CHAPTER III: It is Shown That Antichrist has not yet Come. ANY false suspicions and errors exist in regard to the Third proposition, on the time of the coming of Antichrist both among Catholics and heretics. Yet with this distinction, Catholics know that Antichrist is not coming until the end of the world (which is true), but some err in that they think the end of the world is nearer than it really may be. On the other hand, the heretics err in the fact that they think Antichrist is coming long before the end of the world and that he really already has come. Therefore, we shall speak on each error. In the first place, all the fathers who noticed the malice of their times suspected that the times of Antichrist approached. Thus the Thessalonians thought in the time of the Apostles that the day of the Lord approached, which the Apostle corrected in 2 Thessalonians II. Likewise, St. Cyprian says: “Since Antichrist threatens, let the soldiers be prepared for battle, etc.” 34 He also says in another epistle: “You ought to know, as well as believe and hold for a certain fact, that the day of persecution of the head has begun, and the end of the world and time of Antichrist approaches.” 35 Jerome says: “He who held fast arises in our midst and we do not understand that Antichrist approaches?” 36 St. Gregory the Great: “All which has been predicted comes to pass, the proud king is near.” 37 Gregory also boldly pronounced the end of the world. 38 But these were suspicions not errors, since these holy Fathers did not dare to define a certain time. Next, others more boldly constituted a certain time. St. Jerome relates in de illustribus viris, that in 200 A.D., a certain Jude thought Antichrist was coming and the world was ending, clearly he was deceived. Again Lactantius says: “Every expectation is no more than two hundred years, etc.” 39 There he teaches that Antichrist was coming and the world was to end two hundred years from his time. He also lived in the times of Constantine, around the 300th year of Christ, therefore, he thought the world would by chance end in the year 500; but experience shows he was also deceived. St. Augustine relates the error of some who said that the world would end around the year 400 from the ascension of the Lord, 40 and also some who established the thousandth year. They were all deceived. It also happened even to the Pagans, who, as Augustine witnesses in the same book, gathered from I know not what divine oracle that the Christian religion would only endure for three hundred and sixty five years. There was a certain Bishop, Florentinus by name, around the year 1105 who asserted that Antichrist had already been born, and hence the end of the world was closing in. The Council of Florence, having three hundred and forty bishops was gathered for this reason by Pope Paschal II. 41 Next, there was also a famous opinion that had many defenders, 42 that the world was going to endure for 6,000 years, since God had created the world in six days, and a thousand years is to God one day. The writers of the Talmud also agree with this opinion and they say that they had a vision of the Prophet Elijah in which it is asserted that the world will endure for six thousand years. This opinion cannot yet be refuted from experience because according to the true chronology more or less 5600 years have elapsed since the beginning of the world. Ambrose rejects this opinion, asserting in his time that six thousand years had already elapsed, though obviously he is misled. 43 The moderation of St. Augustine is the best, since he thought the opinion probable, and followed it as probable. 44 From here, it does not follow that we know the last day. Moreover, we say it is probable, that the world will not endure beyond six thousand years, but we do not say that it is certain. On that account, St. Augustine bitterly rebuked those who asserted that the world is going to end at a certain time, when the Lord said: “It is not for us to know the time and the hour which the Father has placed in his power.” 45 Laying all these aside, let us come to the heretics. All the heretics of this time teach that the Roman Pontiff is the Antichrist, and now openly lives in the world, but they do not agree among themselves on the time in which he appeared. They have six opinions. The First are the Samosatens, who bide their time in Hungary and Transylvania. They teach in a certain book which they titled: Premonitions of Christ and the Apostles on the abolition of Christ through Antichrist, that a little after the times of the Apostles Antichrist appeared; that is without a doubt when it began to be preached that Christ is the eternal son of God. They think, on the other hand, that Christ is a pure man, and that there is only one person in God, and this faith was preached by Christ and the Apostles. Thus, a little after the death of the Apostles, Antichrist came to Rome and after abolishing Christ the pure man, introduced another eternal Christ, and made God triune, and Christ twofold. This opinion is easily refuted, apart from the arguments which we asserted above against all the heretics, and in two ways. Firstly, because when Antichrist will have come, he will make himself God, not someone else, as the Apostle says. 46 Moreover, they themselves claim that the Roman Pontiff does not make himself God, but preached Christ and made him God from a true man. Secondly, because they say, soon after Christ and the Apostles slept, the true faith of Christ was thoroughly extinguished and the whole world began to worship Christ as God. But Christ preached that the gates of hell were not going to prevail against the Church, and the Angel Gabriel preached that the kingdom of Christ would be forever. 47 David preached that all kings would serve Christ. 48 Therefore, how true is it that in the very beginning the nascent Church was destroyed by Antichrist? The Second opinion is of the Lutheran, Illyricus, who teaches in his Third Catalogue that Antichrist came when the Roman Empire fell into ruin. Moreover, it is certain that the Roman Empire began to fall after the tenth year of Honorius, when Rome was first taken, that is in the year of the Lord 412, as Blondus showed; 49 yet, Illyricus seems to understand this concerning the conception, not the birth of Antichrist. Accordingly he teaches the same thing in the Centuries, 50 that Antichrist was conceived in some manner at the beginning of the year 400, thereafter animated and formed in the womb of his mother, around the year 500; and at length was born in the year 606, when the Eastern Emperor Phocas conceded to the Roman Pontiff that he could be called head of the whole Church. He teaches the same thing in another place, that Antichrist was going to rule savagely with the spiritual sword for 1260 years, but with the temporal sword for 666 years, and then the end of the world would come. The first number he gathers from Apocalypse XI, where it is said the time of Antichrist would be 1260 days. Illyricus would have it that a day is taken as a year. The second number he gathers from Apocalypse XIII, where the number of the beast is 666. This opinion can be refuted in two ways. Firstly, it follows, that Antichrist was not only born but also died, and hence the end of the world already came. For the Roman Pontiff took up the temporal sword, that is temporal dominion, at least in the year 699. Then Aripertus gave to the Roman Pontiff the Coctian Alps, where Genoa is now. Later, in the year 714, Luitprandus confirmed that donation, as Ado of Vienna and Blondus affirm, not to mention the Centuriators and Theodore Bibliander, who remarked for the year 714, that this province became the first Papist province. Not long after, that is, in the year 760, Pepin gave the Exarchate of Ravenna to the Roman Pontiffs, along with a great part of Italy as many historians witness—even the Centuriators and Bibliander. Therefore, if Antichrist began to reign in the year 760, and endured for 666 years, then the end of the world happened in the year of Christ 1421, and now there have been more than 150 years after Antichrist died. But if the beginning of his reign is placed earlier, that is in the year 699, then the end will be placed in the year 1360 and now more than 200 years will have transpired from the death of Antichrist. Perhaps they will respond that after the 666th year of his reign Antichrist did not die but only lost his temporal dominion. Thus, they might say that the spiritual kingdom of Antichrist endured for 1260 years, which still would not have ended, and if they were to begin from the year 666, consequently they ought to say that the spiritual kingdom of antichrist ought to endure considerably beyond his temporal kingdom. But that is certainly absurd and against all authors, and besides, it at least follows that the Popes ought to have lost their temporal dominion 200 years ago, which is opposed to the obvious fact. Secondly, the same error can be refuted because it follows from the error of the Centuriators, who thought they discovered exactly when the world will end, which is against the words of the Lord in Acts I and Matthew XXIV. What should follow is clear since, if they know that Antichrist began to reign with the spiritual sword in the year 606, they know that he was going to reign only 1260 years and then the Lord is going to come to judge right after, as they gather from Paul in 2 Thessal. II. Therefore, they know the last judgment is going to be in the year 1466. But if they do not know this, they are compelled also to not know whether Antichrist has come. The Third opinion is of David Chytraeus who teaches with Illyricus in his commentary on chapter 9 of the Apocalypse, namely that Antichrist appeared around the year of the Lord 600, and that this is sufficient to show that St. Gregory was the first Antichrist Pope. Chytraeus, however, does not agree with that which is asserted by Illyricus, in so far as the time and duration of Antichrist, but he prudently advises that it is not to be defined so boldly. He attempts to show with three reasons that Antichrist appeared in the year 600. Firstly, because in that time Gregory established the invocation of the Saints and Masses for the dead. Secondly, because in the year 606, Pope Boniface III asked the title of universal Bishop from the Emperor Phocas. He adds the third reason in his commentary on chapter 13, that this time plainly and especially agrees with the number of the name of Antichrist, which contains 666 as it is contained in the Apocalypse, ch. 13. Furthermore, Chytraeus adds that from this same number of the name Antichrist the time can be gathered wherein Pepin confirmed the reign of Antichrist. For as many years as there are from the year 97 in which John wrote the Apocalypse even to Pepin, is without a doubt 666 years. Likewise the time is reckoned from Pepin to when the Roman Pontiff was declared Antichrist by John Huss to be about 666 years. This opinion can be easily refuted, as it rests upon frauds alone. For in the first place Gregory was not the first who invoked Saints and taught that Masses were to be offered up for the dead. All the Fathers taught this very thing as we showed in another place. For the present Ambrose suffices, who preceded Gregory by 200 years. He says in his book on widows: “The Angels are to be observed, the Martyrs prayed to.” 51 He also says in his epistle to Faustus on the death of his sister: “Therefore, I deem that she is not to be wept for with tears but pursued with prayers, you ought not grieve for her but commend her soul to God with offerings.” 52 Next, Phocas did not give the title of universal to the Pope but addressed him as head of the Churches. Even Justinian had already done the same long before, in an epistle to John II and before that the Council of Chalcedon had done so in an epistle to Leo I. Therefore, there is simply no reason to place the coming of Antichrist in the time of the Emperor Phocas. As to what Chytraeus adds on the number 666, it is altogether inept because that number does not agree precisely with the times that he would have it Antichrist appeared, or was confirmed, or declared to be so. For from Christ to the sanction of Phocas there are 607 years, not 666. From the revelation in the Apocalypse to Pepin 658 years, and from Pepin to John Huss there are, as he says, 640. But certainly John the Apostle in the Apocalypse recorded a precise number since he also adds minute details. Moreover, John Huss was not the first to declare that the Pope is Antichrist, Wycliff had already done that. Nay more, John Huss never even said that the Pope is Antichrist. For in art. 19 of the Council of Constance, after being condemned, he says that the Clergy, through their avarice, prepare the way for Antichrist. Next, all Lutherans boast that Luther was the first to unmask Antichrist, which brings us to the next opinion. The fourth opinion is of Luther in his computation of time, where he places two arrivals of Antichrist. One, with the spiritual sword, after the year 600, when Phocas called the Roman Pontiff the head of all Churches. He also says that Gregory was the last Roman Pontiff. The second is when he arrives with the temporal sword after the year 1000. Bibliander teaches the same thing. 53 Therefore, Luther and Bibliander agree in the first arrival with the Centuriators and Chytraeus—with the exception that Luther and Bibliander say that Gregory was a good and holy Pope while the Centuriators and Chytraeus say that Gregory above all did his best to introduce Antichrist and hence, he was the worst Pope, which is a horrendous blasphemy. In the second arrival, Luther and the Centuriators clearly disagree. This opinion, apart from the common arguments which will be made afterward, is easily refuted. Luther places the arrival of Antichrist in the year 600 and 1000 altogether without reason. On the year 600 we have already spoken in refutation of Chytraeus. Concerning the year 1000 it can easily be shown since Luther places the beginning of the temporal reign of Antichrist in that time when Pope Gregory VIII deposed the Emperor Henry IV, for then he ruled temporally as well as waged wars. Well now, all of these things already happened, as Gregory II excommunicated the [Byzantine] Emperor Leo, and deprived him of the rule of Italy in the year 715, as the historians Cedreno and Zonara witness in the life of the same Leo. Furthermore we already showed the Roman Pontiffs had temporal dominion in the year 700, three hundred years before the first millennium. Next, the Centuriators witness that Stephen III waged wars around the year 750, 54 and Adrian I could be said to have done the same thing, as well as other of their successors. In like manner, around the year 850, Leo IV, a holy man as well as famous for miracles, waged war against the Saracens. He reported a singular victory and fortified Rome with towers and ramparts still, he girded the Vatican hill with a wall, which thereafter was called after his name civitas Leonina, as nearly all historians of that time relate, and even the Centuriators themselves. 55 The Fifth opinion is of Henry Bullinger. In the preface to his homilies on the Apocalypse he wrote that Antichrist appeared in the year 753. Such an opinion disagrees with all those whom we cited above, and thence can easily be refuted because it rests upon a very weak foundation. Bullinger teaches in the Apocalypse, ch. XIII, that the number found there of the name of the Beast 666, means by that number the time of the arrival of Antichrist, in other words, so many years after the Apocalypse was written, Antichrist was going to come. And because it is certain from Irenaeus that the Apocalypse was written around the end of the reign of the Emperor Domitian, i.e., around the year 97, he gathers Antichrist was going to come in the year 753, by computing 666 years from the year 97. To this point the opinion of certain Catholics can also be related, such as Jodocus Clicthovaeus, who reckoned from the commentaries of St. John Damascene 56 that Muhammad was Antichrist properly so called because he came around the year 666 according to what John had said before. But this reasoning amounts to nothing. In the first place, the Centuriators protest and contend that the number in the book of the Apocalypse does not mean the time of the birth of Antichrist, but of his death. Moreover, John the Evangelist, in chapter XIII of the Apocalypse, rejects the commentary both of Illyricus and Bullinger, since he explains himself that the number is not of the times but the name of Antichrist, i.e. Antichrist is going to have a name, whose letters in Greek form the number 666, as Irenaeus and all other Fathers explain. Besides, no change is read in the Roman Pontiffs for that year 753. Moreover, Muhammad could not come then since he was born in the year 597 and began to call himself a Prophet in the year 623. Next, he died in the year 632, as Palmerius witnesses in his Chronicle. Therefore, he did not make it to the year 666. The sixth opinion is of Wolfgang Musculus, who in his works under the title de Ecclesia, 57 affirms that Antichrist came a little after the times of St. Bernard, i.e. around the year 1200. He attempts to show this because St. Bernard enumerates many vices of men, and especially of Churchmen and very serious persecutions of the Church, adding: “It remains only for the man of sin to be revealed.” 58 But this opinion is refuted without much effort: St. Bernard merely suspected from the evils which he saw that Antichrist was near, just as we said many Fathers suspected it from their times, such as Cyprian, Jerome and Gregory, and Bernard was deceived in that suspicion just as they. Besides, the Popes from the year 900 to 1000 were without comparison worse than the Popes from 1100 to 1200. So if the former were not Antichrist, why would the latter be?
sábado, 21 de septiembre de 2024
viernes, 20 de septiembre de 2024
¿Razones para no ser católico? Una respuesta, punto por punto, a las razones de mormón ex-católico para abandonar la fe
https://scripturalmormonism.blogspot.com/2021/01/why-i-am-not-roman-catholic-will-never.html
Tema 1: Iconodulía
El objetor desarrolla sus argumentos en varios artículos. Tomaré lo que en ellos dices, tratando de no duplicar los argumentos, que suelen repetirse.
https://scripturalmormonism.blogspot.com/2014/10/latter-day-saints-and-religious-images.html
Objeción 1. Éxodo 20:4-5: No prohíbe hacer imágenes per se, pero sí prohíbe usarlos para devoción religiosa, como inclinarse ante ellas o servirlas.
Objeción 2. Los ejemplos de la serpiente de bronce o los querubines del arca no pueden usarse como evidencia que avale la doctrina católica, porque estas imágenes solo eran representativas y no recibían veneración.
Objeción 3:
Objeción 3. En el cristianismo primitivo se permitían imágenes, pero no se les daba ningún culto. Eran solo imágenes representativas.
Objeción 4. Hubo algunos escritores primitivos que se opusieron totalmente a las imágenes, como admiten los católicos. Entre ellos, Epifanio.
Objeción 5. La veneración de imágenes es un desarrollo tardío, y tanto Nicea II como Trento están equivocados sobre el consenso unánime de los Padres sobre la cuestión. Belarmino lo dice:
La cuarta regla es: cuando todos los Doctores de la Iglesia, de común acuerdo, enseñan que algo nos viene de la Tradición Apostólica, ya estén reunidos en un Concilio general, ya escriban separadamente en sus libros, eso debe ser considerado como Tradición Apostólica. Hay una razón para esta regla, porque si todos los Doctores de la Iglesia, cuando están de acuerdo en algún punto de doctrina, pudieran errar, toda la Iglesia erraría, ya que está obligada a seguir a sus Doctores, y no los sigue. Un ejemplo de la primera parte de la regla es la veneración de las imágenes , que los Doctores de la Iglesia reunidos en el Concilio general de Nicea II dijeron que es de la Tradición Apostólica. Un ejemplo de la segunda parte no se encuentra, si absolutamente todos los Padres que escribieron deben decir algo expresamente sobre ella. Sin embargo, parece suficiente, si algunos Padres famosos hablan de ello expresamente, y los otros no los contradicen, cuando están discutiendo el mismo asunto. Porque entonces se puede decir sin ser temerario que es la opinión de todos; porque, cuando uno de los Padres se equivoca en un asunto grave, siempre se encuentran muchos que lo contradicen. (Robert Bellarmine, Controversias de la fe cristiana [trad. Kenneth Baker; Keep the Faith, 2016], 247-48, énfasis añadido)
Objeción 6. Los Padres muestran justamente que Nicea II y Trento se equivocan.
Clemente se opone a las imágenes:
Clemente, Stromata, Libro II, XVIII: “La Ley misma exhibe justicia. Enseña sabiduría mediante la abstinencia de las imágenes visibles y al invitarnos al Creador y Padre del universo”. Ibíd., Libro V, V: “[Porque Dios no quiere que] nos aferremos a las cosas de los sentidos... Pues la familiaridad con el sentido de la vista menosprecia la reverencia a lo que es divino”.
28.4. Y de nuevo recomienda Pitágoras: "No llevar anillo ni grabar en ellos imágenes de dioses" (Pitágoras, Symbolica, 27. 28), lo mismo que mucho tiempo antes Moisés legisló en términos precisos: no se debía hacer imagen o reproducción esculpida, fundida, modelada o grabada (cf. Ex 20,4; Lv 26,4; Dt 4,15-17), para que no nos apeguemos a lo sensible, sino que pasemos a las cosas inteligibles28.5. Porque la costumbre de la mirada escudriñadora (o: decidida) desprecia la majestad de lo divino, y venerar la esencia inteligible mediante la materia es deshonrarla por la sensación.28.6. Por eso también los más sabios sacerdotes egipcios determinaron (poner) al aire libre la estatua de Atenea, como los hebreos edificaron el templo sin imágenes. Pero hay quienes dan culto a Dios, adorando una copia del cielo, que contiene los astros que ellos han fabricado.
Pues veamos ahora lo que sigue, que es de este tenor: "Pasemos ahora a otros temas. Los cristianos no soportan la vista de templos ni de estatuas, en lo que coinciden con los escitas, con los nómadas de la Libia y con los seres, gentes sin Dios, y con otras naciones ajenas a toda religión y a toda ley. Así piensan también los persas, según cuenta Heródoto por estas palabras: "Los persas sé que tienen las siguientes costumbres: no levantan estatuas, ni altares, ni templos, y tienen por necios a quienes tal hacen. La causa, a mi parecer, es que no piensan, como los griegos, que los dioses sean de forma humana" (HEROD., I 131). Heráclito igualmente se expresa así: "Y oran a estas estatuas como si uno se pusiera a hablar con las paredes de su casa, no sabiendo quiénes son los dioses y héroes" (Fragm. I 151 fragm.5). ¿Qué nos enseñan los cristianos que no nos lo diga aquí mejor Heráclito? Bien secretamente da a entender ser bobo orar a las estatuas si uno no conoce "quiénes son los dioses y héroes". Tal es la doctrina de Heráclito; pero ellos deshonran sin distinción toda imagen. Si la razón que dan es que la piedra, o la madera, o el bronce, o el oro que fulano o zutano han trabajado, no es dios, valiente sabiduría. Porque ¿quién sino un tonto de remate puede creer que eso sea Dios y no ofrendas e imágenes de los dioses? Si es porque no es posible concebir imágenes divinas, por ser otra la forma de Dios, según opinan también los persas, no caen en la cuenta que se contradicen a sí mismos cuando dicen que Dios hizo al hombre su propia imagen y la cara semejante a sí mismo (VI 63). Pero concederán que estas imágenes se destinan al honor de alguien semejante o diferente en la forma, si bien explican no ser dioses, sino démones a los que tales imágenes se dedican, y, en fin, que quien adora a Dios no tiene que dar culto a los démones".
En efecto, no contamos por adición, aumentando gradualmente de la unidad a la multitud, y diciendo uno, dos y tres, ni tampoco primero, segundo y tercero, pues «Yo», Dios, «soy el primero y yo soy el último». Y hasta ahora, ni siquiera en el tiempo presente, hemos oído hablar de un segundo Dios. Al adorar al Dios de Dios, confesamos la distinción de las Personas y al mismo tiempo nos atenemos a la Monarquía. No desperdiciamos la teología en una pluralidad dividida, porque una sola Forma, por así decirlo, unida en la inmutabilidad de la Deidad, se ve en Dios Padre y en Dios Unigénito. En efecto, el Hijo está en el Padre y el Padre en el Hijo; pues tal como es éste, tal es el primero, y tal como es éste, tal es éste; y en esto consiste la Unidad. De modo que, según la distinción de Personas, ambos son uno y uno, y según la comunidad de Naturaleza, uno. ¿Cómo, pues, si uno y uno, no hay dos dioses? Porque hablamos de un rey y de la imagen del rey, y no de dos reyes. La majestad no está partida en dos, ni la gloria dividida. La soberanía y autoridad sobre nosotros es una, y por eso la doxología que atribuimos no es plural, sino una, porque el honor rendido a la imagen pasa al prototipo. Ahora bien, lo que en un caso es la imagen por razón de imitación, en el otro caso lo es el Hijo por naturaleza; y así como en las obras de arte la semejanza depende de la forma, así en el caso de la naturaleza divina y no compuesta la unión consiste en la comunión de la Deidad. Uno, además, es el Espíritu Santo, y hablamos de Él solo, unido como está al único Padre por el único Hijo, y por Sí mismo completando la adorable y bendita Trinidad. De Él, la íntima relación con el Padre y el Hijo está suficientemente demostrada por el hecho de que no está clasificado en la pluralidad de la creación, sino que se habla de Él solo; En efecto, no es uno entre muchos, sino Uno. Porque, como hay un solo Padre y un solo Hijo, también hay un solo Espíritu Santo. Por consiguiente, está tan alejado de la naturaleza creada como la razón exige que lo singular esté alejado de los cuerpos compuestos y plurales; y está de tal manera unido al Padre y al Hijo como lo uno tiene afinidad con lo uno.
Tema 2: Mariología
2.1. La Inmaculada Concepción
dfdf
2.2. La Asunción de María
Fuente: https://scripturalmormonism.blogspot.com/2016/10/refuting-taylor-marshall-on-bodily.html
Argumentos:
1. No existe absolutamente ningún testimonio patrístico que afirme la asunción corporal de María en los primeros siglos de la historia cristiana.
2. La dormición y la asunción de María no son lo mismo. Se puede aceptar lo primero sin aceptar lo segundo.
3. Contrario a lo que sostienen los católicos, Epifanio no afirmó la Asunción de María. Él señala que hay un silencio sobre el final de la vida de María, y va repasando varias alternativas. Sostiene que María pudo permanecer inmortal pero no lo afirma con certeza. La realidad es que no había ninguna tradición autorizada sobre María en este punto.
4. Apocalipsis 12 no puede usarse para defender la asunción de María, porque el testimonio patrístico más antiguo sobre la identidad de la mujer en Apocalipsis 12:1 no refiere a ella sino al pueblo de Dios (Obras y fragmentos de Hipólito, 61; Metodio, el banquete de las diez vírgenes, cap. V).
5. La mayoría de los intérpretes del libro de Apocalipsis, tanto católicos como no católicos, rechazan la interpretación mariana de la mujer del capitulo 12, e interpretan que la mujer es la Nueva Jerusalén, o la comunidad fiel.
Respuesta:
Consideración: lo que el objetor debe demostrar es que la Iglesia erró en su pronunciamiento dogmático del dogma de la Asunción. O sea, debe demostrar que la Asunción es falsa. Y demostrarlo fuera de toda duda razonable. Suponemos que los argumentos que presentará son aquellos con los que intenta demostrar esto.
1. Existen varios motivos para rechazar esta objeción.
a) Esta es una falacia de argumento del silencio. Existen buenos usos del argumento del silencio, y malos usos. La ausencia de referencia patrística temprana no es suficiente para asumir que la creencia no existiera en este tiempo o la falsedad del dogma.
b) Por otro lado, no es una condición sine qua non el que tenga que estar presente toda creencia en los padres de la Iglesia más antiguos para sostenerla. Los Padres no se expresaron sobre muchos temas, que solo se desarrollaron o expresaron después.
Pero no es necesario que esté presente de forma unánime en todos y desde temprano. Como dice San Roberto Belarmino, y que el mismo objetor citó en otro artículo:
La cuarta regla es: cuando todos los Doctores de la Iglesia, de común acuerdo, enseñan que algo nos viene de la Tradición Apostólica, ya estén reunidos en un Concilio general, ya escriban separadamente en sus libros, eso debe ser considerado como Tradición Apostólica. Hay una razón para esta regla, porque si todos los Doctores de la Iglesia, cuando están de acuerdo en algún punto de doctrina, pudieran errar, toda la Iglesia erraría, ya que está obligada a seguir a sus Doctores, y no los sigue. Un ejemplo de la primera parte de la regla es la veneración de las imágenes , que los Doctores de la Iglesia reunidos en el Concilio general de Nicea II dijeron que es de la Tradición Apostólica. Un ejemplo de la segunda parte no se encuentra, si absolutamente todos los Padres que escribieron deben decir algo expresamente sobre ella. Sin embargo, parece suficiente, si algunos Padres famosos hablan de ello expresamente, y los otros no los contradicen, cuando están discutiendo el mismo asunto. Porque entonces se puede decir sin ser temerario que es la opinión de todos; porque, cuando uno de los Padres se equivoca en un asunto grave, siempre se encuentran muchos que lo contradicen. (Robert Bellarmine, Controversias de la fe cristiana [trad. Kenneth Baker; Keep the Faith, 2016], 247-48, énfasis añadido)
O sea, solo basta que esté presente en algunos Padres sin contradicción de los otros Padres, ni antiguos, ni contemporáneos, ni posteriores.
c) Además, la Asunción de María es un misterio del cual probablemente no hubo testigos, y es conocido por deducción y argumentos teológicos en vez de históricos. Esto lo señala Michael Schumaus en su Teología Dogmática:
"La Asunción de María es un hecho realizado por Dios, pero no un acontecimiento que pueda datarse. Por eso, no hay tradición alguna histórico-teológica. A decir verdad, no puede haberla. El hecho de la Asunción corporal de María al cielo, realizado por Dios, fue transmitido e incluido durante los primeros cinco o seis primeros siglos dentro de otras verdades de fe. A partir del siglo VI es cuando emergen los testimonios expresos. Por eso la objeción de los protestantes contra el nuevo dogma descansa en gran parte sobre una falsa inteligencia, como si se afirmara una tradición histórico-teológica y una equiparación de la Resurrección de Cristo y la Asunción de María" (Teología Dogmática, VIII, quest. 7, 5).
Lo mismo señala Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange:
“No es posible probar directamente de la Sagrada Escritura ni de los documentos primitivos que el privilegio de la Asunción fue revelado explícitamente a ninguno de los Apóstoles, porque ningún texto de la Escritura lo afirma explícitamente, y hay una ausencia similar de testimonio explícito en los documentos primitivos”.
Así, para que la Asunción sea considerado parte de la revelación, basta con que haya sido revelado al menos implícitamente:
"Es necesario, pues, para que la Asunción de María sea cierta y pueda ser propuesta a la fe de todos los fieles, que haya sido revelada a los Apóstoles, a uno de ellos por lo menos, ya de manera explícita, ya en forma implícita o confusa y que más tarde se hace explícita".
Por ello, aunque no se puede probar la revelación explícita, sin embargo:
"Pero se prueba indirectamente por los documentos posteriores de la Tradición que existió una revelación, implícita a lo menos, porque existen, a partir del siglo VII, hechos ciertos que no se explicarían sin ella."
pag. 132:
https://www.traditio-op.org/biblioteca/Garrigou/Garrigou-Lagrange-Reginald-La-Madre-Del-Salvador.pdf
Por tanto, no sirve alegar contra el dogma católico lo mismo que los católicos ya reconocemos sin problema alguno.
d) Además, es en parte falso lo que afirma el objetor, pues se encuentran algunos testimonios sobre la Asunción de María.
El primero es el testimonio del apócrifo Liber Requiae Mariae, de entre los siglos III y IV.
Para que no se le quite peso por ser un apócrifo, hay que decir que los apócrifos generalmente expresan historias piadosas que son las que circulan entre los fieles. No refieren necesariamente a libros falsos o heréticos.
El segundo, es el apócrifo De Obitu S. Dominae
Aquellos testimonios no pueden datarse con mucha seguridad. Sin embargo, el siguiente es el de San Epifanio de Salamina, que sostiene la Asunción de María en los años 370:
"5,1 Porque lo que dice esta secta es una completa tontería y, por así decirlo, un cuento de viejas. ¿Qué escritura ha hablado de ello? ¿Qué profeta permitió la adoración de un hombre, y mucho menos de una mujer? (2) El vaso es selecto, pero una mujer, y por naturaleza no es diferente [de los demás]. Sin embargo, como los cuerpos de los santos, ha sido tenida en honor por su carácter y entendimiento. Y si tuviera que decir algo más en alabanza suya, [ella es] como Elías, que fue virgen desde el vientre de su madre, siempre permaneció así, y fue llevado y no ha visto la muerte. Ella es como Juan que se apoyó en el pecho del Señor, "el discípulo a quien Jesús amaba". 12 Ella es como Santa Tecla; y María es aún más honrada que ella, debido a la providencia que le concedió. (3) Pero Elías no debe ser adorado, aunque esté vivo. Y Juan no debe ser adorado, aunque por su propia oración—o más bien, por haber recibido la gracia de Dios—hizo algo terrible de quedarse dormido. 13 Pero ni Tecla es adorada, ni ninguno de los santos."
Véase la pág. 660 del PDF:
https://ia800501.us.archive.org/18/items/EpiphaniusPanarionBksIIIII1/Epiphanius%20-%20_Panarion_%20-%20Bks%20II%20%26%20III%20-%201.pdf
En el siglo IV, encontramos también el testimonio de una homilía de Timoteo:
Según el padre [Michael] O'Carroll (en su libro [2000], Theotokos: A Theological Encyclopedia of the Blessed Virgin Mary , 388), ahora tenemos lo que algunos creen que es una homilía del siglo IV sobre el profeta Simeón y la Santísima Virgen María por Timoteo, un sacerdote de Jerusalén, que afirma que María es "inmortal hasta el tiempo presente a través de aquel que tuvo su morada en ella y que la asumió y la elevó por encima de las regiones superiores".
Por otro lado, en el siglo V cerca del 450 está el testimonio de Juvenal, obispo de Jerusalén, que conocemos porque lo menciona San Juan Damasceno siglos después:
San Juvenal, obispo de Jerusalén , en el Concilio de Calcedonia (451), hizo saber al emperador Marciano y a Pulqueria , que deseaban poseer el cuerpo de la Madre de Dios , que María murió en presencia de todos los Apóstoles , pero que su tumba , cuando se abrió, a petición de Santo Tomás, se encontró vacía; de donde los Apóstoles concluyeron que el cuerpo fue llevado al cielo (PG I, 96).
Luego viene el testimonio de San Gregorio de Tours, del siglo VI, en los años 580:
"Los Apóstoles tomaron su cuerpo en un féretro y lo colocaron en una tumba; y lo custodiaron, esperando la venida del Señor. Y he aquí que de nuevo el Señor estaba junto a ellos; y habiendo recibido el cuerpo santo, Él ordenó que fuera llevado en una nube al paraíso: donde ahora, reunida con el alma, [María] se regocija con los elegidos del Señor..". ( Ocho libros de milagros , 1:4; entre 575-593)
Y sigue el testimonio de San Isidoro de Sevilla, que es el siguiente que afirma la Asunción de María.
Si se va a hablar de los Padres, entonces, que no se obvie a San Epifanio, Juvenal, San Gregorio de Tours, San Isidoro y San Juan Damasceno.
Como se ve, entre los testimonios a veces suele haber una brecha larga de tiempo. Sin embargo, nadie podría decir que entre esos periodos no se creía en la Asunción de María, pues la creencia no muere y resurge una y otra vez, sino que permanece aunque para nosotros haya falta de testimonios. Por eso el argumento del silencio es de los argumentos más débiles.
e) El objetor solo plantea esta objeción porque somos los católicos los que damos importancia al testimonio patrístico, ya que consideramos que la Tradición es fuente de revelación. Pero él mismo se convirtió al mormonismo, no ve ninguna autoridad a la Tradición y a los Padres.
Por lo que si quiere usar un criterio católico en contra nuestro, pues lo está usando mal, como se vio en los puntos a), b) y c).
2. Concedemos. Pero ninguna objeción es esta contra la veracidad de la Asunción. Además, la fiesta de la dormición de María surge cuando ya hay testimonios previos que afirman la Asunción. Pero él de por sí se ha convertido en mormón; por lo que él mismo no le da ninguna validez a la Tradición.
3. Epifanio solo afirma que la Escritura guarda silencio sobre si María murió o no. Pero él personalmente sostiene que quizá no murió. Esto no tiene nada que ver con el tema de la Asunción, porque el tema de si María murió o no y sobre si fue asunta son dos temas distintos. Entre los mismos católicos hay discrepancias sobre si ella murió o no, y hay libertad de opinión en este asunto. Lo que el objetor alega solo refiere a este tema pero no a la Asunción, que afirma Epifanio en otro pasaje citado arriba. Allí mismo dice que, al igual que Elías, ella permaneció siempre virgen y fue llevada al cielo sin ver la muerte. Sin embargo, el objetor ha ignorado completamente este pasaje.
4 y 5. Este es un argumento superfluo, porque de ninguna parte de la discusión se niega que la mujer de Apocalipsis 12 pueda representar a la Iglesia o a Israel o al pueblo de Dios. Aceptamos de buen modo que la mujer es la Iglesia. Pero también aceptamos que es María. Así lo dice la Enciclopedia Católica:
Es cierto que los comentaristas generalmente entienden que todo el pasaje se aplica literalmente a la Iglesia, y que parte de los versículos se aplica mejor a la Iglesia que a María. Pero hay que tener presente que María es a la vez figura de la Iglesia y su miembro más destacado. Lo que se dice de la Iglesia es, a su manera, cierto de María. Por eso, el pasaje del Apocalipsis (12,5-6) no se refiere a María simplemente a modo de adaptación [108], sino que se aplica a ella en un sentido verdaderamente literal que parece estar en parte limitado a ella y en parte extendido a toda la Iglesia. La relación de María con la Iglesia está bien resumida en la expresión “collum corporis mystici” aplicada a Nuestra Señora por San Bernardino de Siena [109].
Por tanto, lo que el objetor tiene que defender no es que la mujer de Apocalipsis es la Iglesia, sino que tiene que demostrar que no puede bajo ningún aspecto interpretarse como María.
Por ello se puede aceptar de buena gana toda la argumentación que presenta para demostrar que la mujer es el pueblo de Dios. Pero simplemente es irrelevante porque no es ese el punto en discusión.
Lo que el objetor tiene es un presupuesto implícito, que es: los textos solo pueden ser en un solo sentido, ningún otro; descubierto el sentido natural, primario, del texto, todos los demás son inválidos.
De allí es que rechaza que en la mujer de Apocalipsis 12 se vea a María. Pero su presupuesto es falso.
En segundo lugar, también es falso su otro presupuesto: ha de aceptarse siempre como única interpretación posible la más antigua que aparezca en el testimonio patrístico, y rechazase las demás interpretaciones.
Ningún católico ha sostenido esto alguna vez. El objetor se ufana de tener a Belarmino en su Biblioteca. Pues el mismo Belarmino resalta cómo los antiguos podían interpretaban una cosa sobre algún pasaje pero que los nuevos pueden interpretar algo más; y lo acepta si la interpretación es válida.
Y como último punto, el mismo objetor cita en su artículo a Epifanio interpretando a la mujer de Apocalipsis 12 como María.
El objetor, casi al final del artículo, sostiene como conclusión:
En realidad, la razón por la que Marshall cree en la Asunción corporal de María es que Pío XII la proclamó dogma el 1 de noviembre de 1950. No hay ningún testimonio bíblico, ni siquiera patrístico temprano, de que esto sea una doctrina, y mucho menos un dogma a la par de la resurrección corporal y la ascensión de Jesucristo.
Robert A. Sungenis debatió sobre este tema con James R. White en septiembre de 2010 y adoptó un enfoque diferente (y más honesto) al respecto, admitiendo básicamente que todo se reduce a si Roma es infalible o no. Comparemos y contrastemos el intento de Marshall de defender este dogma con el de Sungenis, quien admite abiertamente que no existe ningún testimonio patrístico temprano de la Asunción.
Hasta ahí.
El objetor lo plantea como si fuese un problema, cuando en realidad es precisamente lo contrario. Es justamente la definición dogmática lo que garantiza la veracidad de la Asunción de María. Pues la verdad revelada se fundamenta en la autoridad divina que revela y en la autoridad de la Iglesia que enseña la verdad revelada, no en el peso de los argumentos que se usen para defenderla. Como señala Michael Schmaus:
"La Iglesia, en la definición dogmática, no ha legitimado como doctrina eclesiástica una de esas leyendas que se crean, o una pía opinión popular nacida de ilusiones. Ha pronunciado mas de manera segura y obligatoria que la glorificación corporal de María es un elemento de la revelación y de la fe. Ella es el criterio de la pertenencia de esa verdad al contenido de la revelación y la única que puede proporcionar una declaración segura y obligatoria. La teología sola no es capaz de esto desde sus propios presupuestos y métodos. Sin el reconocimiento y proclamación de la Iglesia no se lograría la perfecta seguridad de la fe. Aquí la Iglesia no es algo así como un sustituto, que entra en acción cuando la ciencia más, a fin de remediar su impotencia. Es, más bien, desde un principio y esencialmente, y en realidad ella sola, la instancia que crea certeza de fe al garantizar una doctrina como verdad revelada" (Teología Dogmática, VIII, quest. 7, 6).
De allí que ya Belarmino responde a la objeción implícita que tiene el objetor: que la Iglesia acepta dogmáticamente tradiciones que, después de todo, son falsas. Dice Belarmino:
El tercer argumento que los adversarios sacan de la incomodidad que traen consigo las tradiciones. Porque si se abre esta puerta, de modo que digamos que se deben aceptar algunos dogmas que no pueden probarse con ningún testimonio de la Escritura, se dará ocasión a muchos de inventar e introducir en la Iglesia muchas cosas falsas bajo el nombre de tradiciones. Porque vemos que antiguamente incluso los hombres más santos fueron engañados de esta manera. (...) Respondo (...) Digo en segundo lugar que este inconveniente, que es común a las tradiciones y a las Escrituras, no daña mucho ni a las tradiciones verdaderas ni a las Escrituras verdaderas. Porque hay una autoridad en la Iglesia y también un modo y una razón determinados para distinguir las tradiciones y Escrituras verdaderas de las falsas; ni por el juicio público de la Iglesia ha sido aceptado ningún libro apócrifo como canónico, ni una tradición falsa como verdadera (cap. 12).
Conclusión: los cinco argumentos fueron tremendamente débiles y ninguno llega a demostrar lo que pretendía.
Es increíble cómo el autor, que se ufana de ser "un experto en teología dogmática y en historia católicas oficiales", ponga esto como una razón para no ser católico cuando ninguno de sus argumentos demuestra lo que pretende: que la Iglesia erró en su pronunciamiento infalible del dogma de la Asunción.
Sus argumentos, en realidad, se reducen a dos:
1) La ausencia de testimonio patrístico temprano.
2) La mujer de Apocalipsis, por una serie de razones, es la Iglesia. Por tanto, no es María.
El argumento 1), por principio, es irrelevante. Porque no es una condición sine qua non que para considerar una doctrina como parte del Depósito de la Fe el que se encuentre en testimonios de los primeros Padres de la Iglesia.
El argumento 2) claramente es superfluo. No es necesaria la larga argumentación que demuestre que la mujer de Apocalipsis 12 es la Iglesia, porque ningún católico en principio niega eso.
Lo que se afirma es que, además de ser la Iglesia, es también María. No es una disputa de interpretaciones en donde tiene que ser una o ser la otra. Sino que perfectamente una y la otra son perfectamente válidas.
Si el objetor quiere rechazar que María sea la mujer de Apocalipsis 12, tiene que demostrar positivamente la imposibilidad de que María lo sea, y no dar una interpretación alternativa que, de hecho, no la invalida y que nadie en ambos lados de la discusión la rechaza.
Además de que es incoherente con lo que él mismo afirma. Porque se queja de que la interpretación patrística "más antigua" de la mujer de Apocalipsis 12 no es María sino la Iglesia; pero pasa por alto que Epifanio de Salamina, que él mismo cita, interpreta a la mujer como María. Lo citó él mismo.
¿Las interpretaciones patrísticas solo sirven cuando le cuando son las "más antiguas" y las siguientes hay que ignorarlas?
Evidentemente, no.
Que se decida en sus criterios: si quiere interpretaciones patrísticas o si quiere la interpretación "más antigua". Si lo primero, entonces debe aceptar el testimonio de Epifanio; si lo segundo, entonces debe sustentar la posición según la cual:
a) Siempre la interpretación más antigua es la única aceptable.
b) La segunda interpretación más antigua no es contemporánea a la primera.
El objetor termina su artículo citando a un católico, el cual "admite": "... todo se reduce a si Roma es infalible o no".
Pero el objetor lo cita como si eso fuera un problema en contra de la Asunción. Cuando, al contrario, garantiza la veracidad del dogma, porque está asegurado con la infalibilidad.
Por ello, si quiere rechazar un dogma como este, debe hacer algo más que alegar los argumentos que alega.
Tema 3: La Misa
Tema 4: El Papado
Episcopado Monárquico
Argumentos:
Objeción 1: La idea de que el oficio de Pedro debía pasar a sucesores no se le ocurrió a nadie en la época apostólica y post-apostólica, y en todo el siglo II está ausente esa idea.
Objeción 2: Según 1 Clemente, en Corinto no hay un episcopado monárquico, la comunidad solo se divide en hombres mayores (presbíteros) y jóvenes; y entre los presbíteros hay líderes (obispos y diáconos) que dirigen el culto; han sido elegidos por el pueblo y la autoridad en última instancia recae en el rebaño.
Objeción 3: El Pastor de Hermas excluye cualquier posibilidad de que en Roma existiese un episcopado monárquico.
Objeción 4: Las listas de obispos son una mera invención. Cuando mucho, existió en un inicio un primus inter pares pero no podemos saber cuándo comenzó el episcopado monárquico.
Objeción 5: No fue hasta el siglo III que el obispo de Roma se creyó sucesor de San Pedro. Los otros ocupantes de sedes apostólicas no se vieron a sí mismos como sucesores personales de los Apóstoles.
Respuesta: El objetor en este artículo solo trata de mostrar que Von Harnack no creía que el primado de Pedro pasara a sus sucesores y que no creía que hubiera en un inicio un episcopado monárquico; en contra de un converso católico que sostenía haber leído a Von Harnack y que había visto en él un apoyo a la doctrina católica.
Sin embargo, el objetor ha enlazado el artículo como link dentro del artículo general donde expone las razones por las cuales él no es católico. Por tanto, responderé los argumentos que él toma de Von Harnack como si estuviera asintiendo y coincidiendo con ellos.
Todo esto queda refutado cuando se considera que existen testimonios del episcopado monárquico.
El primero es el mismo Apocalipsis, que señala que las siete Iglesias de Asia tienen, cada una, un ángel. El ángel no es más que el obispo.
El segundo es Ignacio, que sostiene igualmente el monoepiscopado.
... estando sujetos al obispo y al presbiterio, . . . (Efesios 2)
Yo... he disfrutado de tal comunión con vuestro obispo... ¡cuánto más os considero felices a vosotros, que estáis tan unidos a él como la Iglesia a Jesucristo y como Jesucristo al Padre, para que así todas las cosas concuerden en la unidad!... Tengamos cuidado, pues, de no ponernos en contra del obispo, a fin de estar sujetos a Dios. (Ef 5)
Cuanto más se ve al obispo callar, tanto más se le debe reverenciar. Porque a todo aquel a quien el dueño de casa envía para que esté al frente de su casa, debemos recibirlo como a Aquel que lo envió ( Mt 24,45 ). Es evidente, por tanto, que debemos considerar al obispo como al Señor mismo (Ef 6).
...estén unidos a su obispo, . . . (Mag, 6)
... ni hacer nada sin el obispo y los presbíteros. (Mag, 7)
... Policarpo, obispo de Esmirna. (Mag, 15)
Polibio, vuestro obispo... (Trall, 1)
Por tanto, como hijos de la luz y de la verdad, huid de las divisiones y de las malas doctrinas; antes bien, donde está el pastor, seguidlo como ovejas. (Fil. 2)
Porque todos los que son de Dios y de Jesucristo están también con el obispo. (Fil. 3)
No hacer nada sin el obispo; . . . (Fil. 7)
A todos los que se arrepienten, el Señor concede el perdón, si se vuelven en penitencia a la unidad de Dios y a la comunión con el obispo... (Fil. 8)
Nadie haga nada relacionado con la Iglesia sin el obispo. Se considerará eucaristía propia la que sea administrada por el obispo o por aquel a quien él le haya confiado. Dondequiera que aparezca el obispo, allí esté también la multitud; así como donde está Jesucristo, allí está la Iglesia católica. No es lícito sin el obispo ni bautizar ni celebrar ágapes; pero todo lo que él apruebe, eso también agrada a Dios, de modo que todo lo que se haga sea seguro y válido. (Smyr, 8)
Es bueno reverenciar tanto a Dios como al obispo. Quien honra al obispo ha sido honrado por Dios; quien hace algo sin el conocimiento del obispo, en realidad sirve al diablo. (Smyr, 9)
Ignacio, también llamado Teóforo, a Policarpo, obispo de la Iglesia de Esmirna, o mejor dicho, que tiene como obispo propio a Dios Padre y al Señor Jesucristo: . . . (Poli, Saludo)
... vuestro obispo preside en el lugar de Dios, y vuestros presbíteros en el lugar de la asamblea de los apóstoles, . . . (Mag, 6)
... reverencia... al obispo como a Jesucristo, que es el Hijo del Padre, y a los presbíteros como al sanedrín de Dios y a la asamblea de los apóstoles. (Trall, 3)
... corresponde a cada uno de vosotros, y especialmente a los presbíteros, animar al obispo, para honra del Padre, de Jesucristo y de los apóstoles. (Trall, 12)
La enseñanza del monoepiscopado en Ignacio es tan clara que los presbiterianos han querido atacar la autenticidad de las cartas. Y parece una locura querer tratar el tema del monoepiscopado ignorando completamente el testimonio de Ignacio, como hizo el objetor.
El siguiente testimonio es el de Policarpo, de quien se acepta que fue obispo.
Policarpo... habiendo sido en nuestros tiempos un maestro apostólico y profético, y obispo de la Iglesia Católica que está en Esmirna. ( Martirio de Policarpo , 16 ; se cree generalmente que la fecha de la muerte de Policarpo está entre 156 y 167; la carta fue escrita por la iglesia de Esmirna por testigos oculares del espantoso martirio de Policarpo)
Justino, igualmente, habla del "presidente" en el culto.
Hegesipo, otro testimonio, él mismo obispo, testifica haber estado en Roma hasta tiempos del obispo Aniceto, y dice que Corinto tenía obispo, lo mismo que Jerusalén. Como lo cita Eusebio:
Hegesipo, en los cinco libros de Memorias que nos han llegado, ha dejado un registro muy completo de sus propias opiniones. En ellos afirma que en un viaje a Roma se encontró con muchos obispos y que recibió la misma doctrina de todos. Es apropiado escuchar lo que dice después de hacer algunas observaciones sobre la epístola de Clemente a los corintios. Sus palabras son las siguientes: “Y la iglesia de Corinto permaneció en la verdadera fe hasta que Primo fue obispo en Corinto. Conversé con ellos en mi camino a Roma y permanecí con los corintios muchos días, durante los cuales nos renovamos mutuamente en la verdadera doctrina. Y cuando llegué a Roma, permanecí allí hasta Aniceto, cuyo diácono era Eleuterio. Y Aniceto fue sucedido por Sótero, y él por Eleuterio. En toda sucesión, y en toda ciudad que se mantiene donde se predica la ley y los profetas y el Señor”. El mismo autor describe también los comienzos de las herejías que surgieron en su tiempo, con las siguientes palabras: “Y después de que Santiago el Justo hubiera sufrido el martirio, como también el Señor por la misma causa, Simeón, el hijo del tío del Señor, Clopas, fue nombrado como el siguiente obispo. Todos lo propusieron como segundo obispo porque era primo del Señor. ( EH , IV, 22, 1-4 )
El siguiente es el testimonio de Ireneo, que es tan conocido que no necesita ser expuesto.
Objeción 1: No es más que una falacia de argumento del silencio. La ausencia de la presencia de la idea de que el oficio de Pedro pasara a sus sucesores se explica simplemente por la escases de fuentes. Excepto 1 Clemente, no tenemos ningún documento de la Iglesia de Roma del periodo. Pero igualmente, ya vimos que el episcopado monárquico estaba presente en aquel tiempo, así que no es atrevido asumir que, habiendo un obispo de Roma y San Pedro muriendo allí, el obispo de Roma se considerara como sucesor de Pedro.
Además de que es falsa la última parte de la objeción, pues Ireneo de Lyon precisamente señala que los obispos de Roma fueron establecidos por Pedro y Pablo.
Objeción 2:
Objeción 3: Irrelevante lo que diga Hermas, porque como informa el Canon Muratori, fue escrito en tiempos en que Roma tenía un obispo:
"El Pastor , además, lo escribió Hermas muy recientemente en nuestros tiempos en la ciudad de Roma, mientras su hermano el obispo Pío se sentaba en la silla de la Iglesia de Roma".
O sea, el Pastor de Hermas se escribió circa 150.
Y además del testimonio del Canon Muratori, está el de Hegesipo, que dice que permaneció en Roma "hasta tiempos de Aniceto", o sea, hasta tiempos del sucesor de Pío. Por lo cual, Hegesipo asume que Pío tuvo antecesores en el episcopado, y que llegó a Roma en tiempos de estos.
Objeción 4: Lo que se afirma sin pruebas, se rechaza sin pruebas.
El objetor no puede ser inconstante. Porque en el inicio rechazó la veneración de imágenes o la asunción de María simplemente porque no aparecían en los primeros Padres. Y sin embargo, lo que sí aparece en los primeros Padres igualmente lo rechaza gratuitamente o directamente lo ignora.
Didaché, Bernabé, 1 Clemente, Ignacio, Papías, Policarpo, Justino, Taciano, Hermas, C. Muratori, Ireneo
Tema 5: Teología
Tema 6: Dios Creador
martes, 3 de septiembre de 2024
La tolerancia hoy y en la cristiandad medieval (o cómo la cristiandad medieval lo hizo bien)
Toleration is hailed in today’s world as an important, even the most important, political ideal. We say that we should tolerate each other’s opinions and values and not seek to impose our own by force on those who disagree with us. Such an ideal of toleration is not adopted everywhere. Toleration of different religions does not exist in some countries (as Saudi Arabia) and toleration of different political views does not exist in others (as North Korea and Myanmar). Indeed no country even in the First World is universally tolerant. All countries are convinced that some differences are intolerable, such as racism and sexism and anti-Semitism. One might say there is no paradox here. Such things are instances of intolerance, and there cannot be a society of toleration if intolerance is one of the things tolerated. All differences are to be tolerated save those that do not tolerate difference. There is no professedly tolerant society which does not have extensive security, intelligence, and spying networks to seek out such people and jail or expel them. The same sentiments that motivated the rooting out of communist subversives from liberal democracies in the years following WWII have lain behind more recent attempts to root out Islamic subversives, whose spectacular destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City still benumbs the mind. Let us change countries and centuries and turn to Spain at the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. If their Catholic Majesties, along with the political and ecclesiastical 3 hierarchies, believed, and had good reason for believing, that the Talmudic Jews1 in Spain were political and religious subversives, was the expulsion of them in 1492 a legitimate exception to the principle of toleration, as the uprooting of communist and Islamic subversives is believed by us to be such an exception? The answer to this question is taken to be an obvious no. According to modern liberal theorists, Ferdinand’s and Isabella’s Spain was not a liberal democracy but a Catholic ‘theocracy’ and theocracies, so called, are not legitimate forms of government.2 The reason we are given that such governments are not legitimate is that people have rights to live their own lives as they wish and should always be allowed to live as they wish provided they allow others the same rights. Liberal democracies allow people these rights but theocracies do not. Therefore liberal democracies are permitted to uproot subversives but theocracies are not. The problem is not that theocracies are intolerant of subversives, for liberal democracies are intolerant in the same way. The problem is that theocracies are illegitimate and have no right to do what is necessary to protect themselves. Legitimacy means toleration and toleration means allowing people to live as they wish provided they allow others to do the same, that is, it means tolerating all those who believe and practice the principles of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy alone is legitimate because it alone is tolerant; and it alone is tolerant because it alone is liberal democracy. The argumentation is viciously circular. If we are to get anywhere in understanding the good and bad of toleration we need to start somewhere else.
Definition and Kinds of Toleration We speak of the tolerance not only of people but also of material things like bodies and bridges. The tolerance of a bridge is how much weight it can carry without collapsing, and the tolerance of the body is how much of a certain substance it can absorb without illness or death. Tolerance in this sense is not wholly different from the tolerating of other people that is meant by political toleration, for we tolerate that in political life which we are able or willing to bear with. Toleration means how much difference of opinion or behavior a community or individuals are able or willing to bear before the community collapses or the individuals forcefully resist. Toleration in its most general sense is a capacity to bear things, and the capacity to bear something is the capacity not to be adversely affected by that thing (as a bridge that bears a weight or a society that bears differences). Hence tolerance might be defined as a capacity not to be affected by another, and political toleration as a community’s capacity not to be affected by that which is other, whether in opinion or behavior. Toleration is a capacity both of nature and of choice. A community is both a definite thing with definite features and something determined by the choice of those who compose it. A community’s natural capacity of toleration is what it can in fact tolerate without being corrupted or destroyed. A community’s voluntary capacity of toleration is 5 what it chooses to tolerate whether or not what it chooses to tolerate is something the community has the natural capacity to tolerate. Toleration as a public policy is a community’s voluntary capacity of toleration (a community’s natural capacity of toleration is determined by the community’s nature and not by the choice of its rulers). Choice is of the good but when mistaken or perverse it is of the bad. Choice and action in the case of toleration are also of someone and by someone and about something, for they are someone’s tolerating of someone about something said or done. Further, they are for some reason or end and at some time and place and in some way or manner and for some duration. Of these differences the most important are the ‘by whom’, the ‘of whom’, the ‘about what’, and the ‘why’, for these constitute the substance of the choice and action. The others constitute the circumstances. The why is more determinative than the by or of whom or the about what, for it is in view of the why that one decides who is to be tolerated and by whom and in respect of what. The why itself is the good or some part of it or the opposite. Good tolerations will be those that tolerate for the sake of the good and the bad tolerations those that tolerate for the sake of the bad. Conversely, good intolerances will be those that are intolerant for the sake of the good and bad ones those that are so for the sake of the bad. Those who do the tolerating, the by whom, are the rulers or the ruled, and those who are tolerated are also rulers or ruled but contrariwise (rulers are ruled insofar as they are subject to the rules they make). The about what will be either words or actions or both (and thought and character too, insofar as thought and character issue in words and actions). The kinds of toleration based on these differences are many but it would be tedious to list them. Sufficient to notice the principles of the division.
Toleration and the Common Good The ‘why’ is the chief determining factor in the kinds of toleration and distinguishes toleration into good and bad. So the first thing to consider is the why of toleration or the end toleration must serve. This end must be the end that the community proposes to itself as the object of pursuit. The proper end of community is the common good. Rulers who pursue their private good (their own power or fame or wealth) at the expense of the common good (the welfare of the people as a whole) are corrupting community and reducing it to tyranny (the classic definition of tyranny, going back to Aristotle and beyond, is precisely that the rulers pursue their private good and not the common good). The common good of community may be understood in two main ways, either substantively as the good itself that is worth pursuing, or instrumentally as the necessary means for such pursuit. Modern liberal doctrines take the instrumental way of understanding the common good and take toleration to be relative to such understanding. They rely for their justification on the view that the good is individual to each and known only to each and hence that it cannot be up to the rulers of the community or anyone else but only the individual to decide what it is. The problem here is the dogmatic character of the assertion that the good is individual to each and to be decided by each. The dogmatism is self-refuting. It amounts to an imposition of what each is free to decide about the good, since it denies that any may decide, at least as a matter of public policy, that the good is the same for all. 7 Liberalism defends itself on the historical grounds of the wars and oppression and other violence that always result when rule is imposed by force and toleration is refused. The wars referred to are the European wars of religion. But these wars only support the liberal thesis if interpreted to support it. There are other and better ways to interpret these wars which do not support the liberal thesis.3 Besides liberalism imposes liberal rule and the liberal principle of toleration on those who oppose both. Therefore liberalism, by its own argument, must produce oppression and wars and violence. And it does. The wars of the twentieth century, which were fought by secular liberals against secular illiberals and were the bloodiest and most destructive in all of recorded history, had nothing to do with religion and, if the calls of religious leaders had been followed (notably Benedict XV and Pius XII), would not have taken place. Liberalism lacks rational foundation. Toleration cannot be defended on its ground of the instrumental common good. The substantive common good alone furnishes a legitimate end for toleration and for distinguishing good toleration from bad. The substantive common good is that fullness or completeness of life of which man is capable. The good of anything is the completion of its being. All men have the same good because they have the same being. But they have the same being only specifically and not individually. One should not expect all men to do the same things or to be complete in doing the same things. But one can expect them to do things after the same manner and to be complete in doing them after the same manner, that is to say, after the human manner. By the human manner is meant the rational manner, for man is par excellence the rational or reasoning animal. Whether one is a soldier or a lawyer, one is perfect as a soldier or a lawyer if one does each of these things well, that is, in the way which accords with rational judgment. He is best as a soldier who does what befits a soldier when and how and where it befits a soldier, and what is befitting a soldier is judged by reason. The most important factor after the ‘why’ is the ‘what’. The what is words and deeds. Thoughts will only be included insofar as these cause and are manifest in words and deeds (things not manifest or that cause nothing manifest escape human control). All those thoughts and words will be tolerated that belong to the common good. All those which oppose it will constitute the range of candidates for not being tolerated. Which of these candidates should not in fact be tolerated will vary. In a simply just society, none of them will be tolerated, but the use of force will not be required because no citizen will want to do or say them (education in justice will teach them otherwise). All citizens will judge them to be bad and to be avoided. Only in less than simply just societies, where not everyone is just, will there be need for use of force.
Religious Toleration So much for the theory. It needs to be illustrated and religion is the best example for the purpose. An assumption must first be made, that religion is a matter of truth or falsehood. If this assumption is not made religions and the differences between them do not rise above differences in tastes, and it would be absurd to talk about the toleration of tastes qua tastes or to make them an object of public policy. The discussions of religious 9 toleration typical in liberal democracies do not begin to be serious because the assumption is made, at least for political purposes, that religion is not a matter of truth or falsehood.4 The liberal position on religious toleration is incoherent. No serious debate about the question can be had on the assumption it adopts. If the assumption has to be made that religion is a matter of truth or falsehood, and if, further, religion turns out to be false, it should, if possible, be got rid of – unless it is trivial or has some incidental advantage, as easier control of the people and more effective suppression of crime. In this case one might suppose that religion should not just be publicly tolerated but publicly promoted, and that all religions popular among the people should be thus promoted which have the same incidental advantage. A policy of this sort was adopted in the ancient world. In the medieval world it was also adopted but with a difference. Religion was held at that time not only to be practically beneficial but also theoretically true, whereas in the ancient world it had often been held to be practically beneficial but theoretically false. The ancient world only faced a serious question of religious toleration when a religion arose that was popular, had the incidental advantages just mentioned, and claimed to be simply true and the others wholly or largely false. The rulers did not know what to do with a popular religion that made truth, a truth rationally defensible before learned men, its distinctive badge. Other popular religions, being intellectually bankrupt, could not do the same. The rulers took the easy way out: let nothing disturb the status quo and let the new religion be suppressed. They failed. The new religion conquered not just the masses but the rulers and the intellectuals too. It won without force of arms and the other religions lost despite force of arms.
The success of the new religion created a new world in which religion was on all hands acknowledged to be a matter of truth and not just of utility. Settling for utility at the expense of truth, as the ancient world had done, was never a happy compromise: the human mind wants truth as much as the human heart wants goodness. Only in a world like that of Medieval Christendom could a serious question of religious toleration arise. What to do about false religions, even and especially useful ones? A false religion can have no rights of principle against a true one. A society that accepts the true religion must have a right to resist or marginalize other and opposed religions. It would have no obligation to tolerate them. Such policy would be imposed on it by the common good, which is the measure of correct toleration. Obedience to the true religion must be part of the common good if not indeed the most important part. A standard response to this conclusion is that even if religion is a known and public truth (and not, say, a matter for merely private judgment) the use of force to impose assent is not justified. The truth should be allowed to operate and persuade by its own conviction. One can rationally assent only to what one recognizes by one’s own mind to be true. A forced verbal assent would never be more than external and insincere.5 The answer to the objection is that there are many sorts of truths and the mental grasp of them does not happen in the same way nor is it subject to the same impediments. The proper organ of truth is the mind and if the truth is evident the mind naturally embraces it. Instruction and reasoning are the means for making truth evident. But some truths, even if they can be made evident to the mind, may be opposed by one’s desires. Moral truths are especially liable to this opposition. Desires can impede the intellect and blind it to evident truth, even truth accessible to unaided human reason. They can also be an impediment to truth not accessible to unaided human reason but known only by divine revelation. Truth by revelation has to be accepted, if it is accepted, not because its truth is seen from within (as when, say, we see the truth of some mathematical proof), but because it is guaranteed by divine authority. Acceptance of truth on authority is something we do all the time, as in medicine where we trust the authority of doctors, or in schools where we trust the authority of teachers. In these cases the truth that we do not know ourselves but accept from others is a truth we could come to know ourselves if we went through the right training. In the case of divinely revealed truth we can, ex hypothesi, never know it directly for ourselves (at least not in this life) but only on authority. The name we give to acceptance of truth on authority is faith. Faith is of truth; it is knowledge; it is knowledge derived from authority; it is rational. These features are present in the case of putting faith in what a doctor tells us about our health. What we know in this way is truth (it is truth about our health); it is knowledge (it is a coming to have what the doctor has, which is knowledge); it is based on authority (it is based on the authority of the doctor); it is rational (it is rational to accept the authority of one’s doctor). Such knowledge is indirect. It goes to the truth through another. But it is knowledge. The difference is between knowing, say, that water is H20 because a chemist has told us and knowing that water is H20 because we have ourselves performed the experiments that prove it. The first is knowledge by faith and the second is knowledge direct. Knowledge by faith, while it exists in the mind, is attained by act of will. We must choose to trust our doctor or the chemist, and only because we do so do we have knowledge about our health or about the chemical composition of water. The choice must 12 be rational in that it must be based on adequate evidence. The evidence will not be about the fact known (we would not then need to trust anyone to know it); it will be about the trustworthiness of the authority. We are rational in trusting our doctor because we have evidence that, say, he went through the right training, that he is licensed by known medical authority, that he is acknowledged as an expert by other doctors who went through the right training and are licensed by the same authority, that what he told us about our health before turned out correct (we were cured of this or that ailment by following his instructions), that he is not a liar, that he has an upstanding character, and the like. Such faith is rational but it is also an act of choice. The evidence, because it is about the trustworthiness of the authority and not about the things the authority says, does not convince the mind of the truth of these things but only of their trustworthiness. To believe their truth the mind must be moved to do so by an act of trust. But an act of trust is an act of will. We can, if we like, refuse to believe the doctor or the chemist however convincing the evidence of their trustworthiness may be. We cannot, by contrast, refuse to believe that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles once we have seen the proof, though we can contradict it in words if we like, for speech is an act of will. Where acts of belief dependent on acts of will are involved coercion can be legitimate – not to force the act of will (an act of will cannot be forced) but to facilitate it by the suppression of opposing irrational desires and opposing irrational contradictions. The force is used to facilitate the act of trust, not to prove its rationality (which is done instead by the evidence). That there is such force with respect to belief and that it is legitimate is 13 ignored by liberal doctrines of tolerance even though they have to rely on something like it to justify their own coercive acts of self-protection. Use of force with respect to belief presupposes legitimate authority and sufficient evidence for trusting it. In the case of divinely revealed truths there will be need of sufficient evidence that the source of the revelation is divine. The source must be God himself, speaking either directly or through instruments whose divine origin and sanction are publicly manifest. Any religion claiming to be divine whose divinity is not publicly manifest can be dismissed on these grounds alone. We must assume that God is at least as rational as we are and that if he wanted to reveal something which he also wanted everyone to believe he would reveal it in such a way that everyone could see that it came from him. No written document could thus constitute evidence of divine authority. A written document needs authentication and interpretation. The Bible is neither selfauthenticating nor self-interpreting. It must get its authentication and its interpretation from some other source. That source must be public if the authentication and interpretation are to be public. The source must be living and visible if the religion is to retain its authority for all the generations that successively come and go. It must be possessed of an authoritative teaching authoritatively proclaimed, and it must be open to the view and examination of all if it is to proclaim, by its authority, a teaching accessible and necessary to all. There is only one candidate that could plausibly answer to this description: the Catholic Church. If the Church is not the public divine authority, nothing in our world is. These elementary considerations are sufficient by themselves to rule out as inauthentic all Protestant churches and so to rule out as illegitimate all attempts by 14 Protestant churches to impose their teaching as revealed truth. What goes for Protestantism, which relies on the Bible, goes also for Islam, which relies on the Koran and its associated documents (the Sharia and the Hadith). The Koran is a document and in need, like the Bible, of authentication and interpretation.6 To the extent that Islam relies on the Koran for its promulgation and imposition of religious belief and its suppression of religious difference it is inauthentic and contrary to reason. Judaism is differently placed. It does not rely on a book but on a tradition of teaching and interpretation handed on in the Talmud (and also the Kabbalah, the Zohar, and the like), and practiced by the rabbis. Yet that tradition, like Protestantism and Islam, has no publicly known and acknowledged authority of interpretation. The Talmud and its associated documents also lack divine sanction, having neither Moses nor the prophets for author. Judaism also claims to have divine authority only for Jews. It fails to meet the conditions of reason for being a divine revelation authoritative for all men. The Catholic Church, to be divinely authoritative, must be publicly manifest as such. A divine authority whose divinity is not manifest cannot rationally be accepted as divine. How then is the divinity of the Church manifest? The first fact is its simple existence as a public body claiming and exercising divine authority and claiming to do so with infallibility. It would be absurd for a divine authority to be capable of mistake, else what it said could never be trusted as being true. Only a Church that made claim to infallibility could even in principle be divine. The second fact is miracles and prophecies and exorcisms of demons and the sanctity or the luminous goodness of individual believers and practitioners within the Church. The existence of all these things and the records of witnesses of them are publicly available for examination. All that is left for any who doubt or deny them is to take the Church at its word and examine the records for themselves. Where there is authentication by eyewitnesses there is no rational ground for rejecting the evidence: if it is irrational to believe without sufficient evidence it is no less irrational not to believe with sufficient evidence. There are other facts making the divinity of the Church manifest, as the evidence of history and its attestation to the continuing existence of the Church over long centuries always saying and doing the same things (ancient churches and cathedrals are more manifest here than written records). There is also the learning and teaching of the Church and its promulgation of doctrines which, though not repugnant to human reason, are inexplicable as discoveries of human reason. The Trinity and the Incarnation of the Second Person thereof are such doctrines (Islam and Judaism have no such doctrines; indeed they expressly repudiate them). An obvious response to these facts is that miracles and exorcisms and prophecies and saints and the like exist outside the boundaries of the Church in other religions. If these things prove the divinity of the Church they must prove the divinity of these other religions. The response is correct but insufficient. That other religions contain holiness and miracles and prophecies shows they must in some way be divine. It does not show that they have public divine authority. It is one thing that the divinity of something be manifest; it is another thing that that divine thing have public authority to speak and rule in the name of the divine. That only the Church could have such authority is evident 16 because, as shown above, only the Church makes the claims and does the things that are rationally required of such authority. If its divinity is publicly manifest, its authority to speak in the name of the divine is publicly manifest at the same time. If the divinity of some other thing is publicly manifest, its authority to speak in the divine name will not be manifest. For either it does not claim such authority (as Buddhism and Hinduism do not), or it does not make a rational claim to such authority (as Protestantism and Islam and Judaism do not). So much establishes that the Church makes a rational claim to divine authority and that a choice to accept the Church and what it says is rational and generates knowledge in the same way as acceptance of what a doctor says about health, or a chemist about water. The Church alone has right, divine right, to speak and rule with authority in matters of religion. If a whole society or nation accepts the authority of the Church, it would have a right and duty to follow the Church where matters of religion were concerned. The duty would arise, as do all political duties, from the common good. Toleration would be measured in the same way, and the secular or political authorities would have the duty, and the right, not to tolerate attacks on the Church or open disobedience to it. All those who had chosen, even if irrationally, not to accept the authority of the Church would not be subject to the Church. They would be free to pursue their own life but only in obedience to the political authority. They could rightly be prevented by the political authority, and with force if necessary, from trying to attack or destroy the Church. A situation more or less along these lines is what existed in Medieval Christendom. The political organization of Medieval Christendom and its understanding 17 and practice of what was to be tolerated and what was not to be tolerated was in principle right. Mistakes and excesses occurred but the principle itself was rationally unimpeachable. The same cannot be said of Protestant or Islamic countries or of modern Israel, which have no rational claim to divine authority. Ferdinand’s and Isabella’s Spain, by contrast, did have such a claim. The modern world has declined from the moral and religious heights of Medieval Christendom. Attacks on the Church and its teaching can no longer be repulsed by force because societies and nations have grown old and sickly and are no longer capable of so much goodness. We must settle for something less. The less is freedom for the Church to operate and perform its functions, though without special protection and defense from the state. The Church will survive without the state but liberal democracy may not survive without the Church. Indifferentism and skepticism about truth, or organized hostility thereto, along with unrestrained yielding to the imperious demands of passion, as they spell the collapse of the human spirit, so they spell the collapse of the decent communal life which that spirit supports and in which it flourishes. There are times when societies and nations reach points beyond which little or nothing can be done to preserve them from further decay and death. We may hope for something better. We cannot guarantee it.