourth, it is proved by reason. It is lawful for the commonwealth to defend its citizens from internal enemies of peace by eliminating them with different kinds of punishment, and therefore it will also be lawful to defend its citizens from external enemies by war and weapons when it cannot be done in any other way. Since, in order to preserve themselves, it is necessary for commonwealths to be able to keep away all their enemies, both internal and external, and since this is the law of nature, it is certainly not credible that the ability to defend themselves was removed through the Gospel. Last, it is proved by the testimonies of the Fathers. Tertullian in Apologeticus, chapter 42, says: “We sail with you, and fight with you, and farm with you, and trade with you.” St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his third [second] Oratio de pace [22] says: “Both [the time of war and the time of peace] require some consideration, for even though it is actually possible in some cases to fight war in accordance with God’s law and authority, nevertheless for as long as we can we should incline rather to peace as the more divine and sublime course.” In his homily De nuptiis, on John 2, St. John Chrysostom says, among other things, “You use the army as a pretext and say that you cannot be pious; was not the centurion a soldier, and yet his being in the army did him no harm?” Blessed Ambrose, sermon 7, says, “to be in the army is not a crime, but to be in the army for the sake of pillaging is a sin.” And in his De officiis, book 1, chapters 40 and 41, he lists among the virtues military valor, and he proves that our men did not lack it with many examples. Likewise in his Oratio de obitu Theodosii he vigorously praises Theodosius for his ability in war. In his epistle 5 [138] to Marcellinus blessed Augustine says: “For if Christian discipline disapproved all wars, the soldiers in the Gospel who were asking for advice about salvation would have been told to throw away their weapons and to remove themselves completely from the army, but in fact they were told not to do violence to any man, or accuse any falsely, and to be content with their wages. So He commanded that their pay should suffice and certainly did not prohibit them from serving in the army.” And in epistle 205 or 207 [189] to Boniface he says, “Do not think that anybody who serves in the army cannot please God, etc.” He teaches the same in book 22 of his Contra Faustum, chapters 74ff., and book 6, Quaestiones in Iesum Nave, question 10. Blessed Gregory, in book 1 of the epistles, chapter 72 [epistle 74] to Gennadius,136 says: “Just as the Lord of victories made your excellence shine brightly against the enemies of war in this life, so it is necessary that the same excellence is shown against the enemies of His Church with all vigor of mind and body, etc.,” and in chapter 73 [epistle 75], “If such prosperity had not followed your excellence in warfare as a reward of your faith, and through the grace of the Christian religion, it would not be such a wonder, but since you have made provisions for future victories (God willing) not with carnal precaution, but rather with prayers, it is something wonderful that your glory stems from God, who grants it from above, not from earthly advice.” Gregory of Tours in Historia, book 5, chapter 1, says: “If only you, O kings, engaged in the same battles as your forefathers, that the heathen terrified by your union might be crushed by your strength!” Blessed Bernard in his sermon to the soldiers, chapter 3, says: “Indeed the soldiers of Christ confidently fight the battles of their Lord, and have no fear of sinning when killing the enemies, and no fear of incurring the danger of being killed, seeing that death suffered or inflicted for Christ is not a crime but deserves a great glory.” But against this they object, first, through the Scriptures, starting with Deuteronomy 32: “To me belongeth vengeance and recompence,”137 and Romans 12: “Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.”138 I reply that the vengeance that public authorities seek is rightly called the vengeance of God, for they are ministers of God serving Him in this matter, and that is why Paul, having said, “Vengeance is mine,” at the end of Romans 12, begins chapter 13 by saying, “But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.”139 Then they add this passage from Isaiah 2: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,”140 which are things predicted of the Christian era. I reply that in this passage only the perfect peace to come at the time of Christ’s birth is predicted, as blessed Jerome explains, and we know that this was fulfilled at the time of Augustus. Those words “any more” do not mean “for eternity,” but “for a long time.” Moreover, even if that had not been fulfilled, nothing could be concluded from it, for Isaiah does not prohibit war if there are enemies who disturb us, but he predicts a time in which there will be no enemies. Therefore as long as there are enemies, war can be waged, as it can also be said that it is predicted that Christ’s kingdom will be peaceful, seeing that His kingdom is not of this world and does not deal with temporal matters, and in this it is distinguished from the Judaic kingdom, which had to be strengthened and preserved with war and killings. Finally they object with these words in Matthew 5: “But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also,”141 and Matthew 26: “All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,”142 which are similar to Romans 12, “Recompense to no man evil for evil. Provide things honest in the sight of all men, etc.”143 I reply that Julian the Apostate once used the same arguments against the Christians, as Gregory of Nazianzus reports in the first oration In Julianum [4], around the middle of the work. But first, that all these precepts or counsels are given to private citizens, for God or the apostle did not command the judge not to punish him who wronged another, but He commanded everybody to suffer patiently their wrongs. War, however, does not pertain to private revenge but to public justice, and just as loving one’s enemy, which everybody must, does not prevent the judge and the executioner from doing their duty, so it does not prevent the soldiers and the emperors from doing theirs. Moreover, even these are not always precepts to private citizens; sometimes they are precepts, sometimes advice. Precepts are always to prepare the soul, so that a man may be ready to turn the other cheek and to give away his coat to somebody who wants it rather than offend God. But such action is in fact prescribed when it is necessarily demanded by God’s honor. Otherwise it is only advice, and sometimes not even that, for instance when offering the other cheek is of no use because the other person just repeats his sin. Such is the response of Gregory of Nazianzus in this passage, and Augustine’s in epistle 5 [138] to Marcellinus. Second, they can oppose our argument with three decrees of the Church. The first is in the Council of Nicaea, canon 11, where a most serious punishment is inflicted against those who return to the army after leaving it.144 The second is in epistle 90 [167] of blessed Leo, to Rusticus, and it is found also in the canon “Contrarium, de poenitentia,” distinction 5.145 Leo says, “It is contrary to the ecclesiastical rules to return to a secular army after doing penance,” and later, “He who wants to involve himself in worldly warfare is not free from the Devil’s snares.” The third is Gregory’s canon “Falsas,” same distinction, where it is said that those who adopt an activity that cannot be done without sinning are not entitled to do penance unless they abandon such activity, and Gregory gives the example of a soldier.146 To the first I reply that it deals with those who because they confessed their faith were deprived by Diocletian or Licinius of their sword belt, and afterward they reclaimed it, ready to deny their faith. See Zonaras and Balsamon on that canon, and Rufinus, Historia, book 10, chapter 6, and what we wrote on this in book 2 of De Conciliis, chapter 8. To the second and third I say that it deals with those who committed many sins occasioned by their military life and who therefore needed to do penance. In fact, those who return to military life knowing from experience that they cannot live it without sinning, are badly behaved because they themselves are evil, not the army; this is especially so when they have been commanded by a priest not to return. And that those canons do not in fact absolutely prohibit military life is clear from the ending of the canon, “Falsas,” where after saying that those who come back to the army after doing penance behave badly, it is added, “unless they come back upon suggestion of their bishops to defend justice.” Third, many passages from the Fathers are set against our argument by Erasmus, and to those passages we add two, one by Tertullian and the other by Jerome. In De corona militis, second part [11], Tertullian asks whether military life is becoming to a Christian. And he replies: “Do we believe that it is lawful for a human oath to supersede a divine one? And to answer to another lord after Christ? Will it be lawful to live by the sword when God said that whoever takes the sword shall perish by the sword? And will a son of peace, to whom even lawsuits are not becoming, engage in battle?” I reply that Tertullian does not condemn military life for being evil in itself. This is clear, first, from the passages above quoted from Apologeticus, chapters 5 and 42. Second, because in the book De corona militis he says that those who were soldiers before baptism can remain soldiers even after baptism, and he only teaches that he who is free must not enter military life after baptism, and he says: “Clearly, if faith afterward comes to those who have already entered military life, their situation is different from those whom John admitted to baptism, just like that very faithful centurion whom Christ approves of and Peter instructs in the Christian religion. For once the faith is accepted and sealed, one should either desert immediately or try every way possible not to do anything against God.” Third, it is clear because the chief reason he gives why Christians should not serve in the army is the danger of idolatry, for almost all princes were then pagans. Therefore Tertullian judges war to be contingently evil at that time: “Will he be guarding the temples he has renounced? Will he be eating with those who displease the apostle?147 Will he defend at night those demons that he rejected with exorcisms during the day? Will he bear a standard opposed to the standard of Christ? etc.” Moreover, his other reasons given above are only reasons of convenience, as is clear. In the epistle to Ageruchia, De monogamia, Jerome says: “Once it was said to soldiers, ‘Tie your sword very firmly to your thigh’; now it is said to Peter, ‘Put up again thy sword into its place,’ etc.” But his point is that in the Old Testament wars were commanded by God and were necessary to acquire and preserve the promised land; in the New Testament not wars but peace is commanded, since weapons are not necessary to conquer the kingdom of heaven. Nevertheless, from this it does not follow that Christians, as citizens of the temporal commonwealth, cannot wage wars against those who wronged them. Besides these, Erasmus opposes some other Fathers, and first Origen, who in Contra Celsum, book 2, just before the middle, says that Christ removed all wars; and in treatise 7 on Matthew, he explains in the passage of Luke 22, “He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one,”148 saying that this passage is harmful for those who interpret it literally, thinking that they really must sell their garment and buy a sword. I reply that in the first passage there is nothing supporting Erasmus, for when Origen says that Christ removed all wars, he does not mean that Christ prohibited all wars, but that with His providence He brought a general peace to the world at the time of His birth. Indeed here there is something against Erasmus, for Origen says that because of God’s providence it happened that with Christ’s coming all were subjects of the Roman emperor, for if there had been many kings, wars would have been necessary, as some would respond to the wrongs of others. Nor is anything said against war in the following passage, for the words of God must not be understood so literally that anybody should necessarily sell his garment and buy a sword. In that figure of speech the Lord wanted only to explain that the apostles would have had the same hardship and need as those who sell their garment and buy a sword to defend themselves. But what is inferred from this against war? Because our Lord in this passage did not truly command purchase of a sword, then is He understood to have prohibited war? When Origen himself, in his homily 15 on Joshua, says that physical wars must not be waged by Christians, he means that the Christian army under the command of Christ is not a physical army against men, as was the army of the Jews under Joshua, but a spiritual one against demons. However, from this it does not follow that waging wars is unlawful for Christians as citizens of the political commonwealth. In the same manner the arguments that Erasmus takes from Chrysostom, Basil, and Theophylactus (drawing from St. Thomas’s Catena aurea, on Luke 22) can be disproved, since those passages show only that Christ did not order the apostles to really buy a sword. Then he juxtaposes our arguments against those of Ambrose, who in book 10 of his commentary on Luke explains the passage “He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one.” Ambrose says: “O Lord, why do you order me to buy a sword and prohibit me from striking? Why do you command me to get what you forbid me to bring out? Maybe to prepare me for an act of defense and not authorize an act of revenge, so that I would decide not to take revenge even if I could. The law does not in fact forbid to strike back and therefore perhaps He said to Peter, who was offering two swords, ‘It is enough’ as if this were lawful until the Gospel, so that in the law there is the knowledge of justice, and in the Gospel the perfection of virtue.” I reply, first, that nothing is said in this passage against war that is waged by public authority; this passage deals with private defense or revenge. Second, even private defense, according to Ambrose’s statement, does not refer to the prohibition of the precept, but to the perfection of the advice, as is clearly indicated by the words, “so that in the law there be the discipline of equity, and in the Gospel the perfection of virtue.”149 Erasmus opposes also Augustine, who, he says, is not consistent, for while in some cases he defended war, in others he wrote against war, as in the commentary on Psalm 37 where he writes: “We must not pray for our enemies to die, but for them to amend themselves.” And in epistle 5 [138] to Marcellinus he writes many things against war; indeed in epistle 158 [133] and other places he beseeches the same Marcellinus to punish the Donatists without bloodshed. However, Erasmus seems to have regarded those with whom he spoke as children, for what are these things to our purpose? Certainly in the commentary on Psalm 37 Augustine censured hatred of the enemy, which leads some to pray to God for their enemies’ death: who denies, in fact, that it is evil to wish the enemy’s death out of hatred and lust for revenge? But wishing death on one’s enemy and even accomplishing it is not evil according to the order of justice, if it is done not because of hatred toward man, but because of love of justice and the common good. Indeed in epistle 5 [138] there is nothing against war, but rather something in support of it, as we quoted before, and I do not know what Erasmus was dreaming of. In epistle 158 [133] he begs the judge to pardon the wicked who were already in custody and confessed their crime, which the bishops even now are accustomed to do. But what does this have to do with war? Or should we say that whoever begs that a thief be not hung consequently prohibits war? He also used as a counterexample St. Martin, who, as Sulpicius reports in his biography of him, said to the emperor Julian: “Let him who is to fight accept your gratuity. I am a Christian; fighting is not lawful for me.” However, Erasmus did not report St. Martin’s words faithfully, for he does not say “I am a Christian; fighting is not lawful for me,” but “So far I have fought for you, but now allow me to be a soldier for God; I am Christ’s soldier, fighting is not lawful for me.” By this he did not mean simply that he was Christian, but also that he was a monk by vow and way of life, for that is what “Allow me to be a soldier for God” and “I am Christ’s soldier” mean. This was the reason why Sulpicius a little earlier had written that St. Martin, after receiving baptism, continued being a soldier for two more years, not because St. Martin did not want to renounce the world immediately, but because the tribune of the soldiers, who shared the tent with him, promised to also renounce the world after his term as tribune had expired, that is, he promised St. Martin to become a monk with him. Therefore, St. Martin affirmed that war was forbidden not to a Christian, but to a monk, since he, being Christian, had remained in the army for two more years. Finally, Erasmus urges that the weapons of the Church are the sword of the word of God, the shield of faith, the helmet of salvation, the breast-plate of justice, the darts of prayers, as the apostle teaches in Ephesians 6, and therefore Christians must not fight with swords and weapons. I reply, first, that the apostle does not describe a war against men, but against demons, as is clear from this passage, “For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, etc.”150 Second, I say that the weapons of Christians are chiefly faith and prayers, but weapons made of iron are not unnecessary on that account, for in Exodus 17 we read that God granted victory to the Israelites against Amalek, with Moses praying and Joshua fighting, and we know that the Maccabees fought with weapons and prayers, and Augustine writes to Boniface, epistle 194 [Pseudo-Augustine 13],151 “Seize the weapons in your hands and let the prayer resonate in the ears of the Creator.” And Augustine writes to the same Boniface in epistle 205, alias 207 [189]: “Some fight against the invisible enemies by praying for you; you struggle against the visible barbarians by fighting for them.” But, they say, war is the opposite of peace, and peace is good and an effect of charity; therefore war is evil. I reply that war is the opposite of peace in such a way that it is also a means toward peace, and this is the difference between a just and an unjust war. An unjust war is the opposite of a good peace and leads to an evil peace, and therefore such war is evil; a just war is the opposite of an evil peace and leads to a good peace, just as the wounds of the surgeon are the opposite of the ill and imperfect health of sick people, but they lead to good and perfect health as their end.
Chapter 15: How many and what are the conditions of a just war?
The conditions of a just war are usually four according to those who discuss these matters: legitimate authority, a just cause, a good intention, and an appropriate way of proceeding. But each one must be discussed by itself. The first condition is legitimate authority, as St. Augustine says in Contra Faustum, book 22, chapter 75: “The natural order of mortals, that is suited to peace, requires that the authority and deliberation to undertake a war reside in the prince, while the soldiers owe it to peace and common safety to execute military orders.” And reason proves the same, for if private citizens or anyone who has a superior are wronged by somebody, they can appeal to their superior and ask him for justice. But if princes are wronged by other princes, they do not have a common tribunal where they can complain, and therefore it is lawful for them to respond to public wrongs with war. Moreover, this authority of declaring war resides, according to common opinion, in all princes and peoples who have no superior in temporal matters, which means all kings, the Republic of Venice, and similar entities, and also certain dukes and counts who are not subject to anybody in temporal matters, for those who are subject to others are not themselves heads of commonwealths but rather limbs. Note, however, that this authority is not required for a defensive war, only for an offensive one, for self-defense is lawful for anybody, not only for a prince, but also for a private citizen, while declaring war and invading the enemy are the prerogative of the supreme head. The second condition is just cause, since a war cannot be declared without a cause, nor can it be declared simply for some crime, but only to ward off a wrong. Thus St. Augustine in question 10 in his Quaestiones in Iesum Nave says: “Just wars are usually defined as those that take revenge for a wrong done, for instance if the people or city against which war is waged neglected to give satisfaction for their people’s unjust action or neglected to return what was wrongly taken away.” The reason is that a prince is only a judge of his own subjects, and therefore he cannot punish all the crimes committed by others, but only those crimes that are detrimental to his subjects; for even if he is not an ordinary judge of other people, he is nevertheless the defender of his own, and by reason of this necessity he behaves in a certain sense as the judge of those who wronged his people, so that he can punish them with the sword. Indeed, it must be observed that the cause for war must not be trivial or dubious, but important and certain, lest such war bring more harm than the hoped-for advantage. If in fact it is dubious, we must distinguish between prince and soldiers. The prince without a doubt commits a sin, for war is an act of punitive justice, and it is unjust to punish anybody for a reason not yet proved. Soldiers, however, do not commit a sin unless it is clear that the war is certainly unlawful, for subjects must obey their superior and must not discuss his commands; rather they must presume that their prince has a just cause, unless they clearly know the contrary. Likewise, when the guilt of a private citizen is dubious, the judge who condemns him sins, while the executioner who kills the condemned man does not, for the executioner is not bound to discuss the sentence of the judge, as Pope Boniface teaches in Liber sextus, “De regulis juris,” rule 25: “Whoever does something by order of the judge appears not to behave wrongly, since he must necessarily obey,”152 and blessed Augustine, Contra Faustum, book 22, chapter 75, says: “Thus it happens that a just man, if perhaps he is in the army of a sacrilegious king, could rightfully fight at his command preserving the order of civic peace, both when he is certain that what he is commanded to do is not against God’s precept and also when he is not certain that this is the case, for maybe the iniquity of the command makes the king guilty, but the duty to obey proves the soldier innocent.” Note, however, that this indulgence must be applied only to those soldiers who are obligated to serve their prince when he wages war, such soldiers being his subjects and also those who, even in time of peace, receive a regular salary from the prince, but not those soldiers who come from somewhere else when a war has to be fought. In fact, those who are not obliged to serve in the army cannot enter a war with a safe conscience, unless they know that the war is just. Those, however, who do not think about this, and are ready to enter a war whether it is just or not, simply to get paid, find themselves in a state of damnation. The third condition is good intention. Since the aim of war is peace and public tranquillity, it is not lawful to undertake a war for any other end. Hence those kings and soldiers who undertake a war either to harm somebody, or to enlarge the empire, or to show their prowess in war, or for a reason other than the common good, sin gravely, even if the authority is legitimate and the cause is just. So in the epistle to Boniface (no. 207 or 205 [189]), blessed Augustine says: “The will should want peace, only necessity should bring war, so that God may free us from the necessity and preserve us in peace. For peace is not sought in order that war might be undertaken, but a war is undertaken so that peace might be acquired. Therefore you should be peaceful even when fighting, so that by winning the war you may bring those whom you conquer into the unity of peace”; and in Contra Faustum, book 22, chapter 74: “Lust for harming, cruelty in seeking revenge, an unpacified and implacable spirit, brutality in rebelling, lust for power, and similar things are rightly condemned in war.” But there are two things to be noted. First, since war is a means to peace, but a very serious and dangerous one, a war must not be undertaken immediately when there is cause; peace must first be sought in other less dangerous ways, such as a peaceful request to enemies for the satisfaction that they owe: Deuteronomy 20: “When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it,”153 and blessed Augustine, epistle 207 [189] to Boniface: “The will must want peace, only necessity should bring war.” But you will ask, if the enemy at first does not want to give satisfaction, but soon, with the war already begun, asks for peace and offers to give satisfaction, will the other be bound to desist from war? Cajetan at the entry “war” says that he is not bound to end the war when it has already begun, but he would be obliged to accept satisfaction before beginning the war. But (with the proviso of a better judgment) it seems that we must say that he who has a just cause is never bound in justice to accept satisfaction either before the beginning of the war or after, but in both cases he is bound to do so out of charity. The reason for the former is that a prince who has a just cause for war functions as judge of the other prince, who wronged him, but a judge is not bound in justice to pardon a guilty man who is condemned to death even if he offers satisfaction; nevertheless he could pardon him out of mercy, if he is the supreme judge. For example, a king is not bound to spare the life of a thief even if he gives back what he stole, but the king can out of mercy. The reason for the latter is that war is a very grave punishment, by which not only he who sinned is punished, but many innocent people are also involved accidentally. Christian charity seems, therefore, always to demand that the war should end when he who did the wrong offers due satisfaction, unless perhaps something else is accidentally involved, for instance, if the enemy against whom one fights is such that it benefits the common good that he is subject to another or that he is completely destroyed. Such enemies were the Amorites, whom God ordered to be eliminated completely (Deuteronomy 20). Second, it is to be noted that this third condition differs from the first two, because if those are absent, the war is unjust, but if this one is missing, the war is evil, but not properly speaking unjust. Whoever wages war without authority or just cause sins not only against charity, but also against justice, and he is not so much a soldier as a robber; but whoever has authority and just cause, and nevertheless fights for love of revenge or to enlarge the empire or for any other evil end, does not act against justice, but only against charity, and he is not a robber, but an evil soldier. From this it is deduced that when only the third condition is lacking, soldiers and kings are not obliged to make any restitution but only to do penance, while when the first or the second condition is lacking, all are obliged to make restitution for damage caused, unless they are excused by an invincible ignorance. For just as a crass and guilty ignorance does not excuse from sin, so it does not excuse from restitution, as we explain in the last chapter, regarding injuries and damage inflicted. But whoever suffers from an invincible ignorance is not obliged to make restitution for as long as he suffers from such ignorance. But when he realizes that the war was unjust, he is obliged to make restitution not for the damage inflicted at the time of the war, but for anything he has gotten out of the war that was not his. If he has no possessions but has become richer by selling things, he is obliged to give back as much as he gained, for something that does not belong to him cannot be kept even if it has been acquired in ignorance and without sin; it must be given back to the owner, if he is known, or to the poor. The fourth condition is the appropriate way of proceeding, which consists chiefly in this, that no innocent should be harmed, which John the Baptist explained in Luke 3: “Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages.”154 With these words John prohibits the injuries that soldiers usually inflict upon innocent people either by force or by treachery, either against their person or against their property. When he says, “Do violence to no man,” he prohibits the injury that people inflict with brutal violence, as when they kill the peasants if they do not readily obey. When he says, “neither accuse any falsely,” he prohibits the injury that is inflicted with treachery and calumny, as when they say that somebody is a traitor or an enemy, even if they know the contrary to be true, and with this accusation either rob him or kill him or bring him to the commander or the prefects. Indeed, when he adds, “and be content with your wages,” he prohibits the injury inflicted on somebody not to their person, but to their goods, as when they rage and pillage wherever they can, or demand and extort things from those who owe them nothing. However, it must be observed that there are three kinds of people on whom soldiers cannot inflict any damage, according to the rule of John the Baptist. The first is composed of all those who do not belong to the commonwealth of the enemies, and from this rule soldiers who inflict some damage on citizens or friendly peasants with whom they are quartered or whose land they are passing cannot be excused. And neither are they excused if they say that they have not received their pay, for this does not entitle them to the goods of private citizens. The citizen or peasant should not pay the price if the king or commander sins by not paying stipends to the soldiers, unless, for just cause, the inhabitants of a certain place are condemned to this form of punishment, that is, of providing for the soldiers, but that happens rarely. The second kind of people are those who, even if they belong to the commonwealth of the enemies in some capacity, nevertheless are exempted by the chapter “Innovamus, de tregua et pace,” where it says: “We decree that priests, monks, those who live in convents, pilgrims, merchants, peasants who come or go or work in the fields, and the beasts by which they plow or bring the seeds to the field, should enjoy a fitting security.”155 Here “merchants” does not seem to mean those who live in the city of the enemies and are part of that city, but only those who are there in transit or who are going to market, but are not part of the city. The third kind is composed of the people not suited for war, such as children, elderly people, and women, for such people, even if they can be captured and robbed since they are part of the city, nevertheless cannot rightfully be killed, unless they are killed by chance and by accident. Thus when a soldier shoots into a battalion of enemies and by chance kills a child or a woman or even a priest, he does not sin, but when he kills them intentionally and has the means, if he wishes, to avoid killing them, then he sins. In fact, natural reason teaches this, and God also commands the Hebrews in Deuteronomy 20 to spare children and women, and Theodosius was gravely reproached by Ambrose because when he wanted to punish the Thessalonians, he ordered all those who were in his way to be killed without discrimination, as Theodoretus reports in his Historia, book 5, chapters 17 and 18. The fact that Moses also sometimes ordered women and minors to be killed, as appears in Deuteronomy 2 and 3 and other places, does not mean that the same is lawful for our soldiers, as Moses clearly knew from God’s revelation that God wanted it, and to God no man can say, What doest thou?156
