miércoles, 30 de octubre de 2024

John Eck, Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutherum

 

Chapter 1: Concerning the Church and Her Authority .... 9

Chapter 2: On Councils..

Chapter 3: On the Primacy of the Apostolic and Petrine See.28

Chapter 4: That the Heretics Rashly Oppose the Scriptures.45

Chapter 5: Concerning Faith and Works.50

Chapter 6: Concerning Confirmation.63

Chapter 7: Concerning the Sacrament of Order.65

Chapter 8: On Confession.72

Chapter 9: On Satisfaction.77

Chapter 10: On the Eucharist under Both Kinds.85

Chapter 11: Concerning Marriage.89

Chapter 12: Concerning Extreme Unction.91

Chapter 13: On Human Constitutions.93

Chapter 14: On Feasts and Fasts.100

Chapter 15: Concerning the Veneration of the Saints .... 110 \

Chapter 16: Concerning the Images of the Crucified and of the Saints.122

Chapter 17: On the Sacrifice of the Mass.127

Chapter 18: Concerning Vows.134

Chapter 19: Concerning the Celibacy of the Clergy.142

Chapter 20: Concerning Cardinals and Legates of the Apostolic See.148

Chapter 21: Concerning Excommunication.150

Chapter 22: Concerning the War against the Turks.155

Chapter 23: Concerning the Immunity and Wealth of the Church.159

Chapter 24: On Indulgences.165

Chapter 25: On Purgatory.'.170

Chapter 26: Concerning Annates . 175

Chapter 27: Concerning the Burning of Heretics.178

Chapter 28: Disputations with Heretics Are to Be Held.186

Chapter 29: That Under the Eucharist Is the True Body of Christ.191

Chapter 30: Concerning the Baptism of Children .201

Chapter 31: On Free Will.210

Chapter 32: On Prayer and the Canonical Hours.220

Chapter 33: On Plurality of Priests and on Tithes.234 "W

Chap ter 34: On the Building of Churches and Their Decoration.244

Chapter 35: On the (Indelible) Stamp (Character).254

Chapter 36: On Transubstantiation.258 t

Chapter 37: That Masses Are to Be Said in Latin, Not in German.264

Chapter 38: On Private Masses.270


CHAPTER 1 ON THE CHURCH AND HER AUTHORITY

The First Proposition has three members. 

Proposition 1: The Church is the body of Christ, the bride 2 of Christ, the Kingdom of Heaven. 

i. He has subjected all things under His feet, and gives Him¬ self as Head over all the Church, His Body, and its fulness, filling all things in all" [Eph 1:22-23].' 

"May you walk worthy of the calling with which you were called, with all lowliness and meekness, with patience, forbearing one an¬ other in love, endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. One body and one Spirit, even as you were called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in us all" [Eph 4:1-6]. 

ii. The proof of the second part of the first proposition, name¬ ly, the Church is the Bride of Christ. 

"One is my dove, my perfect one, she is the only one of her mother, she is the chosen one of her who bore her" [Cant 6:9]. 

"A garden enclosed is my sister, my bride, a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed" [Cant 4:12].

 "Wives, submit yourselves to your husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church, and He is the Savior of the body. But just as the Church is subject to Christ, so also are wives subject to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ has loved the Church, and gave Himself for her, that He might sanctify her, cleansing her by the layer of water in the Word of life, that He might present her to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that she should be holy and without blemish" [Eph 5:22-27]. 4 

Of Jerusalem like a bride adorned for her husband [Rev 21:2]. But you are the body of Christ, and members one of another" [1 Cor 10:17; 12:12; Rom 12:5]. Thus therefore the Church is one, not outwardly, but in¬ wardly, as the ark of Noah was one [1 Pt. 3:20f] which was the figure of the one Church; outside that one sealed Church no one is saved, just as men outside the ark perished. Christ is no biga¬ mist: the Church of the apostles and ours are one Church. Before Luther was born, there was the Church that believed the Mass a sacrifice, seven sacraments, etc. She was the bride of Christ. Therefore now let us remain with that same Church, and not be joined to the Church of the wicked. Christ, because He loves the Church His bride, did not leave her, neither for five hundred nor a thousand years. How then would the Head desert His body for so 2 J long a time? Wien He forsook the Synagogue, less loved on account of sins, only seventy years in the physical captivity of Babylon, how would He forsake His bride one thousand years in captivity of errors ? iii. Proof of the third part of the proposition, namely, the Church is the kingdom of heaven"For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a householder, who went out early in the morning to hire laborers for his vineyard" [Matt 20:1]. The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, who made a marriage feast for his son, and sent forth his servants to ca^ them that were bidden to the marriage feast . . ." [Matt 22:2f], Then is the kingdom of heaven like ten virgins who took their lamps and went forth to meet the bridegroom, and the bride; five of these moreover were foolish ..." [Matt 23:If], You will find many similar parables. Application inferring three corollaries: 

1. If the Church is here called the kingdom of heaven, how could error and falsehood reign in that kingdom for a thousand years? For the kingdom of heaven is the kingdom of truth. 

2. It is clear that God goes out even until evening to bring in workers [cf. Mt 20:6f]; but the Lutherans believe on the 1 contrary that no one was brought in for a thousand years, except their idol, Luther. 

3. It is clear that the Church here on pilgrimage has been gathered from good and bad, for Christ clearly says that there are wise and foolish virgins [cf. Mt 25:2ff], good and bad fish [Mt 13:44-52]. See Gregory, Homilies, [1.11.4; 1.12.3: PL 76.1116, 1120].


Proposition 2: The Church does not err, not only because she always has Christ as her Bridegroom, but also because she is ruled by the teaching authority of the Holy Spirit who never for2 sakes her. "I shall ask my Father, and He will give you another comforter" [Jn 14:16]. "Holy Father, preserve in thy name those whom thou hast sent to me" [Jn 17:11]. "Moreover, I pray not only for those apostles, but also for those who are going to believe through their words, in me" [Jn 17:20]. "The Church of the living God is the pillar and foundation of truth" [1 Tim 3:15]. How then can it err? "I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot hear them now. When He, the Spirit of truth, is come. He shall teach you all truth" [Jn 16:12f]. Here the Lutheran must show us the Gospel, the teaching authority of the Holy Spirit, promised in the 3 Church. "And you need not that any one teach you; but as His anoint¬ ing teaches you concerning all things, and is true, and is no lie" [1 Jn 2:27]. Therefore, the anointing of the Holy Spirit always teaches the Church. "And behold I am with you always, even to the end of the world" [Mt 28:20], said Christ (who is the way, the truth, and the life) to His disciples. It is clear that the Church as the pillar of truth, with Christ as leader and the Holy Spirit as teacher, does not err. How much less believable is it then that the whole Church would err for a thousand years, as the 1 Lutherans rave! Proposition 3: Even as the Church is one, so is there Unity in the Church. "I beseech you, brethren, to mark those who make decisions and offenses contrary to the doctrine which you have learned" [Rom 16:17]. Later: "They serve not Christ . . . but their own belly." Later: "Their pleasing speeches . . . deceive the hearts of the innocent" [Rom 16:18]. "I beg of you, moreover, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that all of you say this, and that there not be schisms among you; be perfect in the same mind and the same knowledge [1 Cor 1:10]. The Lutherans cause new schisms and fight both among themselves and with others, so that now Carlstadt has broken off, and Egranus* and Luther, and Zwingli, and the Catabaptists. For God is not a God of dissension but of peace, just as I teach in all the Churches of the saints" [1 Cor 14:33],^” Rather therefore is it to be believed that God inspires a true understanding of Scripture to the concord and unity of the Church, than to one private man such as Luther or Zwingli or Osiander: nay, it follows, that what Holy Mother Church defines or accepts is not to be believed with less firmness or held in less veneration than if it were expressed in Scripture. "Whatever things were written were written for our instruc¬ tion, that through patience and through comfort of the scriptures we might have hope. Now the God of comfort and of patience grant you to be of the same mind one with another according to Christ Jesus; that with one accord you may with one mouth glorify God, in prayer to God"[Rom 15:5-6]. Almighty everlasting God, by whose Spirit the whole body of the Church is sanctified and ruled. Paul subjoins, after the reckoning of the mystical body: "Be of the same mind one towards another; set not your mind on lofty things, but condescend to things that are lowly" [Rom 12; 16 ]. "If there is any consolation in Christ, if any consolation of charities, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels of com¬ passion, fulfill my joy, that you be of the same mind, having the same charity, being of one mind. . ." [Phil 2:If]. My people have done two evil things : "They have forsaken the fountain of the water of life, and they have dug for themselves leaky cisterns, which cannot contain water" [Jer 2:13]. Thus the Lutherans, leaving the true and living fountain of the Church, dig leaky cisterns of heretics, of Wyclif, Hus, the Albigenses, and others. In vain God sent His Son, in vain the Holy Spirit, in vain the apostles, martyrs, doctors, confessors, if through Luther alone the light of truth was to be opened. Why then did God not send one Luther for all?


Proposition 4: It is clear that, representatively, the Church is her prelates and leaders gathered together. "And the king turned his face about, and blessed all the Church of Israel, and all the Church of Israel stood," etc. [1 K 8:14]. Note "the Church of Israel"; what alone would be more representative is clear from the beginning of this chapter: "Then all the elders of Israel were assembled, with the heads of the tribes, and the leaders of the families of the children of Israel unto King Solomon," etc. [1 K 8:1]. 

Objections of the Heretics. 2 

1. The authority of Scripture is greater than that of the Church. For the Church ought to be ruled according to Scripture. For the Word of God yields to no one.

2. It is not lawful for either the Church or any man to go against Scripture. 

3. One does not say that what the Pope with the Cardinals and the bishops determines has been determined by the Church, be¬ cause the Church is the congregation of all believers and the con¬ nection in true faith by which the just man lives. 

4. The Church of God is in the Spirit alone, because she is believed, and thus hidden. 

5. Luther says that he is of the Church, and believes the Church is with him, where he is preacher. So also Zwingli, Carlstadt, Pelican, Soblerus, Hubmaier Pacimontanus* etc. 

Disposal of Objections 

1. Christ did not write any book, nor did He bid the dis¬ ciples or apostles to write one, yet He gave many precepts con¬ cerning the Church; hence when about to send apostles out to plant the Church, He did not say, "Go write," but "Go into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature" [Mt. 24:14], Therefore the law was written on tablets of stone, but the Gospel on hearts. "Since you are a letter of Christ, sent out by us, and written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not in tablets of stone, but in the physical tablets of the heart" [2 Cor 3:3]. Jeremiah agrees: "Behold, the day is coming, says the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah, not like the covenant I made with your fathers, etc., but this will be one which I shall make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord; I shall give my law in their inward parts, and in their heart I shall write it, and I will be their God and they will be my people" [Jer 31:31-33]. Jerome: Why is it necessary to take into one's hands what the Church does not receive? 

2. The Church is older than Scripture, for when the Apostles began to preach, there was no written Gospel, nc Vetter of Paul, and yet there was the Church dedicated by Christ's blood. 1

Thus the apostles without the Scripture of the New Testament chose Matthias [Acts l:22ff], ordained seven deacons [Acts 6:3]; Peter caused Ananias and Sapphira to die [Acts 5:lff]. Even though the apostles were very diligent in sowing the Word of God, yet very few things are found written by them. It follows logi¬ cally that they taught many more things than they wrote; the things taught have equal authority with the things written. 

3. Scripture is not authentic without the Church's authority:' for the canonical writers are members of the Church. Hence against a heretic wishing to contend against the Church's constitution and custom one objects with the very weapons whereby he wishes to contend against the Church. He is going to quote the canonical Scrip¬ tures of the four Gospels, and the Pauline Epistles. Let the objec¬ tion immediately be raised against him: how does he know that these Scriptures are canonical except from the Church, for why does he believe the Gospel of Mark, who did not see Christ, to be canonical, and not the Gospel of Nicodemus, who saw and heard Christ, as John testifies [Jn 3:lff]? So why has the Gospel of Luke the disciple been received, and the Gospel of Bartholomew the apostle been rejected, unless we humbly confess the authority of the Church 2 with the Blessed Augustine, something Luther sometimes taught, that the Church could judge concerning the Scriptures. Therefore it thus is clear that the Church is older than Scripture, and Scripture would not be authentic without the Church's 3 authority. Hence, Augustine, Against the Epistle Called Fundamental, 5.6 [PL 42.176]: "I would not have believed the Gospel unless the authority of the Churchy had moved me to do so. More below on Scripture at Chapter 4. 

i. Scripture teaches: "Remember to hallow the Sabbath day; six days shall you labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is the Sabbath day of the Lord your God," etc.* Yet the Church has changed the Sabbath into Sunday on its own authority, on which you have no Scripture.

ii. Christ said to His disciples on the mountain: "I have not come to abolish the law but to fulfill it" [Matt 5:17]. And yet the Church of the apostles in council boldly made pro¬ nouncement on the cessation of legal matterb. 

iii. In the final chapter of Matthew, Christ said to the disciples: "Go therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you [Matt 28:19f]. Here Christ gave the form of baptizing ex¬ plicitly in the name of the Trinity, and yet the primitive Church changed this form of baptizing to "in the name of Christ Jesus." Repent, says Peter, "and let each one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ in forgiveness of your sins" [Acts 2:38].2 And in Acts 8 [:12j it is said that the Samaritans were baptized by Philip in the name of Jesus. And in Acts 19 [:5]: "When these things were heard they were baptized by Philip in the name of Jesus," that is, by Paul. n 

iv. Scripture is defined in the council: "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" [Acts 15:28] etc., "that you should abstain from sacrifices offered to idols, and blood and things strangled [v. 29]. This matter, so clearly defined and expressed, the Church by her authority changed, because she uses both blood and strangled meat. Note the power of the Church over scriptureSee below, Chapter 13, On Human Constitutions. 

v. Now if you wish to live more according to the scriptures than according to the authority of the Church, now all the Jews coming to baptism would be held to the law of Moses, for thus they would find in the Scriptures that apostles and other converts have lived. James and the elders spoke to Paul returning from the Gentiles: See, brother, how many there are among the Jews who have believed, and all are emulators of the law. Moreover, they have heard of you, that you teach all the Jews that are among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, saying that they ought not to circumcise their children, nor to walk according to their custom. What is it tnerefore? The multitude must needs come together, for they will hear that you have come. Do therefore this which we say to you. We have four men that have a vow on them; having taken them, purify yourself with them, and be at charge for them, that they may shave their heads, and all shall know that there is no truth in the things about which they had been informed concerning you, but you walk and yourself keep the law. Moreover, concerning those of the Gentiles who believed, we have written, adjudging that they should keep themselves from idols, from what is sacrificed, from blood and what is strangled, and from fornication" [Acts 21:20-25]. Here, Paul, with many thousands, kept at one behest of the law of St. James. Would you, 0 Luther, converted from the Jews today, rather live according to those scriptures, or according to the authority of the Church? 

We confess the Church to be the congregation of all the faithful who are of the body of Christ, and when primates and leaders of any province decide anything, the whole province is said to have decided it. Thus the prelates of the Church are called "the Church," because they represent her and their subjects. Otherwise the Church could never be gathered. "But if he does not hear you . . . tell the Church; but if he does not hear the Church, let him be to you as a Gentile and publican" [Matt 18:16f]. Ac¬ cording to Luther's view, if anyone wanted to tell the Church, he would have to traverse the whole earth. Chrysostom [Horn, in Mt, 60.2: PG 58.586] explains: "It clearly refers to the prelates that is, presidents, because he will soon give the power of binding and loosing to the apostles as prelates." "If you perceived a case before you difficult and ambiguous to judge, between blood and blood, between cause and cause, between leper and non-leper, and you saw the judgment to be a matter of controversy within your gates: rise up and go up to the place which the Lord your God has chosen and come to the priests of the tribe of Levi, to the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire of him, who will judge the truth of the judgment for you, and you shall do what they say, who are in charge of the place the Lord has chosen, and they will teach you according to his law, and you will'follow their decision, and turn aside neither to the right nor to the left. But he who in his pride refuses to obey the authority of the priest, who is at that time ministering to the Lord your God, that man will die by the decree of the judge, and you shall remove the evil from Israel, and all the people hearing it will fear, so that none shall henceforth be swollen with pride" [Dt 17:8-13]. See the power of the priest under the law. How much more power do you think the priest under the Gospel has, and ponder the penalty of the dis¬ obedient. "And when Paul and Barnabas had no small dissension against them, the brethren decided that Paul and Barnabas and certain others of them should go up to the apostles and presbyters in Jerusalem about this question" [Acts 15:2], See how the Deu¬ teronomy c. 17 passage was fulfilled. And what was the Church? Not the whole congregation, but they went up to the apostles and presbyters who represented the Church.'*' 

4. If the Church is hidden, how did Christ enjoin the tell¬ ing it to the Church, and if he did not hear the Church, etc. But if it were hidden, what could be said to it, or how would it hear? Likewise the Church is the body of Christ, and the Christians are its members [Rom 12:5; 1 Cor 10:17; 12:12; Eph 1:23; 5:30; Col 1:24]. Let Luther say whether they were hid¬ den and only mathematically the Church, when Paul said: "Now you are the body of Christ, and members each in his part" [1 Cor 12:27], It is the way of heretics to have caverns and caves and lurking places: the Church puts the lamp upon a lampstand [Lk 8:16]. The Church is shown to you in councils, in the Apos¬ tolic See, in bishops and leaders of individual Churches. For if the Church were only mathematical, the brother of Paul (Timothy) would not have praise through all the Churches [2 Cor 1:1]. David would not have said: "With you is my praise in the great church" [Ps 21:26], "and in the seat of the elders let them praise him" [Ps 106:32]. For this see Augustine on the First Epistle of John, the first tractate at the end.''' 

5. What Luther says, all the heretics have said. Accordingly Augustine inveighs against the Donatists, who wanted to confine the universal Church to the cornerstone of a few heretics. See more 2 in Johann Cochlaeus, On the Authority of the Church, and John Fisher. Among the older writers see Juan Torquemada, who wrote extensively on behalf of the Church.


CHAPTER 2: ON COUNCILS 

Because the Authority of the Church Rests Chiefly in Councils, We Shall Now Deal in a Proper Order concerning Councils. Proposition 1: Examples are found of the convening of coun¬ cils in the Church [both by the Fathers of the Old Testament and] by the Apostles in the New Testament. [In the Old Testament an example is inferred where it is said: leading men of the synagogue, and who in the time of assembly were called by name' [Num 16:2.]. "Obededom and his sons were assigned to the south, in which part of the house was the council of the elders" [1 Ch 25:16]. [But in the New Testament one reads in the Acts of the Apostles of more councils being convened. I first mention one, after the ascension of the Lord, concerning the election of Matthias, where "Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren said . . . Men, brethren, the scripture must needs be fulfilled of which the Holy Spirit spoke before through the mouth of David concerning Judas, who was the leader of those who apprehended Jesus" [Acts l:15ff]. [The second council was convened over the establishment of deacons for the ministry of the daily dispensation: "Then the Apostles, calling together the multitude of the disciples, said: It is not fitting that we should leave the word of God and serve tables. Therefore, select from among you seven men of good reputa¬ tion, full of the Holy Spirit and wisdom, for us to appoint over this business" [Acts 6 :2f]. [The third council was concerned with the question of observing legal matters; of this it is said:] "But there arose some of the sect of the Pharisees that believed, saying: They must be circumcized, and be commanded to observe the law of Moses. And the Apostles and elders assembled to consider this matter" [Acts 15:5f], and afterwards a decision was made. "For it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication; from which things keeping yourselves, you shall do well" [Acts 15:28f], Note the form of the Apostolic Council. The Apostles and Elders assembled. The Gentiles did not set themselves against the Apostles. Now, by what authority, by what scripture, do you, Luther, do this toward councils? Why do you deprive us of the freedom given by Christ? For even if in deliberating they should cite scripture from Amos ch. 9 [.Iff], yet thereby they have brought forward nothing to forbid these three; likewise they have added no scripture in the decision. Antioch too accepted Jerusalem's decision. Luther despises Rome's decision. It is clear that a council had the power of determining that any were necessary for that time, which neverthe¬ less was not simply necessary for faith. Why then is the same power not today in the Church, as often as necessity demands it? There is the same Christ, the same Spirit, the same faith. Why then is there not an equal power of councils? [A fourth council was held by the Apostles in Jerusalem to do away with the suspicion of certain Jews, who thought Paul treated the ceremonies of the Law as if they were idolatry [Acts 15]. [The fifth council was gathered under Paul at Miletus, con¬ cerning the rule of the Church, when "Paul sending to Ephesus, called the elders of the Church. And when they had come to him and were together, he said to them: You know . . . ." [Acts 20:17]. And later: "Take heed to yourselves, and to the whole flock . . . . [Acts 20:28].] Likewise the Apostles celebrated another synod. For about to set out to preach the Gospel throughout the earth, accord¬ ing to the Lord's command, meeting together, and each one offering his opinions, they handed on the Creed, as it is held from the tra¬ dition of the fathers, which the whole Church holds. For so St. Clement, disciple and successor of the Apostles attests in his decrees. Likewise Pope Leo I, writing to Augustine, says: "The short and perfect confession of the Catholic Creed has been sealed by the decisions of the twelve Apostles." Likewise Ambrose, esteeming the key of the kingdom of heaven to be the faith of the Apostles, says: "I believe that this key has been fashioned bylabor of the twelve workmen. For holy faith was conceived by the Creed of the twelve Apostles, who as skilled workmen coming to¬ gether as one, fashioned the key by their council. For they called that Creed a key, through which the devil's darkness is laid open, that the light of Christ may come." "Do not transgress the ancient boundaries, which your fathers have laid" [Prov 22:28].^ "Again, I say to you, that if two of you shall consent upon earth, concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done to them by my Father who is in heaven. For where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" [Mt 18:19f]. No one can more clearly be proved not to have heard the Church than if he did not hear a council. In no place is there greater agreement than in a council. In no place are more gathered in the Lord's name than in general coun¬ cils. "Ask the bygone generation, and diligently seek out the memory of the fathers, for we are but of yesterday and know nothing, for our days on earth are a shadow; they will teach you, and tell you, and utter words out of their heart" [Job 8:8-10]. "Wisdom is with the elders, and prudence in length of days" [Job 12:12]. Therefore let us hear councils and fathers, not heretics recently born and apostates. If the authority of councils be taken away, then all things in the Church will be ambiguous, doubtful, uncertain, un¬ sure, for at once will all the heresies condemned by councils re¬ turn. But if you fight against them with Scripture, now cut off from the authority of the Church, they will reject whatever they please, as Luther rejected the Epistle of St. James, because it was in disagreement with him, and likewise Maccabees. And once the heretics did not accept the four Gospels, just as the Manichees rejected the Old Testament. A matter to be pitied indeed! If that notion of the heretics were true, whenever any doubt arises concerning the faith, there would be no way of deciding it, but each one, according to the prudence of his own head, would incline to one side or the other. How then would Christ have suf¬ ficiently provided for His Church through the Gospel Law, which nevertheless ought to be utterly perfect? "He that shall contra¬ dict your mouth . . . let him die" [Josh 1:18]. "How great things he commanded our fathers, that they should make the same known to their children, that another generation might know them" [Ps 77:5f]. Therefore, let us believe the com¬ mandments, and trust the councils and the fathers. 2 Augustine, Epistle to Januarius [54.1]: "Those unwritten tra¬ ditions that we preserve, which are observed throughout the earth, one is to understand, what by the Apostles themselves or plenary Councils (whose authority in the Church is most conducive to sal¬ vation) have been commanded and established to be kept." [Gratian, Deer., 1.12.11: Fr 1.29] Hence it is utterly insolent madness to argue over whether such things are to be done. Therefore the Lutherans are insolent and mad. Augustine, Against the Donatlsts, 7.[1.1], assumes that the holy Catholic Church is fortified against the Donatists with the authority of a plenary council. And Book 1, chapter 18 [.28] ad¬ judges a plenary Council to have the agreement of the entire Church. Gregory in his Epistles [3.10]: "Just as the four books of the Evangelists, so also the four Councils do I confess to accept * and venerate: namely, Nicea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon." [Gratian, Deer. 1.15.2, Fr. 1.35.] ^Constantinople I (A.D. 381)


Proposition 2: The greater Churches (just as they are in Council) represent the whole Church. This is very often made clear in Exodus.* Take for example Ex 19:3, when God willed to give the Law to Moses, He commanded him: "These things you shall say to the house of Jacob and tell the children of Israel," etc. And yet afterwards of Moses it is said: "Moses came, and calling together the chief born of the people, he set forth all the words ...” etc. [Ex 19:7]. And although only the elders of the people answered, when Moses spoke to them,still the text subjoins: "All the. people answered together" [Ex 19:8] etc. It was not all the people, un¬ less by representation. "Ask your father, and he will declare to you: your elders and they will tell you" [Dt 32:7]. Now a stupid people and proud citi¬ zens ask Luther, Zwingli, Blarer, Osiander, Bucer. "Despise not the discourse of the wise elders, . . . but acquaint yourself with their proverbs. For from them you shall learn wisdom and instruction of understanding, and to serve great men without blame" [Ecclus 8:9f]. Let not the discourse of the elders be passed over, for they have learned from their fathers, since from them you shall learn understanding and instruction. 

Objections of the Heretics. 

1. In a council are men: therefore they often deceive and are deceived, since "Every man is a liar" [Ps 115:11].** 2. It Is understood that the Council of Carthage under the holy man Cyprian with 80 bishops erred concerning the rebaptizing of heretics. 3. Likewise the plenary Council of Rimini of 600 bishops erred with Arius. And Ephesus II likewise with Eutyches^ and 3 Dioscorus. And the Council of Constantinople under the Emperor Constantine on the abolition of images.

4. And also general councils unanimously undertaken deter¬ mined various things, even in those things which are set forth to be believed: as the Council of Constance on the primacy of the Pope, against the Councils of Nicea and Africa. Objections of the Laity evilly influenced by the Lutherans. Since the Laity are of the Church, and there is no less a ques¬ tion about the salvation of their souls than of the clergy's it is fitting that they should take part.


Disposal of Ob/j ections. 1. We admit that those who assemble in Councils are men, yet in a lawful General Council, they are governed by the Holy Spirit as their guided who does not allow them to be deceived. For Paul and John, Isaiah and David, were men, yet Paul says in his Epistle 2 to the Galatians (1:8): "If an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than what we have preached to you, let him be anathema." Therefore the canonical writers wrote infallibly, yet they were men. Likewise the fathers in the Councils. 2. That Council of Carthage was not plenary but particular, as Augustine shows against the Donatists: particular councils can err, and be corrected by general councils (Aug, Against the Donatists, 2 [.3.4]. And that the very councils which take place throughout individual regions and provinces, without any doubt yield to the authority of plenary councils, convened from the whole Christian world, is clear by the evidence of things. 3. The synod of Rimini was not a council, nor was it lawfully gathered. The works of the heretics were forced upon Liberius against his will, contrary to the Council of Nicea, with Taurus, the prefect, urging by prayers and threats on behalf of the Arians at the command of the emperor. And the simple-minded Eastern bishops were led astray by the subterfuges of the heretics; afterwards when they understood them, they retracted the conclusions of Rimini. So also the Synod of Ephesus*in which the heretic Dioscorus presided, was not lawfully convened, since the Pope's legates refused to approach that evil place, and it was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon. Thus the impious Emperor Constantine*when he was repulsed by the pontiff gathered the Synod of Constantinople which was after2 ward condemned by the Second Council of Nicea under the Empress Irene; hence likewise Carlstadt, Zwingli, Hetzman, Blarer, repuls¬ ing Luther in this point, have been condemned. Note here that general councils, gathered in the Holy Spirit, never are found to have departed from the way of truth, most espe¬ cially on defining those matters which pertain to orthodox faith and right morals. But councils convoked by the command and assent of heretics have always departed from the right faith. Such was the Council of Rimini.' Concerning this the Ecclesiastical History. [Sozomen, 4.16-19], amply speaks. Such also was the Council of Milan, convened at the command of Constantius the Arian Emperor, to obtain the condemnation of Athanasius, the keenest defender of the faith. In this council, the Catholic bishops Dionysius, Eusebius, Paulinus, Hilary, and some others, because they would not subscribe to the condemnation of Athanasius, were driven into exile, as is stated in the Ecclesiastical History, [Sozomen, 4.9], Of this sort also was the Council of Antioch'’under the Arian Emperor Constantius, celebrated in the confession of 40 bishops, where Athanasius was ejected from his episcopal see which he held in Alexandria, and con¬ demned to exile: so that thereupon the strength and authority of the Council of Nicea might be more readily destroyed, and falsehood triumph over truth (more fully recalled in Hist. Tripart., 4.9). Similar^also was the council afterwards assembled at Seleucia in Isauria of 160 bishops against the Council of Nicea. See Hist. Tripart., 5.34. Plenary councils, which are concerned with morals and the governance of the Church, have made various decisions ac¬ cording to the quality and condition of times, persons, etc. without prejudice to faith. Hence Innocent III speaks as follows on consanguinity and affinity [Deer. Greg. IX, 4:14.8; Friedberg, 2.703.53-57]: "It ought not to be judged reprehensible, if ac¬ cording to the variety of the times, human statutes may vary now and again, especially when urgent necessity or evident utility demands it, since God Himself made some changes in the New Testa¬ ment from those which He laid down in the Old."^ So he speaks. Yet lawful general councils have not contradicted themselves in matters of belief. This is Augustine's view: that previous plenary councils are emended by later ones [Agalnst the Donatists, 2.3.4]. Moreover on the fact that the African and Nicene Councils are not in conflict with that of Constantinople, see Ch. 3, below, 2 On the Papacy The laity can take part in councils as witnesses, as defenders, as conciliarists, as advisors, as executors, yet since the birth of Christ they have never had a definitive voice in councils. In Acts 15:2: " . . . they determined that Paul and Barnabas should go up, and certain of the other side, to the Apostles and presbyters to Jerusalem about this question." Note that they went up to the clergy, not to the laity, and no mention is made of laymen in that same council. In the eighth council, the fourth session, the princes bidden to interrogate, said: "As we are following your word, we shall interrogate them by virtue of your precept, not ... by our own authority, for this authority belongs to you." The Emperor Basil says of the laity: "Although it is not per¬ mitted to them according to the canon to say anything substantial concerning ecclesiastical cases, for this is the function of pon¬ tiffs and bishops." [Constantinople, AD 869] Sozomen [EH. 6.7] relates: "While Valentinian was hastening through Thrace toward Rome, then the bishops of Hellespont of Bithynia sent a legate Hypatian, the president of Heraclia, seeing that he deigned to interest himself in the correction of dogma.

He answered: 'Since I am the least of people, it is not right for me to investigate such things. But let the priests to whom this duty is assigned gather together wherever they will.'" Ambrose to Valentinian, Against Auxentius: "If we examine the order of the Scriptures, or histories of the ancients, who is there who will refuse in a case involving the faith, that bishops are wont to judge concerning Christian emperors, not emperors con¬ cerning bishops?" The Emperor Marcian in the Chalcedonian Council said at the synod: "We wish the Council to concern itself with the preserva¬ tion of the faith, not with displaying power, after the example of the most glorious prince Constantine, in order that, once the truth has been found, the multitude, [already] drawn to depraved doctrine, may not disagree besides." And again: "There are certain definite chapters, which in respect to goods, we reserve to Your Holiness; we have determined that it is fitting that these be disposed of according to rule by you through this synodical council, rather than established by our laws." [Gratian, Deer., 1.96.3: Fr. 1.338] 

The Emperor Basil at the End of the 8th Council. "Concerning you laymen, both those in high office and those absolutely converted, I do not have anything more to say than that we are in no way permitted to undertake discussion of ecclesiastical cases, or steadfastly to resist the integrity of the Church, and to oppose a universal council. For such things are the responsibility of patriarchs, pontiffs and bishops to investigate and examine, who have been assigned the office of governing; who have the power of sanctifying and binding and loosing; who have obtained the churchly and heavenly keys. These are not our responsibilities: it is we who ought to be fed, who need to be sanctified, to be bound or loosed from a bond. However much of religion and wisdom a lay per¬ son may manifest, or even if he may be inwardly endowed with all virtue, so long as he is a layman, he does not cease being called a sheep. This is the reason why, for those of you established in the order of sheep, pastors have the subtlety of discussing words, of seeking and striving after the things which are over us. There¬ fore we must with fear and sincere faith hear them and revere their faces, since they are ministers of Almighty God, and possess his form, and require nothing more than those things which are of our order. Hence by Christ the people are given leave to do not those things which princes, kings, tetrarchs or nobles might tell them, but 'whatever the scribes and Pharisees sitting in Moses' seat, have told you, this observe and practice.'* But when the heretics seek popular applause, Jeremiah's prediction is fulfilled: 'the prophets prophesied a falsehood, as the priests applauded with their hands, and my people loved such things, but what will happen to them when the end comes?' [Jer 5:31].^ On these things the Lord speaks through Isaiah: '. . . children that will not hear the laws of God, who say to the seers: see not; and to those that behold: Behold not, for us those things that are right: speak unto us pleasant things, see errors for us. Take away from me the way, turn away the path from me, let the Holy One of Israel cease from before us' [Isaiah 30:9-11]." Do the Lutheran people now say this very thing to their own false prophets? There is therefore a consummate har¬ mony between the Holy Scriptures, the Church and her councils.













CHAPTER 3: ON THE PRIMACY OF THE APOSTOLIC AND PETRINE SEE

Because the supreme authority (which we contemplate in councils and in the Apostolic See is within the Church, it is fitting that we briefly affirm the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and of Peter. 

After Peter's confession, Jesus says to him: "Blessed are you Simon Bar-Jonah, because flesh and blood have not revealed to you, but my Father who is in heaven: and I say to you, you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against her: and I will give to you the keys of the Kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever you bind on earth, will be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you loose on earth, 2 will be loosed also in heaven" [Mt 16:17ff]. It is clear how he meant to designate the person of Peter, for he set forth his old name, Simon, his new name, Peter, the name of his father Bar-Jonah and properly shows this. "You are, and upon this rock," Jerome explains: "That is, upon you, and I will give you the keys," etc. 

And through these words the holy fathers attest that the primacy was promised to Peter, and upon Peter the Church was to be built. 

Cyprian, Epist 68.8, to PupianP and 54.7, to Cornelius.^ 

Origen, On Matthew, Horn. 6. 

Jerome, Against the Pelagians 1. and On Matthew, 16. 

Ambrose, Sermon 47.^ 

Augustine, Against the Epistle of Donatus.^ 

Chrysostom, On Matthew, Horn. 4. 

Hilary, On Matthew. 

Leo, On the Anniversary of his Assumption of the Pontificate, Sermon 3. 

Gregory, Moral!a; Epist., to Emperor Maurice.

Cyril, On John, 2.12; Council of Constantinople IV; of Pope Nicolas. See our book, On the Primacy of Peter. The power which Christ promised to Peter, He gave after the resurrection. "Jesus said to Simon Peter, Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these? He said to him: Yes, Lord, you know that I love you. He said to him: Feed my sheep" [Jn 21:15]. This he repeated a third time: "Feed my sheep." 

To Peter alone as the prince of the Apostles in the presence of the other Apostles, He committed the flock: for "to pasture" in the Scriptures means "to rule," and in Ez 34:2; Isaiah 44:28; 56:11; Jer 22:22; Jer 23:1; Ps 72:70f, kings are called "shepherds." This is true in Hebrew and in Greek. 

That the primacy was given to Peter through these words, Cyprian, De Simplicitate Praelatorum, attests. Jerome in his Discourse an Peter to Eustochium, Ambrose in his Sermon on Penance, and on the Faith of Peter. Chrysostom On John, Horn. 8, on Repentance Augustine, Questions on the New and Old Testaments, Qu. 75. Leo in his Sermon on the Lord's Ascension. Gregory, Horn, in Ev., Mk 16, and Epist. to Ciranus. Bernard, in his Sermon 3 On the Seven Loaves Bede in his Homilies. 

Peter's primacy is proved from many other passages of Scripture Lk 22:31f: "Simon, behold Satan has desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail, and you, being once converted, may confirm your brethren." Note that He prays for Peter more than the rest, and petitions two things: indefectibility of faith and power to confirm the faithful. Thus do the following interpret it: Augustine, Chrysostom, Leo, Cyril, Bede. In Mt, Ch. 17, Christ said to Peter: "Go to the sea, and cast in a hook; and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when you have opened its mouth, you shall find a shekel: take that, and give it to them for me and you" [Mt 17:26]. It is clear that Christ, with many disciples present, equates only Peter with himself in paying tribute. So understand this: Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Origen, Ambrose.


*falso: concilium Chalcedonense octavum. Eck intends the 8th Ecumenical Council - Constantinople IV (AD 869).

Mt 10:2, Mk 3:6, Lk 6:14, where the appointment of the Apostles is described: by all Peter is named as head, first, that Jerome and Chrysostom reckoned on behalf of his primacy on the basis of Jn 21 that Peter alone came to Christ across the waters of the sea. This is the sign of a singular pontificate, says Bernard, On Consideration, to Eugenlus. And if to the other disciples it is commanded that they let down their nets, only to Peter is it said "launch out into the deep” [Lk 3:4]. So ponders Ambrose. 

We have now heard from the holy fathers: all attribute the primacy to Peter, first promised by the Lord, then after the resurrection set forth over the whole Church. Let some thing be added to these prior proofs. 

Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 3. 

Athanasius in his Epistles to Marcus, Liberius, and Felix II, in which he abundantly proves the primacy of the Pope. 

Eusebius H.E., 2.14. Augustine On John’s Gospel, Tract. 56.* Against the Donatists, 2, etc. 

Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7. 

Paulinus, De S. Foelice. Anselm to Pope Urban. Valentinian, Marcian, Phocas, Justinian, Emperors under the title "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith." 

We have set forth very fully all these matters in our three books On the Primacy of Peter to Leo X,1 and you will find many rare items in the large work. Against Luther of Johann Faber, Archducal Councillor (now Bishop of Vienna). 2 

Reason persuades that there was a high priest under the old Law, whose authority was heard [Dt 17 [:9]. And the monarchical rule is best: and such is the order in the Church Triumphant. This is beautifully confirmed by Gregory Nazianzus: Moses in doubtful times provided for the synagogue [Dt 17: 10ff]. Why should not Christ have provided for His bride the Church?

Gregory, Moralia, 21.15^ "(God) created all men equal in nature, but by reason of merits, he set some behind others in order by a secret dispensation. But this diversity which derives from one (nature), is distributed by divine judgment: so that, since every man does not walk the way of life, one may be ruled by another." The heretic strongly desires that the Church Militant not have a ministerial head; and that there may come to pass in the Church what is written: "In those days there was not a king in Israel, but each man did what seemed good to him" [Jdg 17:6, 18:1, 31; 21:24]


Objections of the Heretics 

1. Christ did not promise or give to Peter the keys for his own person, but because he was acting in the person of the Church. 

2. If the Church is built upon Peter the man, the gates of hell have already prevailed against him in the voice of one maidservant [Mt 26:69-88], and will daily prevail over his successors and sinners. 

3. And since the Church was built upon a rock, but his rock was Christ [1 Cor 10:4] it cannot be referred to Peter, "... and other foundation can no one lay; save that which has been laid" [1 Cor 3:11]. 

4. The primitive Church of the Apostles would not have been a Church, since Peter,18 years after Christ had suffered, was still in Jerusalem. Where then was the Roman Church? 

5. Peter never was at Rome. 

6. Peter is a member of the Church. 

7. How could Peter have been the rock, when in Mt 16:18f Christ said: "Get behind me, Satan."


Disposal of the arguments adduced against Peter.

1. We admit, with Augustine, that the keys were given to the Church, yet in the person of Peter, that is, Christ formally gave the keys to Peter, for the benefit of the Church; He gave the keys not to one, but to unity. Thus Peter acted in the person of the Church, just as the Emperor of Germany. Therefore certain persons have the keys, because otherwise there would be no use of them. 


2. The gates of hell prevailed against the persons succeeding Peter, yet not against the power of Peter. This succession of Peter abode in power, although the persons might sin. But when Peter denied Christ, the Church had not yet been founded but was to be founded on him, because Christ said: "Upon this rock I shall build my church," that is to say, after the resurrection. 


3. Even if Christ is the chief rock and primary foundation, yet He has vicars and substitutes, secondary rocks. For alongside Paul's statement that Christ alone is the foundation stands the statement of John [Rev 21:14]: "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them, the twelve names of the twelve apostles, and of the Lamb." 


4. Luther is mistaken that Peter came so late to Rome: for he was 5 years in Pontus, and 7 years at Antioch in Asia; afterwards he migrated to Rome: although in the 18th year he came from Rome to Jerusalem to the Council. Now, nothing applies to the matter. For Peter was the supreme pontiff wherever he was, although by the revelation of the Spirit, as St. Marcellus the martyr says, he chose a see for himself at Rome. Therefore Peter was for a time supreme bishop before he became Bishop of Rome. 2 


5. This is a new lie of Urban Rieger, or another Lutheran, that Peter never was at Rome and previously Paul converted those of whom he speaks in Gal. 2. St. Jerome attests to that in his comment on Rom 1:11, "that I may impart to you some spiritual grace" etc. To strengthen, he says, those Romans, holding the faith by the preaching of Peter. Paul says he wished to strengthen, not so much from their having been received by Peter, but that their faith might be strengthened by two apostles, witnesses, and doctors: otherwise he would have taken care not to build on another's foundation. 

The very ancient man Hegesippus, who came to Rome under Anicetus in the year of our Lord 160, wrote in Book 3 of On the Destruction of Jerusalem, how Nero sought a pretext for killing the Apostles, and when the command was given that the Apostles be seized, Peter was asked that he give himself over to another. 

Dionysius Bishop of the Corinthians, living at Rome A.D. 50, says: "You having admonitiorf from Peter and Paul, have joined the planting (plantation) of the Roman Church." Also both men arriving and teaching in this city at the same time, were crowned too with martyrdom in like manner at one and the same time. A certain writer 2 named Gaius under Pope Zephyrinus attests the same thing. 

Saint Ignatius, a disciple of John the Evangelist, writes to the Tarsians: "What of the fact that Peter was crucified? That Paul and James were cut down with swords? That John wTas banished to Patmos?" And in his letter to the Romans.: "Not just as Peter and Paul do I bid you: for they were Apostles of Jesus Christ, but I am the least." Irenaeus, bishop of Lyon, Against Heretics, 3.1., says as follows: "Matthew gave the Scripture of the Gospel to the Hebrews in their own language, while Peter and Paul proclaimed the Gospel at Rome, and founded the Church." 

And Ch. 3: "By the two most glorious apostles Peter and Paul, the Churches of Rome were founded and established." Tertullian, living A.D. 150, wrote in Against Marcion, 3. : "To the Romans, Peter and Paul left the Gospel with the seal of their own blood." And On the Prescription of Heretics, 36, speaking of Rome, he adds: "Where Peter is broughtinto equality with the Lord's passion."

Eusebius of Caesarea, Hist. 2: says: "In those times of Claudius, by the mercy of divine providence, he led Peter, the most approved of all the Apostles, and the greatest in magnificence of faith and merit of virtue, the prime prince, to the city of Rome." 

And in the book De Temporibus: "In the same year, he was seized by Herod." And later: "Peter, a Galilean by birth, the first pontiff of the Christians, after he had first founded the Church of Antioch, proceeded to Rome, where preaching the Gospel he persevered for 25 years as bishop of the same city."  

Gaudentius of Brixen, a very ancient writer, says: "On this day in the city of Rome, the cruelty of Nero slew both for the name of Christ." 

Jerome, On Famous Men, c.l ; "Simon Peter, son of John of the province of Galilee, of the village of Bethsaida, brother of Andrew the Apostle, and prince of the Apostles, after his episcopate of the Church of Antioch, and preaching of the dispersion of those who had believed in the circumcision in Pontus, Galatia, Cappodocia, Asia, and Bythynia, in the second year of the Emperor Claudius hastened to Rome to overcome Simon Magus; there he occupied the episcopal see for 25 years." 

Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Paul's disciple, attested the same to his fellow-disciple Timothy, concerning the passing of the Apostles. 

Linus the next pope after Peter, wrote to the Easterns in behalf of the martyrdom of Peter in the city. 

Ambrose in Sermon 67, says: "Let us not think it came to pass without cause, that on one day, in one place they bore the sentence of one tyrant, suffered on one day, so that together they came to Christ, in one place, lest Rome should be deprived of either one." etc. And further on: "In the city of Rome, which obtained the chief position and headship of the nations," he speaks of Peter and Paul. Papias of Jerusalem, the hearer of John the Evangelist, attests that Peter wrote his first canonical epistle at Rome. 

[Paulus Orosius, .Hist, 6.6, "in the 805th year since the founding of the city of Rome, Tiberius Claudius the fourth after Augustus began to reign, and remained emperor for 16 years. At the beginning of his reign, Peter, Apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ came, and taught with faithful word faith unto salvation to all believers, and confirmed it with mighty virtues. And thereupon there began to be Christians at Rome." And in the following chapter: "Nero was the first at Rome to inflict torture and death upon the Christians, and ordered them to be tortured through all the provinces with equal persecutions, and attempting to uproot the very name itself, he killed the most blessed Apostles Peter with the cross and Paul with the sword."] 

This is attested by Athanasius, Marcellus, Damasus, Leo, Bernard and innumerable others.  

[See Johannes Faber, in his work, past the middle.]


6. We speak of Peter as member and part of the Church, but we 2 deny that he could not besides be the ministerial head, or vicar of the true head. Similarly, it is one thing to act as a private person; something else, as a public person. And if he is head he is undoubtedly a member. 7. No wonder that Peter, upbraided by Christ because he decided, contrary to his confession, that Christ should be killed, because not yet had he received the keys, not yet had he been confirmed not yet had the fulness of the spirit come upon him. Therefore not yet was he the rock, but after the resurrection Christ founded upon him the Church, as Jerome expressly states in his Commentary on Matthew, at that verse. Lastly, Chrysostom and Hilary would not apply the name of Satan to Peter, but to the devil, the supporter of this advice. Now the fall of the person does not remove the power. Origen, On Matthew, Horn. 3, says: "As yet Peter was leaden, and it could happen that he would have a revelation from the Father, whereby he might profess Christ to be the son of the living God. As yet this great mystery was hidden from him, whereby Christ willed to be crucified for the salvation of the human race, and to rise on the third day."

For when Luther by "rock" understands faith; faith, just as much as grace, is lost in man, and no more is the faith of one man than of another man: and thus upon the faith of all the faithful has the Church been built. And if all the faithful are the foundation, what Church will he then give unless he most ineptly says the same is founded upon himself?


Still Other Obj actions of the Heretics against Peter and the Pope. 

1. Peter did not have authority over the Apostles, but the Apostles over him, because they sent him and John into Samaria [Acts 8:14]. 

2. And Peter did not ever exercise that primacy, as the Pope does; the latter does not wish there to be any bishop in the world, unless he receives the pallium and confirmation from him. 

3. Peter knew this was forbidden by Christ in Lk 22:24f, when a contention broke out over who of them was to be regarded as the greatest, Jesus said to them: "The Kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them, are called beneficent. But you are not so: but he that is greatest among you, let him become the least, and he who is the leader, as he who serves." It is clear (say the heretics) that it is the Kings of the Gentiles, not the pontiffs, who lord it over them. 

4. Mk 10:37ff, when the sons of Zebedee aspired to that power, they received the reply: namely, that they should drink of the cup, and yet not be certain where they would sit [Mk 10:39f], 

5. In Luke 9:46 and Matthew 18:Iff, He taught them that such superiority should be avoided. 

6. Paul withstood Peter [Gal 2:11]. 

7. Pope Victor wishing to excommunicate the Easterns, was forbidden to do so by Irenaeus Bishop of Lyon. 

8. Anicetus yielded to Polycarp Bishop of Smyrna. 

9. The Eastern bishops did not obey Pope Julius. * 

10.It was the Emperor Constantine IV who determined that the pope was first.

11. Thus many thousands of martyrs of the Eastern Church would have been condemned, likewise Cyprian, Augustine, Nicolas, because there never was a pope over the churches of Asia, Greece, or Africa. 

12. When did he establish the Antiochian, Constantinopolitan, Alexandrian, or Indian bishoprics? 

13. Theophilus of Alexandria and Epiphanius deposed Chrysostom and the same Epiphanius excommunicated John of Jerusalem. 

14. The Council of Nicea attests that the bishop takes charge of suburban churches. 

15. The same council decreed that bishops were to be ordained by provincial bishops, not by the pope. 

16. The same council attributed the primacy to the Jerusalem bishopric, not to that of Rome. And Jerusalem was first, because "out of Zion went forth the Law" [Is 2:3]. 

17. At the Council of Africa IV, the bishop of the prime see was not to be called "prince of bishops" or anything of that sort, but only "bishop of the prime see"; later: not even the Roman pontiff is to be called "universal." 

18. Both Pelagius and Gregory rejected the name "universal bishop." 

19. The primacy of the pope is proved from the decrees and decretals of the Roman pontiffs, books originating within the last 400 years. 


We have gone into these matters more deeply because the heretics have shouted more against the rock than they attacked anything else.


Disposal of Objections. 

1. Now we shall say that Peter exercised the primacy, yet when you argue that Peter was sent into Samaria, why was he thus less than the Apostles? This is the form of argument of the Arians that the Father sent the Son [Jn 6:44; 10:29; Gal 4:4]. Therefore the Father is greater than the Son, because the sender is greater than the sent. As if Herod who was not greater than the Magi, did not send the three Magi, to worship the child, and it is frequent that the more powerful are sent from the college and the Senate by counsel or love, not by the authority of inferiors. Hence in Joshua 22:11-14 one reads: "And when the children of Israel had heard of it . . . that the children of Ruben and of Gad and the half tribe of Manasses had built an altar in the land of Canaan, upon the banks of the Jordan, over against the children of Israel: they all assembled in Shiloh, to go up and fight against them. And in the meantime they sent to them into the land of Gilead, Phineas the son of Eleazar the priest, and ten princes with him, one of every tribe, ' that they might censure them for having committed this sacrilege. Note that the Sons of Israel, the lesser people, sent Phineas, who "was their leader before the Lord," as stated in 1 Chr 9:20. Therefore it is clear from these Scriptural passages, that it is of no consequence to assert: he is sent; therefore he is less than the sender or the senders. 


2. Peter carried out his office. We do not wish to recount what they recounted in Jn 6:69f; Lk 12:41; Mt 19:27; Lk 5:8; Mt 4:X8f; Mt 17:23f; Mt 18:21; but when in Acts he had already been created Pontiff, let us hear what he did: for first he directed the ordination of Matthias as an Apostle. "Peter rising up in the midst of the brethren, standing, said: 'Men, brothers. . . etc. [Acts l:15f]. Secondly, on the day of Pentecost, he defended all the Apostles. "Peter standing up with the eleven, lifted up his voice" [Acts 2:14]. Thirdly, with John present he healed the lame man and defended him in the presence of the people [Acts 3:Iff], Fourthly, in the council he defended himself and John [Acts 4:5ff]. Fifthly, he pronounced the death sentence on Ananias and Sapphira [Acts 5:4ff]: this was the greatest indication of coercive authority. Sixthly, he condemned the accursed trafficking of Simon [Acts 8:20ff], Seventhly, he was bidden to receive even Gentiles as prelates into his power, when he saw "a sheet. . . in which there were beasts and reptiles," etc., and a voice came to him: "Arise, Peter; kill and eat" [Acts 10:11-13]. Here he was bidden as head to receive Gentiles in the body of the Church.

Eighthly, in the Apostolic Council he was the author of the decision suspending the law, as Jerome teaches, and Acts 15:7ff. Beware therefore of heretically lying against St. Peter, that he did not use the power divinely bestowed upon him. Concerning the corollary, it is false, for each patriarch confirmed his own bishops, and the patriarch of Thessalonica confirmed his own bishops in Greece, yet did so as the vicar of the pope, as is clear from the acts of Pope Leo. The heretic supposes that all bishops have the pallium, which is false, because regularly archbishops have it, and a few bishops by privilege, as the bishop of Bamberg in Germany. [See our 34V treatise On the Primacy, 3.15.] On the reason for the pallium see 1529 St. Gregory, Epist.* 3. It is agreed that Christ forbade ambition and tyranny, but not authority because that is from God, and "he who resists authority, resists God's ordinance" [Rom 13:2]. There he wished to teach the humility of the president, not to remove his power. In like manner from the fact that He was ministering and also taught other chief persons to minister, anyone would wrongly infer that Christ had no power. And when Christ asked who is the greater among you, it is evident that he wished someone else to be greater in power, although it happened to him that he was the lesser one by the showing forth of ministry. 4/5. We reply similarly, for he willed, as Jerome says, for his followers to reach the pinnacle of virtues, not by power but by humility. For those who are in power ought to humble themselves 35r within, as if they were not in power, that they may become as little children in humility, not in sense and in age-; 6. Paul reproved Peter, because he was holding onto the edification of faith, that is, to the office of the apostolate in which they were equals, yet Peter was still prior in rule and authority. For even today it often happens that the Pope and other superiors are often reproved by inferiors. Indeed, the heretic Luther censures all churchly prelates, though he is the superior of none of these.


7/8. Anicetus was the first to determine that Easter be celebrated on Sunday. First Pius, then Victor, confirmed this, and their decision prevailed. At first the Easterns resisted this, because from the bidding of St. John, they celebrated on the 14th moon of the first month. From Smyrna Polycarp addressed Anicetus (Note: Greek to Roman), and recognized that he was performing the office of bishop, yet Anicetus could not persuade Polycarp says Eusebius in the Church History. Luther the Corrupter says: Anicetus yielded to Polycarp." He wished to excommunicate the Easterns resisting Victor, whom Irenaeus warned, not that Victor should have no power over the Easterns. For why should the holy martyr have concerned himself; but to consider the concord of the Church and her peace, he determined that disturbance not arise in the Church. 


9.It is wonderful that the heretic leans upon the deed of heretics, for those eastern bishops expelled Athanasius and Paul, who taking refuge with Pope Julius, after the heretics were arraigned and excommunicated, were restored. Here the heretic tumbles down, because Pope Julius more than 1100 years ago had authority over the eastern bishops of Asia and Egypt. * It is false that Constantine IV first gave the primacy to the Roman pontiff, when previously he had it from the Gospel with the confirmation of Emperors Constantine, Valentinian, Gratian, Theodosius, Marcian, Basil, and others. 


10. Hence it is not inappropriate that the decree of the princes yield to the right of the Apostolic See, in order that the temerity of the rebels may be restrained. Yet the heretic has erred that Constantine IV determined anything in this matter, but he has only remitted the confirmation of the elected Pope, which the Emperor previously was accustomed to do in his own way. 


11. None of the holy martyrs withdrew themselves from obedience to Peter or his successors where and when it was necessary. The heretic is mistaken: but if the pope is supreme, it is necessary that all bishops be confirmed by him, for just as it suffices for priests to be confirmed by bishops, so bishops by archbishops, primates or patriarchs. So you understand concerning Ambrose, Augustine, and Nicolas. I believe that because of the pride of the bishops in Germany it came to pass that they shook off the authority of the primate of Magdeburg. And prior things are clear from the eighth council, from the Council of Nicea and others. See Dist. 64 of the Decretals. It is clear that the bishops of Africa were under the Roman pontiff, because from the council of Milevis they wrote to Pope Innocent I, seeking confirmation of that. See Augustine, Epist. 90, 91. The third and fourth Councils of Carthage were confirmed, one by the authority of Pope Zozimus, the other by the authority of Boniface, since he sent Bishop Fatistinus thither. Augustine was concerned with them. The Councils under Cyprian in Africa sought approval from Pope Cornelius (Cyprian, Epistles, 1.2; 2.11). Now it was clear that the bishops of Asia, Egypt and Greece were under the Roman Pontiff, because it was through the Roman Pontiff that Athanasius was restored, Chrysostom was restored, Flavian was restored, Appiarus in Africa was restored. For abundant evidence, see our book On the Primacy * 


12. It was not necessary for the installation of a bishop to take place directly at the hands of the Roman Pontiff, yet that those churches were subject to the pope, is clear from the fact that he restored bishops ejected from these churches. And today, from Pope Leo X, and from Hadrian VI, Asiatic bishops have received confirmation. 


13. How much can heresy claim? When it has nothing solid for itself, it brings forward the utterly wicked ejection of the best of bishops, John Chrysostom, who was ejected through the utterly greedy and wicked Theophilus of Alexandria, with the help of the ungodly Empress Eudoxia. The injustice committed against this holy man the heretic takes for a lawful act, but remains silent about the fact that he was restored by Pope Innocent, and the negotiation carried on by the Pope with Alexander Bishop of Antioch; and the Emperor Arcadius resisting the Pope and Chrysostom, was excommunicated. Go now, heretic, and deny that the bishops of Greece _were under the Roman Pontiff! Concerning John of Jerusalem it is clear from St. Jerome that a council had been called at Antioch (for at that time the Bishop of Jerusalem was under that Patriarch, and under the Archbishop of Caesarea) and John was condemned by the synod, in which Epiphanius was of preeminent authority. 


14. Canon 6 of the Council of Nicea goes as follows: "The ancient custom persisted in Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis, and the Bishop of Alexandria has authority over all these, seeing that it is a custom like to that of the Roman bishop. Similarly in Antioch and the other provinces his honor is to be kept with each and every Church [Gratian Deer. 1.65.6; Fr. 1.251] that this passage does not exclude the Roman primacy which the heretic wrongly infers, but that the authority of the three patriarchal churches was then confirmed, for at that time there were only three patriarchal sees, that is, the Roman, the Antiochene, and the Alexandrine. Nay, more strongly through that council the primacy of the Roman pontiff is proved, first because although Nicea was in Asia, yet Ossius of Cordova, presided over the Council in the name of the Pope, and signed first not in his own name as all the remaining bishops, but in the Pope's name. Secondly, because it was decided in the Council of Nicea that in case of the deposition of a bishop, appeal could be made from the whole world to the Roman Pontiff. Athanasius leaned on him and obtained restoration; so did Chrysostom. And when the Church of Africa opposed Pope Zozimus in the restoration of Appiarus, once made certain of the matter by the Council of Nicea, the Church acquiesced. Go, now, heretic and rave that the Nicean Council controverts the Pope. 


15. On the ordination of bishops, what has this to do with primacy, when today the pope very rarely ordains a bishop or perchance never, but at the present time three bishops meeting together, ordain and consecrate a bishop? [Deer. 1.64.1, Fr 1.247]. 


16. Canon 7 of this Council so provides. "For the custom and ancient tradition obtained, that the episcopal office was conferred upon Elias, that he might have the consequence of honor, apart from the rank of metropolitan" [Gratian, Deer. 1.65.7: Fr. 1.251]. This stupid heretic dreams of a primacy attributed to Jerusalem, when as yet primacy was not attributed to it, as it permitted it to be subject to the Metropolitan who was at Caesarea, as Jerome states. Therefore it decreed that Jerusalem was to be honored by ancient tradition, but says nothing about primacy, as Jerusalem was first in time but not in rank. The African Council did not deal with the primacy or with Rome, but the African bishops settled among themselves that their primates (such were the bishops of Carthage, Numidia, Mauritania, etc.) were not to flaunt their glorious titles, and their jurisdiction over others. Canon 6 of the Third African Council deals with this and nothing else. And the mad heretic when he read in the Decretals [1.99.3: Fr. 1.350f] the words of Gratian attached thereto, believed them to be the words of the Council, and they were not. But we will shortly speak of the universal bishop. 


18. Gregory and Pelagius did not spurn the primacy of the Roman Church, but approved of it, as we have shown very fully in our treatise On the Primacy of Peter. But they so denied that there could be any universal bishop, because there should be a proper ruler of each Church. Since thus there could be no other bishop, the episcopal honor should both be withdrawn from all and referred back to one alone. That because there was something distinctive in the hierarchical order, the holy fathers rightfully rejected it, except for the dignity of the Roman Church.


19. The Primacy of the Roman Church is proved not only from the decrees of the Pontiffs, but from the Gospel, from the holy martyrs, councils and doctors. But the heretic is mistaken: he believes that there were no other canonical laws except after the appearance of Gratian's Decretum and the Decretals of Gregory IX, despite , the fact that there had always been statutes and laws in the Church. For example there was once a Codex of canons a Decretum of Pathasius, Decretum of Burchardus, a Panormia of Ivo, etc. Therefore all things heretical vanish like water bubbles. 


Conclusion. Let us all receive the authority of the Church shining in the Apostolic See of the Roman See: since Jerome in times difficult for the faith consulted her, writing from Asia Minor to Damasus; Augustine writing from Africa to Innocent and Boniface; and Cyprian writing to Cornelius; Athanasius writing from Egypt to Marcus and 2 Julius, Ambrose writing from Italy, etc. Now those defending themselves against rebaptizers draw back from their basis, hence they confess many things not written and yet to be adhered to. Zwingli infers from the baptism of Mary 3 the baptism of children.

viernes, 4 de octubre de 2024

Richard Swinburne. La existencia de Dios

 Introduction 1 

1. Inductive Arguments 4 

2. The Nature of Explanation 23 

3. The Justification of Explanation 52 

4. Complete Explanation 73 

5. The Intrinsic Probability of Theism 93 

6. The Explanatory Power of Theism: General Considerations 110 

7. The Cosmological Argument 133 

8. Teleological Arguments 153 

9. Arguments from Consciousness and Morality 192 

10. The Argument from Providence 219 

11. The Problem of Evil 236 

12. Arguments from History and Miracles 273 

13. The Argument from Religious Experience 293 

14. The Balance of Probability


 1. Inductive Arguments

An argument starts from one or more premisses, which are propositions taken for granted for the purpose of the argument, and argues to a conclusion. An argument is a valid deductive argument if it is incoherent to suppose that its premisses are true but its conclusion false. For example, the following argument is a valid deductive argument: 

(Premiss 1) No material bodies travel faster than light. 

(Premiss 2) My car is a material body. 

(Conclusion) My car does not travel faster than light. 

In a valid deductive argument the premisses make the conclusion certain. There are arguments that are not deductively valid, but in which the premisses in some sense ‘support’ or ‘confirm’ or ‘give strength to’ the conclusion, and some or all arguments of this general kind are often characterized as ‘good’ or ‘correct’ or ‘strong’ inductive arguments. However, we need here to distinguish carefully between two different kinds of argument. There are arguments in which the premisses make the conclusion probable, that is, more probable than not—for example: 

P1: 70% inhabitants of the Bogside are Catholic. 

P2: Doherty is an inhabitant of the Bogside. 

C: Doherty is Catholic. 

The conjunction of the premisses makes the conclusion probable. However, many arguments that are called ‘correct’ inductive arguments are hardly to be regarded as of this type. Take the following argument: 

P: All of 100 ravens observed in different parts of the world are black. 

C: All ravens are black.

The normal way to construe this conclusion, in the context of a discussion of inductive arguments, is to suppose that it is about all ravens at all moments of time and points of space—and, even if you suppose that nothing on a distant planet would count as a raven, that means all ravens at all times in the earth’s history and at all places on its surface. But, when the conclusion is interpreted this way, it becomes implausible to suppose that P makes C more probable than not. For it is not improbable to suppose that the blackness of observed ravens arises from a particular feature of modern ravens, a particular feature of their make-up not present in older ravens. To suppose that all ravens are always black seems to go a long way beyond the evidence recorded in P. C may, however, be true; and, most of us suppose, P increases the probability that it is true, but P does not make C probable. Most of the arguments of scientists from their observational evidence to conclusions about what are the true laws of nature or to predictions about the results of future experiments or observations are not deductively valid, but are, it would be generally agreed, inductive arguments of one of the above two kinds. (I do not mean that they have the simple pattern of the easy examples given above, but only that they are arguments that have the defining characteristics of one of the two kinds.) The various astronomical observations made by Tycho Brahe, Kepler, Galileo, and other men of the seventeenth century were observations that favoured Newton’s theory of motion, in the sense that they made it more likely to be true, more probable, than it would have been otherwise. The various botanical, geological, and breeding data described by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species added to the probability of his theory of the evolution of animal species by natural selection of variations. It is an interesting question, to which I shall need to allude at a later stage, whether, in a typical scientific argument from various data of observation and experiment to a conclusion about what are the fundamental laws of physics or chemistry, the premisses make the conclusion probable or merely add to its probability. Laws of nature are normally supposed to be generalizations that not merely hold at all times and places, but would continue to hold under unrealized or unrealizable circumstances (for example, however humans interfere with the universe). Newton’s theory of motion consists of his three laws of motion and his law of gravitational attraction. Did the various observations of the seventeenth century make it more probable than not that his theory was true? I pass no judgement on this matter at this stage. However, on our normal way of looking at these matters, clearly observational evidence often makes more probable than not a particular prediction about the future. All the observational evidence about the past behaviour of sun, moon, planets, etc. makes it more probable than not that the earth will continue to spin on its axis for the next twenty-four hours and so that the sun will rise over the earth again tomorrow. Let us call an argument in which the premisses make the conclusion probable a correct P-inductive argument. Let us call an argument in which the premisses add to the probability of the conclusion (that is, make the conclusion more likely or more probable than it would otherwise be) a correct C-inductive argument. In this latter case let us say that the premisses ‘confirm’ the conclusion. Among correct C-inductive arguments, some will obviously be stronger than others, in the sense that in some the premisses will raise the probability of the conclusion more than the premisses do in other arguments. The point of arguments is to get people, in so far as they are rational, to accept conclusions. For this purpose it is not sufficient that their premisses should in some sense necessitate or probabilify their conclusion. It is also necessary that the premisses should be known to be true by those who dispute about the conclusion. There are plenty of valid arguments to the existence of God that are quite useless, because, although their premisses may be true, they are not known to be true by those who argue about religion—for example: P1: If life is meaningful, God exists. P2: Life is meaningful. C: God exists. This argument is certainly valid. If the premisses are true, the conclusion must be true. The premisses may be true; but atheists would deny either the first premiss or the second one. Since the premisses are not common items of knowledge to those who argue about religion, they do not form a suitable jumping-off ground for such argument. What are clearly of interest to people in an age of religious scepticism are arguments to the existence (or non-existence) of God in which the premisses are known to be true by people of all theistic or atheistic persuasions. I therefore define arguments from premisses known to be true by those who dispute about the conclusion which are valid deductive, correct P-inductive, or correct C-inductive arguments, respectively good deductive, good P-inductive, and good C-inductive arguments. In investigating arguments for or against the existence of God, we need to investigate whether any of them is a good deductive, good P-inductive, or good C-inductive argument. I take the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equivalent to ‘there exists necessarily a person1 without a body (i.e. a spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things’. I use ‘God’ as the name of the person picked out by this description. I understand by God’s being eternal that he always has existed and always will exist. There is an alternative understanding of ‘eternal’ in the Christian tradition as ‘timeless’ or ‘outside time’. This understanding did not, however, arrive in the Christian tradition under the fourth century ad; it is very difficult to make any sense of it, and, for reasons that I have given elsewhere,2 it seems quite unnecessary for the theist to burden himself with this understanding of eternity. By God’s being perfectly free I understand that no object or event or state (including past states of himself) in any way causally influences him to do the actions that he does—his own choice at the moment of action alone determines what he does. By God’s being omnipotent I understand that he is able to do whatever it is logically possible (i.e. coherent to suppose) that he can do. By God’s being omniscient I understand that he knows whatever it is logically possible that he know. By God’s being perfectly good I understand that he always does a morally best action (when there is one), and does no morally bad action. By his being the creator of all things I understand that everything that exists at each moment of time (apart from himself) exists because, at that moment of time, he makes it exist, or permits it to exist. The meaning of this claim that there is a God will be developed in somewhat greater detail at points in later chapters, especially in Chapter 5.3 The claim that there is a God is called theism. Theism is, of course, the core belief of the creeds of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In the course of human history many people have taken for granted the existence of God, and many others no doubt have taken for granted his non-existence. They have not had consciously formulated reasons for their beliefs. They have just believed. However, others who have believed have had reasons for their beliefs. As with most people’s reasons for most of their beliefs, these reasons have often been very vague and inchoate. Sometimes, however, people have formulated some of their reasons for belief in a sharp and explicit form. Then we have something clearly recognizable as an argument for or against the existence of God. Those arguments that have been frequently discussed have been given names—and thus we have ‘the cosmological argument’, or ‘the argument from religious experience’. Other arguments exist that have not been discussed frequently enough to gain a name. And people have had other reasons for belief or disbelief that have never been formulated explicitly enough to constitute an argument. In the course of this book I shall discuss various of the reasons that people have had for believing in the existence of God, or in the nonexistence of God, some of which have received a sufficiently precise form already to be codified in named arguments and others of which will need to be knocked into a clear shape. I shall discuss only arguments in which the premisses report what are (in some very general sense) features of human experience—for example, evident general truths about the world or features of private human experience. Such arguments I shall term a posteriori arguments. They claim that something that humans experience is grounds for believing that there is a God or that there is no God. I shall not discuss a priori arguments—these are arguments in which the premisses are logically necessary truths—namely, propositions that would be true whether or not there was a world of physical or spiritual beings. Among logically necessary truths are the truths of mathematics or logic. Hence I shall not discuss the traditional ontological argument4 for the existence of God, or any variants thereof. Nor shall I discuss arguments against the existence of God that claim that there is something incoherent or self-contradictory in the claim that there is a God. I think that ontological arguments for the existence of God are very much mere philosophers’ arguments and do not codify any of the reasons that ordinary people have for believing that there is a God. The greatest theistic philosophers of religion have on the whole rejected ontological arguments and relied on a posteriori ones.5 Arguments against the existence of God that claim that theism is incoherent do, however, I admit, have some basis in the thought of ordinary people. I shall not, however, of course be able to discuss all the a posteriori reasons that people have had for believing that there is or that there is not a God. But I shall consider those that, in my view, are the most plausible and have had the greatest appeal in human history. In reaching my final conclusion about how probable it is that there is a God, I assume that no a priori arguments of either species,6 and no a posteriori arguments other than those that I discuss, have any significant force. Although my theme is arguments for and against the existence of God, it will seem that I concentrate on arguments for the existence of God. I do discuss in a separate chapter the main argument against the existence of God—the argument from evil, which claims that the existence of pain and suffering in the world shows that there is no perfectly good and all-powerful being. But, apart from that argument (and the associated argument from hiddenness, which I also discuss there), the main reason that atheists have for believing that there is no God has been their claim that there is insufficient evidence, that the theist’s arguments do not make the existence of God probable to any significant degree. The atheist’s arguments, apart from the argument from evil, have been largely in the form of criticisms of the theist’s arguments. I therefore discuss such arguments in the course of discussing each of the main arguments for the existence of God. In discussing arguments for the existence of God, I shall consider forms of cosmological and teleological argument, the argument from the existence of consciousness, the moral argument, arguments from miracle and revelation, and the argument from religious experience. A cosmological argument argues that the fact that there is a universe needs explaining and that God’s having made it and kept it in being explains its existence. An argument from design argues that the fact that there is design in the world needs explaining, and that God’s action provides that explanation. There are various forms of argument from design, according to the kind of design to which it draws attention. I discuss two different genera of the argument under the headings ‘teleological arguments’ and ‘the argument from providence’, and different species of each genus. The argument from the existence of consciousness argues that the fact that there are conscious beings is mysterious and inexplicable but for the action of God. Arguments from miracle and revelation cite various public phenomena in the course of human history as evidence of God’s existence and activity. The argument from religious experience claims that various private experiences are experiences of God and thus show his existence. Some of the issues that I discuss are ones that I have treated at greater length elsewhere; but the discussion in this book is, I hope, adequate—given the constraints imposed by the length of the book—to support the conclusions drawn here. For example, I discussed the problem of evil at book length in my book Providence and the Problem of Evil; 7 but I hope that the discussion of it in Chapters 10 and 11 of the present book suffice to make it plausible that the kind and amount of evil that we find on Earth do not count significantly against the existence of God. Yet there is one respect in which my discussion in this book is manifestly incomplete. When I discuss arguments from miracles, I have space only to discuss which strange public phenomena (for example, a dead man coming to life) if they occurred would be evidence for the existence of God, but I do not have space to discuss the historical evidence for and against the occurrence of particular public phenomena. So in effect I discuss here only the form of an argument that needs filling out with detailed historical material.8 Kant produced a threefold classification of arguments for the existence of God that has had a permanent and to my mind far from beneficial influence on the subsequent discussion of this topic. He wrote:


There are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason. All paths leading to this goal begin either from determinate experience and the specific constitution of the world of sense as thereby known, and ascend from it, in accordance with the laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the world; or they start from experience which is purely indeterminate, that is from experience of existence in general; or finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. There are, and there can be, no others.9 The distinction is made in terms of the nature of the premiss. Either you start from a conceptual truth—in which case you have the ontological argument; or from ‘existence in general’—in which case you have the cosmological argument; or from the details of what Kant calls ‘determinate experience’, how things are in the world—in which case you have the ‘physico-theological’ argument. My reason for claiming that this doctrine of Kant has had a far from beneficial influence on discussion of this topic is that by his use of the word ‘the’ Kant tends to assume that there can be only one argument of each type—whereas in fact there can quite clearly be many different arguments under each heading that are so different from each other that it would be misleading to call them forms of the same argument at all. There is, for example, no reason to suppose that all arguments to the existence of God in which the premisses are in some sense conceptual truths need have the form of the traditional ontological argument. Above all, there is no reason to suppose that all arguments from how things are in the world need have the form of the argument that Kant calls ‘physico-theological’, and has elsewhere been called the argument from design. This latter argument may itself have many forms. It may argue, for example, from the regular behaviour of objects in the world codified in laws of nature, or from the ready availability in the world of the things that humans and animals need to survive. In both cases there is an argument from a very general order in nature. But there are arguments too, as we have noted, from particular miracles, from the development of human history, or from particular religious experiences. Not all of these may be particularly good arguments but they deserve to be considered on their merits—Kant’s classification obscures their existence.

So then we shall consider the worth of various a posteriori arguments, not merely two, as listed by Kant. When we have our arguments in clear form, we shall need to ask—are they good deductive arguments, or good P-inductive arguments, or good Cinductive arguments? Sometimes the proponents of such arguments have not been clear whether the arguments were intended to be deductive or inductive, let alone about the kind of inductive arguments that they were intended to be. One unfortunate feature of recent philosophy of religion has been a tendency to treat arguments for the existence of God in isolation from each other. There can, of course, be no objection to considering each argument initially, for the sake of simplicity of exposition, in isolation from others. But clearly the arguments may back each other up or alternatively weaken each other, and we need to consider whether or not they do. Sometimes, however, philosophers consider the arguments for the existence of God in isolation from each other, reasoning as follows: the cosmological argument does not prove the conclusion, the teleological argument does not prove the conclusion, etc., etc., therefore the arguments do not prove the conclusion. But this ‘divide and rule’ technique with the arguments is admissible. Even if the only kind of good argument was a valid deductive argument from premisses known to be true, it would be inadmissable. An argument from p to r may be invalid: another argument from q to r may be invalid. But, if you run the arguments together, you could well get a valid deductive argument; the argument from p and q to r may be valid. The argument from ‘all students have long hair’ to ‘Smith has long hair’ is invalid, and so is the argument from ‘Smith is a student’ to ‘Smith has long hair’; but the argument from ‘all students have long hair and Smith is a student’ to ‘Smith has long hair’ is valid. That arguments may support and weaken each other is even more evident, when we are dealing with inductive arguments. That Smith has blood on his hands hardly makes it probable that Smith murdered Mrs Jones, nor (by itself) does the fact that Smith stood to gain from Mrs Jones’s death, nor (by itself) does the fact that Smith was near the scene of the murder at the time of its being committed, but all these phenomena together (perhaps with other phenomena as well ) may indeed make the conclusion probable.10

In order to consider the cumulative effect of arguments, I shall consider them one by one, starting with the cosmological argument and including the arguments from evil and from hiddenness against the existence of God, and ask how much the premisses of each argument add to or subtract from the force of the previous arguments. To give advance notice of some of my conclusions, I shall argue that (neither separately nor in conjunction) are any of the arguments that I consider for or against the existence of God good deductive arguments. There are, of course, as I have pointed out, valid deductive arguments to the existence of God, but they start from premisses that are far from generally accepted. On the other hand, I shall argue that most of the arguments (taken separately and together) for the existence of God are good C-inductive arguments— that is to say, their premisses make it more probable (or likely) that God exists than it would otherwise be. Some of these arguments of course confirm the existence of God much more strongly than do others. I shall allow that the argument against the existence of God from evil is a good C-inductive argument of very limited force. I shall claim that the argument from hiddenness to the non-existence of God is not a good C-inductive argument. The crucial issue, however, is whether all the arguments taken together make it probable that God exists, whether the balance of all the relevant evidence favours the claim of theism or not. For clearly, in so far as the probability of a hypothesis is relevant to whether or not we ought to act on it, we ought to act on a hypothesis in so far as it is rendered probable by the total evidence available to us—all we know about the world, not just some limited piece of knowledge. The religious person claims that his religious viewpoint makes sense of the whole of his experience; and his atheistic rival is liable to make a similar claim. In the final chapter I shall reach a conclusion on whether or not the balance of all the relevant evidence favours theism. I shall be fairly brief in dismissing the suggestions that any of the arguments separately or all the arguments taken together constitute a good deductive argument. I shall be fairly brief because many other philosophers have devoted their technical skills to this task, and relatively few philosophers today would accept that there are good deductive arguments to be had here. I shall devote most of my time to assessing the inductive strength of such arguments. I shall consider of each argument whether it is a good C-inductive argument, but only when we have all the arguments shall I ask whether, taken together, they make a good P-inductive argument. I proceed in this way because, as will appear, it is a lot easier to see when we have a good C-inductive argument than when we have a good P-inductive argument. It will be useful to introduce at this stage the symbols of confirmation theory that I shall use from time to time in subsequent chapters. I represent by lower-case letters such as e, h, p, and q propositions. P(pjq) represents the probability of p given q. Thus p might represent the proposition: ‘The next toss of this coin will land heads’, and q might represent the proposition: ‘505 of the last 1,000 tosses of this coin have landed heads’. Then P(pjq) represents the probability that the next toss of the coin will land heads, given that 505 of the last 1,000 tosses have landed heads. (The value of P(pjq) would then generally be supposed to be 0.505.) However, the relation between p and q may be of a much more complex kind; and clearly we normally assess the probability of claims on evidence other than or additional to that of relative frequencies. p may be some scientific hypothesis—say, Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity—and q may be the conjunction of all the reports of the evidence of observation and experiment that scientists have collected relevant to the theory. Then P(pjq) represents the inductive probability of Einstein’s General Theory given all the reports of relevant observations and experiments. Inductive probability is thus to be distinguished from statistical probability, which is a property of classes of things (for example, inhabitants of a certain town, say Tunbridge Wells) and is a measure of the proportion of things in the class that have some other property (for example, voting Conservative in the 2001 Election). The probability of an inhabitant of Tunbridge Wells voting Conservative in 2001 is just the proportion of inhabitants of Tunbridge Wells who voted Conservative in 2001. (In English, the indefinite article—for example, ‘the probability of an inhabitant . . . ’—often indicates that the probability is statistical.) The classes may be of actual things (for example, inhabitants of Tunbridge Wells), or of hypothetical things, things that would be generated by a certain process (for example, tosses of this coin, if we were to toss it for a very long time). Inductive probability is also to be distinguished from physical probability. The physical (or natural ) probability of an event (and so of the proposition that records it) is a matter of the extent to which at some earlier time the event is predetermined by its causes. An event that is made inevitable by the preceding state of the world has a physical probability of 1—its occurrence is physically necessary; an event whose non-occurrence is made inevitable by the preceding state of the world has a physical probability of 0—its occurrence is physically impossible. An event has a physical probability between 1 and 0 if it is not predetermined that it will happen or that it will not happen, but the preceding state of the world is biased in favour of its happening to the degree measured by the value of the probability: larger values of the probability indicate a greater bias in favour of its happening.11 Physical and statistical probabilities may themselves constitute evidence that makes some hypothesis inductively probable; or other evidence may make it inductively probable that they have a certain value. My concern with inductive probability is a concern with how probable q makes p, quite apart from who is doing the calculation, how clever he is, and his degree of confidence in the evidential force of q. Clearly in science and history and all other empirical inquiries we think that there are correct ways to assess whether and (within rough limits) how much some evidence supports some hypothesis. I shall set out these criteria in Chapter 3. In order to emphasize the objective character of the value P(pjq) with which I am concerned and to distinguish it from measures of evidential support that measure subjects’ degree of confidence or are in part functions of subjects’ abilities to work out the true measure of evidential support,12 I shall in future call P(pjq), the logical probability of p on q. This is clearly an a priori matter. If q represents all the relevant evidence, the value of P(pjq) cannot depend on further evidence—it measures what the evidence you have already got shows. It is an a posteriori matter whether, in 1,000 tosses, 505 have landed heads; but an a priori matter whether that evidence gives a probability of 0.505 to the next toss landing heads. A hypothesis up for investigation is often represented by h. Then P(hje &k) represents the probability of a hypothesis h given evidence (e &k).13 It is often useful to divide the evidence available to an observer into two parts—new evidence and background evidence; if this is done, the former is often represented by e and the latter by k. Background evidence (or background knowledge, as it is sometimes called) is the knowledge that we take for granted before new evidence turns up. Thus, suppose that detectives are investigating a murder. h could represent the hypothesis that Jones did the murder; e could represent the proposition that reports all the new evidence that detectives discover—for example, that Jones’s fingerprints were found on the weapon, that he was near the scene of the murder at the time it was committed, etc., etc. k could represent the proposition reporting the detectives’ general knowledge about how the world works—for example, that each person has a unique set of fingerprints, that people who touch metal and wood with bare hands usually leave their fingerprints on them, etc., etc. Then P(hje &k) represents the probability that Jones did the murder, given detectives’ total evidence. For all propositions p and q P(pjq) ¼ 1 if (and only if) q makes p certain—for example, if q entails p (that is, there is a deductively valid argument from q to p); and P(pjq) ¼ 0 if (and only if) q makes p certain—for example, if q entails p. 14 P(pjq) þ P( pjq) ¼ 1. So if P(pjq) > 1=2, then P(pjq) > P( pjq) and it is on q more probable that p than that p. So (for background knowledge k) an argument from e to h will be a correct C-inductive argument if (and only if) P(hje &k) > P(hjk), and a correct P-inductive argument if (and only if) P(hje &k) > 1=2. The division between new evidence and background evidence can be made where you like—often it is convenient to include all evidence derived from experience in e and to regard k as being what is called in confirmation theory mere ‘tautological evidence’, that is, in effect all our other irrelevant knowledge. 

My strategy will be as follows. Let h be our hypothesis—‘God exists’. Let e1, e2, e3, and so on be the various propositions that people bring forward as evidence for or against his existence, the conjunction of which form e. Let e1 be ‘there is a physical universe’. Then we have the argument from e1 to h—a cosmological argument. In considering this argument I shall assume that we have no other relevant evidence, and so k will be mere tautological evidence. Then P(hje1 &k) represents the probability that God exists given that there is a physical universe—and also given mere tautological evidence, which latter can be ignored. If P(hje1 &k) > 1=2, then the argument from e1 to h is a good P-inductive argument. If P(hje1 &k) > P(hjk), then the argument is a good C-inductive argument. But, when considering the second argument, from e2 (which will be the conformity of the universe to temporal order), I shall use k to represent the premiss of the first argument e1; and so P(hje2 &k) will represent the probability that God exists, given that there is a physical universe and that it is subject to temporal order. And, when considering the third argument, from e3, k will represent the premiss of the second argument (e1 &e2). And so on. In this way all relevant evidence will eventually be fed into our assessment. I shall consider some eleven arguments. I shall claim that for most of these en, where n ¼ 1, ... 11, P(hjen &k) > P(hjk)— that is the argument is a good C-inductive argument for the existence of God, that two of the arguments (one for and one against) have no force (P(hjen &k) ¼ P(hjk) in these cases) and that one argument against has force (P(hjen &k) < P(hjk)) where en is the occurrence of evil. The crucial issue to which we will eventually come is whether P(hje11 &k) > 1=2. In using the symbols of confirmation theory I do not assume that an expression of the form P(pjq) always has an exact numerical value. It may merely have relations of greater or less value to other probabilities, including ones with a numerical value, without itself having a numerical value—P(hje1 &k), for example, might be greater than P(hje2 &k) and less than P(hjk) and less than 1/2 without there being some number to which it is equal. Clearly, for example, we may judge one scientific theory to be more probable than another on the same evidence while denying that its probability has an exact numerical value; or we may judge a prediction to be more probable than not and so to have a probability of greater than 1/2, while again denying that that probability has an exact numerical value. Now it is sometimes said that the different arguments for the existence of God show different things. The cosmological argument shows at most the existence of some sort of necessary being; the argument from design shows at most some sort of arch-architect;15 the argument from miracles shows at most some sort of poltergeist— so what have they in common? This objection gets things back to front. There is no one thing that premisses show. In a deductive argument there are many different conclusions that can be drawn from a set of premisses. And in inductive arguments the premisses support different conclusions with different degrees of force. What does ‘there is a print in the shape of a human foot on the sand’ show? It shows with different degrees of force many things— that sand is shapeable, that some creature has been on the sand, that a man has walked on the sand. The evidence makes probable the different propositions to different degrees. Our concern is with the effect of various pieces of evidence on the proposition in which we are interested—‘God exists’. Does each confirm it (that is, increase its probability)? Does it make it probable? Our concern is for various pieces of evidence en (including any k) and for h ¼ ‘God exists’ with the value of P(hjen). This may well be for some en less than the value for some other interesting proposition h1, say, ‘there exists an impersonal cause of the universe’, of P(h1jen). That is, en may make h1 more probable than it makes h. However, even though, say, P(h1je1) > P(hje1), it certainly does not follow that P(h1je1 ...e7) > P(hje1 ...e7). That is, ‘God exists’ may gain only a small amount of probability from e1, a small amount from e2, a small amount from e3, and so on. For each of e1, e2, e3, there may be some other proposition h1, h2, h3, which is in some sense a rival to ‘God exists’ for which P(hnjen) > P(hjen); but, nevertheless, on the total evidence h may be more probable than each of the rivals. A similar situation normally arises with any far-reaching scientific or historical theory. Each separate piece of evidence does not make the theory very probable, and indeed taken on its own makes some narrower theory much more probable. But the cumulative force of the evidence taken together gives great probability to the wide theory. Thus each of the various pieces of evidence that are cited as evidence in favour of the General Theory of Relativity do not by themselves make it very probable, but together they do give it quite a degree of probability. Each by itself (given the general background knowledge available in the early twentieth century) was evidence in favour of some rival but far less wide-ranging hypothesis than General Relativity. Thus the movement of Mercury’s perihelion taken by itself would suggest only that there was a hitherto unknown planet lying between Mercury and the sun or that the sun was of an odd shape, rather than that General Relativity was true. Taken by itself it would not have given much probability to General Relativity; but taken with other pieces of evidence it did its bit in supporting the latter. It is along these lines that the theist may wish to answer the accusation that an argument such as the cosmological argument does not show the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Not by itself, he may reply, but it does its small bit together with some very diverse arguments that do their small bit, to get to this conclusion. Note that it is no objection to a P-inductive or C-inductive argument from e to h that some contrary hypothesis h is also compatible with e, as some writers on the philosophy of religion seem to think. They seem to think that if, for example, the order in the universe is compatible with ‘God does not exist’, then there is no good argument from it to ‘God exists’. But one has only to think about the matter to realize that this is not so. In any non-deductive argument from e to h, not-h will be compatible with e; and yet some non-deductive arguments are good arguments. Note also a further interesting feature of good C-inductive arguments. In such an argument from e to h, P(hje &k) > P(hjk). It may be the case that also for some contrary hypothesis h there is a good C-inductive argument from e—that is, also P(hje &k) > P(hjk). The fact that certain evidence confirms a hypothesis does not mean that it does not also confirm a rival hypothesis. Once again, this should be immediately clear if one thinks about it. Suppose that a detective has background information k, that either Smith, Brown, or Robinson did the crime, and that only one of them did. Then evidence (e) turns up that Robinson was somewhere else at the time the crime was committed. e adds to the probability that Brown did the crime, and it also adds to the probability that Smith did the crime. Despite this, one sometimes reads writers on the philosophy of religion dismissing some consideration that is adduced as evidence for the existence of God on the grounds that it supports a rival hypothesis equally well. So then our task will be to assess the worth of different arguments to the conclusion ‘God exists’. How are we to do this? In the case of deductive arguments, philosophers have a moderately clear idea of what makes a valid argument, and so are in a position to look at various arguments and see if they are valid. But our main concern will be with inductive arguments. How are we to set about assessing the probability of ‘God exists’ on different pieces of evidence? To do this we need to know for what fillings of p and q P(pjq) becomes high or low. There is, however, fortunately no need to undertake any very general examination of this question. This is because all important a posteriori arguments for the existence of God have a common characteristic. They all purport to be arguments to a (causal ) explanation of the phenomena described in the premisses in terms of the action of an agent who intentionally brought about those phenomena. A cosmological argument argues from the existence of the world to a person, God, who intentionally brought it about. An argument from design argues from the design of the world to a person, God, who intentionally made it thus. All the other arguments are arguments from particular features of the world to a God who intentionally made the world with those features. Not all inductive arguments are arguments to an explanation. When we argue from the sun having risen at intervals of approximately twenty-four hours over the last many thousand years to the claim that it will rise tomorrow, we are not arguing to an explanation. Its rising tomorrow does not explain its previous rising. Yet when the geologist argues from various deformations to the occurrence of an earthquake millions of years ago, he is arguing to an explanation; he is arguing from phenomena to an event that brought those phenomena about. However, not all arguments to an explanation are arguments to the intentional action of an agent. An intentional action is an action that some agent does, meaning to do it. It is one, therefore that the agent has some reason or purpose for doing—either the minimal purpose of doing it for its own sake or some further purpose that is forwarded by doing the action. Since he acts for reasons or purposes on which he chooses to act, we may term such an agent a rational agent. Persons are rational agents;16 but they are not the only ones—animals too often perform intentional actions. By contrast, however, inanimate objects and events do not have purposes on which they choose to act and which they seek to fulfil, but rather they bring about their effects unthinkingly. The geologist’s argument from deformations to the occurrence of an earthquake is an argument to an explanation of the deformations, but not an argument to an explanation in terms of the intentional action of a rational agent. However, when a detective argues from various bloodstains on the woodwork, fingerprints on the metal, Smith’s corpse on the floor, money missing from the safe, Jones’s having much extra money, to Jones’s having intentionally killed Smith and stolen his money, he is arguing to an explanation of the various phenomena in terms of the intentional action of a rational agent. Since persons are paradigm cases of rational agents, I will term explanation in terms of the intentional action of a rational agent personal explanation. In Chapter 2 I shall analyse the nature of personal explanation more fully and I shall contrast it with the other accepted pattern of explaining mundane phenomena, which I shall call scientific explanation.17 In Chapter 3 I shall go on to consider when it is right to invoke personal explanation and when it is right to invoke scientific explanation. A crucial issue that arises there is when is it reasonable to suppose that phenomena do have a (causal ) explanation, and when, by contrast, is it reasonable to suppose that phenomena are just brute facts, things that explain other things, but do not themselves have an explanation. This issue of what is the proper terminus for explanation will be discussed in Chapter 4. It is one that is crucial for theism. For the theist claims that the various phenomena that constitute his evidence—for example, the existence of the world and its conformity to order—need explanation; and that this is provided by the action of God, whose existence and action need no explanation. So Chapter 2 will bring out the nature of the theist’s explanations, and Chapters 3 and 4 will provide essential tools for answering the question of when it is right to invoke them. With these tools we shall then be in a position to look in detail at the theist’s arguments.




2. The Nature of Explanation

General considerations

When the theist argues from phenomena such as the existence of the universe or some feature of the universe to the existence of God, he is arguing, we have seen, to a causal explanation of the phenomena in terms of the intentional action of a person. Explanation in terms of the intentional action of a person is the normal case of what I termed personal explanation. We give a personal explanation of my being in London by my having gone there in order to give a lecture; or of the letter’s being on the table by my wife’s having put it there in order to remind me to post it. However, as we have seen, not all explanations are personal explanations. Other explanations of the occurrence of phenomena seem to have a distinct common structure and these I will call scientific explanations. This chapter will be concerned with analysing the structure of explanations of the two kinds; and the next chapter will consider when each is to be invoked. When someone is said to have provided an explanation of the occurrence of some phenomenon (that is, an event or state of affairs), this is ambiguous. What is meant may be that he has provided a true explanation of the phenomenon, or it may be merely that he has suggested a possible explanation of the phenomenon. Our interest in explanations is interest in true explanations. What is it to provide a true explanation of the occurrence of a phenomenon E? It is to state truly what (object or event) brought E about (or caused E ), and why it was efficacious. To explain the occurrence of the high tide is to state what brought about the tide—the moon, water, and the rest of the earth being in such-and-such locations at such-and-such times, and why the moon etc. had that effect—because of the inverse square law of attraction acting between all bodies. We can thus detect two components of an explanation of a phenomenon E—the ‘what’ that made E happen and the ‘why’ that made E happen. The ‘what’ will be what I may term some other independent actual factors—other events, processes, states, objects, and their properties at certain times. By these factors’ being independent I mean that the ‘what’ is not the same event or process as E nor part of it; nor is it an object that is a participant in E at the time of E, nor is it a state or property of E or the objects that participate in E at the time of E’s occurrence. Only something different from E can make E happen. By the factors’ being actual I mean only that any events, processes, and states cited occurred; that any object cited existed and had the properties cited. To say that certain factors A...D brought about E entails at least that each, in the conditions of its occurrence, made it more physically probable that E would occur; it influenced E’s occurrence. Normally, perhaps, each of the factors is necessary, given the others and the world being in other ways the same, for the occurrence of E—that is, without any one of them, the world otherwise remaining the same, E would not have occurred. Normally, perhaps, too the set of factors together is sufficient for the occurrence of E—that is, given their occurrence, E must necessarily occur. We may call all the factors together that make up the ‘what’ the cause of E. Alternatively, or more usually, we distinguish one as the ‘cause’ of E (the effect), and call the others the conditions that were necessary for the cause to have its effect (or at least made it physically probable that it would have the effect); which we call the cause is sometimes a somewhat arbitrary matter. Normally it will be the most unexpected member of the set of factors, or the one, the occurrence of which involves the sharpest change from the previous state of the world. Thus, suppose someone lights a match close to petrol at a certain temperature and a certain pressure, and all of this produces an explosion. We may describe the ignition of the match and the petrol’s being at that temperature and pressure as jointly the cause of the explosion. But it would be more natural to describe the ignition of the match as the cause of the explosion, and the petrol’s being at that temperature and pressure conditions necessary for the cause to have its effect. My terminology will be as follows. I shall call a set of factors that together were sufficient for the occurrence of an event E a full cause of E. Any member of a set of factors that contributes towards bringing E about I shall call a cause of E. 24 The Nature of Explanation To set out the ‘why’ of an explanation is to say why the cause, under the specified conditions, had the effect that it had. Thus it might be to cite a law of nature that all events of a certain kind exemplified by the cause bring about events of a certain other kind exemplified by the effect. To cite the ‘why’ is to cite what I shall call the reason why the cause under the conditions of its occurrence had the effect that it had. I am thus using the word ‘reason’ in a wide but natural sense—in a wider sense than the sense in which a reason for something is always someone’s reason for bringing it about. In saying that something was the reason for some effect I do not necessarily imply that it was someone’s reason for bringing about the effect. Now, if there is a full cause C of E and a reason R that guarantees C’s efficacy, there will be what I shall call a full explanation of E. For, given R and C, there will be nothing remaining unexplained about the occurrence of E. In this case, the ‘what’ and ‘why’ together will deductively entail the occurrence of E. But, if there is no full cause of E (for example, there occur factors that facilitate the occurrence of E, but do not necessitate it) or no reason that ensured that the cause would have the effect that it did, there will be at most what I shall call a partial explanation of E. Any explanation involving factors or reasons that did not make the occurrence of E physically necessary but made it physically more probable than it would otherwise have been, I will term a partial explanation. E may be given a partial explanation because there is no full explanation of E. Alternatively, it may well be the case that, even if a full explanation exists, people are in no position to provide it, yet they can give some explanation— they can state some of the causes that make up the ‘what’ and some of the reasons for their efficacy. In that case they are providing an explanation, but only a partial one. Also, of course, people may take for granted or not be interested in certain aspects of a full explanation and for that reason give only a partial explanation. A geologist interested in the history of geological formations may explain a present formation by telling the historical story of successive stages in its evolution. In telling this story, he may not bother to cite the physico-chemical laws that are responsible for one stage succeeding another, simply because he is not interested in these. For that reason his explanation is only partial. The context often determines which answers to our questions about ‘the explanation’ of some phenomena will satisfy us. But, while in other contexts The Nature of Explanation 25 of discussion we may not need to give full explanations even if they are available, in the contexts of scientific and metaphysical discussion it is often of crucial importance to know whether there is a full explanation of some phenomenon and what its character is.


Scientific Explanation 

Explanations are of different patterns according to the different kinds of cause and reason that feature in them. Explanation of the kind used in science I shall call scientific explanation. The classical account of the nature of scientific explanation is that set out carefully by C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, and subsequently championed by Hempel.1 On the Hempelian account the causes are a group of events (states of affairs or changes thereof) C, known as the ‘initial conditions’, one of which we may arbitrarily select as ‘the’ cause. The ‘why’ is a set of natural laws L. In the normal case these will be universal generalizations, having the form ‘all A’s are so-and-so’ or ‘all A’s do so-and-so’—for example, ‘all copper put in nitric acid dissolves under such-and-such conditions of temperature and pressure’. C and L then fully explain E if E follows deductively from them. We explain a particular explosion by the ignition of a particular volume of gunpowder in certain conditions of temperature, pressure, and humidity, and the generalization that under such circumstances ignited gunpowder explodes. We explain a particular piece of litmus paper’s turning red by its having been immersed in acid and the generalization that litmus paper being immersed in acid always turns red. Sophisticated scientific explanations invoke many laws or generalizations and a complex description of previous events, of which it is a somewhat remote deductive consequence that the event or state to be explained occurs. It is a consequence of Newton’s laws and arrangements of the sun and planets thousands of years ago that they are in the positions in which they are today, and the former explain their being in those positions. This normal pattern of scientific explanation is called by Hempel deductive–nomological explanation, or D–N explanation— ‘deductive’ because E is deduced from L and C, and ‘nomological’, from the Greek nomos, ‘law’, because laws are involved in the explanation. A D–N explanation of an event is a full explanation. However, sometimes the law involved may be a probabilistic law—that is, claim that ‘n per cent A’s are B’, where n is intermediate between 100 and 0. It may be a law of genetics that ‘90 per cent offspring of such-and-such a mating have blue eyes’ (or ‘there is an 0.9 probability of an offspring of such-and-such a mating having blue eyes’. The probability in this case is a statistical probability.) In such cases, according to Hempel, a law L together with initial conditions C will explain E if L and C make it highly probable that E. (The high probability is in this case an inductive probability, a measure of how much evidence supports some hypothesis, in this case that E occurs.) Thus, if an individual a is an offspring of the stated mating, this together with the law suggested above makes it probable that a has blue eyes; then Hempel holds, the law and the initial conditions together explain a having blue eyes. However, the notion of the inductive probability being ‘high’ is very vague; and plausibly the law and initial conditions may provide some sort of explanation of an event even if the probability is not very high—so long as the law and initial conditions make the occurrence of the event more probable than it would otherwise be. So, following others,2 I shall amend Hempel’s account of statistical explanation as follows: a law L and initial conditions C explain an event E if they increase the probability of the occurrence of E. Clearly explanation that involves probabilistic laws is only partial explanation. There is still something unexplained in why the initial conditions were on this occasion efficacious. Science does not explain only particular events, but it may also explain laws. If it is a consequence of L1 that, perhaps under particular conditions C, L2 operates, then L1 (together with C) explains the operation of L2. (If the consequence is deductive, the explanation is a full one; if L1 only makes the operation of L2 probable, the explanation is only partial.) More fundamental laws explain the operation of less fundamental laws. Given a certain assumption about the constitution of gases, Newton’s laws of motion explain the operation of the Van der Waals gas law. One set of laws is often said to explain another also when a slightly looser relation holds. L1 (perhaps together with some C) may entail and render it probable that phenomena will be as predicted by L2—to a high degree of approximation. It then follows that the true laws of nature in the realm of L2 are very slightly different from L2, but that L2 is a very close approximation to them. Newton’s laws of motion have the consequence that, given the distribution of sun and planets through space, Kepler’s laws of planetary motion will hold to a high degree of approximation. I shall follow common usage and say that in such circumstances L2 operates to a high degree of approximation, and that L1 explains the operation of L2. It is Hempel’s claim that explanation that does not at first sight seem to fit into this scientific pattern can really quite easily be so fitted. Thus we use this scientific pattern of explanation not only when doing science of any degree of sophistication but in much everyday explanation of happenings. We explain the cheese’s being mouldy by its having been left in a warm place for two weeks and by the generalization that almost always cheese turns mouldy within two weeks if it is in a warm place. Our explanation may often take the form of explaining some phenomenon as brought about, not by an event, but by an object. We may say that the breaking of the window was brought about by a brick, but what we are saying here, it is urged, is that the breaking was caused by some event involving the brick—for example, its fast motion; and this reduction to the scientific pattern seems initially plausible enough. This account, however, needs amplification in order to distinguish between merely accidentally true universal or probabilistic generalizations and true laws of nature that intuitively involve some sort of physical necessity or probability. A universal generalization ‘all ravens are black’ and ‘this is a raven’ would not explain ‘this is black’ unless the generalization were a claim that there is some sort of causal connection between being a raven and being black—namely, that ravens must be black—of physical necessity. Similarly, we need to add that a statistical generalization ‘n per cent of A’s are B’ (a statistical probability of n=100 of an A being B ) does not explain a particular A’s being B unless it asserts some sort of causal connec28 The Nature of Explanation tion between being A and being B. This will be so if it is claiming that each A has a n=100 physical probability of being A. By the physical probability of an event, it will be recalled, I mean a certain bias or tendency in nature. If nature is deterministic, the only physical probabilities in nature are probabilities of 1 (physical necessity) or 0 (physical impossibility). But, if there is a certain amount of indeterminism in nature, then there are physical probabilities between 1 and 0. When probabilistic generalizations are concerned with these, then we may call them probabilistic laws—most interpreters of Quantum Theory, for example, claim that the basic formulae of Quantum Theory are fundamental laws of this kind. In the latter case ‘n per cent of A’s are B’ together with ‘this is an A’ would (partially) explain ‘this is a B’ if its being an A made it physically probable to degree n=100 that that thing would be a B. Only so would there be some sort of causal connection between being A and being B, which we need if ‘n per cent of A’s are B’ is to explain an A’s being B. By contrast, John’s voting Conservative is not to be explained by the fact that his name appears on page 591 of the telephone directory and 70 per cent of those on that page vote Conservative. For the latter generalization just states how things happen to be; it is not to be understood as stating that being on that page pushes people in the direction of voting Conservative. I shall in future call Hempel’s account amended in respect of explanation by probabilistic laws in the way described and amplified somehow or other so as to make a distinction between true generalizations and laws that involve physical necessity or probability the amended Hempelian account. But what this model amounts to depends on how we spell out the notion of a law of nature and so of the physical necessity or probability involved in a law. One view, originating from Hume, is the regularity view. On this view, ‘laws of nature’ are simply the ways things behave—have behaved, are behaving, and will behave. ‘All copper put in nitric acid dissolves under such-and-such conditions of temperature and pressure’ is a true universal law of nature if and only if all bits of copper when put in nitric acid under those conditions always have dissolved, now dissolve, and will dissolve. ‘50 per cent of atoms of C14 decay within 5,600 years’ is a true statistical law if and only if, taking the whole history of the universe, half the atoms of C14 have decayed within 5,600 years. We do, however, need the distinction between laws of nature, and accidental generalizations that are true The Nature of Explanation 29 merely by accident.3 ‘All spheres of gold are less than one mile in diameter’ may be a true universal generalization, but it holds only in virtue of the accident of no civilization anywhere in the universe having put or going to put enough effort into constructing such a sphere. Regularity theory has reached a developed form that tries to take account of this distinction, in the work of David Lewis. For Lewis, ‘regularities earn their lawhood not by themselves, but by the joint efforts of a system in which they figure either as axioms or as theorems’.4 The best system is the system of regularities, which has (relative to rivals) the best combination of strength and simplicity. Strength is a matter of how much it successfully predicts (that is, whether it makes many actual events, past, present or future— whether observed or not—probable; and very few actual events improbable); simplicity is a matter of the regularities fitting together, and no doubt, each having internal simplicity in a way that Lewis does not, but no doubt could, spell out. The true laws are the regularities of the best system. Accidental generalizations are the regularities that do not fit into such a system. They float loosely without being derivable from more fundamental regularities. So ‘all spheres of gold are less than one mile in diameter’, even if true, is probably not a law, because it does not follow from the best system—as is evidenced by the fact that it certainly does not follow from our current best approximation to the ultimate best system—a conjunction of Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory. Similarly with probabilistic laws—if and only if ‘90 per cent of A’s are B’ were a consequence of the best system of regularities would it be a law of nature. If (and only if) it follows from such a best system that a particular A will be followed by a particular B (and certain other complicated conditions hold), then that A causes that B. Lewis’s account of laws of nature is part of his campaign on behalf of ‘Humean supervenience’, that everything there is supervenes (logically) on ‘a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact’, which he interprets as a spatio-temporal arrangement of intrinsic properties, or ‘qualities’.5 Laws of nature and causation are for Lewis among the things thus supervenient. There seem, however, to be overwhelming objections to any Humean account, including Lewis’s, if laws of nature are supposed to explain anything—and in particular to explain whether and why one thing causes another, as Humeans suppose that they do. For, since whether some regularity constitutes a law depends, on this account, nor merely on what has happened but on what will happen in the whole future history of the universe, it follows that whether A causes B now depends on that future history. Yet, how can what is yet to happen (in maybe two billion years’ time) make it the case that A now causes B, and thus explain why B happens? Whether A causes B is surely a matter of what happens now, and whether the world ends in two billion years’ time cannot make any difference to whether A now causes B? What is yet to happen can make no difference to what is the true explanation of why B occurs (namely, that A occurred and caused B )—though, of course, it might make a difference to what we justifiably believe to be the true explanation. (Put another way, that some proposed explanation is the simplest explanation of the data, past and future is evidence that it is the true explanation; but it does not constitute it being the true explanation.) Further, it is because of their role in causation that laws of nature are said to generate counterfactuals. Suppose that ‘all copper expands when heated’ is a law of nature, but that I do not heat a certain piece of copper; it is all the same fairly evidently the case that, ‘if that copper had been heated, it would have expanded’. But, if a law simply states what does (or did or will ) happen, how can it provide any ground for asserting the counterfactual? It would do that only if there were some deeper kind of necessity built into it than that provided by fitting into a system. Fitting into a system could be evidence only of that deeper kind of necessity. So, dismissing Humean accounts of laws for good reason, let us consider alternative accounts of the physical necessity (and physical probability) involved in laws of nature that do not analyse it away in terms of patterns of actual events. Physical necessity may be thought of either as separate from the objects that are governed by it, or as a constitutive aspect of those objects. The former approach leads to a picture of the world as consisting of events (constituted by substances having, gaining or losing properties), on the one hand, and laws of nature (involving physical necessity or probability), on the other hand; and it can be developed so as to allow for the possibility of there being universes in which there are no events, but merely laws of nature.6 Laws of nature are thus ontologically concrete entities. The version of this account that has been much discussed recently is the version that claims that laws of nature are relations between universals.7 (Universals are properties that can be fully instantiated in many different objects. Thus ‘brown’ is a universal, because innumerable different things can be brown.) It being a fundamental law of nature that ‘all photons travel at 300,000 km/sec. relative to every inertial reference frame’ consists in there being such a connection between the universal ‘being a photon’ and the universal ‘travelling at 300,000 km/sec. relative to every inertial reference frame’. These universals are tied together, but the tie is not a logically necessary one—that is, it is not on this view part of what it is to be a photon that it travels at that speed. But it is physically necessary, and the physical necessity is a matter of the two universals being tied together. One can perhaps begin to make sense of this suggestion if one thinks of the causing of states of affairs (for example, the bringing into existence of a photon) as making properties, which are universals, to be instantiated; and this involving the bringing of them down to Earth from an eternal Heaven, together with whatever is involved with those universals—namely, other universals (for example, travelling at 300,000 km/sec.) connected thereto. But why should we believe that there is such a Platonist heaven in which universals are tied together? And how can universals act on the world? This is a very mysterious causal relation between the non-spatio-temporal world and our world for which we have no analogue. The alternative to thinking of the physical necessity involved in laws of nature as separate from the objects governed by it is to think of it as a constitutive aspect of those objects. The way in which this is normally developed is what we may call the substances-powers-andliabilities (S–P–L) account of laws of nature. The ‘objects’ (the ‘what’) that cause are individual substances—this planet, those molecules of water. They cause effects in virtue of their powers to do so and their liabilities (deterministic or probabilistic) to exercise those powers under certain conditions, often when caused to do so by other substances. Powers and liabilities (the ‘why’) are thus among the properties of substances. Laws of nature are then just regularities—not of mere spatio-temporal succession (as with Hume), but regularities in the causal powers (manifested and unmanifested) of substances of various kinds. That heated copper expands is a law is just a matter of every piece of copper having the causal power to expand, and the liability to exercise that power when heated. As a matter of contingent fact, substances fall into kinds, such that all objects of the same kind have the same powers and liabilities. The powers and liabilities of large-scale things (lumps of copper) derive from the powers and liabilities of the small-scale things that compose them (atoms; and ultimately quarks, electrons, etc.). And, given a satisfactory theory integrating all science, all ultimate particulars will have exactly the same powers and liabilities (for example, the power to cause an effect proportional in a certain way to their mass, charge, spin, etc., and the liability to exercise that under conditions varying with the mass, charge, spin, etc., of other objects). This account of the ultimate determinants of what happens as merely substances and their causal powers and liabilities provides explanation of what happens in familiar terms. As I shall consider more fully shortly, we ourselves have causal powers that we, unlike inanimate objects, can choose to exercise. The S–P–L way of explaining things was the way familiar to the ancient and medieval world, before talk of ‘laws of nature’ became common in the sixteenth century. It was revived by Rom Harre´ and E. H. Madden in Causal Powers. 8 When talk of ‘laws of nature’ became common in the sixteenth century, they were supposed to be God’s laws for nature, and so such talk has its natural place in a theistic world view. But if there is a God and he makes things in the world behave as they do, he surely operates not directly, but by sustaining the laws of nature— which means, on this account, by determining which powers and liabilities substances have, and conserving those powers and liabilities in substances. The basic structure of explanation in terms of substances, powers and liabilities does not presuppose that there is a God who operates in this way. With the S–P–L account, unlike with the Humean account and the universals account, we have moved away from the Hempelian structure of scientific explanation in a crucial respect. For ‘laws of nature’ no longer play any causal role in explaining particular phenomena. What causes the expansion of a particular piece of copper is that piece of copper, its power to expand and its liability to exercise that power when heated. The regularity involved in other pieces of copper having similar powers and liabilities is no part of the explanation. While causation is essentially involved in laws, laws are not essentially involved in causation. The S–P–L account of laws of nature and of the explanation of particular events seems to me more satisfactory than the other accounts. The regularities in the causal powers and liabilities of particular substances, and so in their behaviour, which constitute the ‘laws of nature’, do entail that particular substances will have particular powers and liabilities; and so, any evidence that makes it probable that such and such (e.g. ‘all A’s do so-and-so in circumstances C’) is a law of nature is evidence that makes it (inductively) probable that a particular instance of it holds (for example, that this A has the power to do such-and-such and the liability to exercise it in circumstances C). But the law does not explain why these substances have those powers and liabilities. And so the S–P–L account raises the question of why so many substances have similar powers and liabilities to each other (why does each substance in the universe have the power to attract each other substance in the way stated in, for example, Newton’s ‘laws’), and we will return to that question in Chapter 8. But, as we shall see, a question the same in essentials arises also on the other accounts of laws of nature; and the argument of this book does not depend on my preferred account of laws of nature and so of scientific explanation. So I shall normally operate simply with the amended Hempelian model without presupposing how it is to be spelled out, or corrected. However, at crucial points I shall draw the reader’s attention to 34 The Nature of Explanation alternative accounts of laws of nature and so of scientific explanation, and especially to the S–P–L account. I now move on to contrast scientific explanation with personal explanation


Personal explanation

The other pattern of explanation that we use all the time in explaining mundane phenomena is what I shall call personal explanation. In personal explanation the occurrence of a phenomenon E is explained as brought about by a rational agent P doing some action intentionally. The central case of this, with which we shall be primarily concerned, is where P brings about E intentionally—that is, brings E about, meaning so to do. The other case is where P brings about E unintentionally in consequence of doing something else intentionally—we shall come to this case briefly later. In the central case E occurred because P meant E to occur through what he was doing. What an agent meant to occur through his agency may be called the intention (or purpose—I shall use these terms interchangeably) J in the agent’s action, for example, that E occur. E is then explained by P having intention J. E may be the motion of my hand, P be myself, and J my intention that E occur. E is then what I shall call the result of an intentional action A of bringing E about.9 In the example cited, A is my moving my hand. However, E is only partially explained by P’s having intention J. For a person may have the intention to bring about some effect and yet fail to do so. I may mean my hand to move through my agency, and yet the hand may fail to move because someone is holding it down; in consequence the only action that I perform is that of trying to move my hand. If E does result from P and J, a full explanation will tell us why, how it was that P’s intention was efficacious. This leads us to the well-known distinction10 among intentional actions between basic actions and mediated actions. Roughly speaking, a basic action is something that an agent just does, does not do by doing anything else. A mediated action is an action that is not a basic action, one that an agent does by doing something else. I signal by moving my hand. I break the door down by giving it a kick. The former is a mediated action; the latter a basic action. Now, if bringing about E is a basic action, the answer to the question how it was that P’s intention was efficacious will simply be that bringing about E was among the basic powers or capacities X that P had at that time—that is, was among the basic actions that P could do at will (that is, would succeed in doing if he formed the intention to do them). Bringing about the motion of our arms or legs, lips, eyes or eyebrows, etc., is for most of us most of the time among our basic powers. E is fully explained when we have cited the agent P, his intention J that E occur, and his basic powers X, which include the power to bring about E; for, given all three, E cannot but occur. Of course, often in such cases it is so obvious why E occurred that we do not bother to give the explanation, but the explanation is true nevertheless. We may not bother to comment, when someone is walking along, that his legs moved because he moved them (that is, that he brought about their motion, meaning so to do), but it is true nevertheless. Sometimes, however, this sort of explanation is not at all obvious—it may on occasion be the explanation of a person’s ears wiggling or her heart stopping beating that she brought about these things intentionally. If bringing about E is a mediated action, the answer to the question how it was that P’s intention was efficacious will be more complicated. It will be that E was the intended consequence of some basic action of P’s, A—that is, a consequence that P meant to occur through his performing A, which consists in bringing about some state of affairs S. P has the intention J that E occur as a consequence of the occurrence of A (and so J contained within it the intention that S occur). For P to have this latter intention, he must believe that his doing A will (no less probably than his doing any other basic action) have his bringing about E as a consequence (normally perhaps by S causing E ). The explanation of how P’s intention was efficacious is that bringing about S is among P’s basic powers X, and that the bringing-about of S had as a consequence the occurrence of E. There will often be a scientific explanation of the latter. S may cause E in accord with natural laws L, because it is a consequence of L that in circumstances D (which in fact hold) S is followed by E. So, in this case, P, J, X, D, and L fully explain the 36 The Nature of Explanation occurrence of E. E is brought about by P having a certain intention J, which in consequence of his basic powers X brings about some state of affairs S in circumstances D, which laws of nature L then ensure will bring about E. Thus a full explanation of the door being flat on the ground is that I, exercising my basic powers, brought it about that my foot moved quickly into contact with the door, meaning this to occur and it to cause the door to be flat; the door hinges, the mass of the door, the mass and velocity of my foot were in fact such that it was a consequence of the laws of mechanics that the impact of my foot with the door was followed by the flattening of the door. In the above analyses I use the word ‘consequence’ in a wide sense. The connection between A and E may be either causal or logical. This may be as in the above example, because S, the result of A, causes E. It may also be because, given current circumstances D, the performance of A constitutes bringing about E. Thus, given conventions in banking and motoring, my writing my name in a certain place has as a consequence that a cheque bears my signature, and my putting my arm out of the car window has as a consequence that a signal indicating a turn to the right is made. So, to summarize, in the central case of personal explanation we explain a phenomenon E as brought about intentionally by a rational agent P. If the bringing-about of E is a basic action A, we need to cite further an intention J of P that E occur and to state that bringing about E is among the things that P is able to do at will—namely, among P’s basic powers X. P, J, and X provide a full explanation of E. Of course, we can often go further and explain how it is that P has intention J (for example, by stating that he formed this intention in order to forward some wider intention, as when we explain that he formed the intention to sign a cheque because he had the intention to pay you money). Or we can explain how it is that P has those powers (for example, by stating which nerves and muscles need to be operative for P to have these powers). But P, J, and X suffice to explain E—whether or not we can explain how it is that J and X hold. If the bringing-about of E is a mediated action, things are more complicated. We cite P and his intention J to bring about E as a consequence of a basic action A; we explain that the performance of A was among P’s basic powers, and we explain how the performance of A had E as a consequence. Again, the occurrence and operation of the factors cited here may themselves be explained further; but they do not need to be for us to have a full explanation. When there is only a The Nature of Explanation 37 basic action involved, the agent P is the cause of the effect; his intention and powers provide the reason for the efficacy of the cause. Where the action is a mediated action, further factors are added. The two figures at the top of the diagram on p. 39 summarize these results for basic actions, and for mediated actions in cases where a natural law L brings it about that S has E as a consequence. Causes and the conditions for their operation (the ‘what’) are shown to the left of the arrows: reasons (the ‘why’) are shown above the arrows; effects are shown to the right of the arrows. There is, I claimed earlier, a second kind of personal explanation. Here we explain the occurrence of E as brought about unintentionally by a rational agent P bringing about something else intentionally; E is an unintended consequence of an intentional action. For example, in standing up I may unintentionally knock over a cup. Here the knocking-over of the cup is caused by my occupying a certain standing position, which was a state of affairs brought about intentionally by me. I did not mean the cup to be knocked over, but, given the circumstances (the original position of the cup, etc.), my occupying the standing position causes the knocking-over of the cup in virtue of the laws of mechanics L. My concern henceforward will be only with the central case of intentional action where the effect is brought about intentionally.


Personal Explanation Unanalysable in Terms of Scientific Explanation

 Personal explanation looks very different from scientific explanation. In scientific explanation in the amended Hempelian model we explain an event E by past events or states C and natural laws L. In personal explanation we explain E as brought about by an agent P (not by an event or state) in order to realize intentions for the future. Despite the apparent difference, it has, however, been argued by some philosophers, seminally by Donald Davidson11 and by many others at greater length, that really personal explanation conforms to the scientific pattern. In my terminology and using the Hempelian model of scientific explanation, a Davidson-like suggestion amounts to the following. Suppose, first, that E is the result of a basic action. Then, to say that P brought E about intentionally is just to say that an event involving P—that is, P’s intention that E occur—J, brought it about. To say that P had the power to bring about E is just to say that P’s bodily condition Y (brain states, muscle states, etc.) and environmental conditions Z (no one having bound P’s arm, etc.) and laws L1 are such that an intention12 such as J is followed by the event intended, E. We then have a scientific explanation as set out in the diagram.

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P -J and X E

Structure of the central case of personal explanation of E, when E is the result of a basic action.


Structure of the central case of personal explanation of E, when E is the result of a mediated action. (One scheme).


Attempted analysis of the above in the scientific pattern. 


Attempted analysis of the above in the scientific pattern. 


Suppose, next, that E is the result of a mediated action. Then to say that P brought it about is to say that an event involving P—that is, P’s intention J—under the current bodily and environmental conditions Yand Z brought about (in accordance with laws L1) the result of the basic action S, which had as a consequence E. We have seen that there are different ways in which S may have E as a consequence. One way is that S may bring about E in accord with the normal scientific pattern of causation—that is, in virtue of some law of nature L. This is the scheme depicted in the diagram. The other way in which S may have E as a consequence can also, it is suggested, easily be fitted into the scientific pattern of explanation. So, on this reductionist view, personal explanation is in essence really scientific explanation. There are not explanations of events of two kinds—only explanations of one kind. Events brought about by actions are just those that include intentions among their causes. In order to show what is wrong with this, I wish to make two points—first, that the intention in an action that an agent is performing is not the same as any brain event that might be connected with it; and, secondly, that having an intention (in the sense with which we are concerned13) is not a passive state of an agent, but just is the agent exercising causal influence (which will cause the effect intended if and only if the agent has the requisite power). I understand by a substance a thing (other than a property) that has properties; tables, planets, atoms, humans, and other persons are all substances. (Sometimes, when there is no danger of misunderstanding, I use ‘object’ as a synonym for ‘substance’.) Substances have properties—that is, characteristics that can characterize them and other substances as well. In this sense all properties are universals; brown is a property, and different things can be brown. Properties include both monadic properties, which characterize individual substances, and relational properties, which link two or more substances. Being square, weighing 10 kilos, or being-tallerthan are properties, the former two being monadic properties, the latter being a relational property that relates two substances (one thing is taller than another thing). On these definitions there is no more to the history of the world than substances coming into existence, gaining and losing properties (including relations to other substances), and then ceasing to exist. It is useful to have a word for these things such that there is no more to the history of the world than all these things; and a natural word to choose for that category of thing is the word ‘event’. I propose to use it in this sense: that an event consists in the instantiation of a property in a substance (or substances, or in events) at a time or the coming into being, or ceasing to exist, of a substance. Events include the table being square now, or John being taller than James on 30 March 2001 at 10.00 a.m., or me coming into existence on 26 December 1934. In order to fulfil the purpose of the definition of ‘event’, we need so to individuate properties that, if you knew which properties had been instantiated in what when, you would know (or could deduce) everything that had happened. This will involve, for example, counting being red and reflecting light of such-and-such a wavelength as different properties—for you could (just by looking at it in normal light) know that something was red without knowing (or being able to deduce) that it reflected light of such-and-such a wavelength, and conversely. It follows immediately that having an intention cannot be the same event as having any brain event, for you could know that someone was intending to do such-and-such in his action without knowing that he was in a particular brain state or any brain state, and conversely. These are two different events connected with a subject , even if perhaps of physical necessity they always go together. It is true that other criteria for two events being the same event might yield a different result—that the two events were the same; but then, to tell the whole history of the world on those other criteria, it would not be enough to know that some event (for example, some brain state) had taken place; you would need to know that it had two different somethings, say ‘characteristics’—a brain characteristic, and an intention characteristic—associated with it. Some sort of dualism is unavoidable here, and I suggest that my proposed use of the word ‘event’ provides a neat system of categories by using which we can describe the world fully, a system of categories not too distant from ordinary usage. So intentions are not brain events, even if closely connected with brain events. In the sense to be defined in Chapter 9, they are mental events. The next issue is what sort of mental events are they. Is having an intention a passive state, some state in which the agent finds himself—like having a sensation or a belief ? Davidson thinks of intentions as ‘desires’ and let us read him (despite what he writes elsewhere) as supposing that these are mental events distinct from brain events. These desires may need some event such as a perception or a neural event, to make them cause other events. Then, he claims, actions are events that have passive mental states, desires for their occurrence, among their causes. Personal The Nature of Explanation 41 explanation is analysable in terms of the production of effects by such desires. Despite the fact that it is the most plausible form of reductionist theory, like all the others, Davidson’s theory is open to a fatal objection. The basic idea of all such theories is that an agent’s bringing about an effect intentionally—that is, meaning so to do— which is how we defined the agent’s bringing about an effect having an intention so to do—is to be analysed as the causing of that effect by some passive state of the agent or some event involving him. But all such analyses fail because, if an intention (or wish or desire) of P to bring about E is some passive state or event, it could bring about E without P’s having intentionally brought about E. Causation by an intention (so understood) does not guarantee intentional action. The classic objection to the reductionist theory was formulated as follows by Richard Taylor. Here the causal factor is termed a ‘desire’, but it could equally well be termed a ‘want’ or an ‘intention’. Suppose . . . that a member of an audience keenly desires to attract the speaker’s attention but, being shy, only fidgets uncomfortably in his seat and blushes. We may suppose, further, that he does attract the speaker’s attention by his very fidgeting; but he did not fidget in order to catch the speaker’s attention, even though he desired that result and might well have realized that such behaviour was going to produce it.14 Here we have a case of a desire for E causing E, and yet there is no action. The basic point is that desires, wants, etc. may occur and yet the agent for some reason may not act to fulfil his desire or want. Nevertheless, in such a case, possibly without the agent’s knowledge, the desire may bring about the intended effect—without the agent’s bringing about the effect intentionally. An agent’s bringing something about intentionally is not analysable as his intention bringing that thing about, if an intention is supposed to be a passive mental event or state. The same applies if we substitute, for ‘intention’, ‘desire’, ‘want’, or any similar term.15 So a Davidson-type analysis seems to fail. To say that P brought something about intentionally is not to say that some passive state of P or event involving P, such as an intention, brought that thing about. There seems to be no other plausible way in which personal explanations can be analysed into the scientific pattern, and so it would appear that personal explanation is of a distinct type from scientific explanation (on the amended Hempelian model of the latter). (Note that in future I shall understand by a ‘desire’ to do some action a causally influential inclination to do the action, which may or may not coincide with a judgement by the agent that it is overall good to do the action. If it does not coincide, the agent has to choose whether to resist his desire or yield to it.) If intentions are not states or events that happen to an agent, they must themselves be actions. Having an intention is not something that happens to an agent, but something she does. For me to have the intention in acting of moving my hand is to do what (if I were to fail or find it difficult to move the hand) would be called ‘trying’ to move my hand. In the past, having such an intention has been given the technical name of making a ‘volition’ to move my hand. The basic mistake that reductionist analyses make is (in the terminology introduced at the beginning of the chapter) to treat intentions as belonging to the ‘what’ rather than to the ‘why’ of explanation. When one explains an occurrence as brought about by an agent having some intention, one is not by the word ‘intention’ describing some occurrent state or event that caused the occurrence, but one is stating that the agent brought about that occurrence and did so because he meant to do so. To act intentionally is to exercise causal agency in a certain direction, which will succeed in producing the intended effect if the agent has the requisite power. An intention—to avoid a puddle, say—explains why at a certain time a man with normal basic powers (and that involves, physically, a normal brain and the operation of normal psycho-physical laws) behaved as he did, made such movements as in fact led to his feet bypassing the puddle. That this account is correct is brought out by the linguistic fact that explanations in terms of intentions can easily be paraphrased in terms of explanations in which there occur no nouns that could conceivably be regarded as denoting occurrent states or events. To say that a man’s intention in making certain movements was to avoid the puddle is to say that he made them in order to avoid the puddle, or so as to avoid the puddle. But no such paraphrase is possible for the initial conditions which are cited in normal scientific explanations. Although intentions, like laws of nature, belong to the ‘why’, the reasons, of explanation, there are, of course, vast differences between laws of nature and intentions. Intentions are such that necessarily the agent whose they are ‘goes along’ with them, is aware of them, and has privileged access to them in the sense that he is in a better position than outsiders to know about them. Laws of nature are not necessarily known to anyone, nor necessarily does any person ‘go along with them’ or have privileged access to them. But that the ‘why’ is here known and adopted by an agent is one of the differences between personal and scientific explanation. The other main difference is that, in personal explanation, talk about a substance which explains, namely a person, is not reducible to talk about occurrent states of or events involving that person. The contrast between scientific and personal explanation remains even on the S–P–L account of the former, although the two patterns are much closer to each other on this account. That is a reason for preferring the S–P–L model; it brings out that both personal and scientific explanation are species of the same genus, causal explanation. In both, the cause is a substance or substances. In both, the substance has certain powers, and produces the effect in virtue of its powers. The difference is that, in scientific explanation, the substance has liabilities to exercise its powers under certain circumstances; it is either physically necessary or probable that it will, and it has no intention or purpose in doing what it does; whereas in personal explanation the substance (the person) acts intentionally, doing the action that—given its beliefs—will most probably fulfil its intentions. There is no parallel for that in the scientific case. In consequence, even if scientific explanation can be expressed in terms of an event (the substance being in certain circumstances) rather than the substance itself causing the effect, personal explanation cannot be expressed in this way. A person causing an effect is not analysable 44 The Nature of Explanation as a passive state of that person or an event involving that person causing the effect.


Can there be Two Explanations of a Phenomenon? So far in this chapter I have been concerned to characterize the structures of the two types of explanation that we use in explaining the occurrence of phenomena, and to show how they differ from each other. I now turn to the question of whether there can be only one true explanation of some phenomenon. For, if so, then, if there is a personal explanation of some phenomenon, there cannot be a scientific one, and conversely. I suggest that there can be two true distinct explanations of some phenomenon E, if one or other of three conditions is satisfied, but that otherwise there cannot be. Clearly there can be two true distinct explanations of E, when one or other or both are partial explanations of E. For the one may combine with the other to make a fuller explanation. Thus a man’s death from cancer may be explained by (1) his smoking and a law about the proportion of smokers who die from cancer, and by (2) his parents’ having died of cancer and a law about the proportion of those whose parents die of cancer who themselves die of cancer. Since (1) and (2) only make probable but do not necessitate the man’s death from cancer, they are only partial explanations. Clearly they can be combined into a fuller explanation in terms of the man’s smoking and his parents having died of cancer and the proportion of those who smoke and whose parents have died of cancer who die of cancer. But can there be two different full explanations of a phenomenon? The answer is still yes—if the occurrence of the causes (the ‘what’) and the operation of the reasons (the ‘why’) cited in one explanation are to be explained at least in part by the occurrence of the causes and the operation of the reasons cited in the other explanation. For example, the present position of Mars is explained by its position in the last few days and the laws of planetary motion, formulated more or less correctly by Kepler. Where it has been recently and the laws stating how planets move determine where Mars will be today. Yet the present position of Mars is also explained by its position and velocity last year and those of all other heavenly bodies, and Newton’s laws of motion. Newton’s laws state how material bodies change their The Nature of Explanation 45 velocities under the influence of other bodies. Both are full explanations, and yet they are clearly compatible. This is because Newton’s laws and the positions and velocities of the planets explain their (approximate) conformity to Kepler’s laws. Kepler’s laws operate because Newton’s laws operate and the sun and the planets have the initial positions and velocities that they have, and are far distant from other massive bodies. It is for this reason that the motion of a human hand is often explicable by both personal and scientific explanation. The motion of my hand may be fully explained by goings-on in the nerves and muscles of my arm, and physiological laws. It may also be fully explained by me bringing it about, having the intention and power so to do. Yet in this case the causes and reasons cited in each explanation provide a partial explanation of the occurrence and operation of the causes and reasons cited in the other. The goings-on in my nerves and muscles are brought abut unintentionally by my bringing about the motion of my hand intentionally. Also, the operation of physiological laws provides part of the explanation of my having the power to move my hand—only because nervous discharges are propagated as they are, am I able to move my hand. So there is here a twofold reason why two full explanations can each fully explain the motion of my hand. But can there be two distinct full explanations of some phenomenon E, when neither in any way explains the occurrence or operation of the causes and reasons involved in the other? Yes, again, so long as there is overdetermination. In overdetermination each of the full explanations gives causes and reasons sufficient for the occurrence of the effect, but neither pair on its own is necessary since the other pair would have produced the effect on its own. If someone dies as a result of being poisoned by A at the same time as he is shot by B, we have such overdetermination. But such coordination will be a coincidence, barring a common cause of the actions of A and B (for example, C who employed both A and B to murder the same victim in order to ensure that he really died). It cannot be necessary for the production of the effect to have two distinct full explanations, when neither in any way explains the occurrence or operation of the causes and reasons involved in the other; unless the occurrence and operation of the causes and reasons involved in both are explicable, at least in part, by the causes and reasons of a third full explanation (a common cause). It follows, given that scientific and personal explan46 The Nature of Explanation ation are the only two possible kinds of explanation,16 and barring accidental overdetermination, that there can be a full personal explanation and a full scientific explanation of some phenomenon only if one in part explains the occurrence and operation of the components of the other—either the scientific explanation at least in part explains the causes and reasons in the personal explanation, or conversely; or there is a further full explanation (either personal or scientific) that explains the causes and reasons operative in both the other explanations.


Explanation by the Action of God

 In this chapter so far I have been concerned to analyse the structure of personal explanation, and to show its relation to scientific explanation. I have done this because, when the theist claims that the action of God explains various phenomena, such as the existence and orderliness of the world, he is proposing a personal explanation of these phenomena. However, personal explanations of phenomena by the action of God differ from most mundane personal explanations in two important respects, on which I must now comment in conclusion of this chapter. The first is that a personal explanation of the occurrence of a phenomenon E in terms of God’s bringing it about, meaning so to do, cannot be even in part explicable scientifically. We have seen that a personal explanation may often, at any rate in part, be explained by a scientific explanation—and conversely. Thus a person having the powers that she has may be explained in part by her having nerves and muscles and by the operation of various physiological laws. Her having the intentions that she has may also be given a scientific explanation, and perhaps a human’s existence may also be explained in this way. The fact that personal explanation cannot be analysed in terms of scientific explanation does not mean that its operation on a particular occasion cannot be given a scientific explanation. However, it seems coherent to suppose that there should be a personal explanation of the occurrence of some event E by the agency of an agent P having the intention J to bring about E and the power so to do, without all this being in any way susceptible of a scientific explanation. To start with, an agent might have the power to perform certain basic actions without his having that power being dependent on any physical states or natural laws. His capacity to perform these actions might be an ultimate brute fact (or only explicable by another personal explanation). Likewise, an agent’s having the intentions in actions that he does, his choice of intentional actions, may not be susceptible of scientific explanation. To see the above, note that there is at present with respect to some of the intentions that we form no plausible scientific explanation of why we form these intentions, rather than any other ones. And yet our explanations of other things in terms of these intentions would still be explanations even if there was no explanation of why we formed these intentions. Then we have basic powers to bring about mental images of different geometrical shapes. There might be a partial scientific explanation of my having this power in terms of my brain being in a certain state giving me this power. Yet there is no contradiction in supposing that powers of visualiza48 The Nature of Explanation tion are not dependent on the brain, or on anything else. Maybe we just have such powers. But that would not affect the fact that my having a certain mental image could be explained by my basic power to produce such images. And, although we normally suppose (correctly) that there is a scientific explanation of the existence of this body that is mine, there is no scientific explanation of how it comes about that this body is mine (rather than someone else’s) and so no scientific explanation of my existence at all. For this world could have been the same in all its physical aspects, and yet a different person could have operated through this body. (I develop this point more fully in Chapter 9.) And yet the fact that science cannot explain my existence does not mean that there is no true explanation of things in terms of me bringing them about. Personal explanation may explain without there being a scientific explanation of the occurrence and operation of the factors involved in it. When the theist claims that the existence of the world and its various features is to be explained by the action of God bringing these things about meaning so to do, he will claim that God’s action cannot be explained scientifically, even in part. God is supposed to be perfectly free. God’s existence and powers do not depend on the states of the physical world or the laws of its operation—rather, vice versa. Nor are God’s intentions scientifically explicable. But all this, as we have now seen, does not in any way weaken the explanatory value of the personal explanation. God’s bringing about some event may be explicable by a wider personal explanation. He may bring about E in order thereby to bring about F; F may be an event that takes a considerable period of time, and E may be the first stage of F. But the theist claims that this kind of explanation is the only kind of explanation of God’s actions that can be provided. God’s own intentions alone explain his doing what he does. God’s basic actions are supposed to include creating the universe e nihilo (that is, not out of existing matter), keeping it in existence, making things behave in accord with natural laws, and occasionally intervening in the universe (sometimes by setting those laws aside). Creating matter e nihilo is not something that humans are able to do, but it is easy enough to conceive of their doing it. It is logically possible that I could just find myself able as easily to make appear before me an inkwell or to make a sixth finger grow, as I am at present able to move my hand. Various tests (for example, sealing off the room and keeping its contents carefully weighed) could show that the inkwell The Nature of Explanation 49 or finger were not made of existing matter. Creating e nihilo is a perfectly conceivable basic act. The other important respect in which personal explanations of phenomena by the action of God differ from most mundane personal explanations is that God is supposed to be a person without a body—that is, a spirit. It is important to make clear at this stage what it is for a person not to have a body. We can best do so by asking a different question—what is it that I am saying when I say that this body, the body behind the desk, is my body? First, that I can move, as basic actions of mine, many parts of this body, whereas I can make a difference to anything else only by moving parts of this body. To move the arm over there (your arm), I have to grasp it with this arm, but I can move this arm straight off. Secondly, my having a mental life of thought and feeling and intention depends causally on the operation of this body, and in considerable part which mental events I have (in particular my sensations, feelings, and perceptual beliefs) are caused by events in this body. In so far as these events are caused, it is events in this body that cause them; and other events (for example, occurrences in the room) cause my mental events only by causing events in this body that cause the mental events. In consequence, thirdly, while I am aware of goings-on in this body without causal influences from outside the body impinging on it (I know the position of these limbs and feel the emptiness of this stomach), I can come to know about things outside the body only through their effects on this body. I see the desk and so know where it is only because light rays from the desk impinge on these eyes. I learn what you tell me only because by talking you set up air vibrations that impinge on these ears. And, fourthly, I look out on the world from where this body is. It is things around this body that I see well, things further away that I see less well. Clearly a person has a body if there is a physical object (that is, a substance) to which he is related in all of the above four ways. And clearly a person does not have a body if there is no physical object to which he is related in any of the above ways. If a person is related to different physical objects in each of these ways, we shall have to say that his body is of a different kind or more widely extended than ours. And if he is related to a physical object only (or only to some 50 The Nature of Explanation degree) in some of these ways, we shall have to say that he is embodied only to some degree.17 Now, on the traditional account of God, God is supposed not to be embodied in any of these ways. There is no physical object, not even the whole universe, through which he has to act in order to make differences to other things. He could abolish this physical universe at a stroke and create another one, and he can exert causal influence on non-embodied creatures without needing to operate through anything physical in order to do so. Nor is God dependent on anything physical or anything else for his life of thought. And he knows about everything without being dependant on any physical process for the acquisition of his knowledge. And he does not have any particular perspective on the world. He knows how things are without being dependent for his knowledge on a particular pattern of sensations arising from a particular viewpoint. So God is in no way embodied. He can, of course, move any part of the physical universe as a basic action, and knows without inference about the state of every part of the universe; but that does not make the physical universe his body, because he is not dependent on the universe for this ability and knowledge. So then in the arguments to the existence to God the theist argues from the existence and order of the world and various features of it to a person, God, who brought these things about, meaning so to do. In this chapter I have been concerned to analyse what it is to explain an event as brought about by some person meaning so to do; and in conclusion I have drawn attention to two special features of personal explanations in terms of the action of God. Having investigated in this chapter the structure of personal explanation, in the next chapter I will consider the evidence that justifies us in putting it forward, the evidence that makes it probable that an explanation of the personal type rather than one of the scientific type is the true explanation of some phenomenon. We will then be in a position to see whether the evidence recorded in the premisses of arguments to the existence of God constitutes such evidence.